Napoleon's campaign in Poland was punctuated by several major engagements: Pultusk-Golymin, Preussisch-Eylau, Heilsberg and Friedland just to name the biggest ones. All of these were hard-fought, bloody, and, with the exception of Friedland, inconclusive affairs. Heilsberg was not the least of these. I believe it would have been accorded a greater place in history as Napoleon's first defeat (replacing Aspern-Essling) if four days later the French Army had not redeemed itself so unambiguously with their overwhelming triumph at Friedland. The outcome of Heilsberg cannot be contested; the French lost as many as 14,000 men to the Russian and Prussian 9,000, and Bennigsen held the field at the end of the day. It is typical of Napoleon's methods, however, (we find similar tactics which resulted in temporary set-backs all the way back in his first Italian campaign) and in no way can be cited as an example of Napoleon's failing acumen for war. (True to form the next day he maneuvered his army around the Russian positions, forcing their abandonment, gaining the vital crossroads and causing Bennigsen to seek shelter on the opposite bank of the Alle River. This interposed his army between that of the Coalition and Konigsberg. In the ensuing footrace the Russian Army became exhausted and susceptible to catastrophic defeat. And that's just what happened at Friedland.) While his strategy cannot be called brilliant, Bennigsen's conduct of his army in Poland was the best Napoleon had encountered in an opponent. Having spent the spring recovering from his winter offensive in which he attempted to relieve the siege of Danzig (this culminated in the battle of Preussisch-Eylau) he spent the lull constructing a series of mutually supporting field works on the heights surrounding the town of Heilsberg. As soon as these were completed Bennigsen went on the offensive again, taking advantage of the fact that the French, certainly aware of how the Russians were occupying their time, had been misled into believing that the onus for offensive operations now fell upon them, and that he, infact, would adopt a defensive posture. Now that Danzig had fallen, the French line essentially followed the Aissarge River from the Baltic do%~n to the town of Deppen, from there it crossed to the right bank and ran a right angle to Davout's III Corps centered on Allenstein. Ney's VI Corps was pushed somewhat forward and centered on Guttstadt. It served to link Davout with the main line. Separating Ney from the Russian lines were several miles of woodland. Bennigsen took advantage of the cover this woodland offered to send his columns against Ney unobserved. If the French VI Corps could be destroyed or severely driven back, Davout would be isolated and in his turn defeated or driven back on Warsaw. Bennigsen launched a feint attack on Spanden, or in the direction of Danzig, to draw the French attention to their Passarge River defenses on their left, or away from the actual assault which would fall on their right. (This puzzled Napoleon to no end; it seemed madness to him to attempt the relief of a city that had already fallen!) By rights Ney's corps should have been destroyed. Communications between the various Russian columns, however, were impeded by the same woodland that had concealed their advance. The attacks went in piecemeal while the Marshal fought a typically tenacious and skillful withdrawal. Aside for several hundred casualties he lost 1,600 men who were cut off in Guttstadt, then reestablished his corps at Deppen. Bennigsen was furious with his subordinates. Napoleon had been planning a resumption of the campaign in mid-June once his lines of communications had been restructured on the shorter distances afforded by the fall of Danzig. Bennigsen's offensive found the French with their preparations