Someone asked a little while back about the Verdun game in S&T 198. I had held off buying the earlier installments of DG’s Over the Top series ­ S&T 186 (Mons and the Marne), and Over the Top itself (Riga, Damascus, Brusilov Offensive, & St. Mihiel) ­ for a variety of reasons. Three of the battles in the boxed game seemed too one-sided to be interesting (all except Brusilov, and even then the Austrians were on a hiding to nothing), while the earlier S&T games were reported to have significant problems (especially the Marne). S&T 198, however, has the attractive combination of a little-gamed Eastern Front battle (Lemberg), and one of the key battles of the war, Verdun. Of the two, I have only played, and can therefore only comment on, Verdun.

The game is at regimental scale, one mile to the hex, and covers the area on both sides of the Meuse where the battle was fought. While the map is the usual attractive Joe Youst effort, a first nit to pick is the amount of it devoted to the German side of the front line, which will, as the Germans are attacking, be so much waste space. Then there is the suppression of French accents in place-names: Béthincourt becoming Bethincourt, for example ­ a small point, but indicative of a relaxed attitude to the historical background.

The victory conditions give a nod to both Falkenhayn’s supposed objective of bleeding the French white, and 5th Army’s desire to take Verdun itself. A German Tactical Victory results from capturing the city, while a Marginal Victory stems from the destruction of 20 French units. A Decisive Victory needs the Germans to have achieved both of these objectives (the French victory conditions are a mirror image of these, ie. hold Verdun, destroy 20 German units, etc.).

The game covers the first 15 days (one turn per day) of Operation Gericht (the German attack), though it can optionally be extended for a further 10 days. And here another problem looms. Historically, the Germans did not get near capturing the city ­ certainly the French feared they would lose it, but in reality the German advance was stopped well short. So, of the two German victory conditions, one was never realised, and was only a possibility, at best. In relation to the other, it is difficult to be sure, but, given that both sides casualties tend to be concentrated in their infantry units, and the French have only 30, the loss of 20 would seem fairly devastating, even if some of these losses were HQs or artillery units. I estimate the line the French actually held at the German high water mark during this initial stage of the battle as 28 hexes, and even with rigid ZOCs (which could be questioned in a WWI game at this scale), a French force reduced this far would have little chance of holding such a line.

What all this implies is that here we have a game where ­ if the Victory Conditions are an indication of the designer’s intent ­ the historical advance is unlikely, and the chance of German progress being at least roughly analogous to what they in fact achieved is very slim. Instead, the Germans stand a reasonable chance of both taking Verdun, and destroying the French army defending it.

The set-up and command rules lead to further problems in making possible a recreation the historical battle. Command plays an important part in the game. Each unit is colour-coded for the corps to which it belongs (except for a limited number of army-level units), and these must be within two hexes of their HQ to remain in command. If they are not, then they suffer combat penalties (two adverse shifts if attacking, one if defending), and may not move in the Breakthrough Movement Phase. HQs move only two hexes per turn, while infantry can move 6 (German) or 5 (French) MPs, not to mention the ability to move up to half their MPs again in the Breakthrough Phase. This can rightly make sweeping advances more difficult, as the spearhead units lose touch with their HQ.

However, a more important effect, especially at the beginning of the game, is the fact that the Germans have 8 HQs to the French 3. Given that EZOCs cut command, the best command span an HQ is likely to have is 3 hexes of front line ­ and even then, this assumes that good defensive terrain will be available for the HQ, in the position it needs to occupy so that it can maximise its command span. Sadly, this is often not the case, and leaving a corps HQ in the open invites an artillery bombardment to disrupt it, which is something to be avoided if at all possible. In any event, the French start the game with 44 trench hexes to defend, only 9 or so of which will be held by in command units. The obvious German tactic is to spread out their initial assault, so that most sectors of the French line are attacked, many of which are going to be out of command.

The issue here is that, for reasons connected with his limited aims, Falkenhayn has been attributed much of the blame for the decision to limit the initial German attacks to only the eastern bank of the Meuse ­ attacks on the western bank did not begin until 6th March, the final turn of the basic game. In addition, the Germans appear to have attacked at first with only 3 of the 8 corps they have to hand at the start of the S&T version. The game gives the German player no incentive to exercise such restraint ­ no VP penalty for attacking along the whole line at once, for example ­ with the not too surprising result that the Germans make much better progress than they did in the real battle.

