This article concerns itself with setting forth a workable British strategy for the campaign version of Avalon Hill's 1776 game. It is a strategy markedly different from the historical British attempts to favorably resolve the hostilities and one that is different from the most common game strategies as well.

The British began the actual war, of course, with operations at Boston. For the next three years they occupied themselves primarily with the northern colonies, taking New York, Philadelphia, and Newport, along with other points in the Middle and New England areas. But when they tried to extend their control over the inland areas, such as Burgoyne's campaign against Albany, the British became bogged down and suffered defeats. Subsequent French entry resulted in a shift of emphasis to the southern colonies, mainly to be nearer to the West Indes fighting, but also to try the Americans in a different area. The outcome of this strategy has been apparent for the past two hundred years.

In a surprisingly similar fashion, most 7 776 game strategies involve a fairly faithful repetition of original British strategy. Most British players consider the capture of New York to be an absolute. necessity, along with a large scale commitment of forces to the New England and Middle States areas. There is the invariable attempt at a decisive battle, which the American commander usually succeeds in putting off until the French intervention which neutralizes British seapower and almost always re-opens key rear areas. From this point onward time is definitely not on the side of the British, as their army cannot hope to indefinitely battle a Continental Army that has practically infinite replacement capacity. Any games that go beyond 1778 almost always result in American victories.

Probably the main reason for the British preoccupation with the northern area is the lure of a knockout blow. New England, with its high Rebel replacement values and concentrated strategic points is an inviting target for just such a blow. Combined with the fact that the British start in Boston is the ease of a British buildup in this area at the outset of the war. It is usually not too difficult for the British to muscle through New England and neutralize an entire area early in the game.

But the problem then becomes what to do next? Capture of New England necessitates a campaign into the adjacent Middle States probably the most difficult of all areas of control. New York and Philadelphia are plums ripe for British picking, but overland campaigns will encounter rough terrain and large numbers of Rebels fighting delaying actions. Assembling a force large enough to capture and hold all of the Middle States strategic points usually leaves parts of New England, particularly Norwich and Springfield, open to Rebel advances. In this type of game the British player will find himself defeated by irreplaceable casualties and the certainty of French intervention. Clearly this situation requires the British player to attempt alternate solutions.

General Strategy

The prospects facing the British Commander at the start of the year 1775 should not be considered bright at all. He must accomplish the complete take-over and constant garrisoning of a vast area against a hostile army over a difficult terrain. A wrong move that results in a significant loss of troops could prove fatal to the entire effort. The British must be massed to win battles but spread out to control territory; a situation that creates a lot of openings for an enterprising American Commander.

Uppermost in the mind of the British Commander should be singleness of purpose. A basic strategic decision as to which area will receive initial commitment needs to be made. A nickel-and-dime strategy of spreading small outposts throughout the colonies is a prescription for disaster, for the Americans will be able to mass at points of British weakness and win battles. A more effective strategy is one that leads to the subduing of entire areas at one time. For only in areas completely controlled by the British does Continental replacement cease. Militia activity is kept down as well, providing a relatively safe area needing only a small garrison to maintain. Once an area is subdued and made safe from attack, then plans can be laid for invasions of adjacent areas until victory is achieved.

It is with these considerations in mind that the Southern Strategy has been formulated. The weakest areas in the colonies are those in the South, due to both small initial dispositions and low reinforcement rates. More decisive is the fact that the bulk of British strength can be deployed there before the Continental Army, based in New England, can respond. The placement of reinforcements and an active fleet gives the British a big edge in mobility during the first year of the war.

Ideally the Middle South can be taken in the summer of 1775, followed by the Deep South in the fall. During the winter the victorious troops can be shifted northward for the 1776 campaign against the Middle States and New England. Once the South has fallen and all guerrilla activity put down it will be very difficult for the Americans to retake, as any efforts in that direction would be against the northward moving British Regulars. Such a confrontation would almost certainly be made on British terms. Another reason the South should be given preliminary consideration is because once a large American army is established there it is very difficult to chase down. Invading there first, before the Americans have had a chance to build up many Continentals, is the best time for an easy victory.

More 1776 Strategy

1776 Strategy: Introduction
1776 Strategy: 1775
1776 Strategy: Winter 1776 and Beyond