The battle that developed around the convoy HG76 from Gibraltar to the UK in the middle of December 1941 has been overshadowed in most histories of WW2 by the momentous events taking place in the Pacific and Asia. For that reason, although the lessons were understood in Britain and Germany at that time, historians have often overlooked it. HG76 can be clearly seen as marking the beginning of tactics and measures that would lead to the decisive convoy battles of early 1943 and the ultimate defeat of the U-boats. U-boat attacks were at their height and all convoys sailed in expectation that they were struggling against the odds to arrive at their destinations without heavy loss. HG-76 sailed from Gibraltar expecting three factors to make its passage particularly difficult. One was that German agents in Spain could see the assembly of convoys and report when they had left. The second was the Fw200 aircraft and others, operating from France, which could be expected to seek it out and report its presence. The third was the inevitable concentration of a U-boat wolfpack against it once the convoy was located at sea. The loss of many warships of all categories was pushing the Royal Navy beyond tolerance. Merchant ship sinkings were also reaching alarming proportions. There seemed as yet to be no counter to the Uboat pack tactics employed by the Germans except lots more escorts and although the ability to produce these was looking better now the USA had entered the war, their availability would be still some time off. The Germans, due to the proximity of air bases from which the Luftwaffe could locate them, were particularly savaging convoys between Gibraltar and England and the French Atlantic ports from which the U-boats could sortie. German surface attackers could also not be discounted. Fighting Favor HG-76 had two things in its favor. First was the presence of the little Escort Carrier HMS Audacity (Commander D.W McKendrick) This ship had been the German prize Hannover and commissioned as the Empire Audacity after a very basic conversion to an Escort Carrier. The first such ship to join the fight. Few aircraft were available to operate from such a small flight deck and she went to sea with three two plane sections of Martlet 1's, designated Red, Yellow and Black flights respectively. On passage to Gibraltar the new carrier had proved successful against the Fw200 Condors but suffered some losses herself Her own AA armament was quite meager and more along the lines of a merchantship. For the return voyage with HG-76 she had only four Martlet aircraft available. It was decided some Swordfish of 812 Squadron that were ashore at Gibraltar due to the loss of the fleet carrier HMS Ark Royal should be transferred to her. In the event this proved impossible, as she did not have the facility to operate them. Some of the survivors of Ark Royal were aboard the Audacity when she sailed. The Swordfish aircraft did fly in support of the convoy while it was in range of their Gibraltar base, leading to some German sources mistakenly stating they were aboard. In addition the ship had now been renamed simply HMS Audacity. The second thing in favor of HG76 was the presence of the 36th Escort Group (EG) under the command of the then Commander F.J. Walker (RN). This officer had been an ASW expert between the wars, when this was an unfashionable branch of the service. Having been passed over for higher promotion he had spent the early part of the war watching the growing "Battle of the Atlantic", with great frustration. This was the very type of thing he had trained for, prepared others for and held strong tactical ideas about. The purely defensive tactics then in use were quite against the ideas he held. Walker was an advocate of a more aggressive posture when dealing with U-boats, but had failed to convince most of his superiors. It was March of 1941 before he could persuade senior officers to plead his case to be sent to sea and September before he was appointed to HMS Stork. This also made him the senior officer of the 36th Escort Group which, in addition to his own ship, comprised one pre-war sloop HMS Depthford and seven Flower Class corvettes. They saw no action during the passage to Gibraltar in severe weather conditions, so when detailed to escort HG76 the keen Walker relished the chance to use tactics he had been theorizing about for years. The Admiralty apparently expected him to obediently follow doctrine. He had other ideas. At a rendezvous outside Gibraltar, the 36th EG formed up with HG76, and were additionally reinforced by the Audacity. The destroyers Stanley, Blankney and Exmoor also joined. Walker's ships comprised two sloops, Stork and Deptford. He also had the ASW Corvettes Rhododendron, Marigold Convolvulus, Pentstemon, Gardenia, Samphire and Vetch. The Catapult Ship SS Darwin was also with the convoy. This ship had only a single aircraft on its catapult and was to be reserved for emergencies as the pilot had to try to make it to land once launched. The Stanley was the ex USS McCalla, one of the 