The Development of the Battle
Completing the deployment, the Austro-Sardinian army began the advance, obliquing to theleft with the sound of the band playing Turkish music. Barely having commenced this movement, the Spanish opened an ineffective artillery fire, given thegreat distance that separated them. The fortitude, the Austro-Sardinians advanced their heavy pieces of artillery along the highway of Camposanto and skillfully began to batter the left wing of the Spanish. Toward 2:00 in the afternoon the cannonade was at its height.
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At the same time the diversionary force advanced along the Panaro. In consequence, there was firing between the Partisans and Eslavones on one hand and on the other the Parma Brigade and the free companies on the right of the Panaro, which continued until nightfall. The Spanish report denies that this fight had much influence on the course of the battle, this would then contradict most of the plans of the battle.
Since according to these some neighboring houses near the Spanish line ended up in flames, most of the free companies located by the right bank of the Panaro took part in the fighting and as some projectiles reached as far as the bridges, 600 meters distant from the Spanish left, this would allow us to infer a vigorous battle was waged at that place and that the light troops did not give in to the Spanish. Finally, this would also explain to us the immediate reason that the Spanish could not decide in the afternoon to reinforce their right with the forces from the left.
Meanwhile, the "Corps of Battle" advanced with an unheard-of slowness. Although Marshal Traun continually demanded that the order and direction not be altered in any manner, the troops were obliged to open up to cross a ground furrowed in all directions with small trenched terraces. After two hours, that is to say, towards 4:00, they had not advanced more than 1,000 paces.
By then the right wing was practically on the highway from Camposanto to San Felice, opposite the Brigade of the right wing of the Spanish infantry; that is to say, in front of the Spanish Guards.
The Spanish Seize the Initiative
Lieutenant General MacDonald (Spanish commander in the right center position of the front line), who commanded there, decided that his Brigade should attack the enemy infantry
opposite him and that this would gain their right flank as soon as the numerically superior enemy cavalry were evicted. For that reason it was decided to advance almost 300 paces to the edge of the pond and prolong the right wing with the battalions from the second line
until they covered the open distance between the ponds and the houses.
[1]
The Spanish Guard, on the right of the second battalion of Guadalajara, advanced straight to the front, also the regiments of cavalry of Lieutenant General Atrisco, whose right wing,
extended because of the Irish Brigade, was withdrawn to the line (this being due to the priority of the Guard) and remaining some paces behind them. The Regiment de la Reina continued to the right, behind the right wing of the cavalry, in order to occupy the open expanse between the Panaro and the Migueletes.
The second line took its position behind the Cavalry; there were no more than three battalions remaining: the Regiment de la Corona and the second battalion of Guadalajara, which constituted the last reserve under the command of Lieutenant General Count Sena.
These important modifications in the deployment of the forces were carried out without any intervention from the Commander in Chief of the Army (i.e. General Gages), who had taken a position wilh the Castilla Brigade and who, from this vantage, paid little attention to the events on the right wing. [2]
After this movement of the Spanish, the two opposing armies confronted one another from a distance of only 400 paces. Then around 4:00 in the afternoon, the Austro-Sardinians began to fire their artillery pieces, inflicting heavy losses on the Spanish. While the Austro-Sardinian infantry advanced slowly in a straight line, the cavalry had advanced considerably, possibly out of a desire to fight before the setting of the sun, which was already nearly on the horizon, so that darkness would hinder the actions.
Feldmarschall-Lieutenant Payersberg had arrived now with the first line so near the Spanish cavalry that he could easily hear the orders being given within its lines. Instead of charging without hesitation, abiding by the orders of Traun to advance with the Cavalry as far as the Panaro, he ordered the first line to bend to the left as it advanced in column toward the Panaro. The frivolity of this act was inspired by their numerical superiority. Meanwhile, the
enemy squadrons remained ready to intervene, well assembled, and only 300 to 400 paces away.
Lieutenant Generals Sayve and Atrisco noticed this movement. When the Austro-Sardinians had advanced a little later sufficiently towards the Panaro to recover their front, Sayve signaled to the commander of the cavalry that they awaited the opportune moment to order the charge.
