Wellington Issues his First Orders
(60)
'After dinner we strolled, as was our custom in the
afternoon, into the park, where the great world promenaded
every evening. Towards six o'clock, sauntering about the
walks, I encountered two Prussian aides-de-camp, who had come
from Blucher with intelligence of the advance of the French army,
pointing towards Brussels, or in that direction; we were
instantly ordered to hold ourselves in readiness to march to the
front in the morning.
'About seven o'clock, the orderlies were seen flying
about with their books, that there might be "no mistake," each in
search of his own officer, to show him the orders'.
This outline of the build-up of tension in Brussels, that
afternoon, confirms that the news had arrived there earlier in the
day. Rumours of the commencement of hostilities had spread
throughout the city by 3 p.m. Blucher's intelligence had
arrived some time before 6 p.m., as is confirmed by the
meeting with the Prussian aides-de-camp; finally, it is also
confirmed that by issuing orders between 6 and 7 p.m., Wellington
had apparently begun to take the matter seriously. By that evening,
Bonapartists in Brussels were claiming to be able to hear cannon
fire. (62)
Wellington's first orders merely called on his corps and
divisions to assemble that night and be ready to march off to what
were for most of the army as yet unspecified destinations the next
day. (63)
Dornberg's brigade of cavalry was ordered on Vilvoorde; Lt.
General the Earl of Uxbridge, commander of the seven brigades of
Reserve Cavalry, was ordered to concentrate at Ninove; the 1st
Division at Ath; the 3rd Division at Braine-le-Comte; the 4th Division at
Grammont; the 5th Division in Brussels; the Duke of Brunswick's
Corps at Vilvoorde; the Nassauers on the Louvain road; the
Hanoverian Brigade of the 5th Division at Hal; the Prince of Orange's
Corps at Nivelles; and Lord Hill's Corps at Zottegem.
The formations furthest away from Brussels would only
receive their orders that night, and thus would not be able to make
any movements until the next morning. Those nearer Brussels, being
ordered merely to assemble, were also not going to be in a position
to move to the front until the next morning.
The first crisis of the day in Brussels had occurred between
3 and 7 p.m. Once Wellington's initial orders had gone out, he had
time for reflection. At 10 p.m., he issued 'After Orders', which
instructed certain units to move somewhat further east than his first
orders had. (64)
This would appear to be in reaction to a report received
from Blucher, just received, that the French army had crossed
the Sambre, accompanied by Napoleon in person, and in which
Blucher asked the Duke for information on his movements. (65) Worse news was to follow.
Wellington, anxious not to cause anxiety to the British tourists in Brussels, nor to show any weakness to the resident Bonapartists, had maintained a calm posture throughout the day.
He insisted that all his senior officers should attend that evening's
ball organised by the Duchess of Richmond. This would
bring him two benefits.
Firstly, the air of calmness would be continued, and
secondly, he would have all his senior officers to hand that evening,
should he need them. He went to the ball about midnight, (66) but had not been there long when
news of the French advance beyond Charleroi to Quatre Bras
arrived.
This news had been carried at great haste from Braine-le-Comte
to Brussels by Lt. Sir Henry Webster of the 9th Light Dragoons, who
was attached to the Prince of Orange's staff (67) Webster had left Braine with the
message shortly after 10.30 p.m., and thanks to a change of horses
and a sense of urgency, he arrived at the Prince of Orange's
quarters before midnight.
Not finding the Prince there, he sought him at the ball, where the
message was passed on. The crucial sentence of the message
read: 'At this instant, Captain Baron de Gagern has just arrived from
Nivelles with a report that the enemy has already pushed as far as
Quatre Bras.'This message had been sent by Constant Rebeque,
from Braine about 10.30 p m. (68)
The news must have stuck the Prince like a bolt of lightning. Wellington had ordered a concentration of his forces on Nivelles which would leave the vital cross-roads at Quatre Bras unguarded and the road from Charleroi to Brussels open. Not only that, but direct communications with the Prussians in the Sombreffe position would now be cut off. This devastating news underlined the series of errors the Duke had made that day. The Prince discreetly whispered the news to the Duke, who did not want to believe his ears. (69)
Then, and apparently only then, did the full seriousness and reality of the situation finally dawn on Wellington. Napoleon had driven a wedge between the two Allied armies in the Netherlands: his intention, clearly, was to separate them and defeat them individually.
There was now no more time to lose. The Prince was sent back
to Braine-le-Comte with such haste that he left behind his sabre.
