Wellington was in no position in June 1811 to do anything other than blockade Ciudad Rodrigo in order to make revictualling the town as difficult as possible for the French garrison. He had learned from the two abortive sieges of Badajoz, that to succeed, a well-organised siege train was needed. So, in July 1811, Major Alexander Dickson, one of his artillery officers [1] was instructed to arrange to transport the necessary ordnance, stores and engineers' tools, which had been stored on ships in the Tagus, to Ciudad Rodrigo. They were to be carried by sea as far as Oporto and then, using the very efficient transport system organised by the port wine industry, to Lamego on the Douro. From there 384 pairs of bullocks on 892 carts would carry the equipment by remote country routes to Almeida via Trancoso. [2] The land route from Lamego to Trancoso was through wild and desolate country where the French were unlikely to interfere. Security was a problem for such a complex operation as the local Portuguese and Spanish population were generally friendly to the allies, but the French army was not entirely without local support. Wellington therefore made it known that the purpose of the exercise was to repair and restore the fortifications at Almeida, blown up by the French earlier in the year. The town was, in fact, to be the principal depot for his siege train. Repairs to the fortifications were completed by 11 November. Organising transport for the siege train was only part of the problem. Having been two years on board ship the guns had deteriorated and much repair work was necessary. The mortars were too large to be towed by conventional bullock carts so special sledges were needed. Groups of the siege train moved off from the Tagus at regular intervals from 27 August. Portuguese militia provided both an escort over difficult and dangerous roads and a pool of unskilled labour as the need arose. By mid August Marmont learned about this unusual movement of stores and decided that he had better reconnoitre it. He may well have suspected that Wellington's blockade, combined with such an unusual movement of military equipment could be the prelude to an attack on Ciudad Rodrigo. Fortunately for him, it was harvest time so as a precaution, he commandeered extra provisions for the garrison at Ciudad Rodrigo. His troops had been reinforced by two new divisions from France under General Dorsenne so he had 55,000 healthy men as opposed to Wellington's 46,000 (some of whom were still suffering from the effects of the Walcheren sickness.) [3] Wellington was aware of Dorsenne's arrival but did not consider himself in a position to engage the French at this time. He aimed to keep the French in a concentrated group, thereby making their supply situation as difficult as possible, and to give the guerillas a chance to harass them. Recon One of Marmont's reconnoitring groups consisted of cavalry and horse artillery, which was quickly driven back. The other pushed in a south westerly direction came across Picton's division which was spread over 6-7 miles. The British infantry made an orderly retreat, greatly helped by the cavalry, and Wellington regrouped his troops into a stronger position. This forced Marmont to retire to the Talavera area and Dorsenne further North to the Douro. A large quantity of Allied siege stores were destroyed in this operation, but the French lost two thirds of the supplies destined for the Ciudad Rodrigo garrison. The blockade continued into October. The problems of the French garrison were not helped by Julian Sanchez's guerillas, who dominated the country between the Agueda and Salamanca, making the Ciudad Rodrigo garrison's communications with Salamanca extremely difficult. The guerillas were particularly successful when on 15 October they drove off most of the garrison's beef cattle, grazing under guard near the city walls on the day they were being inspected by Governor Renaud. The Governor was captured by the marauders and his ultimate fate is not recorded! An unenthusiastic General Barrie, being the only general officer available at the time, was appointed to succeed him. The French foraging parties commandeered a number of local pigs to compensate for the loss of the cattle. Wellington's strategy and timing for his operations depended on the disposition of the French troops. As most of his men were wintering in cantonments along the Portuguese border, he decided to persevere in the same system till the enemy should make some alteration in the disposition of his forces. He aimed to keep Marmont and Dorsenne contained, thereby ensuring that if they undertook operations elsewhere they would weaken their hold on Rodrigo. On 2 November, General Thiebalt, governor of the Salamanca garrison, with an escort of 3,400 men, managed to get 12,000 rations to the Ciudad Rodrigo garrison. Such a large body of men could not escape notice or move very fast and thus was risky. The Governor's preparations were thorough and included forbidding any Spaniard to leave Salamanca two days before the convoy started, and broadcasting a false destination for it. Wellington had anticipated such a