D. Hamilton-Williams: The Fall of Napoleon (1994)

Arms and Armour Press 350pp 74 illus. 11 maps. Price £ 20.00 ISBN No. 1-85409-201-4

Although I haven't read this author's book on Waterloo, I am aware of the hype which surrounded New Perspectives. His second book, covering the period 1813-21, displays further worrying evidence that current trends in the popular book trade are infiltrating factual subjects. Notably, this is the American phenomenon of the new 'Name' on a certain topic, such that an author's books are bought without questioning the standard. On the well-trodden subjects these 'Names' have to be 'controversial' or bring a 'new interpretation'. David Hamilton-Williams is the current aspiring name, based on his Waterloo work, which this book's jacket proclaims caused "historians to reappraise their opinions". In the same vein, the author now anticipates that "the new information offered here will change perspectives" (p. 11).

Much recent writing has seen opinion and theory replace well- explained factual research. With their own axe to grind, such new authors seek to show they have the key to events, which has eluded all others. The books are certainly readable and often written in fluent prose, said to be analysis of considerable information. Few people have the time to research any subject, let alone 8 years of European history, and not unnaturally look for a one-stop guide. What they often get is bad research and biased theory.

To assess the value of such books, the factual basis must be established. The best starting point is the back of the book. AoN's editor has mentioned McDonnell's maxim that bibliographies should be regarded with suspicion, as they are aimed at persuading "the non- suspecting reader that the author is a monument of erudition and laboriousness". In this case, Hamilton Williams claims "many hundreds" of books on p.13 (336 to be exact) and access to archives in 7 European countries. Compare this with the footnotes. Aside from two documents in Moscow (which seem to come from recent books), all archival references are British or French. The author himself only claims to have entered British archives on p. 11. 20 German books, including the 10 volume Austria during the Wars of Liberation (translated title) are in the bibliography. The author cannot understand German, but tries to suggest he can when he says on p.27 that the Prussian war-cry changed from 'die Konig' to 'die Vaterland' neither actually takes the feminine form of 'the'!

If an author has not been entirely straight in the fundamental area of sourcing, the reliability of the narrative based on it must be less than certain. There is an arguable case for including 'further reading' in references to works incidental to the subject in hand, but claiming to read the basic works to provide credibility to the book is worthy of particular censure. Such bibliographies are becoming more prevalent in 'new writing' and the publishers, Arms and Armour are regrettably in danger of bringing themselves into disrepute by publishing such misleading claims.

Turn to the notes and we find less than 100 books cited, including 9 German language works! Those used extensively are mostly English books from the last 30 years or French patriotic histories translated into English, which often appear in quite large chunks, notably Houssaye. Look closer at Austria, the state courted by both sides -- all the footnotes are based on Rothenberg's guide Napoleon's Great Adversaries (1982), (220pp to cover the whole period) and papers in the Public Record Office in London, despite claims to have read AJP Taylor's book on the Empire, let alone the German texts. Hamilton-Williams further claims to have used the papers of Emperor Francis, Mack (disgraced after Ulm!), and Radetzky, but go to the back of Rothenberg - the citations are exactly the same and no 'archive sources' appear in the footnotes. The other papers cited in Rothenberg derive from names unfamiliar to most readers. In his acknowledgements, we find the 'Central Austrian Archives' - one of the problems of researching in Vienna is no such institution exists!

From there we pass to Metternich, whose translated memoirs Hamilton-Williams claims to have read, (one citation). Although there are at least 6 English and numerous German biographies of the man, none even makes the bibliography. Unable or not bothering to assess this central character - despite 33 index references and describing him as the architect of Austria's policies, Napoleon's marriage to Marie-Louise and the 1815 campaign (p.227) - Hamilton-Williams dismisses him as leaving "no enduring monument".

This displays an ignorance of central European politics that defies comment. Many other characters and indeed the Continental Powers' part in all this are treated in a similar way. All their plans, methods and personalities are treated with a broad brush, reduced to a few lines in Chapter 2 compared with a couple of pages for Britain.