Between midnight and 1 a.m. on 16 June, the remaining officers
were sent off back to their units one by one. (70) Picton's Division was ordered to
march off at 2 a.m., instead of at 4 a.m. as had previously been the
case. (71)
Orders, as we have seen, had already been issued belatedly
to the remainder of Wellington's Army. At this hour of the night, it
was too late to do anything to accelerate their movements. The Duke
had lost vital hours from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. He could not turn the clock
back. Only those troops immediately to hand, namely Picton's
Division, could be ordered to start off earlier the coming morning.
As the Prince of Orange told Constant Rebeque: ' the Duke
first believed that the attack on Charleroi was a feint; only when the
report of the appearance of the enemy at Frasnes arrived, did he
decide to move all his forces to Quatre Bras.'(72) Wellington had made a
serious error of judgement which would have further consequences
in that campaign.
Probable Cause
It is difficult to establish with any certainty the probable cause
for this error of judgement. It seems likely that Wellington either
believed he had better information, or was expecting to receive more
accurate intelligence.
One possible cause of his lack of suitable action was his
apparent belief that the French offensive that day was a bluff
designed to cover a withdrawal into the interior of France where
Napoleon would take up a central position to oppose the projected
Allied invasion. Muffling reported the mood in Brussels that moming to
his headquarters, writing the following: (73)
'As we were not attacked yesterday, it seems that the
enemy wants only to mislead us by masking his front to hide the
movements he really intends.
'The King of France said to General Fayel who came here
yesterday, that he had reports of significant successes of the
royalists in the Vendee, and that they had taken Angers. Napoleon
himself had sent the Young Guard there, so it was feared that the
Vendee would be crushed before we begin.
'If this is really true, it could be that Napoleon wants to attract
our attention, perhaps to make us take up a position, one in the
centre, around Ste. Menehould, with the main army, so as to be able
to attack us, the Austrians and the Russians'.
Duplicity of Fouche
Another possible cause for this error of judgement was the duplicity of Fouche, the French chief of police. He had apparently promised to provide the Duke with the French plan of campaign, but then had the agent carrying it held up at the border. His memoirs read: (74)
'In such a decisive moment, my situation became just as delicate as difficult; I did not want Napoleon any more; and if he had been victorious, I would have suffered his yoke along with
the rest of France, as he would have prolonged the disastrous situation. On the other hand, I had commitments to Louis XVIII, which I was not only inclined to keep, but also which prudence
required me to guarantee. Furthermore, my agents had promised to move mountains to both Metternich and Wellington. The generalissimo [i.e. Wellington] required that I at least obtain the plan of campaign for him.
'My first thoughts? But the voice of my nation, the glory of the French army which was in my mind as much as the nation, finally the cry of honour horrified me with the idea that the word "traitor" must never appear on the epithet of the Duc d'Otrante (Fouche's title), so I
resolved to be pure. However, sides had to be taken, in such circumstances, was a statesman to be allowed no resources?
This is what I decided. I had certain knowledge that the unexpected invasion by Napoleon would most likely take place between 16 [June] and, at the latest, 18 [June]. Napoleon wanted to
fight a battle with the English army on 17 [June], separating it from the Prussians, after having pushed the latter back. He expected to be all the more successful with his plan, as Wellington, on the basis of false information, believed he would be able to put back the
commencement of the campaign until 1 July.
The success of Napoleon's undertaking thus depended on surprise. I made my moves accordingly; on the day of Napoleon's departure [from Paris to the front] I sent Madame D. . . with a message in cipher containing the plan of campaign. At the same time, I laid a number of obstacles at the place she would have to cross the border, so that she could only reach Wellington's headquarters after the event. This accounts for the inexplicable certainty of the generalissimo which
has surprised everybody and caused much speculation.'
As Fouche was the master of double dealing and deception, one cannot rely on any of his statements. However, it is known that the Duke had spies in Paris, and that he received reports from them daily, so it was possible that he was waiting for news that did not arrive.
Firstly, the timing in his report to Bathurst of 19 June, in which the Duke claimed: 'I did not hear of these events till in the evening of the 15th; and I immediately ordered the troops to prepare to march', (75) conflicts with the evidence
of Zieten, Muffling, the Prince of Orange, Jackson and the officer of
Picton's Division, examined above; and Wellington certainly did not
'immediately' order his troops to prepare to march, but rather hours
later.
As there is nothing on record that supports the veracity of his statement, what could explain it? It is clear from the above outline of the events of 15 June that Wellington must have spent a good deal of time pondering the significance of the information he was receiving.
