French Impetus

Lodi is famous for the reckless rush of a French infantry column across the Adda river bridge. The column had been assembled in Lodi and led towards the bridge by Bonaparte and his Generals, who no doubt spurred them on with shouts of "Vive la Republique", although only Dupas appears to have gone further with his 2eme Carabiniers.

Commemorative coin.

Initially reaching the centre of the bridge, the head of the column was struck by Austrian canister. Historians on both sides agree the French attack nearly came to a halt under the Austrian fire. The Austrian Major Bittner writes: "Many French troops were killed by the canister fire. The head of the column faltered".

Falling back a little and with fresh troops added, the French tried to move forward twice more, but each time were halted in the centre of the bridge. The heavy cannon fire briefly created a thick pall of smoke, which obscured the column's movements, (It is conceivable that having halted the French assault in the middle of the bridge, preparations were started to move the guns away from their vulnerable positions. I However, it is unlikely, that much would have been done unless the French attack had clearly halted. An actual movement under fire or assault is unlikely). For the fourth time, they moved forward led this time by senior officers, although not Bonaparte. This time the French infantry made it, not least as the Austrians suffered from their vision being obscured by the dense smoke and so, did not see the French advance until it was too late.

This is said to be an example of French impetus and elan, but was it really? Put yourself in the position of 'a soldier at the front of the 2eme Carabinier: The Adda was about 120m broad at this point, the bridge being about 165m long. A jump of 5m from the bridge planking to either side would take you into a reasonable current in the centre of the river -- assuming you could swim. Behind you are nearly 100 ranks of infantry with another battalion close behind. You have been fired up initially by Bonaparte around the gate and the likes of Massena are urging you on; the Austrian guns appear to have fallen silent briefly and you are moving forward already; the bodies of fallen comrades can be jumped and until that point, provide some protection from the murderous canister. What would you do`? As Bittner continued: "Pressed from behind by other ranks, (the column head) could not fall back. Thus it continued its advance and reached the end of the bridge." Servan summarises the action from the French side: "The column moved off; it marched on to the bridge; surprised, the Austrians could neither understand nor believe it; in the meantime, they fired their first salvo; the column then halted, they hesitated, a long moment of uncertainty; and they began to fall back in some disorder". (A group of Generals placed themselves at the head of the column) "They called upon the soldiers' innate courage, they marched forward; the troops followed them and soon the whole column was across the Adda and they were soon putting to flight all those who opposed them." This feat of bravery is acknowledged In the Austrian Feldakten: "Realizing the danger, Generals Berthier, Massena, Cervoni and Dallemagne placed themselves at the head of the column and decided the outcome of this risky assault." This charge over the bridge is often confused with the famous events surrounding Bonaparte himself on the bridge at Arcole. However, as a recently-arrived commander of the army, Bonaparte didn't and wouldn't have been expected to lead this assault.

It was not natural elan nor impetus, but a combination of bravery, physical pressure and the gallantry of some French Generals, that retrieved the situation. Those who seek to draw some suggestion Of natural French impetus tactics from this battle are in fact extrapolating a specific set of circumstances into the general history of the French army.

Should the Austrian Gunners have used Canister or Ball?

In his book, Battle Tactics of Napoleon & His Enemies, [7] Nosworthy claims that the Austrian gunners made a fundamental tactical error in changing from hall to canister: "one of the causes of the Austrian defeat was an unthinking application of the prevalent artillery doctrine ... Had the Austrian gunners had a moment to reflect, they would have realised that they should have used ball to plough holes through the entire length of the advancing French column" (pp.5-6). Is this so?

Each Austrian gun required an operating frontage of at least 4.5m [8] which would mean that only one Austrian gun would be firing down the line of the bridge. The rest of the artillery were lined up along the riverbank, firing obliquely over a distance where Napoleon himself recommends canister in his 37th Maxim: "The advantage is less if the river is more than 600 yards wide as the canister no longer reaches the other shore ... when a river is less than 120 yards wide and you can command the opposite bank, the troops thrown over to the other side derive such advantage from the protection provided by the artillery." [9]

Despite discussing the subject on p.382 of his book, Nosworthy ignores ballistics when relating this action: All artillery of the period had a minimum range for firing ball. In the case of Austrian guns, this was about 500 paces or just over 1000 feet/330m. [10]

The initial high velocity on leaving the barrel causes the ball to rise above the horizontal and then gravity takes over to pull it back towards that line, the further point being the minimum range. As the barrel was already about 1.2m above the ground, the ball only had to rise about 0.7m to go clean over most infantry.

