Before we were able to go to print, the Air War came and went. Now that it is over, I would like to take this opportunity to review my Primer and see what proved true and what didn't. I will basically comment on each of the paragraphs in order. Interestingly, while many of my expert assumptions proved fairly accurate, I was way off base on others.
On gaining air superiority:
The Iraqi's themselves must be given a lot of the credit for handing us air superiority on a silver platter. It certainly need not have been as easy as it turned out. My impression is that, not only did we catch them off guard with our attacks on Jan. 17th, but for all the command and control they professed to have, it was not very flexible nor well trained.
The sudden loss of radar sites to jamming or direct attack seemed to paralyze them. They were simply overwhelmed by the rolling tide of aircraft that flooded across their borders and could not regroup or reorganize quickly enough to mount any real defense.
As I predicted, the chemical, nuclear, and fixed missile launch sites received a lot of attention first. Several major airfields were also struck immediately, primarily by the British Tornados with their JP- 233 pods. The time to respond to these attacks was in the first day or two while allied aircraft were still concentrating on the command and control system.
However, lack of direction or guidance from higher headquarters meant that for the most part the Iraqi Air Force simply sat on the ground. There didn't even seem to be an effort to mount local CAP. This is indicative of a tightly controlled and suppressed military which is not allowed any initiative. Only after several days of attacks were scattered attempts to intercept allied aircraft made. This occurred as the coalition shifted emphasis to heavily strike Iraqi air fields.
The Iraqis did a good job of repairing radar sites and/or replacing destroyed ones as fast as they could. They also used good preservation tactics by only bringing them on line for very short periods of time. However, such was their fear of Weasels and ARM missiles that if they detected any aircraft heading in their general direction within twenty miles, the sites shutdown. This of course didn't help the unfortunate Iraqi pilots who bravely tried to attack Allied aircraft. The Iraqi pilots demonstrated an awareness of U.S. electronic warfare capabilities and in most cases strived to make visual intercepts, not using their on board radars to preserve surprise, by streaking up from low level while under radar direction.
However, as most GCI radar sites were kept off the air, it fell to long range early warning radars to guide Iraqi jets. The resolution of the long range radar is poor and within five miles the blips of the Iraqi and Allied jets often merged leaving the Iraqi pilots blind at the most critical moment. While Allied jets had similar problems with AWACS, there was no hesitation about using on board radar and in almost every recorded air combat, it was the U.S. fighters that hit first, with good situational awareness and knowledge of the enemy's position.
Some very good Iraqi pilot's did make night intercept attempts almost succeeding in downing coalition jets. In one case a U.S. crew's first indication of a night intercept was the flash of a missile streaking by, followed by a visual on the afterburner plume of the enemy aircraft breaking away at close range. Apparently the missile had been fired inside minimum range. The crew reported having to launder their flight suits after that mission.
Except for the widely reported first kill of the war, which occurred at night when Capt. Steve Tate shot a Mirage FI in the face with a single Sparrow, most of the kills were scored in daytime engagements. U.S. fighter pilots; reported that in general, Iraqi pilots were not well schooled in ACM techniques, nor in weapons employment.
There were several out of envelope shots observed and some Iraqi MiG-29s fired but failed to guide their missiles to impact, breaking away early and thus losing lock-on. Air combat maneuvers in engagements were noted as being unimaginative and clumsy. One MiG was observed to split-S from low altitude into the ground (He must've heard about Tony [You'll pay, Webster]). After about the 20th kill scored against them, the
Iraqi's air activity fell off to about nil and they began to disperse their air force. As coalition precision guided bombs began to destroy Iraqi aircraft in their shelters, they began scattering aircraft off airbases and into civilian areas. Shortly, after more air to air losses, the well publicized exodus to Iran began in which over 140 tactical aircraft sought sanctuary.
In summary, lack of training and lack of coordination, and an evident lack of desire to fight a first class opponent, even over home territory, allowed the coalition to simply walk all over Iraq's obviously, over-touted airpower.
On Enemy Air Defenses:
Like the air force, the loss of command and control proved fatal to any coordinated air defense effort. AAA consisted primarily of barrage fire, shot blindly into the dark, and hopelessly out of range. Without a radar threat, coalition jets, except for the low flying Tornados, tended to stay well above AAA, using precision guided weapons dropped from 15,00 to 20,000 feet to take out their targets. SAMs were fired ballistically in many cases, and those radar SAMs which radiated were swiftly hit by the ever present Weasels with ARMs. U.S. jammers and decoy systems proved to be very effective even against radar SAMs which did get guidance. Considering the number of combat sorties that were flown, and the relatively light losses suffered by the Allies, enemy defense efforts can only be described as pathetic.
Such was the lack of coordination, or perhaps the fear of destruction, that air defense SAM units in Kuwait were noted to remain silent, even as nearby ground forces were being pounded by aircraft. Most of the U.S. combat losses which occurred, were attributed to AAA and infantry fired SAMs which were abundant everywhere along the Iraqi lines.
At least two F-16's, four A10's, two OV-10's, three AV- 8B's, an F-18, a Kuwaiti A-4, a Saudi F-5E, and a USAF EF- 111as well as several AH-64's, some H-60's and an H-47 are in my notes as having been downed over Kuwait to these defenses. These losses still amount to next to nothing considering that pre-war projections allowed for 150 allied aircraft to be lost in the first few weeks.