move, and planned for the Light Division, stationed on the heights of Martiago near Rodrigo, to descend upon any sizeable force that might approach. His information was that at least three divisions were involved, so Craufurd was forbidden to take risks without reinforcements. As luck would have it, the Agueda was unfordable that day, and it was not possible to reinforce the Light Division so Thiebalt's party was able to retreat in safety. Wellington had come to the conclusion by this time that more was needed than a mere blockade. Some of the information he was receiving was based on rumour, but the general drift of it was that much of the French army was moving eastwards. He was not to know it, but these movements were in preparation for the Russian campaign. Wellington's siege train was obliged to remain at Villa da Ponte for ten weeks because of military activity to the south east, and did not reach Almeida until the 14 November. Dickson found a passable road to Almeida where the party arrived on 1 December. The city fortifications were by this time in good order, enabling the allied hardware to be parked in neat rows on the glacis. [4] He was ably supported by the Portuguese militia, who performed valuable work in repairing and making passable some of the primitive tracks en route. An advanced artillery depot was set up at Gallegos, eleven or so miles from Ciudad Rodrigo. His technicians repaired the gun carriages which had deteriorated as a result of the journey from Lamego, but he was short of specialist tradesmen. Some Portuguese craftsmen who had joined the party from the arsenal at Oporto had deserted en route. Most of the work was done locally but some new bushes were needed which had to be made in Lisbon, but were easy to transport to Almeida. Ciudad Rodrigo Ciudad Rodrigo, a strategic walled frontier town, was built on rising ground on the right bank of the river Agueda originally to protect the Roman bridge and Moorish castle. The city was surrounded by a double enceinte. [5] The interior wall was of old construction - thirty-two feet in height and described by the engineers as being of bad masonry, without flanks, with weak parapets and narrow ramparts. The exterior enclosure was a modern fausse-braie [6] of a low profile, affording little cover to the interior wall which was partially covered by its glacis. On the eastern and southern sides were ravelins [7] to the fausse-braie, but with no covered way, and no countermines. There were the suburbs outside the walled town which were enclosed by earthern retrenchments, hastily built by the Spaniards during the investment of the city in 1810. Three convents, lightly fortified by the French in 1810 lay on either flank of the suburbs with the third in the centre, just beyond the glacis. They formed part of the coordinated defence system of the city and not discrete units. The ground to the east and west of the city was (and is) generally flat but on the north side there are two strategic hills called the Greater and Lesser Tesons, vulnerable to attack. The Lesser Teson rises nearly to the level of the ramparts and the Greater Teson, 600 yards from the town, rises 13 feet above it. Colonel Belmas [8] said that the military personnel in the garrison consisted of 1818 all ranks in two battalions, one of inexperienced recruits and the other an Italian Tuscan battalion. They were supported by 163 engineers and 168 gunners. In order to protect the Northern side of the city, which had proved from experience to be the most vulnerable, the French built a small redoubt named after the city's late Governor, General Renaud. This outwork had two cannon and a howitzer. Its rear, on the slope of the hill, was closed by a low loop-holed wall with a gate in it, and by a chevaux de frise [9] on the outside. The three remaining sides had a good parapet, a ditch eight feet wide and twenty feet deep, filled with water, and very strong palisading at the foot of the counterscarp. The firepower of the redoubt was further supported by a battery of two pieces on the flat roof of the convent of San Francisco, four hundred yards to east and south of it, and by the fortified convent of Santa Cruz about seven hundred yards to the south and west. Outside the city were two fortified suburbs. One of them was on the other side of the river and connected to the main fortifications by a bridge, which was completely commanded by the guns of the southern defences. The other, San Francisco, was three hundred yards beyond the north-eastern angle of the outer works. The city contained the siege train of the Army of Portugal and so was not short of artillery and munitions, but food was short owing to the blockade. Whatever Marmont's personal thoughts on Wellington's intentions, he was obliged to act on orders from Paris despatched on the 20 November. On 13 December he sent three divisions of his infantry and a body of cavalry to the assistance of colleagues in Valencia. Others were to re-occupy the Asturias, and a further force was to patrol the province of Las Montanas. As the main ford across the Agueda was within musket range of Ciudad Rodrigo and its level