An example of ball fired at short range occurred at Wagram in 1809: The Austrian IR42 Erbach was formed up in Division Masses (six deep formations drawn from two companies) behind Aderklaa and faced the French assault as it spilled out from the village: "The French halted and fired a salvo of ball at the Masses, which because of the short range, mostly went high, wounding or killing all the officers' horses behind." [11]

At Lodi, to have fired ball would have meant that the projectile would have flown far over the lead troops of the French column and done nothing to halt their advance. Those behind would just climb over the bodies lying on the bridge and carry on. On a bridge of 165rn, the guns would have had to have been about 170m back from the bridge even to hit the far end of the bridge. An additional advantage for canister at Lodi was that the bridge had no side rails, which could otherwise provide some protection from the shower of canister.

One possibility might be ricochet lire, where the ball's range was extended by bouncing it on hard ground. However, that would have required the Austrian gunners to drop a ball on a bridge just 3.5m (14ft) wide at a range of 50-100 yards. From there it could have bounced anywhere although generally along the line of its previous trajectory.

Schels notes that the Austrian artillerv had to be moved back out of the effective range of French canister, so they would have used ball against the French artillery positions earlier in the day. So, possibly because of the need to change from ball, the Austrian gunners held their fire until the French infantry were about halfway across the bridge - when they poured a hail of canister into the front of the French column, which disappeared in a mass of dead bodies. Continued use of ball would have had little effect, as any fired from the sides would more probably have missed the troops and even if they hit the soldiers, their effect would have been very limited at such an angle and the probability of a hit being much less, if targeted at the head of the column.

Was The Action Necessary?

By piercing Beaulieu's cordon at Piacenza, the Po being the main barrier in the area. and knocking Liptay out of the fighting, Bonaparte forced the Austrians to pull back from the Adda and then base their operations out of Mantua. Milan had been rendered indefensible and the city's capture would have been the decisive blow: Not only would the Austrians lose a major depot, but Sardinia/Piedmont would be cut from any further help and the impact of its loss had a major psychological effect on the Austrian Court Bonaparte had scored a strategic triumph, so was the battle and bloodshed at Lodi necessary?

Clearly, the Austrians were not planning a determined defence of the town end of the bridge and were only going to hold the eastern side until nightfall, just a couple of hours after the French assault began. The key question is therefore what did Bonaparte believe, was his assessment right, and to what extent was it affected by his own requirements?

Bonaparte started out on the false assumption that the main Austrian force under FZM Beaulieu was facing him: "Bonaparte deployed and acted against a disposition of the Austrians, as he believed it to be, not as it actually was" (Schels). In it he saw his chance -- perhaps the last in this stage of the campaign -- to crush Beaulieu and cut off Colli's flank column, thereby to secure control of northwestern Italy. This objective may have clouded his assessrnent of the likely situation.

The Austrians had no realistic possibility of holding the Adda river line. Napoleon's 37th Maxim, mentioned previously, summarises the position at Lodi: "The moment that you become master of a position which commands the opposite bank, you gain many useful advantages for crossing the river, especially if that position has sufficient extent to allow you to position a large number of artillery upon it ... when a river is less than 120 yards wide and you can command the opposite bank, the troops thrown over to the other side derive such advantage from the protection provided by the artillery, that it is impossible for the enemy to prevent the establishment of a bridge" [12] or in this case getting over an existing one.

At the strategic level as mentioned previously, an anonymous Austrian officer pointed out just after the campaign: "Had Feldzeugmeister Beaulieu decided to deploy his army at Lodi to defend the line of the Adda, strong garrisons should also have been placed at Cassano and Pizzighettone. Otherwise, by moving part of their army against one of these crossing points, the French would have then been well-positioned to outflank Lodi ... Had Beaulieu taken measures to destroy the three bridges, the French could nevertheless, because they controlled the higher riverbank, easily have been able to find a good site to cross the river by means of boats and rafts. Moreover, rebuilding the bridges would not have delayed the French advance significantly. In short, the line of the Adda could not have been held for long, the French having the choice of bypassing it either between Pizzighettone and the mouth of the Adda, or along the right (southern) bank of the Po."

In fact, the French were going to require the use of a bridge - Beaulieu had done his best to ensure this: Solari, Governor, of Alessandria wrote to Bonaparte on 3rd May: "it is absolutelv impossible to furnish you with boats to form a bridge across the Po, since, as soon as his army had marched, General Beaulieu caused the bridge to be destroyed and all the boats which had been used in the construction of the said bridge of Valenza, for which there had been employed all the boats, which had been taken this way along the Tanaro, and those on the Po, which had been brought from Casale, and even the number of twenty-five from Turin, to be carried off to Pavia. By his orders, moreover, all the small boats in the environs of Valenza, there being absolutely no others, were sunk." [13] Thus Bonaparte had to use the bridge at Piacenza and would be looking for one across the Adda next.

