With the complete collapse of the Communist Chinese border positions in December of 1951 the first large-scale action in the campaign was to take place at Vinh-Yen On 13 January 1951 twelve of the 96 combat battalions comprising the Viet-Minh Army attacked a small outpost north of Vinh-Yen and drew Vanuxem's Mobile Group (G.M.) number 3 from Hanoi into a counter-attack. Racing to the post's aid, G.M.3 was ambushed and lost almost an entire battalion of casualties. Vanuxem ordered a withdrawal into Vinh- Yen and was soon besieged there. Only by a heavy artillery bombardment was G.M.3 able to withstand the Viet-Minh attacks long enough for G.M.1 to come to its rescue on the 15th. A hill line between the post and Vinh-Yen was taken without opposition on the 16th. But as the sun set at 1700 the entire 308th division with some assistance from the 312th stormed the hills and recaptured the center position, trapping half of G.M.1 on the northernmost hill. This was a rare opportunity in Indochina, the Viet-Minh were in the open, and the French took advantage of it.

The most massive air bombardment of the war was undertaken on the orders of de Lattre, the theatre commander, who had gone to Vinh-Yen to determine the situation. The ensuing napalm attack, which lasted for hours, roasted the VietMinh and cost them almost a battalion in casualties from the bombardment alone. The survivors of G.M.1 who had escaped the trap withdrew into the plain east of Vinh-Yen after the 312th's human wave attack; de Lattre ordered all battalions, save six or seven, from the South airlifted into the Red River Delta area and from these battalions G.M.2 was born. Thrown into battle to protect G.M.1 on the plain and the route into Hanoi, G.M.2 halted the Viet-Minh attack.

The battalion of G.M.1 still besieged on the hill was thought lost when the ambush on G.M.3 (which caused G.M.3 to lose yet another battalion of casualities) afforded it time to escape. Saved from total destruction on the 17th by another napalm bombardment, all three Mobile Groups survived to fight again. The first chance for the French to demonstrate their superior firepower cost the Communists 6,500 men, all but a few KIA.

The second attempt by the Communists to take Hanoi in 1951 was more subtle Shifting the 308th and 312th infantry divisions to the other side of the Red River Delta through 150km of jungle these two divisions were joined by the 316th division for an attack on Mao-Khe in late March. The loss of Mao-Khe to the Communists would have presented the French with an insoluable problem: from Mao-Khe the Viet-Minh could move on Haiphong, the deep water port for the entire Tonkin war theatre or they could cut road number 5, the highway from Hanoi to Haiphong and there were no alternate routes to supply Hanoi.

During this time, between Vinh-Yen and Mao-Khe, de Lattre built the deLattre line which encompassed the entire Red River Delta area. A million cubic yards of concrete were poured to form 2200 pillboxes of varying sizes and shapes in an attempt to cut off Communist infiltration of the Delta. Mao-Khe was one of these pillbox/ outposts, a key outpost at the hinge of the de Lattre line where the line curved from being parallel to the coast to being parallel to the river.

Attack

The attack began in the right of 23/24 March, and two days later Giap's thirty thousand men captured the first line of outposts and threatened the village of Mao-Khe itself. At the mine north of the village an understrength company was besieged by the 316th division. At 0400 the 316th division attacked Mao-Khe mine after their "Volunteers of Death" had breached the outer walls with explosive charges. For hours hand-to-hand combat raged between the French defenders and the Viet-Minh attackers and at dawn the French finally prevailed with the help of an air and naval bombardment.

In the afternoon the 6th colonial parachute battalion attempted to relieve the mine defenders, but failed to reach them. Five hours after the battalion's attack the company fled the mine by going behind the Viet-Mihh positions on the hills to relative safety in the village. At 0200 on the 28th the Viet-Minh stormed the village with seeminqly endless waves of infantry. The defenders, the 6th colonial battalion, the partisans, Sengalese company, and Moroccan company, fought house to house while Frenrh artillery bombarded both French and Communist positions indiscriminately until dawn, when the Communists withdrew. French firepower left the French masters of the battlefield once more.

Giap tried a third time to breach the de Lattre line in May supported by an attack from inside the delta by the 42nd independent regiment, one of three infiltrated into the delta. The de Lattre line was a sieve, and the 64th regiment infiltrated through It to join with the 42nd before the battle began. The 304th, 308th, and 320th divisions attacked, at Ninh-Binh. a key position along the Day River, Phu Ly, a supporting position, and all the posts between Minh- Binh and the sea.

The attack raged at Ninh-Binh from 29 May until 18 June. It began with the attack penetrating into the town of iinh-Binh on the 29th. By the first of June G.M.s 4 and 7, supported by four artillery battalions, an armored group, the 7th parachute battalion (colonial), and a Dinnassaunt arrived as reinforcements. Yen Cu Ha, the position defending the approaches to Ninh-Binh changed hands several times at the battle's climax on 4 June. Two weeks later the Communists withdrew across the Day River to end the battle.

The French had held, but the Communists were now masters of the battlefield they could pick the time that any action would start and last. With the French reserves at Ninh-Binh the 312th division thrust into the Tai Highlands, but the attack was weak and at Nghia-Lo. it was halted by the airdropping of three battalions.

More Tonkin War 1950-1954

Opening Involvement
The Battle for Hanoi January-June 1951
Hoa-Binh (Nov 1951 - Feb 1952) to Operation Lorraine (Oct-Nov 1952)
Dien Bien Phu