by Timothy J. Kutta
The High Command decided to take a new tack. They authorized the construction of a single engine fighter that could fight its way past the American escorts and into a bomber formation. In fact, the new design was to be so strong that it could literally be used to ram an American bomber if necessary. The requirements for the new "ram fighter", as the design was known, were give to the Germany Air Ministry. They decided to assign Focke- Wulf to the task. The Focke-Wulf firm and its chief designer Kurt Tank accepted the challenge. They decided the best and easiest course of action was to modify a standard Focke-Wulf FW-190 into a ram fighter. Tank took a production FW-190A and put armored plate around the engine, wing roots, fuel tanks and cockpit. He put 60mm of bulletproof glass in the windscreen and canopy. All of the modifications would allow the pilot to fly directly into the path of oncoming machine gun bullets without fear of losing his aircraft or life. The weapons array on the aircraft was also modified. It consisted of a pair of 13mm machine guns in the fuselage and four 20mm cannons in the wings. All of the modifications added weight to the airplane and slowed it down. In order to keep the plane's speed up, Tank put a methanol-water MW 50 water boost system on the fourteen cylinder BMW 801D-2 engine. The engine generated 1700 hp at take-off and 1440 hp at 18,700 ft. This gave the plane a top speed of 660 kph (410 mph) which was quite sufficient for it to duel with most American fighters and to catch the bombers. The new variant was designated the Focke-Wulf FW-190A-8/R8 and was accepted for production in mid-1943. With the new fighter now ready, the Luftwaffe High Command had to decide how to use it. Initially, they wanted to put 10 or 12 of the ram fighters into each fighter group. The fighters would be assigned to the most competent bomber destroyers. In the hands of these aggressive pilots the new FW-190 would shoot down more bombers, break up the bomber formations and inspire the other pilots of the group to more aggressive attacks. In April 1944 enough the Focke-Wulf FW-190A-8/R8s had been built to form the first staffel. The new unit was designated Sturmstaffel One and placed under the command of Major von Kornatski. Kornatski was a fanatic and accepted only the most aggressive pilots for his squadron. Each pilot was required to sign a statement that he would not return from an interception mission unless he had destroyed an American bomber. If the pilot could not destroy one with gunfire then he was obliged to ram the bomber. As more ram fighters became available they were integrated in II, III, IV JG-3, II JG-4 and III JG-54. All of these units were given the title Sturm behind their squadron designation. By mid-April several Sturmgruppen, as the units were known were ready for action. They would soon have an opportunity to show the effectiveness of their new aircraft and tactics. Kornatski's unit saw its first action against American bombers bombing Berlin on April 29th. Although they did account for a few bombers it was still not enough for the High Command. Indeed, while April 1944 incurred the highest monthly loss rate of American bombers throughout the air campaign, with 409 heavies lost, the vast majority of these were lost to regular Luftwaffe formations and flak. So, despite the impressive name and fanatic oaths, the Sturmgruppen did not achieve as much as expected. While individual ram fighters did get in among the bombers they still only accounted for one or two bombers damaged or destroyed per mission. They also did not inspire the other pilots of the group to venture into the maelstrom of enemy defensive machine gun fire. In an effort to increase the effectiveness of the new aircraft, the Special Home Defense Jagdgeschwader z.b.V., equipped solely with ram fighters, was formed under the command of Major Walter Dahl. The massing of the ram fighters allowed Dahl to change tactics. Instead of attacking in ones and twos the new Sturm units attacked in packs of as many as 50. They charged the front or the rear of the American bomber wings in closely packed "V" formations of a dozen or more fighters. The sight of so many enemy plane, closing on the bombers overwhelmed the American gunners. Unable to mass their fire on any one fighter, the gunners simply sprayed the air with gunfire. This allowed the Focke-Wulfs to get into the bomber formation and score before any concentrated fire could be directed against them. On September 27th 1944, the Sturmgruppen had their most successful single day against the American bombers. The Eighth Air Force launched 1192 B-17s and B-24s of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Bomb Divisions. The 1st Bomb Division with four hundred and sixty- two B-17s went to bomb Cologne, The 3rd Bomb Division with four hundred and fifteen B- 17s was sent to bomb Ludwigshafen, Opau and Mainz. The Second Bomb Division with three hundred and fifteen B24s was sent to bomb Kassel and Gottingen. The bombers were escorted by six hundred and seventy-eight fighters, a mixed bag of P-47s, P-5 Is and P-38s. The raid proceeded smoothly for all of the units except the 2nd Bomb Division. The weather over Kassel was overcast and the bombers were forced to navigate by radar. Unfortunately, just as the Division made its final turn toward the target, one of the groups became separated. The 445th, an experienced and efficient group, took a wrong heading and headed toward Gottingen some 30 kilometers away. Thirty-seven B-24s were now out of the bomber stream and heading away from their fighter protection. The rest of the formation did not notice but the wandering group of bombers was clearly visible to the German ground radars. The American bombers bombed Gottingen and then headed for home. They were now well separated from the rest of the formation. Ten minutes after the American bombers bombed Gottingen they were intercepted by the Focke-Walf FW-190A-8s of JG 4. The Sturm units of JG 4 massed in three-line-abreast waves and closed in from the rear of the formation. They overwhelmed the bomber group's defenses and pressed home their attacks. They were followed a few minutes later by the other two Gruppen of JG 4. These other groups were equipped with Me- 109s but at this point the bomber group was badly damaged. The Me-109s attacked the damaged and straggling bombers. Within three minutes the attack was over. Ninety enemy fighters had downed twenty-five B-24s and damaged all of the other planes in the group. Five other bombers were written off when they returned to their air base at Tibenham. In a brief well-coordinated attack the Germans had virtually wiped out an American heavy bombardment group. Successes like this were, however, rare. The rammjaegers of both the Sturmgruppen and the Special Defense Gruppen would fight until the end of the war. Overall, it is difficult to judge how effective the pilots of the new units were in the air. The units accomplished their aim, though. Within a few months of their inception many fighter wings created ad hoc ram fighter units. The bravado and fearless flying of these units did inspire other German pilots to press home their attacks. However, the life expectancy of the German fighter pilot was falling rapidly. The swarms of allied fighters coupled with their increased technical superiority cut the German pilots' chances of surviving the war to a minimum. By autumn, Adolf Galland, the head of Germany's fighter forces, had proposed massing all the available fighters at Germany's disposal and sending them out to destroy one large American bomber raid. Galland reasoned that the huge numbers of fighters would simply overwhelm the American escort fighters and knock down so many bombers that Americans would have to halt their bombing offensive to rebuild their shattered units. The attack never came off but analyzing sortie and loss rates evidence from four large air battles in November suggests it would not have accomplished its goals. Desperate Days Over the Reich
Ram Fighter Final Effort: Luftwaffe Kamikazes US Bomber and Luftwaffe Fighter Bases 1944 (large: slow: 81K) US Bomber and Luftwaffe Fighter Bases 1944 (jumbo very slow: 278K) 445th Bombardment Group Formation vs. Sturmgruppen Attack Formation (large: slow: 133K) FW190A vs. B-24J Head On (slow: 79K) Luftwaffe Fighter vs. US Bomber (very slow: 278K) Chart: Measuring Effectiveness (27K) Chart: Principle German Air to Air Weapons (slow: 100K) Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 3 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com * Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS. |