Nevertheless, by trying to hold a series of key points along an Adda river cordon, Beaulieu would simply have been repeating the error made a few days before. The French now had the option of developing the attack along the Po, rather than the Adda, and thereby could turn an Adda cordon. However, Liptay was holding Pizzighettone (although Beaulieu didn't know this until late on the 9th) and it must have looked to the French as though he was intending to stay for the immediate future.

Dallemagne, positioned on the opposite bank of this crossing point on the 9th wrote to Bonaparte: "The enemy still occupies the town at Pizzighettone. This morning I reconnoitred my centre and right, and it did not appear to me that the enemy was making any evacuation, from the (ire which he opened upon us and the troops that he had on the ramparts ... the river Adda is broad and deep. I do not think it can be crossed without boats and all of which might be serviceable for that purpose are detained on the other side." [14]

The following day, Menard reported that the Austrians were still there in force." Were Bonaparte in fact intent on intercepting Beaulieu and cutting his links to Mantua, a move through Pizzighettone to Cremona would have been the most effective, (Beaulieu couldn't go further north as neutral Venetia lay behind the Oglio). The presence of Dallemagne at Pizzighettone suggests some consideration was being given to a crossing here, but this was a far better defensive position for the Austrians, who held the main town on their (eastern) side of the river. Going north enabled Bonaparte to head for Milan, while keeping direct contact with Beaulieu -- the latter he claimed to be his primary target when he wrote to the Directory on the 9th. Further north, Colli's whereabouts weren't certain to the French, but he was either at Milan or pulling back towards the northern Adda bridge at Cassano.

Once in the locality of Lodi early on the 10th, Bonaparte could have either screened the Lodi crossing by securing the town or make the effort to get to grips with the main Austrian army. It could be argued that Bonaparte was not aware of the Austrians' desperate situation, nor could he envisage that Beaulieu was already in Crema on the 9th. The likely presence of Ausrrian troops on all three Adda crossings may also have encouraged hirn in his belief that Beaulieu was indeed establishing a cordon on the Adda.

However, a more careful examination of the strategic situation ought to have prompted Bonaparte to change his view that the main Austrian army would give battle at Lodi. Did Bonaparte consider the effects of his strategy and the likely state of the Austrian army? Austrian historians believe he did not. Not onlv had the Austrian army little chance of resisting a French attack in the field, but its physical and morale state was so bad that it could not even hope to hold its ground behind a river, especially on the lower bank. Schels claims that: "Bonaparte guessed that the Austrian army would concentrate behind the Adda at Lodi, to contest the crossing by any means. It was on this groundless supposition that he based his attack plan and all subsequent orders."

Should Bonaparte Have Changed His View?

Only Schels contends that the French commander could have learned from sympathisers and the inhabitants of Lodi how many Austrians he faced and what defensive measures had been taken. The fact that the bridge was still intact and that Sebottendorf had made no comprehensive attempt to destroy it may have influenced the French commander's judgement. Initially, Bonaparte knew he would only have a small part of his army in Lodi for the time being, so he started positioning his artillery on the ramparts, exploiting the advantage of holding the higher bank and opening up the most intense artillery fire of the campaign. Although effective, most of Sebottendorf's force was out of range and so, it wouldn't have prevented an Austrian retreat.

However, the Austrians remained in position precisely to ensure the French did not cross the bridge to interfere with the planned withdrawal under cover of darkness. Both sides were quite possibly placing their own knowledge and viewpoint on the other side -- Sebottendorf in this situation would have marched on Milan, Bonaparte would have counterattacked while he had superior nurnbers at least to delay his opponents.

As the cannonade rumbled on, the Austrians were not so far from attaining their objective, but in the meantime, the French army had grown to 30,000 men, who had been rested under cover while the artillery duelled. They could now be thrown across the bridge. An assault across the bridge was clearly going to cost quite high casualties. Would a careful commander, who took time to sight two guns personally, not have made some effort to examine the enemy force facing him from the higher ground or buildings of Lodi town? In addition, Bonaparte's whole plan included an outflanking move by much of his cavalry. Although Beaumont's cavalry were having problems crossing the Adda to the north, the threat to their right flank did not go unnoticed by the Austrians and it had a severely damaging effect on morale.

Despite these factors, Bonaparte opted for the costly assault, only to find it was just the Austrian rearguard he was engaging. With relatively light losses, FZM Beaulieu escaped and by the end of May, stood in a good defensive position behind the Mincio near Mantua with his line of communication secured. Contrary to his confident prediction of 29th April, Bonaparte would now have to fight a series of engagements until February 1797, for much of the time with the Austrian-held Mantua fortress sitting in his rear.

