It had been Tilly's original intention to operate defensively behind the Elster and Saale after taking Leipsig and await the arrival of reinforcements, butatthistimehe began to have command and control problems. Pappenheim and several of the younger subordinants argued for an offensive to quash the Protestants spirit. All urged Tilly on for what they considered an easy victory. Tilly had already dug in the hills at Eintritsch, and was content to sit and await a further strengthening of his position, but against his better judgement he gave in to Pappenheim and his followers and moved out of his defensive positions to offer battle above Leipsig.

Because Tilly didn't have absolute command of the Army he abandoned his entrenchments and ignored the chance to meet the Swedish Army as it tried to cross the Loberbach, but instead chose to meet it on the level plane before Breitenfeld. Tilly had the sun and wind at his back, a feature much to his advantage.

Although Tilly had thrown away two more favorable positions, he still felt confident. His army numbered many men who had followed him for years and knew that he had never lost a battle. After a half-hearted attempt by some of Pappenheim's cavalry to hinder the crossing of the Loberbach, both sides were content to form battle lines facing each other. Facing the splendid veterans of Tilly were the splendidly dressed Saxon formations, who had yet to be tested in battle, and the rough Swedish line, actually one of the most experienced armies in Europe, but of unknown ability to most Continentals.

As soon as the Swedish and Saxon line came in range the Imperialist artillery opened fire. The Saxon and Swedish artillery returned the fire, and the Swedish guns were able to repay the Imperialist artillery three shots for one. The two armies thus faced each other and exchanged artillery fire for two and a half hours with the Imperialists steadily getting the worse of it due to the superior number, rate of fire, and handling of the Swedish guns.

At this time Tilly's command and control system broke down again. Pappenheim had been growing restless under the constant galling artillery fire. He gathered his 5,000 cuirassiers and thundered off on a wide wheeling movement in an attempt to bring them against Baner's flank on the right of the Swedish fine. Now, despite the loss of control in the Imperialist camp this action would almost surely have been very damaging to a normal army of that day; but, it was the first modern fire and movement army.

Baner easily shifted fronts so that when Pappenheim completed his wheel he found himself still facing the front of the Swedish line. Worse still, the Swedish didn't have to break their line to do this while Pappenheim had fatally disjointed the Imperialist line. Now it must be remembered that the cavalry of the time did not charge home with cold steel (except for the Swedish) but instead charged up to 10 or so paces from their opponent and then discharged pistols in their face.

Against Gustavus's agile and rapid-firing infantry Pappenheim's Cuirassiers could make no headway. Seven times Pappenheim led the best cavalry division on the Continent into the hail of fire. Seven times the Swedish line held and the cuirassiers retreated. Tilly sent the Elite Holstein Infantry Regiment to Pappenheim's aid. They were cut to pieces, and their leader fell at the head of his men. When Baner launched the Swedish cavalry in a counter attack after Pappenheim's seventh charge the Imperialists broke and ran from the field.

Meanwhile on the other flank Tilly sent Furstenburg and Isolani's cavalry against the Saxons when he saw that Pappenheim had started the battle without orders. On first contact with the Imperialists the Saxons broke and ran off the field in a blind rout led by their leader, John George. Furstenburg partially compensated for this by leading all his cavalry off the field in pursuit.

Tilly, who had had no control over the battle so far, saw in the rout of the Saxons his chance to take control of the battle for the first time and began sidestepping his ponderous battles to envelop the Swedish left wing. Alas, for poor Tilly, the battle he didn't want to fight at the place he hadn't wanted and which he had never had control of was about to turn further against him. Horn, in command of the Swedish left, was alive to the danger of Tilly's flanking movement. He quickly shifted his more agile troops to take Tilly's ponderous battles in the flank by shifting units from his second line. While Tilly's ponderous battles were being out-maneuvered by Horn's agile Swedes, Gustavus was collecting Baner's right wing cavalry and leading it in a charge which captured the Imperialist guns and turned the Imperialist left flank.

The Imperialists now found themselves cut off from Leipsig, and under fire from the front and ends of their line. They were under fire from not only the Swedish guns and their own which had been captured, but also from the Saxons guns which the Swedish had captured and the Swedish reserve artillery.

For a time the fighting flared seriously along the Duben road as Tilly's proud veterans tried to break through. Despite the hopelessness of their situation Tilly's battles stuck manfully to their task until early nightfall when the stampede began and Tilly's once proud army melted into bands of fugitives.

Breitenfeld was the first great battle of the modern era. The Swedish were heavily outnumbered by the Imperialists (not counting the Saxons who didn't count for much anyway). A modern army based on fire and mobility had met a larger traditional army based on mass and inertia. The modern army had won.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1 . "Weapons and Tactics, Hastings to Berlin" By Jac. Weller, C. 1966 St. Martin's Press
2. "Gustavus Adolphus" By Theodore Ayrault Dodge, C. 1895 Boston: Houghton Miffin
3. "Gustavus Adolphus" By C. R. L. Fletcher, C. 1892 London
4. "Gustavus Adolphus and the Thirty Years War" By C. R. L. Fletcher, C. 1963 Capricorn Books N. Y.
5. "Gustavus Adolphus and the Struggle of Protestantism for Existance" By C. R. L. Fletcher, C. 1890 G. P. Putnam's Sons N. Y.
6. "History of Gustavus Adolphus" By John L. Stevens, C. 1885 Richard Bentley and Son, London
7. "Gustavus Adolphus The Lion of the North" By Lt.-Gen. Sir George MacMunn C. 1931
8. "War Through the Ages" By Lynn Montross, C. 1946 Haper & Brothers Publishing N. Y.
9. "Outlines of the World's Military History" By W. A. Mitchell Military Services Publishing Co.
10. "The Thirty Years War" By C. V. Wedgwood, C. 1939 New Haven Yale University Press

The Battle Of Breitenfeld

Chief Actors in the 30 Years War
Organizing the Armies
The Battle: September 17, 1631