From the first warganing clubs, there have been two schools of thought on club organization. One school, of which the founders of the AWA are members, believes that a strong permanent national wargaming organization should be democratically organized. The other school, with many prominent supporters, insists that a democratic national club is unworkable, and that only a central group (whether a profit-making corporation, a self-appointed committee, or a club "dictator") can keep a national organization alive. Each school points to the history of wargaming as proof of its beliefs.

The A.W.A. is not the first national democratic club - "Reformed Aggressor" the Military Strategy Confederation, and the International Federation of Wargasing preceded it. "Reformed Aggressor" never quite got started; the MSC remained primarily a New York organization. The IFW appears to have followed these other organizations into the grave. The centralist schools points to these three failures as proving that a democratic wargaming club will not work.

The founders of the A.W.A. do not agree. We believe that the problem with these and other "democratic" clubs is that the people running these clubs have never taken the democratic idea seriously. By avoiding the mistakes which these earlier clubs made, we believe that we can set up a successful national club.

What are the mistakes we refer to? Much of our planning for the AWA was taken from the IFW, so we will consider primarily faults in the IFW.

1. Excessive Centralization: When all responsibility and work are centered on a few club officers (especially if they all live in the name city) , loss of a single officer is a disaster for the club. Furthermore, if no responsibility or prestige is available to be distributed to people other than senior officers, interest in working for the club will fall. Most people in wargaming are willing to work only if they have the impression that they lead (albeit that they do not lead much). The AWA founders hope that Regional Directors and Committee Chairmen will take on much of the work and the attendent prestige. National Officers will be discouraged by example from taking on the jobs of other officers, so that the loss of one officer will not wreck the club. To assist this, the constitution has been written to encourage the removal of inactive and ineffective officers.

2) Lack of Geographic base: Local clubs and conventions are the basis of most Wargaming activity; organization of the club should reflect this, By selecting Directors from Regions, it is possible for the Director to know his constituents, and vice versa. Furthermore, regional representation gives each Director some incentive to perform his duties, since regional activities will benefit him, too. The IFW neglected this prin:iDle be assigning people to "Voting Units" at random, with the result that no one knows their club officer.

3) Secrecy of Operation and lack of Respect for the ByLaws. Nothing is better calculated to dull the interest of members in the organization than to give the impression that it is run by a secret society which does not care what the members think that the organization should do. We believe that this was the primary failing of the IFW. In order to avoid it, we required regular financial reports of the Treasurer. Furthermore, we do not give the Executive the power to act (spend money) without the approval of the Regiona1 Directors. The fundamental protection, however, is one of habit. If the officers habitually ignore the ByLaws when it suits them, no rules will keep the club from becoming a "dictatorship". If the officers habitually obey the By-Laws, avoiding the notion that they have special "emergency" powers, the club will continue to work.

4) Infrequent elections: The interest span of virtually anyone in being a club officer is around a year--virtually no one in the old IFW stayed active continuously in one post for longer than this. Thus A.W.A. therefore elects its officers every year, just as most other national groups do. (The IFW had elections every two years; almost everyone stopped working before their term in office had expired.

What standards of success do we set? Some people have judged the success of a club with the printing of the club magazine. Other people judge a club by the size of the tournaments it runs, on the number and value of the prizes it offers. We judge our objective "sponsoring conventions;. and publications, and other activities of benefit to the hobby" as being more important. we see the purpose . If the AWA., as helping wargamers to find other wargamers, and giving their activities proper publicity. If people want to get together to play games, or to discuss 1914 strategy, or to put out a magazine, they can do so themselves...

What, the AWA will do is to advise, publicize, and support. If someone wants to put out a magazine on Stalingrad. or., Barbarossa, they probably want writers and subscribers. , Telling all of the A.W.A. members about this person will help find those writers and subscribers. The success of the AWA is to to be measured in the number and variety of special interest groups affiliated to it, the attendance-and success of the conventions which the AWA sponsors, and the number of wargamers who are able to find new opponents and fellow hobbyists through AWA publicity.

These are the objectives of the AWA. We do not seek to unite all wargamers as AWA members -- reading a friend's issue of the American Wargamer will do as well. The A.W.A. does not plan to professionalize part or all of the hobby-- we are content as amateurs and see little evidence that the hobby wants or is able to become a profession. The A.W.A. does not intend to-force people to wear a uniform, use our rule interpretations, or follow our ideas on tactics. Our purpose is to improve the hobby, not to regiment it.