could vary by up to ten feet in winter, Wellington built a trestle bridge near Marialva. It was out of range of French guns and enabled his heavy artillery to cross the river in safety. [10] Ready The bridge was ready for use by 6 January. Wellington, accompanied by Colonel Fletcher and other members of his staff, crossed the river two miles below the town to a point where they could study the city defences and plan the attack. He would have had a fair idea of the disposition of French forces and was probably aware of the problems that arose from the Emperor's remote control from Paris of his armies in the Peninsula. Speed of communication was far removed from that of the twentieth century. For example, letters and despatches took at least three weeks to travel each way. Marmont considered that the Emperor's views on Spain were based on self-deception and that because of his remoteness from the war zone, he was losing touch with reality. [11] He wrote that he: "chose to cut down the number of his troops in Spain and to order a grand movement which dislocated them for a time, precisely at the instant when he had increased the dispersion of the Army of Portugal by sending a detachment of 12,000 men against Valencia. He was undoubtedly aware that the English army was cantoned in a fairly concentrated position on the Agueda, the Coa, and the Mondego. But he had made up his mind - I cannot make out why - that the English were not in a condition to take the field: in every despatch he repeated this statement. [12] Safe passage of despatches between Valladolid, Salamanca and Rodrigo was quite a problem. Governor Barrie sent him two despatches on the 9/10 and 10/11 January informing Marmont that the city had been invested on the 8th, but neither of these were received until 14 January. King Joseph in Madrid did not receive the news of the investment until the 25 January. Why did the news take so long to arrive? Don Julian Sanchez's guerillas had such command of the roads from Rodrigo to Salamanca that no messenger could pass without a large escort. Disguised Spanish emissaries were used as messengers who had to take long detours to Salamanca and Valladolid to avoid harassment. In any case, Marmont could not believe that any-one in their right mind would invest Rodrigo under winter conditions and wrote on 13 January to Napoleon's Chief of Staff that If the English army crosses the Agueda, I would call upon the Tagus Division close to the River Tormes and the troops that General Dorsenne could supply me with. But there is not the slightest likelihood of this happening. In any case, Ciudad Rodrigo has got enough provisions to last until the harvest. [13] General Berthier, had already come to the same conclusion , writing on 13th December that - If General Wellington, after the rainy season is over [after February] should determine to take the offensive, you can then unite all your eight divisions for a battle. .... But such a move is not to be expected. The English, having suffered heavy losses, and experiencing great difficulties in recruiting their army, all considerations tend to make us suppose that they will simply confine themselves to the defence of Portugal. .... It is necessary, therefore, to wait till the crops of the present year are ripe. [June] He continued forcefully Suggestions have been made that Ciudad Rodrigo should be dismantled. The Emperor considers that this would be a great mistake; the enemy, establishing himself in that position, would be able to intercept the communications between Salamanca and Plascencia, and that would be deplorable. The English know quite well that if they press in upon Rodrigo or invest it, they expose themselves to be forced to deliver a battle - that is the last thing they want: however, if they did so expose theselves, it would be your duty to assemble your whole army and march straight at them. Like Marmont, Berthier considered the possibility of Ciudad Rodrigo falling to the English during the winter months as out of the question. Reality at eight o'clock on the evening of the 8 January was different. Governor Barrie , having paid an uneventful visit to the Renaud Redoubt without mishap, advised any one anxious about Wellington's military activities to leave the city as soon as possible. "And from this moment," he wrote in a report dated August 1812, when in captivity, "all contact with the outside world ceased." Colonel Colborne, recently posted to the Light Division from the 66th, advanced to assault the Redoubt with eight companies, two from the 43rd, four from the 52nd, two from the 95th and two from the Caçadores. Thirty men, commanded by an Engineer, were to carry fascines and ladders and twelve to carry crowbars and axes. One party was to fire on the parapets, to break in by the gate, and the rest were to cross the ditch, destroying as many palisades as possible and to storm it by escalade. When the first group gained entry to the redoubt they were to give three cheers. The cry "For England and St George" could be heard. At that signal, all firing was to cease. The movement was undetected until at a distance of fifty yards Colborne