On The Fields of Glory - The Battlefields of the 1815 Campaign by Andrew Uffindell and Michael Corum. 360 pages, illus., hardback. Published by Greenhill Books at £25.00

It made a pleasant change to read a book on the events of 1815 in the Netherlands that is this well written, presented and researched. Siborne's classic remains the best narrative ever to appear in the English language. The best analyses were those by Chesney and Ropes. Nothing published in that language in the century or more since those works were first available has superseded those classics. While Weller's work has been regarded as the best description and battlefield guide available, it now has a serious contender.

The style used by these authors, despite the occasional lapse into purple prose, makes the book as whole an interesting read, with the way that a narrative of the episodes has been complemented with quotes from participants particularly adding life to those events.

The maps and sketches are clear and informative, helping the reader to gain an overview of the situation at various crucial points in the campaign. The way in which the authors chose their source material shows, generally speaking, a solid knowledge of the material. There are also some interesting 'then and now' photos; a shame there were not more.

One-Sided?

The occasional one-sided interpretation, omission of fact or error does little to detract from the book as a whole. The odd twinge of Bonapartism -'In 1814 he, Napoleon, had been forced by treachery....to abdicate' - is a little emotive, How should one thus interpret the July 1944 bomb plot against Hitler? While 'Royalists panicked' on Napoleon's return from Elba, there is lime mention of the instability of his regime in 181 5, and the delays to Bonaparte's plans for the invasion of the Netherlands caused by the Royalist uprising in the Vendee.

Napoleon apparently 'assembled Ihis army in secret' and 'masked his troop movements, and launched 'a massive, surprise onslaught'. Reading Wellington's Dispatches, not to mention the various works by Pflugk-Hartung, De Bas and T'Serclaes de Wommersom, etc. gives a clearer perspective of Allied knowledge of French movements.

Wellington's inexplicable delays at the beginning of the campaign are, as is customary for British historians, glossed over and excused. Apparently, the Duke was being 'over-pessimistic' when he promised to come to Blucher's aid on 16 June. Of course, he would not have deceived the Prussians, would he, as that would not have been cricket, old chap, would it?

It is also pleasant to note that the authors tried hard to limit their unavoidably anglocentric perspective on certain matters. Their wish to use Dutch source material to end 'the long debate about the conduct of Wellington's Dutch-Belgian troops' is admirable, even if they seem to think that their readers 'have hitherto relied on only British, or French, or German histories'. One would assume that certain readers would also have read the Dutch histories of the campaign.

Anybody that has would know that any debate on the role of the Netherlands army in this campaign was concluded the best part of a century ago by historians such as De Bas in his Prins Frederik, as weli as in Renards earlier Response aux Allegations Anglais, not to mention in Boulger's work in English, amongst others.

Drama and Horrors

The drama and horrors of the campaign are brought home with a number of well-selected extracts from eye-witness accounts; one could certainly not accuse these authors of glorifying warfare. The human suffering, and particularly the woefully inadequate ways of dealing with the wounded are, in places, shocking to the modern reader.

Myths Included

While there is a determined effort by these authors to bring new material to light, they occasionally slip into the repetition of some of the numerous Waterloo myths that plague attempts at presenting documented historical fact.

One example of this is their account of the capture of Cambronne. Their footnote refers to Halkett's account as given in the Waterloo Letters, his original letter being in the Waterloo Correspondence in the British Library. Neither of these versions make any mention of any rude words being uttered by Cambronne when he was apparently called on to surrender.

In fact, Halkett describes the situation as follows: 'When about cutting him (Cambronne) down he called out he would surrender'. In such circumstances, it seems more likely that the Frenchman would have said words to the effect of 'please don't cut my head off, I might need it again' rather than 'merde'. Reference to the eyewitness accounts still available in the Hanoverian Archives would have helped to present a more accurate version of this episode.

The chapter of this book covering 'The Prussian March to the Battlefield' makes it quite clear that to reach the field of Waterloo, Blucher's troops encountered numerous difficulties and overcame many physical obstructions that delayed their advance. As such, the odd error of fact - a shame that the works of Lettow-Vorbeck and Pflugk-Hartung were not referred to at this point - does little to mar the chapter as a whole.

This reviewer has however always had difficulty in appreciating the incredulity with which British historians tend to regard Gneisenau's determination to obtain firm assurance from Wellington on 18 June that the Duke was actually going to make a stand at Waterloo before the Prussians would place their army out on a limb. So what if, two days earlier, the Duke had duped his Prussian allies and left them in the lurch, how could Gneisenau possibly be sceptical about Wellington's assurances this time?

Analysis Good

Uffindell's and Corum's analysis of the effects of the Prussian intervention on 18 June is very good indeed, particularly the point that the assault on Plancenoit had forced Napoleon to commit such a substantial part of his reserves that his final attack on Wellington's positions was cruciaily weakened. Would these positions have held if more of the Imperial Guard had been available to assault them? Possibly not.

While the chapter on 'I Corps in Action' rightly praises Zieten for his initiative in deciding to move in support of the Anglo-Dutch-German left instead of following his orders to march on Plancenoit, there is an annoying tendency to make damning criticism of certain decisions. With the benefit of hindsight and the perspective of a wargamer pushing his figures around a table with his God-like view of events, an armchair general might think he knows better. Often, he does not.

The way in which references to source material are presented in this book is helpful. Each chapter is followed by informative footnotes. Rather than clutter up the book with a long bibliography consisting of books not really used by the authors, there is instead a most useable list of further reading, even if a work by a certain author whose list of aliases we would all prefer never to hear again in recommended, when certain of the better Dutch and German works are not mentioned.

To sum up; Uffindell has the makings of a fine Napoleonic scholar, Corum's efforts are most praiseworthy and this book is probably the most useful guide to the battlefield ever written. As such, it is a useful purchase

Recommended to every battlefield tourist.

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On The Fields of Glory (book)
Battleground Waterloo (computer game)
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