John Grehan's article on the first and second (sic) sieges of Badajoz in [Napoleonic Notes and Queries, No. 2] is an interesting and, on its own terms, a reasonable piece of work except in one detail: the events that Grehan describes are in fact not the first and second sieges of Badajoz at all, but rather the second and third. Discounting a brief episode in April 1809 when the forces of Marshal Victor closed in on Badajoz and summoned it to surrender after the battle of Medellin, the first siege of the city actually took place in the period 28 January-10 March 1811. It was thus the longest that it suffered, and, in addition, the reason why Wellington had to spend so much time trying to reconquer it over the next thirteen months. As Mr. Grehan even mentions it in passing, the title of his article seems all the more extraordinary.

The events of the real first siege of Badajoz are covered in detail in Oman's History of the Peninsular War and, rather more accessibly, in David Gates's work, The Spanish Ulcer: a History of the Peninsular War (George Allen and Unwin, 1986), and it is not the present author's intention to retell them in detail here. However, a brief note would still seem to be appropriate. [1]

The first siege of Badajoz was a by-blow of the French invasion of Portugal in 1810. With Massena bogged down before the lines of Torres Vedras, Napoleon decided that help should be sent to him from the large army garrisoning southern Spain under Marshal Soult. Having recently seen off two Allied attempts to invade his dominions from the east, Soult was feeling reasonably secure, and therefore assembled a field army of some 19,000 men. Rejecting a foolhardy plan for a march on Lisbon, he instead suggested that he besiege Badajoz in the hope that this would at least cause Wellington to send back the Spanish forces that he had called in from Extremadura to help defend Lisbon in 1810, and possibly even to detach some British troops as well.

Starting from Seville, Soult marched on Badajoz at the beginning ofJanuary 1811. Though hampered by heavy rains and the sudden appearance on his left flank of a Spanish division commanded by L6pez Ballesteros, who succeeded in drawing off a large part of Soult's infantry for several weeks, the French took the weakly defended town of Olivenza, and then moved in on Badajoz. Operations began on 28 January against the southern front of the town, but under the leadership of the governor, Rafael Menacho, the Spaniards put up a fierce defence, launching several major sorties. Though the troops who had been chasing Ballesteros came up on 3 February, matter were then further complicated by the arrival of a relief force composed in part of the troops from Lisbon, whom Wellington had, as Soult predicted, sent back, and in part of the troops who had been left behind to cover the frontier. Attached to this force, which made up the Spanish Fifth Army, was Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry. In all, the whole amounted to nearly 15,000 men.

Soult was quite unable to prevent the approach of this force, which easily drove off the cavalry which had been watching the northern approaches of Badajoz, and encamped on the heights of San Cristobal (not Christoval). As the garrison of the fortress already amounted to some 5,000 men, Soult was now in serious difficulties, as was demonstrated on 7 February when a very heavy sortie by the Spaniards against the hill of San Miguel was only beaten off with considerable difficulty. Fortunately for him, however, the commander of the Fifth Army, Gabriel de Mendizdbal was a mediocre figure. Rather than using his superior numbers to harass Soult further, he simply withdrew the bulk of his forces to the heights of San Cristobal and went into camp.

Even worse, he ignored Wellington's suggestions that the heights should be fortified, made no attempt to hold the line of the Guadiana, and did not even send out proper cavalry pickets.

Once again, then, the initiative was in Soult's hands, and he lost no time in making use of his opportunity. Having first captured the fort of Pardaleras, on the night of 18 February he sent Marshal Mortier with 7,000 men across the Guadiana to the east of Badajoz by means of two pontoon bridges. The attack was launched at dawn the next day in the midst of thick fog, although this soon cleared. Whilst the French infantry assailed the front of the heights, their cavalry moved round their northern flank, routing the Spanish and Portuguese horse in the process. Taken completely by surprise though they were, the Spanish infantry at first stood firm, only suddenly to be charged in their left flank and rear by the French cavalry. After a brief attempt at resistance, the Spaniards collapsed, with the loss of 5,000 casualties and all their guns and baggage, the survivors fleeing into Badajoz or across the Portuguese frontier.

After this action - known as the battle of the river Gebora - the rest of the story does not take long to tell. Siege operations now continued with Menacho, as before, putting up fierce resistance. However, on 4 March the governor was killed whilst directing the defence, being replaced by Imaz. A breach was made in the walls between the bastions of Santiago and San Juan, and preparations made for a storm. Before it went in, however, Imaz was summoned to surrender, and promptly did so - it seems that he was certainly a man of little spirit, for he had received word that Beresford was on the way, whilst it was more than possible that an assault might yet have been driven off. Imaz was not to know this, of course, but had he managed to beat off a storm, then Soult must have been forced to withdraw for he had been receiving most alarming news of fresh Allied incursions in Andalucia. As it was, however, the fortress fell, and thus we arrive at the point where Mr. Grehan commences his narrative.

Mention of Mr. Grehan leads me back to the point of this article. Let me stress here that this is not to decry a colleague - barring its title and one or two irritating mistakes with regard to place-names, there is nothing wrong with John's article. However, it remains the case that his slip is absolutely typical of a tendency that is all too common in British work on the Peninsular War. In part because of an inability to read Spanish, and in part because of natural prediliction, British authors have all too often behaved as if the Peninsular War was restricted to the operations of the Duke of Wellington. In doing so, they completely ignore the fact that everything that Wellington did was conditioned by the general military situation of the entire Peninsula. Much more, in fact, than the Spanish guerrillas, Spanish armies such as that of Mendizabal were often vital elements in his strategy]. - hence the rage with which he greeted the battle of the river Gebora. As he wrote to his brother, Henry:

The defeat of Mendizabal is the greatest misfortune that has yet occurred to us ... As soon as our reinforcements arrived I intended to have dispatched a British force to Badajoz,which with the Spaniards would have been enough to beat Soult and raise the siege, which event ... could have had the most important consequences throughout the Peninsula. As it is, I cannot venture a sufficient force to do the business alone, and I must first try something else of greater risk and more doubtful result. In short, this defeat goes to the heart of the cause, and it would certainly have been avoided had the Spaniards been anything but Spaniards. [2]

To argue that Wellington relied on the Spanish armies does not imply an exaggerated regard for their fighting abilities, or detract from the importance of the Anglo-Portuguese forces. As the above account makes clear, the Spaniards' performance was, at best, mixed, whilst the historian who would pretend that the Spaniards could have liberated themselves from the French by their own efforts is blind indeed. However, it is only through broadening our approach that a proper understanding can be achieved of the Peninsular War, and an end put to slips such as that made by Mr. Grehan: in sum, the first British siege of Badajoz is not the same as the first siege of Badajoz, just as, pace Lady Longford, the action at Rolica was not 'the first engagement of the Peninsular War'. [3]

Notes