Steven E. Woodworth, Davis and Lee at War, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1995 Pp. xiii, 409.

In the spectrum of current military history addressing "certain characteristics that expose the cultural dimensions of war" most do so out of expressed intent. One very recent work on the American Civil War, Davis and Lee at War, by Steven E. Woodworth includes the 'cultural dimension' as a subtle "byproduct" but succeeds nonetheless in a critically important manner. The primary focus of Davis and Lee at War is to document the failure of Confederate Strategy in the East, and the command relationship between Jefferson C. Davis and Robert E. Lee, contrasting both leader's concepts of how the war should be waged.

Although Davis and Lee at War was written to show "how the lack of a unified purpose and strategy in the East sealed the Confederacy's fate," it provides some culturally rooted answers to what John Shy has termed "one of the few salient and troubling questions in the military history of the modern western world: . . . the surprising ferocity of the Civil War, with how and why Americans, against all prediction and prior experience, sustained four years of murderous combat against one another, killing almost 2 percent of their total population."

Shy focuses on direct cultural approaches to such "riddles," but answers are also evident in Woodworth's analysis. If such cultural aspects are indeed keys to the type of questions Shy has highlighted, then they should not be found only in cultural examinations. The seeds of these aspects must also be readily traceable in any military and political analysis of depth and scholarship. Davis and Lee at War is an excellent example of this premise. Woodworth's exploration of the contrasting strategic (and at times operational) views between Jefferson Davis (seeking a defensive war of attrition to outlast Northern popular support) and Robert E. Lee (seeking decisive blows to rapidly overwhelm and break the Northern will to continue) exposes equally each strategy's dependence on an undeniable cultural aspect: estimating and affecting both the Northern and Southern popular support and "collective wills" to fight. This "popular will" fully incorporates the concept of the "cultural impact on and of war. " An understanding of both how and why these men sought to wage war not only supports Shy's cultural perspective, it is foundational to it.

Before further investigating Davis and Lee at War from the perspective of "Shy's riddle," one must first recognize that while Woodworth has given an exclusive and meticulous focus on the Confederate conduct of the war, Shy has posed his question from the perspective of Union [cultural] endurance. Asking:

How could citizens of a peaceable republic, whose previous military performances fell somewhat short of the heroic, especially when facing an enemy of anything like equal strength, have found it in themselves to fight so tenaciously, so ferociously in a struggle to preserve a decentralized federal union, and - increasingly as the war went on - to liberate from legalized slavery a mutually despised people of African origins?

The solution for answering Shy's Union question with Woodworth's Confederate example is in the phrase: "facing an enemy of anything like equal strength." Indeed, the South initially was "like equal strength," however, a single most encouraging and obvious reason for the North to endure the war was its immense superiority and the inevitability of eventual success. By all reasonable, statistical, and most importantly contemporary comparisons, the South could not defeat a determined North on its own. In this sense the burden of forcing a decision lay with the South. If this position is accepted, then the "will" to endure the fight question falls by default to the South, and thus Davis and Lee at War becomes timely and fully applicable to "Shy's riddle".

At first reading, the title Davis and Lee at War appears a misnomer. Woodworth begins his analysis long before Lee's taking command of The Army of Northern Virginia. One third of the book deals with presenting Davis's personality, and his frustrated, unsuccessful experiences with the Confederate Generals in the Virginia Theater up to Lee's ascendance in June, 1862. Lee's presence is primarily peripheral, but his influence continually grows to overshadow all. Not relying on what these men said about themselves, nor what others have said about them, Woodworth has evidenced his argument in their own words and thoughts. By extracting from and expanding upon letters, personal accounts, and official records of the Confederacy, he has convincingly identified the essential concerns, undertones, and interpreted the emotional sentiments of each.

Woodworth develops Davis's character and temperament first by examining his desire to lead in the field, his political entanglements, and his ever increasing, eventually chronic, physical ailments. Woodworth gives much analysis to an often missed but foundational portion of the Lee-Davis relationship, Lee's predecessors. He stresses the errors, egos, and incapabilities of Generals Joseph E. Johnston, P. G. T. Beauregard, and others (many politically) appointed under them. He tracks the ever increasing animosity between the Confederacy's top Generals and their Commander and Chief.

The volatility of Davis's position becomes evident in knowing the political maneuvering necessary to coordinate the parochial Confederate States while simultaneously (and unsuccessfully) attempting to affect a unified military command and strategy. This "pre-Lee" depth is valuable and necessary to show the initial and developmental stages of the military and political relationships between the two men, the eventual necessity of the relationship due to the failure of others, and the personalized patterns of strategic intention each of them characteristically propounded.

