Sir Arthur Wellesley, in command of a British force numbering some 20,000 men, had agreed to co-operate with the Captain-General of Estremadura, Don Gregorio de la Cuesta and the 35,000 troops under his command, with the objective of defeating the 22,000-strong French army commanded by Marshal Claude Victor, Duc de Belluno. Victor held the line of the Alberche river, which flows into the Tagus about 6 miles to the east of Talavera. He confidently expected the arrival of reinforcements in the form of about 15,000 men, under General Sebastiani, from Toledo and another 12,000 from Madrid, commanded by King Joseph (Napoleon's elder brother) himself.
Victor was unaware that Wellesley and Cuesta (after, it must be said, much bickering and ill-concealed animosity -- mostly on Cuesta's part) had formulated a plan whereby the British would move to outflank the French right, under cover of very hilly, wooded terrain whilst the Spanish would advance eastwards to confront Victor directly. Neither was he aware that Gen. Sir Robert Wilson, with the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, augmented by some Spanish and Portuguese regulars, was manoeuvring to get behind the French position.
What Victor did know (and the Allies did not), was that the recently defeated Marshal Soult had recovered and was about to march to place himself across the line of the British retreat. Further, the Allies believed that the Spanish General Venegas was keeping Sebastiani pinned at Toledo to prevent the possibility of French reinforcements from that quarter. However, far from this being the fact, Venegas had received instructions from the ruling Spanish Juntal to allow Sebastiani to slip away so that Venegas' army could move on Madrid. [1]
Typically, the Junta had omitted to inform Cuesta of these instructions.
In more detail, the Allied plan was for Cuesta to engage Victor by making a frontal attack on his position from the west, whilst Sir Arthur would complete his flanking movement and attack from the north. The expectation was that Victor would have been defeated before King Joseph (or, for that matter, Sebastiani) could have arrived; but Sir Arthur was well aware that the window of opportunity was a small one. The British commander, who had formulated the plan, had great difficulty in persuading the old Spanish general to agree and it was only after a prolonged council of war with subordinates that Cuesta acceded. Accordingly, the British army took up position at three in the morning to Victor's right but on the opposite bank of the Alberche, around an eastward bend in that river. Here, they waited for the sound of the Spanish guns and the appearance of their columns, which would signal the attack.
THE TERRAIN
Victor's position was an extremely strong one. He was ensconced in the bend in the Alberche; his right flank rested on a wooded hill behind which that river ran, whilst his left was on the Tagus - impassable at that point. His main body was on some heights about a half-mile behind the Alberche. The river was crossed by a single, wooden bridge a short distance northwards from the Tagus but was fordable in a number of places. The river banks were masked by underbrush and provided excellent cover for skirmishers (Anson's brigade of Light Dragoons, from Wellesley's army had been discomfited there on the previous day).
RLn - Regular line troops of old army RLt -
Regular light infantry of old army
[1] This is according to Fortescue, however, Oman suggests it was insubordination on
the part of Venegas.
Note: The following notes may refer to the OOBs, as the printed article did not include any footnotes other than the first one. These may also refer to sections of the article that were deleted from the magazine due to space restrictions. In any, case, MagWeb.com includes them as they were printed in the magazine, even if the original locations are not marked. --RL
SIR JOHN FORTESQUE "History of the British Army
Casalegas 23rd July, 1809
ABBREVIATIONS - SPANISH TROOPS
VLn - Volunteer line (levies) newly raised
after 2 May 1808 VLt - Volunteer light
(levies) newly raised after 2 May
MLn - Line Militia of the province specified
RDr - Regular Dragoons from old army RCz - Regular mounted Cazad^•°° from old army
VCz - Volunteer (Levies) mounted Cazadores raised after 2 May VHs - Volunteer (Levies) Hussars raised after 2 May; the 1o Husares de Extramadura was based on the ex-regular Husares de Maria Louisa.
NOTES
[2] I can find no unit of this name in any of my literature sources. It is given in Oman's orbat (op cit Appendix X2, p647) but Bueno Carrera, von Pivka and Johnson mention no such unit in any of their tables. The term "Voluntarios" seems to be scattered liberally among the Spanish army and may have been erroneously used in Oman's source (unpublished document in the Deposito de la Guerra, Madrid). The 2u Ligero de CataluOa were an established unit of regular light infantry at the start of the war but were
not designated "Voluntarios"; I suspect this is the unit in the Vanguard brigade.
