Propaganda Persuasion, and Espionage: Canada and America, 1763 - 1783 by Lyman Collins

The Ohio State University, Columbus Ohio, 1997 Pp. 286.

Bill Collins study Propaganda Persuasion, and Espionage, focuses on the Continental Congress's use of propaganda to influence the population of Canada during the American War for Independence. The thesis of his study is a "disagreement by technicality" (a "yes, but" caveat.) with several other historian's who have concluded that the Canada-propaganda effort (and 1775-6 military invasion of Canada.) was a failure, because the Canadians did not rally to the Americans' cause.

Bill contends that, "yes," Congress failed to persuade Canadians to join the American Revolution, "but" their subsequent 'information' campaign (or propaganda war) was successful in keeping the majority of the Canadian population from also joining British efforts to subdue the rebellion.

Collins argument is not complex, but it does require some problematic conclusions to be made. He could address these conclusions more thoroughly. The first is to confirm Congressional intent and appreciation of the Canadian situation, the second is to show a Congressional ability to make any such impact, and finally some indication of this impact should be quantifiably proven.

Establishing the clear "dual goal" intent of the Continental Congress ( 1. Canadian rebellion, or 2. at least Canadian neutrality) requires the expose' of several very difficult minds to read, or even identify. While some colonial "state governments" were showing peak colonial efficiency during this period, the Continental Congress could never be said to have been of "one mind" beyond the (arguably miraculous) agreement on a declaration of independence. Without a chief executive, the Continental Congress was entirely reliant on unwieldy committees and boards to establish and carry out all policies. This not only made goal-setting and achievement difficult, but became a source for serious discord and frequent conflicts of interest. Thus, reading the mind of the Continental Congress of this period, a nebulous mind at best, is a difficult task.

Bill addresses the possibility that there were committee oriented (not wholly congressional, and possibly individual) ulterior motives for a propaganda campaign, of either commercial or state instigated sources. For this study it must be surmised to confirm a clear goal, and also a Congressional appreciation for Canadian popular opinion must be interpreted to establish that the Congress both wanted Canadian rebellion, (accepted) and still at the same time feared a Canadian-British threat . It seems to me that if the Congress were able to mount a military invasion of Canada for the sole purpose of stimulating a Canadian Rebellion, then the likelihood of Canadian support for the British Army would be of no serious consideration. Proving congressional intent and appreciation then, is no simple task.

Still, if this intent and appreciation were readable, a Congressional ability to make any such impact must be proven. Obviously the congress showed a desire to mount an invasion of Canada but not really an ability. (The invasion was initially a joint New York-Connecticut endeavor which was "approved" by Congress, and later supported by General George Washington when the New York effort showed some promise. ) Both congress and New York proved themselves entirely incapable of logistically supporting any of that military campaign. While the states were barely able to raise their own local organized military forces and projects the continental Congress was woefully inadequate.

As the U.S. Army Historical Series describes it, "It was an inefficient military system for an organized national effort. Washington could never depend on having enough trained men or supplies." The Continental Army either lived off of locally [state] borrowed, or captured British supplies or starved. (More often than not it starved.) This example of congressional inadequacy again raises the questions: Was the Congress ever able to affect Canada? Was the "Canadian concern" one of Congress or one of New York, Connecticut, or even commercial merchants?

Finally, once matters of identifiable intent, appreciation for Canadian sentiments, and a Congressional ability are established, some indication of a "propaganda impact" must be quantifiably proven to make the study's most crucial point. The study must show that (1) the Canadians could have ever been inclined to support the British militarily and, (2) that they were influenced at all by American propaganda. I can think of no other method for proving this difficult premise, except by showing some type of quantitative data before and after the propaganda campaign. If Canadian enlistments were reported to have dropped, public opinion were to have shown some indication of change, or some other source that shows a change over time occurred, then the impact of such propaganda could be gauged or even postulated. Otherwise the premise is easily counter-argued that Canada (which was sparsely populated to begin with) might well have remained "indifferent" regardless of Congressional intent, ability or actions.

The overall concept of Propaganda Persuasion, and Espionage's "propaganda impact" is a fascinating one, and Bill's appreciation for that is no exception. His Continental Congressional Canadian question, is simple and indeed meritorious, not only from a military functional viewpoint, but also from the perspective of impacts of war on society, and society on war. As he adequately argues against these three potential counter-arguments in Propaganda Persuasion, and Espionage. I think he has proven a valuable point.

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