This contrasts sharply with the actions of the Prussian headquarters staff who, being firmly of the belief the evening previously that a French invasion was probable the next morning,
had issued orders for a movement of their army to the front immediately on receipt of the news of the outbreak of hostilities.
Embarrassment?
In his report of 19 June to Bathurst, Wellington, if he was to be quite frank, would have had to admit to the Secretary of War that he had made a major error of judgement, while their Prussian rivals had made the correct decision. That would have been embarrassing to Wellington, and detrimental to his reputation as a commander. The record showed that Wellington had issued orders from 6 p.m. that evening, so that is the version the Duke told to Bathurst.
Secondly, to the statements by Wellington in response to later criticisms by the Prussian Clausewitz, which he made in his 'Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo' dated 24 September 1842. Here, he insisted that he first heard the news at 3 p.m., and not 'in the evening' es he told Bathurst. In the years between the Waterloo Campaign and the publication of this 'Memorandum', various accounts of the events had been published, including Muffling's 'History' which was first translated into English in 1816.
The latter timed the arrival of the news in Brussels as 'at half past four', (76) which, in June, is certainly not 'evening'. Not only Muffling, but also the Prince of Orange had witnessed the events of that afternoon, so how could
Wellington claim in public he had first heard the news 'in the evening'?
Zeiten
Finally, we have seen above that Zieten, shortly before 5 a.m., reported the outbreak of hostilities to Blucherin Namur. It would be strange if Zieten had not reported this to Wellington at the same time, and indeed, Zieten's Journal demonstrates that he did. (77)
As Zieten was the only person in the staff of I Prussian Corps who could write French, and as the Duke did not speak German, then there is every likelihood that the Prussian general did
personally write to the Duke. A despatch sent from Charleroi at 5 a.m. would have arrived in Brussels in three to four hours. Wellington's mention to the Duke of Feltre in his letter of 10 p.m. that day of having heard nothing from Charleroi since 9 a.m. when he received the news of the French attack on Thuin, would appear to confirm the arrival of Zieten's message.
As one of Wellington's staff officers, but not Muffling, knew that morning of the commencement of hostilities, it would seem that Wellington kept this information inside his headquarters. As the reports from the Dutch outposts was merely a confirmation and repetition of that sent by Zieten, then the next news Wellington came to hear from the front directly was that of the French breakthrough to Quatre Bras, which he received around midnight, that is, after he had written to Feltre. The weight of the evidence suggests that Wellington did indeed first hear of the French offensive from Zieten's despatch of 5 a.m. which arrived in Brussels by 9 a.m.
It is interesting to note that Siborne, in the first edition of his
'History' published in 1844, just after Wellington's 'Memorandum'
appeared, followed the Duke's line.(78)
Prussian Documents
However, there then followed an exchange of correspondence between Siborne and the Prussian General Staff in which this historian was provided with copies of various documents from the Prussian 'Kriegsarchiv'. (79)
Having examined and analysed this evidence, Siborne, in the third edition of his 'History', wrote:
(80)
'His [Zieten's] report to the Duke of Wellington arrived in Brussels at 9 o'clock in the morning'. In a footnote to that, Siborne explained:
'In the present edition I have given a somewhat more minute description of the circumstances which occurred on the morning of the 15th, and of the measures adopted by General Zieten, because I think it but due to the memory of this gallant and distinguished officer to defend him from the imputation made against him by the Rev. George Gleig, the author of a volume of the "Home and Colonial Library," entitled "The Story of Waterloo," of negligence in not having
made any communication to the Duke of Wellington of the attack of the French army'.
Thus, it seems quite certain that Wellington first heard of the outbreak of hostilities early on the morning of 15 June 1815. Rather than suffer criticism from his superiors, he made a false statement to Bathurst on 19 June. Finding it difficult to justify this false statement
in public in later years, particularly as numerous accounts of the campaign had by then been published, Wellington plumped for a time of 3 p.m. in his 'Memorandum' of 1842, written eight years after Bathurst's death.
However, the weight of the evidence supports the view that Wellington received Zieten's first report by 9 a.m. on 15 June 1815. The Duke was not going to be able to keep the promises of support he had made to Blucher that day, and he knew it.
<>An earlier version of this article originally appeared in the Waterloo
Journal
(1) Wellington, The Supplementary
Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda ot Field Marshal Arthur Duke of
Wellington, K.G., Vol X, (London 1863), p. 524.