Hurled into Action
After a brief pause, Atrisco hurtled upon the enemy cavalry with the Regiment of Carabiniers and with two squadrons of Dragoons de La Reina. The Sardinian Curassier Regiment de Savoia, which was located on the extreme left, was, in the meantime, bent to the right in a column formation in order to enclose the Spanish completely so that it could take the men of Atrisco in flank as soon as their final deployment was completed.
Atrisco appreciated the danger and rushed upon the Sardinians with two squadrons from the right wing while the other three squadrons, having dispersed the Hussars de Havor, fell upon the
Cuirassiers de Miglio. Payersberg became aware of the charge too late.
Before the heavy squadron could face to the front, the Spanish were there, as the Sardinians on their side were already in night. The astonished cuirassiers attempted in vain to repulse the enemy with their fireamns. A second charge from the Regiment of Cavalry de La Reina with the third squadron from the Dragoons de La Reina succeeded in completely dispersing the first line which left behind on the field numerous dead and wounded, among them Feldmarschall-Lieutenant Payersberg, killed in the retreat while being pursued by the victorious Spanish.
The second line, which had not continued the flank movement with the first line, found itself in a position to fall on the flank and rear of the pursuers, separating them from their army, which was yet intact. Their commandant, Feldmarschall-Lieutenant Cicerin, ordered an attack immediately.
Countermeasures
Lieutenant General Sayve had anticipated this, and had taken counter measures. Beforehand, he had positioned the cavalry and advanced the second battalion de la Corona from the left wing, toward the house between the ponds, ordering them to stand firm against the enemy cavalry and not to fire until the last moment. [3]
Thanks also to the foresight of Lieutenant General Mariani, commander of the left wing, he arrived at that moment with the Dragoons of Sagunto. Mariani had noted that the regiment was not needed and had ordered Field Marshal de la Torre in support with the remainder of the cavalry. De la Torre followed the cavalry of Atrisco, which were probably hidden from the view of the Austro-Sardinians. [4]
When Cicerin arrived in the vicinity of the pond, the Spanish battalions hurled an unexpected fusillade of musketry with a disasterous effect that upset the entire Austro-Sardinian line. De la Torre took advantage of the moment and he fell upon the enemy cavalry which offered little resistance to the dragoons. Losses were heavy. Feldmarschall-Lieutenant Cicerin fell wounded on the spot and the second line retreated in disorder.
So the battle began with the defeat of the Austro-Sardinian cavalry, something which neither of the two sides had counted on. Before proceeding with the attack on the infantry, the cavalry was already in full flight and some isolated horsemen arrived at Mirandola The only general unwounded, General Feldwachtmeister Saint Pierre, gathered the remains of the regiments with much difficulty, and with these he later returned to the bield of battle around 6:00 in the
evening, when it was already dark, without the strength to be of much influence on the course of the battle. His day's work was over.
The Spanish cavalry had gained a complete victory, so much more surprising considering that the allies were much more numerous in cavalry, even excluding the 600 horse detached on the right wing and after the infantry line had reduced much of the difference. The intervention of the dragoons of Sagunto and the musketry of the battalion de la Corona was decisive, without which the victory may possibly have been, in the end, that of the Austro-Sardinians.
Although the Spanish reports do not highlight this as much, the just recommendation in truth had a reflection in the extraordinary honors conceded to the commander of the dragoons de Sagunto and Field Marshal de La Torre, sent to Madrid with the trophies, promoted to Lieutenant Generals and created Marquees of Camposanto, so that they were inclined to believe afterwards that they were the true conquerors. [5]
Eight standards, two kettledrums, and many officers and soldiers, among them the wounded Cicerin, fell into the hands of the Spanish.
The defeat of the cavalry represented an unhappy beginning to the battle that didn't quite have an effect on the infantry. For Marshal Traun exhorted them to stand flrm on the ground with his harangue, "Forget that the cavalry flees. You, valiant fellows, follow me! In Italy, you don't conquer with the Cavalry - but the infantry!"