50 flush deck destroyers transferred from the US Navy, and had poor anti-aircraft (AA) capacity but the Blankney and Exmoor were units of the Hunt II Class escort destroyers with an excellent heavy AA armament with which it was hoped to keep the Focke-Wulfs at bay. Stork, although designed with low angle 4.7" guns in 1936 had been re-armed with a very similar AA armament to that of the Hunt Class vessels. The rest of the escorts were poor in AA defense although well armed for ASW work. The convoy sailed on December 14th and consisted of 32 ships arranged in five columns. Following the ideas he had fruitlessly been recommending to the Admiralty, Walker arranged his escorts in two screens, one close to the convoy and one further out. For the first time the U-boats would encounter a double layer of escorts through which they would have to penetrate. This was not without some risk to the convoy as both screens were consequently quite thin. Ahead of them Force H, formed a 'Hunter Group' comprised of the British destroyers Croome, Gurkha, Foxhound and the Australian destroyer Nestor, sweeping the area outside Gibraltar. This paid off when the Nestor sank U-127 (Hansmann) with all hands, 35 miles off Cape St. Vincent on December 15th. This group could not assist any further than assisting the convoy to clear the immediate area of departure after which they turned back to rejoin Force H. Warned of the departure by agents in Spain, Doenitz ordered the U-boat pack Seerauber (Pirate) to attack. HG76 remained unsighted until U-131 (Korvettenkapitan Arend Baumann) fell in with it during the late afternoon of the 16th. He reported, then dived to let the convoy pass over him, intending to follow along behind and make reports. Due to hydrophone equipment failure he accidentally came to periscope depth in the middle of the convoy and after initially attempting an attack was forced to dive deep to avoid being rammed. He was apparently not spotted. U67 and U-108 also attempted to approach the convoy but were forced to dive by aircraft and could not locate it. Two Fw200s of I KG40 from Bordeaux had also sighted the convoy in the failing light of the 16th and made a report. Although spotted in the distance by Stanley the other escorts did not see them and the Audacity doubted the report and did not send fighters to investigate. At this time U-574 (Oberleutnant zur see Gegnalbach) and U-434 (Kapitanleutnant Wolfgang Heyda) were off Spain, both on their first war cruise and headed to join U-131. Once astern U-131 surfaced in darkness and made another sighting report. He continued to make hourly reports to Lorient where Doenitz directed four other U-boats to head to the area. Walker was however well aware he had been spotted due to Admiralty warnings based on their radio intercepts. He request the Audacity provide dawn and dusk sweeps with her aircraft at a distance of about 20 miles around the convoy. It was the practice of U-boats to maintain contact at maximum visibility while calling others in. Although the seas were very choppy and there was quite a bit of cloud cover overhead, the visibility was quite good at sea level. The weather would remain much the same for most of the voyage. At 0900 on the 17th aircraft from Audacity reported the shadower was 22 miles off to the port of the convoy. Because of an entirely machinegun armament, the fighter was unable to do more than scare U-131 into a crash dive. Of course the U-boat commander did not know the fighter had no bombs and was not going to wait around to find out. Theory of the Offensive Escort The Martlet then climbed high enough for a radar fix to be made on it. This was the chance Walker had been waiting for to test his theory of "offensive" escort. Calling for Exmoor, Blankney, Stanley and Pentstemon to join him, he raced toward the contact in Stork. The good wishes of the convoy Commodore went with him in the form of the signal "good hunting" which formed the idea for the A Hunting We Shall Go theme song adopted by Walker's later 2nd Support Group. Actually U-108 and U-107 are also now in contact but unsighted. Meanwhile, U-131 had attempted to avoid further detection by aircraft, in moving closer to the convoy but the faulty hydrophones failed to warn of the approach of Pentstemon and Stanley, which heavily damaged the U-boat with depth charges. U-131 went down to 600 feet and moved away at five knots in the hope of getting as much distance away from the attackers as possible because chlorine gas was leaking into the boat and they would eventually have to surface. Following his ideas for hunting U-boats, Walker put his escorts out into a search line and commenced the search. When U-131 did pop up two hours later, it was immediately sighted by Stanley and Walker order his units to close and fire as soon as they were in range. In the meantime a Martlet (Sub Lt. Fletcher) of Black Flight dived on the submarine to strafe it but was shot down and killed. On this occasion the U-boat commander had little choice but to fight off the aircraft as he attempted to