gave the word "double quick", when the trampling and jingling of the assailants' canteens betrayed their approach. The defenders had time only to discharge one cannon-shot before the leading companies opened fire and drove them from their guns. The ladders were then placed in position for the escalade, and the party descended into the ditch where they suffered some loss from shells and hand grenades. Some swarmed up the parapet, while others entered through the gate in the gorge which had been accidentally burst open by a French shell, and were in a few minutes masters of the redoubt. Four defenders escaped back to the main garrison, three were killed, and forty-nine captured. The British loss was six killed and three officers and seventeen men wounded. Colonel Colborne modestly described it as an example of success in assaults which could only be expected from high discipline and order. The French authorities reckoned that the redoubt could hold out for five days. The Light Division captured it in 20 minutes. Moorsom commented: The remarkable success of this assault was probably due to the following points: the clear conception and explanation of the plan of attack, so that each individual in charge knew what he had to do; the high discipline and order in which the plan was carried out under the eye of the officer commanding the party; and the care taken to cover the redoubt with a sheet of fire while the escalade was being made, rather than trusting to the rush of a few bayonets against many defenders. [14] George Napier confirms this: The colonel formed his party and gave his orders so explicitly, and so clearly made every officer understand what he was to do, that no mistake could possibly be made. The consequence was that in twenty minutes from the time he moved to the attack the fort was stormed and carried. The operation was anxiously watched by Wellington, Robert Craufurd and Colonel Barnard. On hearing the cheers of success, the latter, overcome by emotion, threw himself on the ground in a paroxysm of delight, in the manner of twentieth century footballers. Craufurd, standing apart, exclaimed "What's that drunken man doing?" When he realised what had happened, he remarked to a bystander that Colonel Colborne seemed to be a steady officer, high praise from a demanding taskmaster. The Colonel despatched a soldier to tell Wellington of their success. The soldier exclaimed incoherently, "I've taken the fort, Sir" to which Wellington replied laconically, "Oh, you've taken the fort, have you? Well, I'm glad to hear it," and rode off. Wellington later wrote to the Earl of Liverpool [15] The attack was very ably conducted by Lieut-Colonel Colborne, and the work was taken by storm in a short time; 2 captains and 47 men were made prisoners …. We took three pieces of cannon. I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of Lieut-Colonel Colborne, and of the detachment under his command. When the Portuguese captured the commander of the redoubt he apologetically confessed that he had been among members of the garrison who had mockingly saluted the British troops the previous day. His captors had stripped him of all his clothes except for his trousers, and he was brought before General Craufurd bleeding profusely through the nose and mouth. The General courteously expressed regret that he had no clothes he could offer him, but Tom Crawley, a well-known character in the 95th, stepped out, saying to the General, "Yer honner, I'll lend him my greatcoat if ye'll allow me." Craufurd responded, "You are very good Rifleman, let him have it." The redoubt's Sergeant, who had been stripped naked by the Caçadores, tearfully embraced his commander, but the best that the Light Division could provide as cover for him was a handkerchief offered by Captain Harry Smith. The garrison now opened a heavy artillery fire on the interior of the redoubt with shot and shell, but Colborne had pushed his force to a small stream in the hollow, south of the hill, where they were in complete safety. From here they were able to act as a covering-party for working parties. These were set to work to open out 150 yards of the old trench-work dug by the French in 1810 about 600 yards from the city. Meanwhile, others made communication trenches across the summit of the Great Teson to the Engineers' depot beyond. The work was well advanced by daylight on the 9, excavations being three feet deep and four feet wide and giving complete cover to the Allies. The operation successfully completed, the Light Division returned to their quarters on the other side of the Agueda at El Bodon. The four divisions engaged in the investment relieved one another in the trenches at about 10 am every twenty-four hours; thus the 4th relieved the 1stt on 10 January and the 3rd relieved the 4th on the 11th. Wellington laid down that troops should spend three days in quarters to compensate for 24-hour continuous tour of duty in the trenches. On the 12th the Light Division had their second spell. On this day, General Craufurd, while supervising his Division in the trenches, had his horse shot from under him, a sign of things to come. He