Ho hum, same old thing about reading German you're thinking. Surely, Britain played quite a part in this - but correspondence in the PRO between the British and their Continental allies are mostly written in diplomatic French, which is closed to the author's linguistic abilities, judging from their absence from the footnotes, (except perhaps one). What of his capacity with French then? Many citations from Napoleon's Correspondence are those in Dr. Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon or are alongside text references to other recent works or translations of Houssaye's works on the 1814 & 1815 campaigns.

It can only be said with some certainty that this author has used contemporary British assessments, (some of which are cited in more recent works) which while interesting, can only be second-hand, although they are regularly cited for discussing European plans (can you imagine someone discussing British policy largely by reference to documents in Vienna or Berlin?). Add to that the recent works and you find the real basis for this book. This sorry state of affairs came about because Hamiltori-Williams did not do his research anywhere near as extensively as he claims. Consulting mainly secondary works, he fails to interpret them properly because of his own in-built bias. Not that all these sources were bad, but he has not studied or analysed them enough to know which are trustworthy and which are not. When dealing with secondary material about figures of legend, it is most important to consider the motivation and viewpoint of the author, not copy great chunks of it out.

A mere chronicle of the events from 1812 to 1821 summarising some good recent works would have its uses, and if that were all Hamilton-Williams might be forgiven for at least attempting to summarise these complex years from a British standpoint. However, we are told from the start that this is new information, new perspective, unlocking cover-ups and deceit - where is it? Here the book passes into the territory of 'here is my theory and I am going to make the evidence fit it'. Napoleon, democrat and lover of peace, was done down in a massive conspiracy. In line with the Emperor's own views, the 'corrupt ... nonentities' of Britain were the authors of his misfortune, backed by the ,useless' Bourbons and variously named foreigners.

In other words, 'I don't understand the Continentals, so I will ignore them or, (as he often does) imply their plans from British assessments'. In his enthusiasm to impress the reader by quoting classic authors from Tacitus to Machiavelli, he does not seem to have come across Housman's remark that 'Accuracy is not a virtue, it is a duty'. There are many obvious errors, such as 'King William of Prussia' (Frederick William III to the rest of us, the first William being the one proclaimed German Emperor in 1871), Habeas Corpus not meaning 'Present' but You have' the body, or Murat's 'near-victory' at Tolentino. Because many of his errors are less spectacular and confused, such as Austrian acquisition/loss of Belgium or parts of Poland, or her 1813-14 deployments, they are all the likelier to go undetected. yet although not spectacular, they are numerous. Some slips may be dismissed as mere typos (such as the dates of Poland's partitions), albeit there are too many, but we even get repeats of text, notably Napoleon's entry to Frederick the Great's tomb on pp.26 and 210 or in the footnotes of Chap.9 note 10 at Chap. 10 n. 26.

The author seeks to create a smokescreen and hide his lack of evidence, when important sections go unnoted, such as Marmont's crucial role in April 1814 on p. 121. Instead, he resorts to puffing up his apparent authority by name-dropping: not only in his extensive acknowledgements to people whose 'contributions' go unnoted in the footnotes, but we are presented with a paragraph on the medieval origins of the Habsburgs, completed by a footnote referring us to 'Personal correspondence with Archduke Otto', the current senior Habsburg. Compare that with 2/3 of a page footnote regarding the alleged murder of Berthier, which is surely for the main text, as it is supposed to show the trademark of the agents of Fouche, while the alleged orchestrator was trying to ingratiate himself generally with the Bourbons - this flimsy evidence is 'conclusive' according to this author!