out-run the escorts. Persistent chlorine gas prevented him diving. The escorts commenced fire at 14,000 yards and after twenty minutes of shelling at closing ranges, the crew of U-131 could be seen going over the side. After picking up the survivors Stork led the escorts back to the convoy, which they rejoined at 1730. Walker had made his first kill off Cape St. Vincent, using the new tactics of going out to meet the U-boats instead of waiting for them to attack. Even though Audacity was down to three Martlets, high hopes were held for future co-operation. Despite the lack of further information, U-434 sighted the convoy just after midnight and immediately made a contact report, then took over as shadower due to the ominous silence from U-131. U-434 was ten miles from the convoy, running on the surface at dawn of the 18th when it fell foul of the unexpected outer escort screen in the form of Stanley. The destroyer turned to attack immediately, despite her Asdic giving trouble and warned Walker. Deptford with Exmoor and Blankney were ordered to race to her aid. Accurate depth charge patterns from Stanley and Blankney had dealt the U-434 her death blows before the other escorts could even arrive and she bobbed to the surface, with her crew tumbling out of the conning tower and into the water just in time. Within minutes, the U-boat had rolled over and slipped beneath the waves. U-434 crew joined the prisoner of war bag along with the men of U-131. Walker was delighted to be able to signal the Admiralty that they had so far sunk two U-boats without loss to the convoy. The same morning two Fw200 Condor aircraft attempted to close the convoy at 1130 but were spotted when still low on the horizon and were chased off by the fighters of Black Flight. The guns of both jammed, allowing the Germans a lucky escape. During the afternoon, however, Exmoor and Blankney, reaching the end of their fuel endurance, were forced to turn back to Gibraltar. Blankney took 45 prisoners with her as the fighters again carried out a sweep. Not long after, in the gathering dusk, Pentstemon sighted a U-boat on the surface ten miles off the port side of the convoy. This was U-107 (Gelhaus) who sent off a contact report at 1819. Walker ordered Convolvulus to join her sister ship in the hunt, but as it was getting very dark, he decided to keep Stork close to the convoy with the rest of the escorts. U-67 (Mueller-Stockheim) was closing the convoy at the same time and attempted to torpedo Convolvulus as she moved to obey her orders. The corvette was near missed but immediately counter attacked and drove U-67 off U-107 was able to avoid detection. Since making contact late on the 16th, U-574 had waited for a pack to assemble; but after witnessing the destruction of U-131, dropped well astern. After dark on the 18th, the U-boat closed to an attack position. At 0400 on the 19th U-574 was closing the rear of the convoy when it sighted Stanley, which had also seen the U-boat and was turning to attack. Torpedoes were fired and shortly after Stanley blew up in a sheet of flame. Although shocked by the loss, Walker, not knowing where the U-boat was, ordered the escorts to perform "Buttercup". This was an idea of his own and which he had trained his group in. As a team they turned outward from the convoy firing starshell and snowflake on every bearing the U-boat might use as an escape route. This forced U574 down and shortly after Stork picked up a positive submarine echo and carried out an attack with a ten-charge pattern. Walker was still turning to attack again when U-574 surfaced, badly damaged, but attempting to escape on the surface. After sweeping the decks of the unfortunate U-boat with gunfire, the Stork turned in and rammed her just forward of the conning tower. The escort continued on over the rolling U-boat and finished her off with a pattern set shallow. Some of the Germans were already in the water when these charges went off and did not survive, but five were later picked up, along with 25 from the Stanley. While in the middle of her rescue operation Stork observed an explosion from within the convoy. U-108 (Schonder) had sneaked in and scored a kill. This proved to be the SS Ruckinge, a ship of 2,869 (gross) tons. As this was the first loss to the convoy, for three Uboats sunk, it was a great victory. Even more so when convoys were being decimated in night attacks. On the down side, Stork had damaged her asdic in the ramming and bent her bows so badly she could no longer steam at full speed. The Audacity had however been lucky, as one torpedo narrowly missed her during the attack. During the same day, the Luftwaffe were attempting to re-establish contact with the convoy. In the morning, a pair of Fw200s approached but Red Flight intercepted. In a daring head on attack, Sub Lt. Brown shot down one. The other was chased by Sub Lt. Lamb and fled into the clouds. During the afternoon another Fw200 was spotted by Stork, which passed on the information to Audacity. Sub Lt. Sleigh of Yellow Flight, tried several stern attacks before