emerged shaken but unscathed. On 9 January, the day after the capture of the Great Teson, Craufurd wrote to his wife, soothing her anxieties for his safety, but heavy with unwitting irony: El Bodon January 9th 1812 My beloved Fanny We are going to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo. For my own part as far as concerns me personally, I am very glad of it. I have been suffering dreadfully from want of occupation. The only thing that has kept me going at all has been the amusement of coursing with greyhounds. A siege is a very interesting operation of war and you need not be alarmed, for it is the least dangerous of all operations, particularly for those of the higher rank. Another thing that makes me feel pleasure in it is, that I am most desirous of getting away from the Army and that one gets away from the Army with better grace after an operation than after a long interval of inactivity and when an operation is expected. I am quite pleased therefore with the present state of things, and I expect in a few months, very few, to be with you, and to have done with this sort of life. God of heaven bless you my dearest Fanny, give my kindest love to our dear little ones, and believe me ever your most tenderly affectionate husband. ROBERT CRAUFURD [16] The weather was frosty and the wind bitter. Most of the army had no tents and were billeted in villages between two and three leagues from the city, on the south side of the Agueda. Those fording the river found that they had to splash their way through water up to their waists. Every man coming from his cantonment wore "a pair of iced breeches", and remained in this uncomfortable state throughout his tour in the trenches. To add to their discomfort, on the 15th the river was full of large blocks of ice which bruised them as they waded across. Not only this, but they were also exposed to enemy fire as they crossed so Craufurd sent some of his cavalry above the ford to protect them. By the time they reached their quarters their clothes were frozen to their bodies. The only alternative would have been to have returned to their billets via the trestle bridge at Marialva. As this was some eight miles to the west of the city (the accommodation being between eight and nine miles due south at Pastores, La Encina and El Bodon) fording the Agueda was the only option. Some of the Riflemen were with the working party, others were with the covering party to protect their colleagues from French fire and others went as near as possible to the walls of the city to dig rifle pits. The French fired salvoes of shells with long fuses into these pits. French snipers were making things difficult for those working on the fortifications on the 12th. On the following night under, cover of a dense fog, Craufurd ordered a party from the 95th Rifles, renowned on both sides of the battlefield for their marksmanship, to approach the fortress to pick off the snipers. The enemy became wise to this tactic and threw fireballs among the crouching riflemen who waited until the fires had burnt themselves out and then carried on as before. On the 13th, Wellington, aware of Marmont's activities and assuming that he could well move in their direction, consulted with Colonel Fletcher, his Chief Engineer. It was decided that, now that the Great Teson had been captured and the Allied guns were established there, the time had come to breach the city walls at the same time continuing the work on the parallels. By the time those near the fortified convent of Santa Cruz were completed, Wellington decided that the moment to storm it had arrived. This was done by 300 volunteers from the King's German Legion, together with a company from the 60th. The night of 14/15 January was lively. Unlike the Emperor and Marshal Marmont who considered the chance of the English storming the garrison as remote, Barrié, perhaps unfairly described by Marmont as 'a detestable officer,' [17] had accepted reality. He was convinced that the establishment of a second parallel on the Lesser Teson, only 200 yards from the city walls should not be allowed at any cost. The Governor organised a sortie of 500 men, all that he could spare from the garrison. His timing was skilful. The French used the cathedral tower as an observation post and like Colonel Jones, one of Wellington's engineers, had noted a bad habit developing when divisions changed over duties in the trenches. He wrote in "Sieges in Spain" that A bad custom prevailed that as soon as the division to be relieved saw the relieving division advancing, the guards and workmen were withdrawn from the trenches, and the works were left untenanted for some time during the relief, which the French could observe from the steeple of the cathedral where there was always an officer on the look-out. The convent of Santa Cruz was temporarily recaptured. Crossing the Lower Teson, the French party swept along the second parallel, where it upset the gabions, shovelled in some of the earth, and then prepared to attack the First Parallel on the Great Teson behind the Renaud Redoubt. This would have put the English batteries very much at risk had not