[3] Many Spanish battalions were Provincial Militia units of pre-war establishment. There were four "Grenaderos Provinciales"
militia regiments, from Old Castille, New
Castille, Andalucia & Galicia (Johnson). I assume the battalion cited by Oman is one of these (most likely one of the Castille units). Thus the word "Provincial" is, I believe indicative of a Militia unit; a better description might be, for example: Milicia Provincial de Truxillo.
[4] Bueno Carrera suggests there were only two battalions of this unit
raised, on 7th June 1808, with a total paper strength of 2,400. Johnson agrees with Oman on 3 battalions and with Bueno Carrera on strength.
[5] The only reference I can find to a unit with the name "Antequera" is in Bueno Carrera. This shows the "Cazadores de Antequera", a light infantry volunteer unit of 2 battalions, raised on 16th September 1808 with a paper strength of 2,400.
[6] These battalions are, almost certainly, "Voluntarios", there being no similarly-named units without this designation in their titles (Bueno Carrara), Also, I believe the 3o de Sevilla was not with its parent division but with Sir Robert Wilson (Oman p476 footnote 2 and p647 footnote). I do not know whether Oman has confused it with another unit which he ought to have included in Manglano's division or whether he simply included 3o de Sevilla in error. The divisional total strength remains as stated, but I have shown 3o de Sevilla in Wilson's force as well as in Cuesta's. Wilson certainly had two Spanish battalions present and Oman seems very clear in his notes as to which these were.
[7] Royal Marines.
[8] Full name: Imperial del sagrario de Toledo (Bueno Carreras). Incidentally, sagrario, literally, means "deposit of relics"! (a religious museum, perhaps?)
[9] An independant single squadron of 150 men.
[10] The two Battalions of Detachments were made up from the stragglers, recovered sick and other remnants which Sir John Moore's army left behind on the retreat to La CoruOa the previous year.
[11] The elite company of this regiment was with Gen. Suchet in Aragon.
[12] In a footnote (p499) Oman gives the strength as 250 but, in the orbat (p648), he states it as 350. I have compromised!
[13] Wilson's rank in the British, Spanish and Portuguese armies.
[14] These two units totalled about 1500. 5o CaAadores, in a return of 15th September 1809 are shown to have 321 effectives. This was after Wilson's foolhardy but heroic fighting retreat at Puerto de BaOos on 12th August (where they, with his other units, were broken); their nominal strength was 770. 1st Bn L.L.L. was 750 strong after its brave combat, under Col. Mayne, at the Alcantara bridge in May so I have settled on my 750 each as an educated guess.
[15] This is the only unit I can find, in Bueno Carrera, with "Merida" in its name, although Oman simply calls it "Merida". The paper strength of Tiradores de Merida's single battalion, according to Bueno Carrera, is 1159, which is high for a Light infantry volunteer unit but agrees quite closely with Oman's given strength. Since it was only raised on 11th June of that year, it could have been at full strength.
[16] Oman says (p620) that Wilson was "destitute of Artillery" in his fight at Puerto de Bacos but Mayne, in the Alcantara bridge combat had the L.L.L. battery present, losing one gun destroyed. It is unlikely that Wellesley would have sent Wilson to his flank guard duty without artillery, so I have assumed Wilson was unable to take it with him into the mountains after Talavera ended but had it during July. There was certainly a squadron of cavalry with Wilson which Oman (p476) says was "...from the Spanish army..." but, again, Mayne had a squadron of L.L.L. cavalry with him at Alcantara and there is no mention of any specific Spanish cavalry squadron attached, so I have (rather
arbitrarily but, I believe, with some justification) shown Wlson's own L.L.L. cavalry as present with him.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
SIR CHARLES OMAN "A History of the Peninsular War"
SIR W.E.P. NAPIER "History of the War in the Peninsular", Constable
JOSE MARIA BUENO CARRERA; "Uniformes Espanoles" de la Guerra de lndepencia Aldaba Militaria
DAVID GATES "The Spanish Ulcer" George Allen & Unwin
RAY JOHNSON "Napoleonic Armies, A Wargamer's Campaign Directory 1805-1815" Arms & Armour Press
OTTO VON PIVKA "Spanish Armies of the Napoleonic Wars", Osprey
LACHOUQUE, TRANIE, CARMIGNIANI "Napoleon's' War in Spain", Arms & Armour Press
JAC WELLER The Peninsular War 1807-1814" Kay and Ward
MICHAEL GLOVER "The Peninsular War 1807-1814" David & Charles
Historical Background
The Generals
Orders of Battle: French
Orders of Battle: British
Orders of Battle: Spanish
Wargaming the Battle
Back to Battlefields Vol. 1 Issue 1 Table of Contents
Back to Battlefields List of Issues
Back to Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1995 by Partizan Press.
This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com