Nevertheless, the loss of Milan and the reverse at Lodi did prompt Beaulieu to repeat his efforts to convince Emperor Francis of the vital importance of the Italian theatre. To drive Bonaparte out of Italy, Vienna would have to recall troops from Germany, but the emphasis is on the loss of Milan, not a tactical setback. On 15th May, Beaulieu wrote to the Emperor: "I have often said to Your Majesty that a large army is required in Italy and that it is in Italy that the outcome of this war will be decided; there is no fighting on the Rhine ... If Your Majesty has decided to recover Milan in rescuing Italy, then in order to have an effective force here, together with all those troops, who are located near to me and at Mantua, it would be necessary that all those troops here are joined by 24,000 regular troops and all the Tyrolean Jaeger and Belgian light troops, in addition to the 11 battalions which Your Majesty has designated for here, so it will be necessary to withdraw troops from your Rhine armies, to concentrate a force of about 50,000 effectives here."

Bonaparte's stunning victory over Sardinia had already prompted preparations for troops to be despatched from Germany. News of the fall of Milan and Lodi meant that as the Rhine armistice ended on 31 st May, FM Wurmser was ordered to depart from southern Germany with a force of 25,000 men to go to the aid of FZM Beaulieu. The battle certainly had some psychological effect, but only served to reinforce the effect of the loss of Milan.

Napoleon won many of his battles by having more men and artillery at the key point than his opponents, although sometimes his opponents let the opportunity slip of counterattacking while the concentration was occurring. Lodi is significant as an early example of Napoleon's use of plenty of artillery to soften up the opposition before launching the infantry attack. The Austrian losses at Lodi were significant, but not heavy: 21 officers, 2,015 men, 235 horses, 12 guns, 2 howitzers and 30 wagons. As Bouvier notes, the French casualties were about 50% more than the Austrians'. The losses were relatively heavy for no real gain, as the Austrian rearguard had achieved its purpose and Beaulieu had escaped. Throwing infantry columns against the increasingly effective artillerv of the later Wars caused increasing losses, which ultimately the French Empire would be unable to sustain. The conduct of the battle by the French and their troops was exemplary, but need Bonaparte have fought the battle or could he merely have left a small force to observe the Austrian rearguard? He was still looking for a "coup de main" to destroy the Austrian army y and thought he had the opportunity at Lodi. Nevertheless, having sent his men over the bridge, Bonaparte did not order a determined pursuit -- he set about moving on Milan.

Why No Pursuit?

There was no real effort to pursue Sebottendorf's command, despite the fact that many of Napoleon's troops had rested for some hours during the cannonade. Instead, on 15th May, Bonaparte entered Milan in triumph at the head of Massena's Division to the acclaim of the local people. His offensive outflanking manoeuvre had achieved the hoped for gain of Lombardy with its huge resources, especially important as the requirements of the Army of Italy could now be fully satisfied.

Why did the victorious French decide not to pursue? Opinions differ on the ability of the French troops to pursue for any distance. Some troops had marched more than ten leagues (about 20 miles) and night was falling. However many others had rested for some hours during the cannonade. Clausewitz has no definitive answer: "Contrary to what was expected, the French divisions did not disturb Sebottendorf's retreat. This was due either to the lack of available cavalry or to the infantry being too tired. The latter however does not seem a sound explanation, Lodi not being far from Piacenza".

Many sources agree that the Austrian cavalry fought successfully to cover the retreat. Sebottendorf reported on this to Beaulieu: "Hussars and Uhlans fought gallantly and indefatigably, despite the unfavourable terrain." However, after the French breakthrough, the Austrian infantry were in such disorder that they would have been unable to execute an orderly retreat, had the French pursued them earnestly. Sebottendorf's draft report includes a passage, which was later crossed out, stating that he tried to rally his scattered troops, but that: "they were so frightened, that I did not dare risk facing the enemy again." Most authors seem surprised by the French diliatoriness in pursuing their defeated opponents, among them, Gebler in his description of Sebottendorf's retreat, and Schels, who writes: "As darkness fell, Sebottendorf continued his retreat towards Crema. This took place in much greater order than would be expected from beaten troops, supposedly pursued by an overwhelming foe."

In later battles, Napoleon would order a vigorous pursuit, but for now he had inflicted a defeat on the Austrians and could march to Milan. There was nothing to be gained by further fighting on the eastern bank of the Adda. Thus, Bonaparte did not force Beaulieu to change his original retreat schedule. The reason why relates again to his true strategic aims and to whether the battle need actually have been fought: After the action had been won, Bonaparte kept his eye on the main prize and headed for Milan. He was more interested in gaining the city's resources for his army, now that the Austrians had evacuated it, than in the land east of the Adda or pursuing an army likely to reach the Mincio before him.

The Need to Create a Myth