General Graham, some of the King's German Legion, and a few workmen of the 24th and 42nd Regiments of the outgoing shift made a stand behind the parapet of the redoubt until the relieving division came to their rescue. By 4 o'clock the British batteries opened fire, continuing until nightfall. The Second Parallel was re-occupied after dark and the San Francisco outwork was stormed by 300 men of the 40th Regiment when three French guns were captured. The garrison's resistance was minimal and Barrie's men withdrew from the San Francisco suburb and also from the Santa Cruz convent. In view of the sparse manning of the main garrison, this was probably a wise move on the Governor's part. During the 15th the English batteries continued firing at the very point in the hastily repaired wall which Marshal Massena's men had breached in 1810. This exercise was successful, as the main wall and that of the fausse-braie were sufficiently weakened to make the breaches only a question of perseverance and time. The battery on the Great Teson was strengthened with the object of making a second breach three hundred yards east of the main one, and they managed to destroy some French guns as they did so. Not only was the garrison now well stocked with food but there was always the possibility that Marmont and Dorsenne might attack at any time and so Wellington was anxious to press on with his preparations to storm. The Second Parallel, once completed, had more batteries placed in it and was to be a base from which an assault could be delivered rather than the ground from which the main part of the breaching work was to take place. This was to be done from the original parallel on the Great Teson. One more battery was marked out on this hill, close to the Renaud Redoubt. It was a little lower down the slope, and slightly in advance of the three original batteries. From this new position, Wellington proposed to batter a second weak point in the enceinte, a mediaeval tower three hundred yards to the right of the original breach. As the French were concentrating on the work on the second parallel, the new battery was easily completed and armed in three days, ready to open up on the city on 18 January. The English bombardment was temporarily silenced by fog on the 16th. Work on the parallels did not stop, however, and the Light Division took their third tour in the trenches with the rifle pits and Second Parallel, from which riflemen continued firing on the embrasures and the breach. The French kept up their fire on the convent of Santa Cruz with grape and musketry, and the soldiers were unable to achieve much at that time. They were relieved at 10 am on the morning of the 17th. On the night of the 16th Wellington invited the garrison to surrender but in accordance with the Emperor's wishes, they refused to do so [18] as they had not been attacked three times. Belmas says that the garrison were expecting an assault on the night of 16/17 January. [19] By the 17th the fog had lifted and the damage to both sides became apparent. By nightfall, the upgraded battery on the Great Teson was in full blast opening up on the morning of the 18th with 32 guns. The greater breach was opened up before sundown and was regarded as ready for storming when an old tower near the Lesser Breach, 'fell like an avalanche', in the words of Governor Barrie. In his report of August 1812 Barrie suggested that this point was skilfully chosen by Wellington's engineers as "It was unique in the enceinte for the facilities which it offered for breaching and the difficulties for defence. This is the spot where the walls are lowest, the parapet thinnest, and the platforms both of the ramparts and of the fausse braie narrowest. Moreover, here was situated the gun which best flanked the original great breach." [20] A new battery was being built at this time to the rear of the Second Parallel on the Little Teson. After dark a gun and howitzer were placed there, firing at the Main Breach to prevent any repairs being done to it. The completion of the Second Parallel proved a difficult and costly business. All the energies of the British batteries were devoted to breaching. No attempt was made to subdue the fire of those parts of the enceinte which bore upon the trenches, but which were far from the points selected for the assault. The French, undisturbed by any return of fire, were able to shoot fast and furiously at the advanced works, and searched the Second Parallel from end to end. It was completed on the 18th, and two guns were brought down into a battery built on the highest point of the Little Teson, only 180 yards from the walls. An attempt to sap forward from the western end of the Second Parallel so as to get a lodgement a little nearer to the place, was completely foiled by the incessant fire of grape kept up on the sap-head. Because of many casualties among the workmen, Wellington regarded any further attempts to push forward at this point as futile. The enemy's fire on the Second Parallel was mitigated on the 16th-18th by digging rifle pits in front of the parallel, from which picked marksmen kept up a carefully aimed fusillade on the