The 1965 war taught the IAF some important lessons, and also slowed down their ambitious expansion plans. The IAF became an independent branch from the Army in 1966, and effectiveness in Close Air Support missions was improved. The importance of having quality aircraft over quantity was also learned after the 1965 debacle with the Vampires. Indigenous industry was also beginning to produce more aircraft. At the beginning of the conflict, the IAF had expanded to 33 squadrons, representing only a ten percent growth in quantity. But what is not seen is the growth in quality by the introduction of more modern types and the retirement of older aircraft. Treat IAF pilots as -1 in terms of initiative (pilot quality did improve) and use the 3rd World table for generating pilot quality.
MiG-21-FL:
Seven squadrons of MG-21s were on line at the outbreak of the 1971 conflict. These aircraft were a unique variant based on the MG-21 PF Fishbed D. The IAF felt that the PF's armament of two Atoll missiles was much too light and unsuitable for dogfighting. They had the foresight to install a gunsight and provisions for a GP-9 23mm gun pack on the centerline station. They had enough gun packs to outfit one-fourth of their MiGs at any one time during the course of the conflict. The gunpack did much for the morale of the pilots, and several kills were scored with it in the conflict. The MG-21 also proved to be a match for the Starfighter in the hands of the Indians. A case could be made for the IAF being the most successful user of the type in combat. These MiGs were also used in air-to-ground tasking, even being used to drop runway 'dibbers' in the initial strikes on Tezgaon airfield in East Pakistan. If you are considering using this type in a campaign, the squadron would have four gun packs available to it with unlimited ammo. In a combined campaign situation, roll 1-8 for an air-to-air mission and 9-10 for an air-to-ground mission. They would be treated as silver for spotting purposes and would use AA-2A IRM.
HAL Gnat:
Seven squadrons of Gnats were on line in 1971. The Gnat flew in the air-to-air role in the conflict and even flew support and strike missions over East Pakistan when PAF opposition ceased. The small size (under 30 feet) of the Gnat created fits for the PAF pilots. It was next to impossible to see, hard to hear by troops that were seemingly attacked from nowhere, and incredibly tough to shoot down because of its small target size and phenomenal maneuverability. Pakistani EWR in several instances were unable to pick up the Gnat, which led to many unsuspecting PAF planes getting bounced. Treat the Gnat as silver for spotting purposes. An improved version of the Gnat optimized for ground strike known as the Ajeet served with the IAF as well from 1976 to 1991. (WARNING: this plane is very popular amongst the Canadian garners and a lack of respect for this plane will result in a quick exit from your plane!)
Hunter:
Six squadrons of Hunters remained in service. These planes were largely supplanted by MiGs and Gnats in the air-to-air role and were now primarily used for strike duties. They would be used in an air-to-ground campaign only. Again, the Hunter did not fare well in combat in IAF hands. PAF fighters seemed to have its number and its vulnerability to ground fire caused a number of losses. In spite of this, its air-toground punch was effective and respected. Treat these planes as camouflaged. The Hunter is still used for advanced training and the IAF display team, the 'Thunderbolts,' still used them as of 1991.
Mystere IV:
Two squadrons of these aging planes remained in service in 1971. They were used for ground attack and in spite of a lack of spares and being on the brink of retirement, they acquitted themselves well. Treat them as silver.
HAL HF-24 Marut:
Three squadrons of HAL HF-24 Marut fighter-bombers served in the ground-attack role at the outbreak of hostilities. Designed in large part by Kurt Tank, the creator of the famous FW-190, the Marut was the first combat aircraft that was entirely the product of Indian industry. The Marut was in many ways a `Super Hunter'. It had a respectable ground attack capability with a 4000 pound external ordnance capacity, provision for an internal rocket pack, and the heavy strafing power of 4 Aden cannon. The Marut suffered from a prolonged gestation period (initial design-1956, first prototype flight1961, and first operational deployment-1968!) and from problems in finding a suitable engine design when the British stopped work on the original engine for the Marut. In any event, the Marut did well in the only documented incident in which it was called upon to dogfight. When two Maruts were intercepted by four Sabres, one of the Sabre pilots made the mistake of going for a head-on exchange with the Maruts. Needless to say, the Aden cannons made short work of the Sabre. The air-to-air tally stood at one kill to no losses for the Marut, which is impressive considering that its missions would have provided solid opportunities for PAF fighters to bounce some. The Marut is silver for spotting purposes, and it soldiered on into the early '80s when it was replaced by more modern strike types.
Su-7 Fitter:
Six squadrons of "Fitters" were on line at the beginning of the war. The Indian government appears to have purchased these planes because of the development troubles with the Marut. Also, the 'Fitter' was the best strike plane then available from foreign sources to the Indians. The 'Fitter' was the Soviet equivalent to the F-105. It shared the low-level tactical nuclear strike role with the 'Thud,' which called for the ability to get in low and quick. However, the 'Fitter' had several problems which became evident when it was called to operate in a conventional role. Like the Thud, the Fitter suffered from a shortage of available weapons stations. Because of the ravenous appetite of the Lyulka engine, two and many times four fuel tanks had to be carried to execute missions of longer range. This left few stations and little weight for ordnance. The Lyulka engine also suffered from a terrible case of `burner lag', which was a common problem with early afterburning designs, but this engine was by far the worst of the lot. Many seconds would elapse before the afterburner would develop its full thrust, wasting much fuel. Data indicate that 32 of the 145 Fitters in service were lost during the 15 days of the conflict-a 22% loss of the force in two weeks, which in any air force is an unacceptable attrition rate. Even though the IAF Fitters won many IAF bombing competition trophies after the war, the IAF appears to have been dissatisfied with the design. When it came time to replace these planes in the early '80's, the IAF opted for the Jaguar and MiG-23BN/MiG-27 rather than the Su-17f20/22 swing-wing successors to the Su-7. Treat these aircraft as camouflaged.
Canberra:
Three squadrons of Canberras were serving the IAF in 1971. They served in the same roles as they did in the 1965 conflict. Treat them the same as in the 1965 conflict. The Canberra served into the late '80's until it was supplanted by Jaguar and Foxbat recon aircraft.
Hawker Sea Hawk:
The Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant operated 18 of these fighters and could boost the total to 35 if need be. The Sea Hawk was a Fleet Air Arm fighter dating back to 1953 that resembled a straight-wing Hunter. In the 1965 conflict, the Vikrant saw no action, but in 1971, it was used in East Pakistan after Air Force planes knocked out Tezgaon airfield. The Sea Hawks, opposed only by a scattering of 23 and 40mm AA pieces, bombed, rocketed, and strafed shipping and port facilities in Chittagong and Cox's Bazar to help tighten the noose on East Pakistan. Sea Hawks served with the Indian navy until 1983, which is a credible record of service. Treat the Sea Hawks as camouflaged over water and uncamouflaged over land. Some interestingpossibilities can be examinedby assuming that the Vikrant and its Sea Hawks were committed in the East with PAF opposition still existent, or to the western front.
Liberation of Bangladesh 1971 Indo-Pakistan Air War
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© Copyright 1992 by J.D. Webster
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