Then there is the issue of the forts with which the French had ringed Verdun. The game takes the view that these were major strongpoints. Although they have an intrinsic defence of only 2, they can be very difficult to take. Indeed, the French player is best advised in many cases not to add his precious infantry to the defense of his forts, but let them take the brunt of the German attack directly. This is because, if I have read the rules correctly (and I admit that I may be mistaken here), an assault on a fort cannot exceed 5-to-1 odds (the maximum 7-to-1, shifted two columns to the right because the attack is against a fort). Only a DE or DZ result will destroy the fort, and this is only a 1-in-3 chance at these odds (admittedly better if the Germans throw in one of their two shock units, in which case the odds do rise to 2-in-3).

At these same odds, infantry supposedly aiding the defense would be sure to suffer at least one step loss (DA or EX result) ­ hence they are often better off out of it. The forts can also be destroyed by artillery fire, but it takes a substantial concentration to have any effect: concentrating 60% of the 5th Army’s artillery would yield a 50:50 chance of destroying the targeted fort. As there are a lot of these forts, and they project ZOCs until they are destroyed, it can take the German some time to wade through them all. A standard French tactic at some point in the game is therefore to pull back to the fort line protecting the center of their line, and try to recuperate while the Germans slowly batter their way through.

Whether this is the historical picture is at the very least questionable. Firstly, and going back to the previous point about actual versus game German progress, only one fort, Douaumont, fell during this initial period (the second taken by the Germans, Vaux, fell in June). Douaumont was captured with remarkable ease, mainly because the French were not really trying to defend it ­ or indeed any of the other forts, having decided that they were museum pieces. Later, Petain changed this, and certainly the fight for Fort Vaux was both prolonged and bitter. However, even later in the battle, it was a moot point how useful the forts were, and much of the fighting surrounding them had to do with their prestige or morale value, rather than any intrinsic military worth. Certainly, the use to which the French are likely to put their forts in the game seems ahistorical.

I am also dubious about the fact that neither side receives any reinforcements during the game. I have no detailed sources to be able to check this, but remain suspicious about the lack of French reinforcements, particularly after Petain took command (on 26th February).

Lastly, there are the linked issues of supply and the map. Since the Germans are likely to make more progress than they did historically, while some of 5th Army hacks its way towards Verdun through the French forts in the centre, other forces can find it well worth their while to begin threatening the two main French supply lines. One of these is the famous Sacred Way, west of the Meuse. The other is the railway line and road running through Dieue, further east along the banks of the river. One possible German plan is to launch a gigantic pincer attack: the western arm starting near Avocourt, then heading through Dombasie and Rampont towards the Sacred Way at Vadelaincourt. The French will find it difficult to defend here after their initial trench line is broken, as there are few obvious lines of defense, and their forces are likely to be stretched to the limit. The eastern arm could start from Woevre, and head directly south to the Meuse at Dieue, causing somewhat similar problems for the French, though there are some helpful ridgelines for the defense.

(So why did the Germans not try this historically, rather than the unimaginative frontal assault on the center of the French position? This might, of course, have been due to Teutonic stolidity, but there do seem good reasons why it was not attempted. The 5th Army may not have launched an assault as far west as Avocourt because immediately behind the French trench lines in this sector lay the extensive Forest of Hesse, which seems to have disappeared from the DG map. And the road and rail supply lines via Dieue? These ran towards the German salient and St. Mihiel, and therefore could not be used to supply the defenders of Verdun ­ which is why the Sacred Way was such a vital supply line for the French. So the pincer movement, which seems to make sense in the game, would have faced greater obstacles in the west, and had much further to go in the east, in the real world of 1916, which is perhaps why the Germans did not try it.

All told then, I think that there are some significant question marks over the ability of this game to recreate in game terms what happened historically. That a game offers alternatives to what actually took place is very right and proper. The Germans should perhaps have a chance to take the city, or crush the defenders (or even both) ­ but it should probably be no more than a chance, and probably a slim one. But that the historical course of events looks extremely unlikely is a black mark, at least in my book. The French resistance is underestimated ­ or the Germans given too easy a time of it. This could be addressed in part by changing the replacement rates in the game, especially increasing the French totals, but then this would need other changes, such as introducing more detailed, less cataclysmic, victory conditions.

Perhaps, as has been suggested before, Verdun would be a good candidate for the area/impulse games which started with Storm Over Arnhem, and were recently successfully brought to the Western Front by Ted Raicer’s game RTC (on Cambrai). Certainly this system seems to do a good job of making attrition battles into interesting games. Meanwhile, if you are looking for a WWI battle game at this level, with roughly the same complexity and length, then I would recommend the La Matz game from Vae Victis #24. Same opponents (Germans attacking Frenchmen), same war (though a little later ­ 1918) but a much better reflection of what might have occurred, and a better game, in that the French ­ on the defensive originally ­ will get an opportunity to counterattack.