The account of Picton's officer in Brussels, as
noted above, continues: (61)
The French Breakthrough
Conclusions
So what could explain the differences in the three versions of these events given by the Duke of Wellington, and which, if any is correct?
Footnotes
(2) Siborne, Waterloo
Letters, (London, 1891), p. 2.
(3) Gleig, Story of the
Battle of Waterloo, (London, 1861), p. 49.
(4) Gleig, The Life of Arthur
Duke of Wellington, (London, 1903), p 259.
(5) Longford, Wellington -
The Years of the Sword, (London, 1969), p 413 f
(6) Uffindell, The Eagle's
Last Triumph, (London, 1994), p. 57 and fn.
(7) Schom, One Hundred
Days, (London, 1993), p 247 f.
(8) Siborne, History of the
Waterloo Campaign, (London, 1848), p. 36 fn.
(9) De Bas & T'Serclaes de
Wommersom La Campagne de 1815 aux Pays-
Bas, (Brussels, 1908), Vol. l, p. 360 ff
(10) Militair-Wochenblatt, Vol
XXX, (Berlin, 1846), p 19 ff.
(11) Sidney, The Life of Lord
Hill, G C.B, (London, 1845), p 304
(12) Sabine (ed.), Letters of
Colonel Sir Augustus Simon Frazer, K.C.B.
(London, 1859), p 531 f.
(13) Wagner, Plane der
Schlachten und Treffen welche von der preuflischen
Armee in den Feldz gen der Jahre 1813, 14 und 15 geliefert worden (Berlin
1825), Vol. IV, p 11
(14) Neither Gurwood The
Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington
Vol. Xll (London 1838), nor Vol. VIII (London, 1847), nor Wellington Vol. X con-
tain any outgoing messages to Bathurst on the vital days of 14 to i8 June
1815 Neither are there any unpublished documents on this issue in the
Wellington Papers.
(15) Gurwood, Vol XII, p 478.
(16) Gurwood. Vol XII, p 473
(17) Militarisches, Heft 1: Januar
1896 (Leipzig), p. 252.
(18) Wellington, Vol. X, p 524.
(19) Muffling Aus meinem Leben, (Berlin ,1851), p. 221 f
(20) These reports can be found throughout Vol. X of Wellington, Supplementary Despatches.
(21) p 408ff.
(22) Militair-Wochenblatt, Vol. XXXI, (Berlin, 1847), p. 160 ff
(23) De Bas & T'Serclaes de Wommersom, Vol. l, p 360 ff.
(24) Public Records Office WO 37/12, fol. 1.
(25) British Library, Add MS 20,192 fols. 270-271.
(26) British Library Add MS 35,062, fol 358.
(27) British Library Add MS 35, 062, fol 358.
(28) Wellington, Vol. X, p. 476.
(29) Wellington, Vol X, p 477 f.
(30) Wellington, Vol. X, p 475.
(31) Muffling, p. 221.
(32)Pflugk-Harttung, Vorgeschichte der
Schlacht bei Belle-Alliance (Berlin,
1903), p. 39 f.; De Bas, Prins Frederik der Nederlanden en zijn tiid, (Schiedam,
1904) Vol. 3, Part 11, p. 517.
(33) Pflugk-Harnung, p 37.
(34) Wellington, Vol. X, p 476
(35) Wagner, Vol IV, p 11. This source
does not cite the original version of
Wellington's message. As most of the Prussian 'Kriegsarchiv' is missing, con"
sidered destroyed in the Second World War, it is now not possible to trace the
original. Furthermore, there is no copy in Gurwood, nor in Wellington, nor in
Wellington's Papers However, as this promise of support is consistent with the
orders drafted by De Lancey on 13 June, the Frasnes letter of 16 June and
assurances given by Wellington during the meeting at Brye the same day, it is
most probable that Wellington did sent such a letter to the Prussians.
(36)De Bas and T'Serclaes de
Wommersom Vol. I, p.353
(37) Charras, Histoire de la Campagne de
1815 - Waterloo (Paris, 1869), Vol I, p124 ff
(38) Ollech, Geschichte des Feldzuges
von 1815, (Berlin, 1876), p. 96
(39) Mitarisches, p 252
(40) The exact time cannot be
ascertained precisely The extract from Zieten's
Journal published in Milit%Orisches stases '2 a.m.'As the French offensive had
not commenced at that time, this must be either a transcription or printing
error; a hand wrinen '5' could be mistaken for a '2'. Zieten wrote a letter on
this subject dated 21 January 1819 in which he gives the time he heard the
cannon shots to be 3.45 a.m. This too is not correct. Zieten's message to
Blucher, quoted in Ollech, op cit., reads: 'Since 4.30 a.m., our right flank has
been under artillery, then musket fire'Zieten thus wrote his messages after
4.30 a.m., and probably around 4.45 a.m.