All other combat losses were in deep strikes behind enemy lines. The British suffered the highest proportion of losses to combat sorties and this was attributed to, and I quote: "bad luck". I believe the use of the JP-233, while effective, did force the Tornados into the barrage fire envelopes and that also cost them.
I would have believed that the ground offensive would s= earlier than it did, but certainly the application of air power was well thought out and the ground attack was held off until the right moment. Tlie weeks of bombing that occurred prior to the ground war had an devastating effect and when the ground troops pushed off, most of the Iraqi army was already defeated and demoralized by air power.
On Command and Control problems: <
I predicted more problems than actually existed. The difference in this war compared to the past was the incorporation of computerized control. Despite the fact that there were 2,000 plus aircraft from some thirteen different services and nationalities operating in theater, things went incredibly smoothly.
First of all, before the fighting started, all Allied aircraft were brought under a central command. All received orders based on a daily operations plan which originated from a single source. In this way there was no confusion and no interservice coordination required. Sectors were assigned for some missions but for the most part aircraft were applied as needed to where they were needed by a central headquarters.
The coordination was so good, that it wasn't unusual for Canadian F- 18's to be tasked to escort USAF B-52's to targets then return and refuel off British tankers in order to escort French or Kuwaiti jets coming off targets. Saudi, British, French, Canadian, and USAF jets performed CAP patrols interchangeably: all coordinating with US and Saudi AWACS as if they were working with their own people. Air traffic control was very tight but smooth.
Computerized planning in advance and superb coordination with pilots checking in at various preset points ensured that area deconfliction among friendly aircraft was always in effect [I just had to leave this sentence unedited].
There were cases reported of friendly aircraft stacked dozens deep at holding points behind our lines waiting for their turn to go in but never was there a loss of control or a problem with aircraft getting in each other's way. Helo's and A- 10's operated closely together and in some ways they operated differently. It appears that the battle area in Kuwait was divided up into grid squares in which A-10's and helos were assigned to conduct search and destroy missions. In effect, "Free-Fire Zones".
These tactics proved fairly effective.
All in all, air traffic control went smoother than I ever would have thought possible given the situation.
On Fratricide:
There were no reported incidents of air to air or ground to air friendly on friendly engagements. This can be attributed to the superb command and control efforts. Visual I.D. was not a standing rule and in several cases, AWACS authorized BVR (beyond visual range) shots against electronically identified enemy aircraft with good results.
Unfortunately, there were many cases of air to ground friendly on friendly shots. Two Marine LAVs were hit by A- 10's in the night fighting during the battle of Khafji the week prior to the ground offensive and then during the "100 hour" ground war, two British scout vehicles and a U.S. Army vehicle were hit by A-10's.
Also, during an Apache helicopter raid, a U.S. Army Battalion Commander personally engaged and destroyed two friendly armored vehicles from his helo ... not good leadership there. While all these were unfortunate events, they have happened in every war during the confusion of combat and will probably happen again in the future.
Conclusions:
Air Power was decisive in this war. Never before in the history of armed conflict, have airplanes proved so effective in battle. This can be attributed to the space-age technology involved and to the superb training of the aircrews themselves.
Precision guided weapons were extremely effective and their success was enhanced by the lack of an effective air defense on the part of the enemy. My personal belief is that, for the first time, air power has achieved what all its proponents have predicted it could, but in the past but didn't, do-either for lack of technology or lack of proper application. It makes you wonder what would have happened in 1965 had air power just been turned loose on North Vietnam instead of being hamstrung and piddled away like it was.
Before we slap ourselves on the back and congratulate everyone around about what a great job we did, I do want to point out some important facts.
- 1) Air power was decisive because it was concentrated
and employed en masse.
2) It was employed en masse because there were nine friendly Nations providing bases to operate from (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, U.A.E., Oman, England, Spain and Turkey) and six Navy aircraft Carriers on station. Also France allowed overflights of its territory for the English based B-52s.
3) Air power was decisive because there were no sanctuaries for the enemy to hide in and no restrictions except those we gave to ourselves for humanitarian reasons (baby milk not withstanding).
I just wonder if we could have done the same thing without the support of Allied basing. Can you imagine trying to stage out of England like we did against Libya. Just how many aircraft could we base in Diego Garcia? Would Turkey have helped if the Arab nations had refused basing rights? And what if Congress had succeeded in cutting heavy carriers out of the U.S. Navy ten years ago like it tried. Could you see six small through deck cruisers or helo carriers, each with a dozen Harriers, trying to pull off this Air War? Not me.
The lessons of this Air War will be many and potentially misleading. A well trained and properly equipped modem air force with all the latest technology overwhelms a second rate air force having third rate pilots and fourth rate command and control: what does it prove? We defeated an opponent that did not have its heart in the fight, nor the training to use the tools it had.
All we know is that our toys work. We did not really get a feel for how we would have to employ those toys against a first rate enemy air defense. So, even though we had a wonderful success, I think we should take the lessons in an appropriate context. The key is that our technological superiority and professionally trained military must be maintained!
Just food for thought and commentary! While I'm at it, how about you the readership writing in with what you believe some of the lessons of the war are?
Air War Over Iraq 1991
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© Copyright 1990 by J.D. Webster
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