The real problem with many zealous Bonapartists is that they are unable to accept that their man had failings and inconvenient facts are ignored in pursuit of the myth. Napoleon's 'setbacks', it is alleged, only began in 1812. Even then we are told a number of times that to take his army to Moscow ranks amongst his greatest achievements. To suit his belief in the Emperor's near infallibility, the author ignores Acre, Eylau and Aspern-Essling ('a strategic withdrawal' p.22) and indirectly, Trafalgar and the Peninsula. It was his growing sense of selfdelusion that led Napoleon to breach his own maxim twice by going for the enemy capital without defeating their field army.

Try telling the thousands that froze to death in Russia that marching to Moscow was a great achievement. From 1807 onwards, there was growing disillusion within France at the heavy cost of the incessant wars, but no, according to this author, everyone was behind Napoleon to the end, except those devious politicians and army commanders in co-operation with France's enemies. Those conspirators, who suit the author's case, have their unpleasant ends mentioned in contrast to Napoleon's glorious return in 1840.

It is symptomatic that any Frenchman refusing to back Napoleon or see things his way is a traitor. Treachery is a tricky concept -- if the 'traitor' achieves his aims, he is suddenly 'far sighted'. The author repeats that old chestnut of the nostalgic: 'Everything would be okay if so-and-so was here'. It was all very reminiscent of Mrs. Thatcher's resignation - nearly all of her supporters knew the game was up and their interests would be better served in different hands. The central person and their keenest supporters, unwilling to acknowledge the end has come, smell treachery everywhere and continue to believe they have popular support, distorting the real situation to suit their dreams.

Such is human nature, but the author fails to realise that human nature is ultimately self-interested. I felt like shouting it in Hamilton-Williams' ear. We are told there was some great conspiracy, but that necessarily means that all the participants are working to the same end, instead of actually furthering their own interests - i.e.: as often during the Wars, a Coalition. Worse are perhaps the 'double standards' where Napoleon's move is a master-stroke, but the Allies are unjust - the Bourbons are puppets (like the Republics in Italy); Napoleon's downfall was a coup d'etat (like Brumaire), etc. Or there are suggestions that Napoleon was some benevolent despot, doing everything for the benefit of his fellow men - but wages near permanent war and said 'What do the lives of a million men matter to someone like me'.

After 23 years of fighting and despoiling their lands, the Allies are supposed to be very nice to Napoleon and allow him to stay in power on the basis of his protestations of wanting only peace! Their conspiracy is proven by their plans for a post-war settlement (er, like Yalta?), albeit to a certain extent they hold back for fear of what may replace this marvellous Napoleon (er, like Hussein in Iraq?).

Instead of doing the research, the author litters the test with emotive words like betrayal, treachery, conspiracy and mutiny. This is all designed to reinforce the author's view that Napoleon was the innocent victim, not defeated by legitimate warlike means, but by clandestine treachery.

The author conveniently forgets the intermeshing of political with military efforts common to all efforts to achieve victory (to paraphrase Clausewitz). Say something enough times and people will believe it, seems to be the principle. To try to cover up his weak or non-existent 'proof, the author's own opinions suddenly are 'obvious' and the evidence 'conclusive'. Such attempts to cover failings are analysed and rebutted, but what is absolutely unacceptable is the use of words like 'collaborator', 'quisling' and 'only obeying orders', which have particularly unpleasant connotations from World War 2. It fast became difficult to take this author seriously.

Aside from the linguistic problem, the emphasis on Britain (with some praise for Prussia) is largely designed to bring you to pp. 205-41 the Waterloo campaign, 'the decisive battle' of the Wars. Of the 31 citations in Chapter 11 on the battle, 18 are for the author's first book! Without reading that, the accuracy of this section cannot be established.

After wading throughout the first 270 pages, this was feeling like Dimbleby's recent tome on Prince Charles. In amongst all the architecture and inner cities comes his affair with Camilla, which was the core of the Press hype. In the case of Fall of Napoleon, the hype surrounds the alleged murder of 1821, but even this fails to excite or stand up to examination.

