The Guard at War

The Infantry

Text by John Grehan & Phil Gaffney,
Original Illustrations by Ian Storer


Napoleon's Guard was unquestionably the most famous, and the most feared, body of soldiers to tread the battlefields of the Napoleonic Wars. It's baptism of fire was at Marengo, a battle so nearly lost by Napoleon. At 1:00 p.m. the fighting around Marengo had reached a critical point. On the French right Ott's Austrians were pouring into the plain between Castel Ceriolo and Marengo. Into the plain marched the Grenadiers and Chasseurs of the Consular Guard. Formed in square, the Guard - less than 1,000 men - stood firm as the Austrian cavalry swept across the plain. Ott's advance was halted. The Austrians brought forward their artillery and pounded the exposed square. But the Guard's discipline held and Ott was forced to re-group before renewing his assault on the weakened French positions around Marengo. They had bought Bonaparte time for the French reinforcements to arrive, and for the First Consul to win the lost battle. The Guard had endured a terrible bombardment but had never wavered. A legend was born.

Five years was to pass before the Guard marched into battle once more and then, at Austerlitz in 1805, it was the cavalry of the Guard which was to win most of the glory. The Chasseurs and Grenadiers a Pied, along with the Grenadiers of the Royal Italian Guard, formed the reserve. They were only committed to the fray when the Pratzen heights - the tactical high ground - was in French hands and the battle effectively won. Then they were moved forward to support the attack against the compromised Allied left wing, driving it onto the Satschan meres and to destruction. This was to be the role of the Guard in all Napoleon's battles to come. This body of experienced, disciplined and highly motivated troops was to be held in reserve to form the spearhead of the masse de decision. Such was the theory, in practice, however, Napoleon proved reluctant to expose his cherished "grognards" and it was to cost him dear.

So it was a Jena a year later. The Guard stood in reserve, and there it stood throughout the battle as Napoleon defeated the Prussians without the aid of his elite. At Eylau in 1807, the battalions of the Guard remained spectators throughout much of the battle. Even though Murat's cavalry broke through the Russian centre Napoleon refused to release the Guard despite the fact that its intervention could have turned stalemate into victory. The Old Guard, the Emperor explained, was "so precious one fears to expose them."

At the decisive Battle of Wagram in 1809, the Guard infantry and cavalry, including the recently created Young Guard regiments, formed a massive central reserve. This force of all arms, along with Marmont's XI Corps and Wrede's independent division, was capable of holding its own against any enemy formation. As the battle progressed Napoleon was compelled to throw in most of his reserves, including the Fusilier-Chasseurs and Fusilier-Grenadiers which were part of the Old Guard Division.

Such was Napoleon's confidence in his Guard he eventually reduced his reserves to just the two regiments of the Grenadiers and Chasseurs a Pied out of an army of 188,000 men. It had been argued that the existence of such a corps d'elite reduced the fighting capabilities of the rest of the army. This was because the best men from each regiment were continually being drafted into the Guard. The presence of such a potent force in reserve allowed Napoleon to commit all his other troops into the battle without fear for his own security or that of the rear of the army.

Napoleon may have been justified in keeping the Guard in hand in his earlier battles. At Borodino in 1812 his determination to save his Guard cost him the chance of a significant victory and, effectively, lost him the campaign. The battle developed quickly and soon became concentrated upon the centre of the Russian line. With the outcome of the battle hanging in the balance Murat, Davout and Ney all sent appeals to Napoleon to send forward the Guard to secure victory. With the Grande Armee 1,200 miles from France, Napoleon refused to release the Guard. He replied to the requests of his Marshals with the words, "And if there should be another battle tomorrow, where will be my army to fight it?"

Napoleon therefore preserved his Guard only to lose them in the disastrous winter retreat from Moscow. Over 20,000 strong at Borodino, the Guard was reduced to less than 2,000 when it re-crossed the Elbe just six months later.

The irony of saving his Guard in battle only for it to be wasted on the march was not lost on Napoleon. In his next major engagement, at Lutzen, the Guard was to play a decisive role. The critical moment of the battle came at 6 o'clock in the evening when Napoleon launched his grand attack upon the centre of the Allied position. The attack was preceded by 70 guns of the Guard, followed by the Young Guard formed into four columns, each consisting of four battalions, with the Old Guard and the Guard cavalry in support. Capturing the villages of Rahna and Gbrschen the Guard drove the entire Allied line back in disorder, clinching a notable victory for the Emperor.