giving up and taking it head on as Brown had done. He downed the Condor, but in doing so his own aircraft was damaged. He returned to the carrier with part of the Condors wireless aerial still wrapped around his tail wheel. At dusk, the aircraft of Audacity reported a U-boat 15 miles to port. This was U-107 (Gelhaus) which had been able to stay in touch with the convoy, and although hunted by Depthford, Marigold and Convolvulus, it could not be found. This was good luck for the Germans as U-107 was directing the arrival of U-108 (Scholtz), U-71, U-751, and U-567 (Endrass). The commander of U-567, Kapitanleutnant Endrass, was a holder of the Knights Cross and one of the few remaining aces. He had been 1st Lt. to Gunther Prien, of U-47 when they penetrated into Scapa Flow and sank the Battleship Royal Oak. Doenitz placed such faith in this commander that he signaled the U-boats that Endrass was on the way, hoping to boost their morale. Unfortunately, while returning to the convoy the escorts were mistaken for the enemy and many of the Merchant ships fired snowflake, lighting the convoy up brilliantly in the darkness. To the amazement of all, no attacks developed and in fact the next day, the 20th also passed almost without incident apart from a 55-mile chase in which Red Section Martlets attempted to catch a Fw200. During the afternoon, another Martlet sighted two U-boats ahead, which enabled HG76 to alter course and avoid them. Most of the daylight hours of the 21st also passed without attacks but several U-boats were sighted. A pair was 25 miles astern, exchanging personnel across a plank when Sub Lt. Brown strafed them. Walker detached four of his escorts, including Deptford to pursue them but they escaped. At 1130 two more U-boats were sighted to port of the convoy and Walker sent Marigold and Convolvulus to pursue. Shortly after another was sighted off the port bow shadowing the convoy from about 10 miles out. At 1500 yet another U-boat was sighted. The night of the 21st to 22nd was promising to be very dangerous. Dangerous Night HG76 was now turned onto a direct course for the Western Approaches, the reasoning being that as the Germans obviously knew they were there, it made little point to sail a longer, diversionary route. Besides as her route had been plotted for several days, the radical change of course after dark might fool some of the submarines. As dusk fell, Audacity went over to her night procedure of zigzagging well clear of the convoy. Despite Walker recommending the port side as being the most likely to be safe, McKendrick preferred the starboard and went off without escort as the convoy having had two escorts turn back, one sunk and one now damaged, could not spare a screen. In view of the success of the previous night, Walker took two escorts with him and staged a mock battle off the port rear side of the convoy along the course HG76 had previously been sailing on and might be expected to be found. By the use of snowflake and starshell he hoped to trick the U-boats into hurrying to the wrong spot as they sought the convoy in the darkness. Unfortunately the merchant ships of the convoy believed this to be a real attack and commenced firing snowflake as well, which left them brightly lit up and spoiled the diversion. Walker then raced back to rejoin but as he did the Norwegian tanker Annavore, of 3,324 tons, rear ship of the center column exploded in flames as U-567 closed for the attack. Walker then made a mistake in ordering another 'Buttercup' be carried out, instead of sweeping astern for the offending U-boat. Once again the Merchant ships fired snowflake and Audacity was illuminated. U-751 (Korvettenkapitan Gerhard Bigalk) could not believe his luck. Ten miles out to starboard of the convoy, the small carrier was brightly silhouetted and he immediately torpedoed her. She was struck aft and was out of control although she continued to steam. The engines were stopped to avoid collision and the little carrier floated helpless in the darkness for twenty minutes. Escorts were racing to the area but before reaching Audacity she was finished off by U-751 which came in so close she was fired on by one of the 20mm Oerlikons of the carrier. The U-boat fired two torpedoes, which struck Audacity in the bow. She sank ten minutes later. As the escorts dashed about the sight of the sinking, searching for survivors, the Deptford sighted a U-boat on the surface and fired starshell with Stork assisting. This was followed up by a series of heavy depth charge attacks. U-567 (Kapitanleutnant Endrass) had been destroyed with all hands, although the escorts were uncertain of the kill, despite oil being sighted. Shortly after this, with excitement running high, Deptford accidentally rammed the Stork and although the damage was not severe, the brig was wrecked, killing two of the five U-boat survivors who had been locked in it. U-67 also attacked the convoy but missed her target, the CAM ship Darwin and was shortly after forced to dive when illuminated by starshell. Forty-one depth charges, some