(41) De Bas and T'Serclaes de
Wommersom, Vol. I, p. 375.
(42) Gurwood, Vol. XII, p. 473.
(43) De Bas and T'Serclaes de
Wommersom, Vol. I, p 375,
(44) Lieut. Basil Jackson, an officer on Wellington's staff heard the news 'early on the 15th June'. See Notes and Reminiscences of a Staff Officer, (London 1903), p 12.
(45) Muffling, p. 228.
(46) Wellington, Vol. X, p. 481.
(47) British Library Add MS 34,708, fols.
265-287.
(48) WelUngton, Vol. X, p 480.
(49) Wel)ington, Vol. X, p. 481.
(50) Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague,
Coll. 66, Journal of Constant Rebeque.
(51) Wellington, Vol. X, p. 524.
(52) Jackson, p.12.
(53) United Service Journal, 1834, Part II,
p. 172.
(54)Geheimes Staatsarchiv preuflischer
Kulturbesitz, Berlin Rep. 92,
Gneisenau, A 48, fol. 32.
(55) Muffling, p. 228.
(56) Ollech, p. 96.
(57) Ollech, p. 96 f.
(58) Ollech, p 99.
(59) Ollech, p. 99 f.
(60) These can be found in Gurwood, Vol. XII, p. 472 f.
(61) United Service Journal, op cit.
(62) Muffling, p. 230.
(63) Gurwood, Vol Xll, p. 472.
(64) The after orders can be found in
Gunwood, Vo). Xll, p. 474. An analysis of
which formations were at what place when these orders were received and to
where they subsequently moved can be found in De Bas and T'Serclaes de
Wommersom, Vok I, p. 469 ff.
(65) Damitz, Vol. ), p 103, Militair-Wochenblan, Vol XXIX, (Berlin, 1845), p 11.
(66) Muffling, p. 229 f.
(67) See Waterloo Roll Call, p. 12 for
further details of this officer.
(68) De Bas and T'Serclaes de
Wommersom, Vol I, p 409 f. The authors refer
to the original messages in the Dutch archives which were destroyed in the
Second World War.
(69) Pflugk-Harnung, p. 82, fn.
(70) Waterloo Letters, p. 148
(71) See: United Service Journal, 1841,
Part II, p. 173, 'Whatever these despatches was carried by Websterl contained, the arrival of which would soon be whispered around the room, and create a sensation, no farther change was
made in the chief's arrangements as concerned us, than altering the hour of departure in the morning from four to two o'clock.'
(72) Journal of Constant Rebeque, op. cit.
(73) Pflugk-Harttung, p. 53.
(74) Fouche, Memoires de Joseph
Fouche, duc d'Orante, vol 2, (Paris, 1944) p341 ff.
(75) Gunwood, Vol. XII, p. 478
(76) Muffling, History of the Campaign . . .
in the Year 1815 (London, 1816), p. 1.
(77) See also: Historisches Jahrbuch,
Vol. XXIV, (Munich, 1903j, Pflugk-
Harnung, Die preuflische Berichterstattung an Wellington vor der Schlacht bei
Ligny, p 43 f This contains Zieten's response to an enquiry from Grolman dated
19 January 1819 asking for details of when and how the former reported the
outbreak of hostilities to Wellington, in which Zieten stated in his reply dated
21 January 1819: 'As all correspondence with Field Marshal the Duke of
Wellington had to be conducted in the French language, and, as in 1815, I did
not have an officer, whose command of the French language was good enough
to write it, I had to conduct the entire correspondence with Field Marshal the
Duke of Wellington myself; that is why there is no copy on file of the report I
sent to Brussels at 3.45 a.m. Ihe means 4.45 a.m.l on 15 June 1815 by a
Courier Jager whose name escapes me'.
(78) See Siborne, Histony of the War in
France and Belgium in 1815, First edition (London, 1844), p. 76 f.: 'It was between three and four o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th that the Duke of Wellington received information of the advance of the French Army.'
(79) British Library, Add MS 34,708, fols.
256-287.
(80) Siborne, OD. cit, 3rd edition. (London. 1848). D. 36.
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