Having been told for 270 pages of Napoleon's omniscience, we are asked to believe that he failed to see the alleged traitor in his entourage, whose existence is obvious to the author! Without even starting on his alleged evidence, Hamilton-Williams tells us on the second page of the chapter on St. Helena that Montholon did it. In a footnote, the work of Weider and his colleagues is accepted as conclusive (and then reproduced at length), the author's contribution being to 'have uncovered conclusive proof to corroborate' them. This is 'The Final Betrayal', which is the subtitle of the book, but only comprises about 8 to 10 pages in all!

If I were Moritholon's lawyer, I would feel confident that my client would be acquitted. In any 'trial', the prosecution must show a trail of evidence without gaps and assumptions. What do we read here? 'Montholon would have been able to get (the arsenic) from de Gros' (the Royalist agent of St. Helena), p.286, but all the author can say about this crucial contact is on p.282: 'We can assume Montholon eventually made contact with de Gros.' The supply of arsenic cannot even be shown. Questions at Tim Hick's talk at the National Army Museum last October revealed that even fairly basic questions by laymen on timings and levels of arsenic in Napoleon's body are highly questionable - the specialist FBI tests on alleged hair specimens and the Napoleonic Society of America's 1994 debate both returned verdicts of 'inconclusive' as to whether arsenic was even the root cause.

The British, the villains of the book, are supposed to have at least facilitated the murder, but the author himself says 'There is no existing proof in writing that the British government had any hand' in it, despite the correspondence flowing between the island and London, and the British mail interception operations, the results of which should have appeared in reports. So, no method, no fellow conspirators - Moritholon, we still hear, had the motive, but first removed other members of the entourage and ingratiated himself with Napoleon, even as far as prostituting his wife. Professor Maury of Montpelier University has recently claimed to have Montholon's 'confession' to the murder - motivated by Napoleon's seduction of the assassin's wife!

The whole book covers a vast subject and no single reader could detect all the errors/propaganda, so the only verdict must be that this book cannot be reliable, merely bias and poor research dressed up in hype. No statement can be accepted, even when supported by reference. If the book is widely read, the stock of public misinformation will soar, which cannot be desirable for the hobby. It could have been a helpful summary of this complex period, but what material is accurately summarised or points properly made, notably about the relationships between, and aims of, the Allies, especially in the event of a Napoleonic victory at Waterloo, are lost in the inaccuracies. Far from building the French Emperor up, David Hamilton-Williams is only succeeding in obscuring Napoleon's many achievements in a sludge of his own theory.

Reading this book at Christmas, the parallels with Stone's film JFK, shown on British TV at that time become clear. In the obsession to prove a conspiracy involving everyone but the victim, the subject becomes obscured, his faults ignored as he becomes a martyr - as Napoleon described himself.

Despite warnings from such as Cornwell and Hofschroer, references from Hamilton-Williams' Waterloo work have already appeared in other magazines as 'authorities' and no doubt, this book will also be repeated. As the author says himself, 'The Napoleon of Legend is not the Napoleon of History' -- which is being promoted here is accurately summed up by one of the legal Latin phrases the author is so fond of: Res Ipsa Loquitor (The facts speak for themselves).

It ends with a plug for a future book on international intrigue and intelligence services, running on from the details of the 'secret terrorist organisations' we were promised in this volume. Just one, 'The Chevaliers de la Foi' appears, detailed at the back in 7 pages after 13 text mentions - on p.85 they are a series of 'talking shops', elsewhere ruthless assassins. Another Latin phrase, which the author doesn't quote, looks appropriate for both these books: Caveat Emptor - let the buyer beware.

I am fully aware that the above is very much out of kilter with reviews of the same book in other magazines; indeed readers of March's History Today will be aware that David Hamilton William's first book in the trilogy, 'Waterloo, New Perspectives' was shortlisted for the annual Longman/History Today award. Dave's review is closely and cogently argued however, and AoN readers are invited to write in with any comments, with the proviso that any such rebuttal should address only these points - ED.

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