The Battle of Camposanto
[1] This change in the disposition of the force is confused, in the documents hitherto named, with the rear advance culminating in a bayonette attack. However we can deduce from the plan of General Sure, and also partly from the account of Anonymous, that this modification had taken place before the battle began, at which hour, the Ireland Brigade had already joined the right wing. The Spanish accounts do not say a word about
this movement, mainly because it subsequently displeased Lieutenant General Gages or because, due to a feeling of national pride, they have attempted to minimize the magnificent actions of the Irish in the battle and attribute all merit to the Spanish Guards. Evaluating the events fairly, you arrive at the conclusion that Lieutenant General Macdonald should have advanced as far as the edge of the pond before the action of the infantry and before the charge of the cavalry, because the infantry clash took place to the north of this line, although the cavalry action developed to the east and to the north of the pond, something only possible if the Spanish occupied the ground on both sides of the pond before the clash. If having waited for the opponent in the original position, the infantry action would have occurred on the line from the pond to the cavalry southeast of this.
[2] Anonymous informs us that Lieutenant General Gages stationed himself prior to the battle on the right wing, with the flrst battalion of Guadalajara, which received the order to occupy a house on the edge of the pond, and, later, to return to the centa where it stayed for the remainder of the battle. From the exposition of General Sure, it appears clearly that this battalion occupied this house only after the charge. According to the account of the Court of Spain, confirmed by the Rectification, de Gages whereabouts are unknown. Maybe it could be that Anonymous made a mistake in saying that the commander of the Army, was not stationed on the most important wins, but in the center, with the Valona Guard. The hypothesis can't be discounted that Gasges had always shown concern for his left wing because of the actions of the demonstrative group, exhasperated by the belief that the strongest of the Austro-Sardinians were actually there, and act that retained him on the left.
[3] Anonymous affirms riding personally to the battalion in that position. According to the deployment in the plan of General Sure, all regiments of la Corona had remained to the left of the Carabiniers, it then made a charge later near the house by the pond. In "The Rectification of the Accounts from the Spanish Court", it says word for word that it was only the second battalion which made the charge, however it fails to mention the position where the battalion is encountered. It seems that one battalion was sent toward the pond, and the other went behind the center of the cavalry.
[4] According to the plans of General Sure and the French Captain, the regiment of Sagunto intervened in the combat on the right, attacking the enemy left. Stockel notes this incident, undoubtedly worth asserting that "The Rectification of the Accounts of the Court of Spain" explicitly confines them, in the moment that the Sagunto Regiment was transferred from the right, the artillery fire became violent and the probable result was that the regiment went as far as the pond exposed to a lively fire. It is worthy to note that, in the exposition of Arvers on the battle, the Dragoons of Sagunto, concealed by a grove of small trees, would have caught the Sardinian regiment of Dragoons de la Regina by surprise. Arvers certainly commits the error of believing that this charge had occurred in the first lines, but he confirms that the attack had taken place on the left wing of the Austro-Sardinians. However the Dragoons de la Regina should be located in the second line, but Arvers does not indicate the original
cause of the charge and owes his response only to the reality of the action.
[5] Saint Simon, to whom you should not lend too much credence, refers in "Histoire de la Guerre des Alpes", that the only son of de La Torre fell during the charge. Seeing that some Carabiniers were trying to lend aid to the fallen, he stopped them, reminding them of their duty to the King. Only after gaining the victory was the general allowed to rush to his son, who had died in the meantime, and give free rein to his grief. This act, well-known to the Court, would have merited de La Torre the title of Marquees and commended to him the splendid gift of the order of Santiago. The story seems quite unlikely because de La Torre could not have seen his son Juan fall, because he served in the Carabiniers with the grade of sublieutenant. Also, the report of the official Spanish accounts indicates that Juan de La Torre didn't die; he was only wounded. Anonymous maintains that de La Torre owed
his success to extraordinary fortune instead of merit, that he made unfounded exaggerations and fantastic claims upon his return to Madrid. In this way he succeeded in procuring extraordinary honors and, according to Anonymous, undeserved ones. He didn't dare return to the Army and so he procured a command in the one of the Infante. Indeed, he was assigned to this ultimately.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.Cavalry Action on the Spanish Right Flank
The Battle of Camposanto: Part II Introduction
The Battle of Camposanto: Late Afternoon Phase
The Battle of Camposanto: Austro-Sardinian Counterattack
Petri: Final Words
FOOTNOTES
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