embrasures of the guns to left and right of the breach. Many artillerymen were shot through the head while serving their pieces, and the discharges became less incessant and much less accurate. But the fire of the besieged was never subdued, and the riflemen in the pits suffered very heavy casualties. The bombardment was at its peak by the 19th and Wellington, having finished reconnoitring, gave the order to attack at 7 pm that night. Since the 17th, it had become apparent that this could not be delayed much longer. The troops' morale was high; they were expecting requests to volunteer for the storming party and the Forlorn Hope. Craufurd received the order to attack while he was with his Division, who were to go off duty and not due to return until the 20th. When the division was told to remain in the trenches instead of going off duty, morale became sky high; clearly, something was afoot. Acknowledgements to: M C Spurrier , Ian Fletcher, John Hoyle and Michael Howard (Royal Green Jackets ret'd) More Robert Crauford Large Map 1 (slow: 123K) Jumbo Map 1 (very slow: 254K) Notes [1] Wellington was not in a position to promote Major Dickson after this exercise: such matters were controlled by the Master General of the Ordnance. [2] For the Portuguese and Spaniards to supply bullock carts to the English was dangerous - the French would have regarded such transactions as treachery. [3] A fever caught on the Walcheren expedition in 1809. More British troops were killed by the fever than by enemy action. [4] Glacis - The downward slope of a rampart of a covered way, extending gradually into the surrounding terrain within a distance of about 200 feet. [5] Enceinte - A wall of earth, ten to fifteen feet high, generally lined with stone or brick, surrounding a fortified place and forming its main defence. [6] Fausse-braie - A lower wall built several yards outside the main fortress wall providing shelter for riflemen or artillerymen firing against the besiegers before they entered the ditch. Once captured, it served as a means to scale the fortress walls. It might also have to provide additional protection for the main wall in a bombardment to force the besiegers to pound a breach in both walls. [7] Ravelin - A detached work composed of two faces, forming a salient angle and raised before the counterscarp (the outer slope or side of a ditch, opposite the fortress wall, usually faced with stone or brick to make the besiegers' descent into the ditch more difficult). [8] "Journal des Sieges fait ou soutenus par les fran�ais dans le Péninsule de 1807-1814" by Colonel Belmas. [9] Chevaux de frise - portable barriers equipped with sword blades etc, and used for blocking breaches. [10] Wellington was lucky. The Marialva trestle bridge was washed away by floods on 2 February - two weeks after Ciudad Rodrigo was recaptured. [11] "Il suppose vrai tout ce qu'il voudrait trouver existant." Marmont's observations on the Imperial Correspondence of February 1812 - Memoires, iv, p 512 [12] Memoires du Duc de Raguse [13] Marmont to Berthier, Valladolid, 13th January 1812. [14] "History of the 52nd Light Infantry" by Moorsom, p 156, (2nd edition) [15] Wellington's Despatches, Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool, 9 January 1812, vol 8, page 518 [16] Craufurd to his wife, 8th January 1812 [17] The consensus among the besiegers would seem to agree with this view. Tomkinson says in "Diary of a Cavalry Officer", p 124, that the governor at the time they stormed was going to dinner, and had not made his appearance for the last two days in the ramparts. Tomkinson considers that he behaved very well, but with his weak garrison could not have held out until Marmont's arrival. Kincaid's view ("Rough Sketches", p 251) was that "The governor directed much more of his attention to keeping an unremitting fire of shot and shells at the working parties in the trenches during the whole of the siege, than to a judicious defence of the breaches." A full translation of Marmont's report on the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and of his view on General Barrie is at the end of this article. [18] Belmas writes: "Lord Wellington reckoned that the breach would soon be operational and called on the governor to surrender. General Barrie replied that he and his garrison would rather be buried beneath the ruins of the city than do any such thing. He posted his troops on the ramparts and on the fausse-braie, at the same time organising frequent patrols in the trenches." [19] Belmas writes: "They worked furiously at the interior defences including the area at the foot of the breach. Beams were placed on the parapets which could be thrown on to the besiegers if they attempted to escalade." I have not yet found any reference to beams in English sources. [20] Barrie's report in the Appendix to Belmas's "Sieges", p 299. Robert Craufurd: The Final Assault Part 2 Back to Age of Napoleon No. 24 Table of Contents Back to Age of Napoleon List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master List of Magazines © Copyright 1998 by Partizan Press. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com