nearly complete. Scarcely had the Russians counted their prisoners before Napoleon launched his riposte. (Anticipating the Emperor's orders Davout marched his corps on Jonkovo to support Ney's right.) This scenario finds Bennigsen contemplating a battle for Guttstadt on the morning of June 8, 1807. His scouts have reported a massing of Frenchmen behind the Passarge between Deppen and Liebstadt, and he knows that both Ney and Davout have eluded his trap. Historically he opted to fall back on Heilsberg instead, It is possible that he merely wished to stir the French to action by his attack on Ney's Corps, and to direct their pursuit onto the Heilsberg redoubts. In this way his force, outnumbered nearly two-to-one might redress the balance with favorable ground and some initiative. In any event, if this was his plan it went off like clockwork. The momentum of Murat's pursuit carried the French directly into the jaws of the Russian works. BATTLE SCENARIO 4: HEILSBERG Start Date 8-9 June End Date 1213 June First Player Coalition Supply Source: Coalition - Insterberg (N-6118) French -to Danzig (N-0135) Map Sections in Play: N and C Morale -Condition: D Movement Commands: French 9, Coalition 6 Victory Conditions: The Coalition player receives 1 victory point for each Russian strength point on the west bank of the Alle river at the end of the scenario. The French receive 1 victory point for each Coalition casualty point accumulated during the scenario. Whoever owns/occupies Heilsberg at the end of the scenario reIceives 8 victory points. Redoubts: Russian: C-3402, C-3302, C-3301. French: C-2135, C-2303, C-2306. Unit (Leader italics), Setup: (Hex Nr.) SPs Russian Set Up MG Infantry (N-2231) 4 Kamenski 5i 6 Gortchakov I (C-3005) 9i Ctr Pahlen III (C-3210) 1c Bagration (C-2807) Markov 4i Baggavut 2i Lf Kollogribov 3c Kos Don (C-2608) 3c Bennigsen (C-2906) 8 Essen III 6i Center 3a IG Constan 9i 5c 2a D Dolgoruki 1c Kos Platov (C-2809) 6c 7 Dochturov (C-2704) 4i Sacken (C-2804) Rt Ouvarov 4c 3 Titov 6i 2 Sukin 5i 14 Olsufief 5i Reserve 6a Rs Gallitzen V (C-2404) 3c MG Infantry (C-1503) March Regt 3i Prussian Set Up: MG Infantry (N-2232) 2 Rembow 3i 2 Rembow 2c Hartmann 2a Avg Kall (N-2231) (with Kamenski) 1c L'Estocq (N-1725) FK Marwitz li FK Marwitz 2c 1 Diericke 5i 1 Diericke 2c MG Cavalry (N-2131) Kohler 4c French Set Up: III Davout (C 261 1) III Morand 9i III Gudin 9i III Marulaz 2c III Friant (C-2311) 9i IV Soult (C 2306) IV St. Hilaire 9i MG Cavalry (C-2506) Guyot 2c IV Legrand (C-2205) 9i MG Infantry (C-2203) IV St. Cyr 7i VI Ney (C-2408) VI Marchand 6i VI Seroux 2a VI Colbert 1c MG Infantry (C-2309) VI Bisson 7i Napoleon (C-1909) unemployed 1C Murat (C 1505) 3C Espagne 2c IV Lasalle (C 1203) 4c 1C Nansouty 5c 2C St. Sulpice 2c MG Cavalry (C-1618) 2D Grouchy 2c 1D Latour Klein (C-1816) 3c 3D Milhaud (C-2918) 2c MG Cavalry (N-1934) Lahoussaye 2c MG Cavalry (C-1803) Durosnel lc MG Cavalry (N-1433) Lc Watier 1c Poniatowski (C-2222) P, Zayonczek 5i P Zayonczek 2c 1 [R] Victor (N-1526) 1 Lapisse 6i 1 Semannont 3a 1 Beaumont IC 1 Dupont 7i MG Infantry (N-2135) 1 Villatte 7i VIII Mortier (C 1111) VIII Dupas 8i VIII Grandjean 6i IT Taulie 5i IG Bessieres (C 1810) IG Soules 6i IG Walther 2c IG Couin 3a V Savary (C 1308) P Dombrowski 4i P Kamieniecki 6i VIII Fresia 2c V-Rs Lannes (C-2007) Gr Oudinot 9i Rs Verilier 6i Sax v. Polz 4i Sax Polenz 1c Sax Lefeb-Des 2c Etudes Militaries: Napoleon's First War Against the Tsar 1807 Roads Across Poland - A Survey The Battle of Heilsberg: History and Scenario Winter Quarters Artillery Strength in The Eagles Turn East Additions & Corrigendum Back to Art of War Issue # 26 Table of Contents Back to Art of War List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1997 by Clash of Arms Games. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com