The Late Afternoon Phase of Battle Begins
The second line of the Austro-Sardinians began to advance slowly. But the unexpected result of the encounter between the cavalries had awakened the fear that the victorious Spanish cavalry would charge the infantry in the flank or rear. For this reason, FeldmarschallLieutenant d'Aspremont, who commanded the left wing, not considering the flank sufficiently defended by the Eslavones battalions, reinforced it with the Piedmont Regiment of the second line and ordered the troops of the third echelon to fix bayonets.
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However, the Spanish cavalry did not charge again. The horsemen who returned from the pursuit rallied again at the spot where they previously had been stationed and remained inactive, despite the fact that the Regiment de la Reina, as well as the infantry next to them, suffered significant losses from artillery fire.
The cause of all this inaction was the absence of a supreme commander. Lieutenant General Gages only dealt with directing the left wing battle; the cavalry commanders felt that they had done enough and didn't see the need to support their own infantry; also they were terrified of the heavy losses that it would cost in a charge against infantry in close order on unfavorable ground. [6]
Nevertheless, there would have been sufficient time in which to renew the flght, given that this was not the final stage of sunset. [7]
It was around 4:30 in the afternoon [8] when the Austro-Sardinian infantry arrived close enough to the Spanish to open fire. The two sides volleyed with violence, but the Spanish soon began to realize that they could not resist indefinitely the excellent fire of the enemy artillery. They made up their minds then to take the batteries with the bayonet. Having once broken through, the Guards would fall on the Alt-Wallis and Roth Regiments.
The second battalion of Guadalajara and the Irish Brigade followed their example. Insensible to the murderous volleys of the enemy, the valiant Spanish Infantry continued to advance and,
including the Irish who were advancing with the Guard, were going to give battle against the Deutschmeister and Traun Regiments. The ObristWachtmeister (Senior) Louis Doxat de La Motte, from the first of the said regiments caught up in the ardor of battle, rushed on them with his battalion. There followed a furious hand-to-hand combat in his battalion, after a heroic fight, was completely Cut to pieces. Doxat fell dead and his flag was captured. [9]
In the meantime, the Guards and the battalion of Guadalajara had arrived adjacent to the enemy. The hand-to-hand fighting was terrible, of such fury that some of the dead among them were covered with numaous bayonet wounds. The Irish penetrated deeply into the line of Deutschmeister, but it was the flnal intervention of the Flanders Regiment, in support of the Guard, that decided the fight in favor of the Spanish. [10]
The Alt-Wallis and Roth regiments retreated, abandoning five pieces of artillery which the Spanish disabled. The two regiments met a little later, resisting the enemy anew. [11]
Things were going bad for the Deutschmeister Regiment, pursued closely by the Irish. The Piccolimini Regiment went in from the second line to help, while d'Aspremont fell on the right flank with 4 Sardinian battalions; this succeeded in stopping the Irish without too much difficulty. This intervention, which could have been decisive, was not better executed due to delayed orders; also, Feldmarschall-Lieutenant d'Aspremont fell gravely wounded. Encouraged, the Sardinians returned to the attack, leaving in the hands of the Spanish the Brigadier Cumiane, who was also wounded. [12]
The first line of the Austro-Sardinians, although obliged to fall back, had been able to reorganize and had resumed its position again; the seven battalions of the second line were Still intact and quick to intervene in the fight. Less favorable was the situation of the 13
Spanish battalions. They had gained a certain success thanks to their courage, but paid the cost with enormous sacrifices that made the intervention of fresh troops indespensable to confront a counterattack. Yet they took advantage of the momentary lull to put themselves in order on the conquered ground, 600 to 700 paces from their starting positions. It would be nearly 6:00 in the evening [13] ; the sun had gone down and the intense smoke impeded vision, already difficult in the pale rays of the moon.
So it can be explained, under these conditions, how the battalions of the second Spanish line were not aware of the decisive moment of the infantry attack. Before the start of the infantry action, Lieutenant General Sayve had sent ahead the first battalion of Guadalajara extending toward the first line. Under the command of Colonel Obregon, they occupied the houses closest to the pond and there these battalions remained for the rest of the attack, maybe by virtue of the orders received to defend this important point of support. [14]
There remained in the second line only the two regiments of La Corona and La Reina, deployed on the ground where the cavalry had charged. There they assembled under Lieutenant General Sayve.
Darkness fell. Sayve became more concemed with not abandoning the highway of the bridges to the enemy patrols, which were able to approach them with impunity, than with the situation of
the first line. When he gathered his last four battalions on the former lines of battle he was already abandoning the first line to its doom.