very close, shook the U-boat for the next two hours as Rhododendrum attacked, with some help from Deptford. She was able to surface at 0430 but was trailing oil and suffering machinery defects, which forced her to withdraw well astern of the convoy. By the morning of the 22nd of December 1941, HG76 had now lost two of its merchant ships, the carrier and one escort, but had sunk four submarines, a score, which up until that time was unheard of. Stork was of course also damaged as was Deptford, depth charges were running low and various other equipment include radar sets had started to fail. The loss of the Audacity meant fighter cover had also been lost as with early warning of U- boats nearby. During this day U-71 and U-125 made contact after being diverted from missions to the US East Coast. Reinforcements had been sent to HG76 from Western Approaches however. The Vanquisher and Witch were both V and W Class destroyers converted to short- range escorts and soon joined the screen. The Admiralty were delighted that at last in these dark days of the war, a convoy had forced the U-boats into a one for one, swap. Indeed as far as the merchantmen and their valuable cargoes were concerned this was a two for one swap in British favor. Walker's aggressive tactics had obviously worked. There would have to be a re-think. Now however HG76 was nearing the UK and a Liberator aircraft of 19 Group, patrolled around them for several hours during the day. At 1600 it reported two U-boats stopped on the surface 25 miles astern of the convoy. One of these was U-67, assessing her damage, which she reported to Lorient. During the night, a very heavy sea hit the SS Ogmore Castle and the crew panicked, convinced they had either rammed a submarine or somehow been damaged. They abandoned ship but when the Corvette Convolvulus arrived she found the merchant ship quite undamaged and informed the crew they should re-embark. The highly embarrassed crew went back on board and the ship resumed its place in the convoy just before dawn. Early Morning In the early morning of the 23rd U-751, U-125 and U-71 all attempted to penetrate the screen but were driven off by the determined escorts. U-751 only just managed to elude Vetch, which was assisted by Vanquisher and Witch. The convoy was now getting close to the UK and heavy air patrols are being maintained by Coastal Command. In view of this the damaged U-67 was ordered home at 0921 and the remaining U-boats directed elsewhere. The struggle around this convoy had proved too costly in losses and damaged U-boats. It was time to seek out easier pickings. By the afternoon the convoy was safely in the control zone of Western Approaches and the Commodore signaled to Stork, "Despite the loss of Audacity and Stanley, you have won a great victory. On behalf of the convoy deepest congratulations and many thanks." Walker's report on the proceedings of the convoy was anxiously awaited. On the 6th of January 1942 he attended a special meeting at the Admiralty with the Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare during which his ideas were sought and considered. They were listened to and taken note of. Until then his ideas of aggressive defense of a convoy had been quite at odds with Admiralty doctrine and practice. As a commander ashore he had been unable to convince them otherwise. As a commander at sea, in charge of an escort group, Walker had not only been able to convince them, but to prove his theories. Captain Walker would later go on to command the famous 2nd Support Group that sank a hefty score of U-boats as the Battle of the Atlantic swung against the Germans. The ships under his command always enjoyed a high priority for repair and rcfit and his signature tune "A hunting we will go" greeted him from shore on his return from successful sorties. Before his untimely death from natural causes on July 9th 1944, the previously "passed over" officer had been re-instated in the seniority list and had won the DSO four times. He was to have been made a Knight Commander of the Bath and promoted to flag rank after August 1944. The men he had led so well heard of his death while on duty guarding the Normandy beachhead. His death was greeted with great sadness. He had, they said, simply 'worn out'. Countless hours without sleep as he directed battle after battle, had taken their toll on his health. Walker was given a full ceremonial naval funeral at Liverpool Cathedral attended by a thousand people, then borne through the streets on a gun carriage as the cortege wound its way to the Mersey side dockyard. The coffin was taken aboard HMS Hesperus and he was buried at sea. The first man to defeat a U-boat pack was a sailor of the best Nelsonian traditions, fighting against a different foe but on the same relentless waters. He had confronted odds thought to be almost insurmountable and had risen above them in triumph. Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 2 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com * Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.