At the Battle of Bautzen, three weeks later, the Guard was again called upon to deliver the decisive blow. As usual the two Young Guard divisions, the Old Guard Division, the Guard cavalry division and the seven companies of artillery a pied and three ~ cheval, began the battle in reserve. In the afternoon of the second day of the battle the Guard artillery was brought into action against the Allied right centre. The relentless pounding of the artillery coupled with attacks all along the line caused the Allies to waver and Napoleon saw this as his opportunity to finish the battle. The Guard marched directly upon the Allied centre, driving Blucher's Prussians before them and forcing back the entire Allied line.

The twin victories of Lutzen and Bautzen caused the Allies to rethink their strategy. As a consequence, they formulated the "Trachenberg Plan" whereby any Allied army that encountered Napoleon and his Guard would retire. The other Allied forces would then concentrate upon the French rear. In agreeing upon such a plan the Allies had, in effect, conceded that they could not beat Napoleon in battle.

Dresden

However, at Dresden in August 1813, the Allies, with a vast numerical superiority, decided to chance their arm and attack the Emperor.

Throughout the afternoon of 26 August the Allies attacked the outer defences of Dresden until 5.30 in the evening, when Napoleon ordered a counter-attack. In the southern sector Mortier with the two Young Guard divisions and Ney in the centre with two divisions of the Old Guard re-captured almost all the ground lost during the afternoon. These were the greatest days of the Guard. When its columns were ordered to march to the attack every combatant on the field knew that the climax of the battle had been reached.

For the French it meant that victory was about to be won. Yet Napoleon's crown rested no more securely upon his head than did a Grenadier's bonnet. The Guard was considered invincible and it still remained to be seen what effect their defeat would have upon the morale of the French army. That moment would come at Waterloo.

As the war continued Napoleon came to rely more and more upon his Guard as the quality of his Line regiments deteriorated. Many of the junior Guard regiments themselves were forced to accept half-trained conscripts into their ranks. But wherever they fought the Guard won and by the time that Napoleon was obliged to abdicate in 1814 the Guard had acquired an awesome reputation.

The Guard's final triumph was at Ligny, two days before its demise at Waterloo. As so often in the past the main assault upon the Prussian positions was preceded by a heavy bombardment from the guns of the Guard artillery. Behind the guns the French advanced in two columns, spearheaded by the Guard. The left column was led by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Grenadiers, and the right column by the 1st Grenadiers, 1st Chasseurs, and the Sapeurs and Marins. Inevitably, the attack broke through the enemy lines. The Prussians were only saved from complete disaster by their cavalry which forced the Guard to form square. This slowed the French advance, enabling Blucher's army to retreat in reasonable order.

Waterloo

And so to Waterloo. The Guard, twenty-four battalions strong, formed Napoleon's third line, situated astride the Brussels road. At around 6 p.m. Duhesme's eight battalions of the Young Guard were called into action to hold Napoleon's right flank against the advancing Prussian VI Corps at Placenoit. The Young Guard, which included sixteen guns of the Young Guard artillery, charged into Placenoit and retook the village. But Duhesme was unable to hold onto his gains in the face of increasing Prussian pressure and Napoleon sent in his Old Guard to stabilise the situation. With the two battalions of the 1st Grenadiers in reserve, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Grenadiers and the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Chasseurs re-captured Placenoit with the bayonet.

Only 1,100 in total, these two battalions, advancing in column of companies with a frontage of just 30 men, drove back fourteen Prussian battalions, inflicting 3,000 casualties in the process. Together the Old and Young Guard held onto Placenoit until long after the battle for Mont St. Jean had been decided.

The struggle for control of the ridge of Mont St. Jean, where Wellington's Anglo-Allied army stood, reached a climax shortly after the re-capture of Placenoit. Wellington's line had sustained heavy punishment and with time running out for the French Napoleon decided to launch his final attack.

Led by Napoleon in person until less than half a mile from the Allied line, the 3rd and 4th Grenadiers and Chasseurs - seven battalions in all - began their march in a single close column. This split into two as they neared the enemy positions. Apart from two batteries of artillerie a Cheval, the attack of the Middle Guard was almost unsupported. Assailed in front and on their flanks by the Allied artillery the two columns were severely weakened as they mounted the ridge.

The Grenadiers were halted by the Allied artillery whilst the Chasseurs were caught in a semi-circle of fire from the British Guards Brigade and the 52nd Light Infantry. The Allies then charged the shaken columns and the Guards, having lost their momentum, and being unable to deploy, were driven back down the ridge.

With the repulse of the Guard the French army disintegrated. Napoleon tried to rally his forces and hold the Allied counter-attack by drawing up his remaining four Old Guard battalions in square across the Brussels road. Supported by the four duty squadrons of the Guard cavalry the 1st Grenadiers and Chasseurs blocked the road and slowed the Allied pursuit. Though surrounded by enemy cavalry and their ranks decimated by the Allied artillery the Guard retired in good order with their drums still beating.

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