Woodworth begins early in his quest to fully develop a clear picture of Davis's "defensive-attritional" strategic intentions, repeatedly pointing out, and clarifying indications of this in correspondence, word, and deed. Davis sought to carefully steward and preserve the Confederacy's warfighting/manpower resources, affecting minimal opportunistic offensive risks, and by means of Southern endurance and longsuffering surviving until the North would concede. It is here that the framework of the "cultural approach" is most readily identified. It becomes evident that Jefferson Davis, and many who also believed as he did, quickly surmised the unprecedented bloody, and ferocious nature of this "mass modern war," and sought to avoid the slaughter by refusing a costly strategy. This strategy of survival and economy of force was a popularly accepted answer to the culturally abhorrent slaughter that was steadily increasing. Despite Davis's aversion to costly warfare, he did not appreciate the fullest military capacity of the North, nor (more importantly) the equally resolute Northern "will to continue."

Davis was an able, effective, often charismatic and influential leader. Many faithfully supported him and espoused his administration, while he consistently professed his position. These same sentiments, Davis's and those he influenced, explain the Southern cultural willingness to continue and endure.

Though Davis and Lee at War is heralded as an interpretation of Confederate strategy and command, and not a biography of either man, a very fascinating Robert E. Lee emerges from Woodworth's account. Aside from the usual, to-be-expected, verification of Lee's talented leadership and military genius, Woodworth brings out (mostly through Lee's own correspondence) a politically astute and socially manipulative Lee, a Lee very adept at getting what he wanted. Woodworth's Lee is evidenced as using his gifted social skills in every category, "playing up" to Davis when necessary to achieve his own fundamentally different strategic convictions.

It is clear from Woodworth's account that Lee also understood the carnage this new type of war was producing, and also sought to avoid extreme expenditures through a more immediate termination of the war. Lee differed from Davis in his more appreciative assessment of the Northern "endurance" and escalating capacity to overwhelm the South's comparatively fragile resources.

According to Woodworth's documentation, Lee accepted the inevitability of Southern defeat in any protracted struggle. Lee rejected a war of "defensive-attrition" and aggressively sought to wage a "high-risk" war of "decisive-maneuver" to inflict high intensity (and subsequently high casualty) defeats, breaking the Northern "will" before vastly superior resources and the attritional odds became irreversible. Lee's mode of warfare was casualty intensive in the immediate sense, with the aim of preserving lives in the long run by shortening the war. Woodworth also hints that Lee's personal tolerance was wavering, thus producing a more, urgent, risky, and costly operational and tactical approach.

Davis commanded and represented a certain realm of "cultural impact" on Southern continuation of the war, but Lee had a much greater influence. Robert E. Lee came to embody, more than any other person, the Southern military and popular will to persevere and win despite the odds. Logically, from a strictly cultural perspective, and as evidenced in Woodworth's interpretation, Lee holds the best answer to Shy's riddle of "sustained ferocity" in the American Civil War. The celebrated (and certainly the hidden) categorical genius of The Robert E. Lee inspired, exhorted and enabled the South to fight so tenaciously, far beyond any reasonable, predictable levels of 'cultural endurance."

Woodworth shows how neither Davis, nor Lee were able to fully implement their own strategy, and mutual failure resulted. Lee was able, in later stages, to obtain (by concession from Davis or through outright misinformation) almost "carte blanche" authority to conduct the war in Virginia, but Davis's national and defensive strategy hindered Lee at critical moments. The failure of both "partial-strategies," which kept hope alive in the hearts and minds of the soldiers and the people, allowed the carnage to continue and even increase.

Woodworth might have paid direct attention to this question in his analysis, but the "cultural impact premise" is still evident (and almost more acceptable when based on a work that argues another point entirely). He could also have given more to substantiate his position that Lee's cases of "reckless aggression" were resultant of his "growing personal weariness to continue" and his "expressed prewar disagreement with secession." More such evidence, though not vital, would only improve Woodworth's argument.

In Davis and Lee at War, Steven E. Woodworth has brought significant new light to bear on a well covered subject. He has shown a deeper understanding of Davis, a wholly new side of Lee, the surprising nuances of their strategic relationship, and most of all he has shown us one of the most significant answers to "how and why Americans . . . sustained four years of murderous combat against one another."

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