But the most serious blame for not having transformed the success of MacDonald into a decisive victory must be attributed to the Commander of the Army, Lieutenant General Gages, who
coordinated the actions and the coo peration of the different groups instead of permitting the commanders to act on their own. Finally, Gages should have chosen the decisive moment to intervene in the fighting on the right, begun with so much success, with the battalions that he had inactive on the left. Even leaving the Parma Brigade opposite the diversionary corps, he could have provided another ten battalions.
Parting from the previous point of view, the initial dispositions for the defense were more than adequate. Gages totally believed that his duty was done and had no reason to order any new measures. Also by reason of the course of events, there was no reserve left, because the second line was intended to occupy the sector to the right of the cavalry, of whose victory he had never dreamed.
Convinced of doing nothing else, the general remained completely passive, in spite of the success of the cavalry and the advance initiated by MacDonald which had created a very different
situation. This also reveals the difficulties of decision making and the slowness of their being understood. He never stated the possibility of prevailing in an offensive battle, possibly influenced by the suspicion that the fighting opposite the right wing involved only one part of the enemy army and that the true attack would threaten on the left.
In this way precious time was lost. The corps of Lieutenant General MacDonald remained without support, and, towards 7:00 in the evening was seriously exposed to an enemy counterattack vigorously undertaken by the Austro-Sardinians.
The Battle of Camposanto
[6] According to the unaddressed, undated Austrian report, the resistance encountered by the Spanish Cavalry in their pursuit was a party of Eslavones and Hussars, their participation probably having discouraged any attempt at renewed charges. The special praise given by Traun to the Eslavones after the battle is probably due to this.
[7] The Account of the Spanish Court, as well as the Rectification, both mention this with little clarity as to the reference. It was not yet dark when the regiments completed their encounter. By all appearances, the clash occurred in effect in the same position as their first deployment and it appears that only the Regiment de La Reina had met abreast of the infantry on the right.
[8] Most sources indicate 4:00 in the afternoon as the hour of the commencement of the infantry action. Actually, at this time only the artillery had begun firing. The Jager Furriel says that the line began firing "toward the 23rd, Italian hour, or 4:30 German time." There is an important paragraph in the letter of Captain Schumacher. According to him, "our pieces began to open fire at 22 (4), but the attack didn't begin until the sun was hidden."
[9] The Spanish captured a flag that, given the development of the battle, could not have belonged to any other but this battalion. According to the Account of the Spanish Court, the Irish captured two flags, one of which was later recaptured by the Austrians.
[10] These first attacks of the Spanish contain many gaps in written accounts, which sometimes conoradict with existing information on the battle. In the
Account of the Spanish Court, the troops that would seriously attacked with the Spanish Guard were the Ireland Brigade and the Flanders Regiment, however the Rectification only indicates the
attack by the Spanish Guard and the Ireland Brigade saying only that the latter followed the Guard. This reversal of reality is due to Spanish pride. The plan of Sure demonstrates that the second battalion of Guadalajara also participated in the attack; Browne and Anonymous especially highlight the heroism of the Irish.
[11] According to the Rectification the Spanish Guard had been placed some 50 paces into the first line. This agrees with the Italian account; that is, the first Austrian lines retreated some 200 paces.
[12] Browne affirms that only the attack of Piccolomini would have succeeded in reestablishing order, which confirms their light losses, although not
having cooperated in other areas.
[13] Although there are many hourly references, they rarely agree. Arvers says that the Sardinian counterattack was at 7 o'clock in the afternoon. According to the Account of the Spanish Court, the battalion of Guadalajara was captured at 7:30. In his report of February 11, Traun admits that the fire had been very intense on both sides, lasting 3 hours; that is, extending an hour and a half past sunset. This confirms that the two opponents locked in combat until at least 7:00. In conclusion, by 7:00 in the evening the fight should have developed in the following manner: 4:30 in the afternoon, the opening infantry fire; 5:00 in the afternoon, the attack of the Spanish and, from 5:30 until the fall of darkness, the bayonet fight; the half hour following serving to enable the battalions to order themselves into a continuous fire that would have lasted on both sides at least until 7:00 in the evening.
[14] Anonymous is the only one affirming that Lieutenant General Gages had ordered the occupation of the house before the battle. According to General Sure, this battalion would have changed places with the Regiment de la Corona after the cavalry charge. The published account by Arvers, probably from Gages, says word for word that one battalion occupied the house at the moment that the first lines had rushed to the attack.
No one says who gave the order; probably Lieutenant General Macdonald.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.A Turning Point In The Battle?
An Assessment of the Action So Far
The Battle of Camposanto: Part II Introduction
The Battle of Camposanto: Deployment
The Battle of Camposanto: Austro-Sardinian Counterattack
Petri: Final Words
FOOTNOTES
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© Copyright 1997 by James E. Purky
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