Marathon

September, 490 BC

by Ernest Mortimer


On the face of it Marathon is a simple battle. It is generally portrayed as a small group of plucky Athenian hoplites (fortified by their belief in democracy) charging and routing a far superior number of rather less enthusiastic (and despotic) Persians. However, this traditional viewpoint has been increasingly questioned from the 1900s with the result that there are some now rather different interpretations of what may have happened on that dusty plain almost 2,500 years ago. Therefore the purpose of this article is to look at some of these ideas on Marathon and give suggestions for how this battle may be wargamed. As a word of warning I will point out that I do not read ancient Greek (having made multiple, mainly dismal, attempts to learn Latin this was never really an option for me!) so the sources I am using are mainly tertiary in nature. As such this article should not be seen as a scholarly contribution to the debate but rather a guide on how this apparently 'simple' battle can provide an interesting evening's wargaming.

BACKGROUND

Darius I became King of Persia (and its empire) in 521 BC. Following his unsuccessful campaign against the Scythians in 516 the lonian Greeks made a bid for independence (499 BC). The lonains sent an embassy to Greece to obtain support. The Athenians, ever optimistic, dispatched an expeditionary force to support the rebels whilst the rather more cautious (and realistic/sensible) Spartans hesitated. Initially the revolt had some success - Sardis was burned (498 BC). The Persians however soon restored the situation, destroying the lonian fleet at Lade (494 BC) and defeating the lonians on land (with regrettably few surviving details), sacking Miletus, the centre of the revolt. With lonia firmly back under control Darius could turn his attention towards Greece. In 492 BC a fleet commanded by Mardonius (Darius' son in law) set off, hugging the northern coastline of Greece as it moved on Athens. Fortunately for the Athenians this fleet was wrecked by storms off Mount Athos. By 490 BC Darius was ready to try again. Perhaps I should point out here that Persia (once she had mobilised) essentially had complete naval superiority (Salamis is still 10 years in the future). For the invasion routes see map.

This time the expeditionary force was commanded by Ataphernes (possibly as 'political' appointment) and Datis (a professional soldier) and took a rather more direct route (which also gave it the opportunity of punishing those Greek island city states which had supported Athens and the lonians en route). Also sailing with the fleet was Hippias, the former tyrant of Athens (expelled in 510 by the Athenians with Spartan support). He could provide the Persian force with valuable local knowledge and perhaps provoke dissension and maybe even a coup in Athens. Possibly he was intended to govern Athens (as a Persian puppet) if the Persians were planned to leave a presence in the city rather than simply burning it.

Despite some resistance, by September the Persians were off the coast of Attica and they landed at Marathon, some 19 miles north of the city. Meanwhile the Athenians had sent Pheidippides to Sparta to request support where he was told that although the Spartans were sympathetic they could not march until the full moon. Initially Athens would have to face the Persians on her own.

The choice of Marathon as a landing site and the subsequent Persian immobility has given rise to some speculation. Why did the Persians not march directly on Athens? Was it timidity? This seems unlikely as the lonian Greeks had been no match for the Persians on land & Eritria (en route) had fallen in 7 days. Were the Persians awaiting further reinforcements (perhaps forces they had left behind on their route to mop up any lingering Greek resistance)? Were they waiting for the supporters of Hippias in Athens to stage a coup (the fall of Eritria had been hastened by treachery)? Was it all part of a 'cunning plan' to lure the Athenians out from behind their walls, so allowing the Persians to defeat them in the open field rather than in a possibly rather bloody storm? Also, with the army lured away the supporters of Hippias would have more chance of staging a coup. There are no readily available answers to these questions (although it's fun to speculate) but the above should be borne in mind when drawing up the players' briefs should you decide to refight Marathon. The treachery idea seems to have been quite popular at the time but one has to ask why did the Persians (who allegedly had men to spare) not pin the Athenian army at Marathon with one part of the army and send the other with the fleet to Athens (either to attack or to encourage treachery). They only seem to have thought of doing this after their defeat at Marathon (and this is disputed).

After landing the Persians camped in the bay whilst the Athenian army (reinforced by a contingent from Platea) watched them (either from the mouth of a valley or from hills overlooking the bay). This standoff lasted several days until one side or another attacked. After a desperate struggle the Persians broke and fled to their ships pursued by the Athenians. Another rather savage melee occurred on the beach but the bulk of the Persian fleet escaped and Athens had won a great victory. From a wargaming point of view this may sound exciting but perhaps not overly interesting. Hopefully, what follows will persuade you otherwise for one of the beauties (for me at least) is that Marathon offers a wide variety of scenario types - you can use it as the basis for almost any type of set piece encounter.

The Armies
The Battlefield & Deployment
The Battle
Wargaming Marathon


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