Commentary

Throughout the struggle, the Prussian infantry had shown considerable determination despite being composed entirely of new recruits and second line units. The Prinz Ferdinand recruit battalion, along with the Tresckow infantry regiment and the reconstituted grenadier battalions had been particularly distinguished. Apart from the hussars, the cavalry had proved unreliable and ineffective; though to be fair, the terrain was hardly suited for the optimal use of the two cuirassier regiments, while the rest of the mounted escort comprised detachments drawn from 17 different units, rather than whole squadrons trained and used to operating togeather. The battalion artillery had been useful on June 28th in driving off Loudon, but as there are no details of its deployment on the 30th, it's not possible to say whether it supported Zieten's attack on the woods.

On both occaisions the Prussians had been prevented from using their local numerical superiority by the uncertainty about the enemy's strength and whereabouts. Though it was known that the Austrians were approaching the convoy's route from both east and west, it was not clear where, when and how they would strike. This proved fatal on the 30th when Zieten had been compelled to detach troops north of the road in case Loudon reappeared, thus depleting the forces available to deal with Siskovics.

Further valuable men were guarding the wagons while others were with the advance guard at Domstadtl. Accordingly, only 2,700 were available for the attack on the Austrians concealed in the trees. Siskovics' clever deployment enabled him to launch a timely counter-attack on Zieten's disordered battalions with his regulars hidden behind the woods. As Zieten's retreat coincided with Loudon's arrival from Barn, the Prussians were confined to the narrow road along the road where they could be attacked from several directions simultaneously. The failure of the still numerous Prussian cavalry to intervene at this point sealed the convoy's fate.

Aftermath

The news of the disaster alone was sufficient to persuade Frederick to abandon the siege even before he heard that Daun had made contact with the fortress from the east. He decided against a retreat via Troppau as this risked a "Domstadtl writ large" and instead resolved on a bold move, retreating in a wide arc through northeast Bohemia into Lower Silesia. As a parting shot, the Prussians gave Olmutz an exceptionally heavy bombardment on July 1 before pulling out at the crack of dawn the following morning. Two month's supply of flour had to be destroyed for lack of wagons to carry it.

Even so, Keith's column was still encumbered with 4-5,000 wagons, the entire siege train and 1,500 sick and wounded. despite being heavily outnumbered [11], both he and Frederick reached Koniggratz by July 13 and retired to the safety of Glatz by early August. Prince Henry, normally very critical of his brother, later commented that it was Frederick's best-managed manoeuvre of the entire war. Certainly, the withdrawal was in complete contrast to the debacle of 1744. Unlike Traun in that year, Daun did little to hinder the retreat. He was in no mood to press battle after his comparatively bloodless manoeuvering had already achieved his objective. Moreover, as he correctly deduced, the Russian advance in the north would soon compel Frederick to abandon his positions, leaving him free to invade Silesia and move the war into a new phase.

Footnotes

[1] The sources differ as to whether Frederick or his engineers were more to blame for the incompetent start to the siege. There is also disagreement as to the reason for the ineffective initial bombardment: a) the batteries were sited to far away; b) shortage of ammunition forced the gunners to use reduced charges; c) the pieces were worn out from the earlier sieges of Breslau and Schweidnitz. All works cited in the bibliography below have good accounts of the siege.

[2] Keith had about 8,000 ( 17 btns, 10 sqds, 2 companies miners) in the siege works west of Olmutz. General Meier with a force of 2,300 (2 btns, 1 company Jaeger, 12 sqds) blockaded the fortress from the east. The main covering force under Frederick and the Prince of Wurttemberg (27 btns and 81 sqds) was posted southwest on the hills at Schmirschitz and Prossnitz. The remainder under General Wedel (3 btns and 10 sqds) formed a screen between Schirmschitz and Littau. Collectively these 41-42,000 men contained 3,000 new recruits who had only arrived on June 1st. Though an additional 7,000 recruits arrived on June 10, the siege corps lost over 1,500 during its operations, while the covering force probably lost as many through skirmishes and desertion. Altogeather, allowing for men incapacitated by illness, Keith and Frederick probably had no more than 42,000 by the end of June. An additional 28 btns and 20 sqds remained in Silesia under Zieten and Fouque with another 32 btns in the Silesian fortresses.

[3] Mitchell to Holdernesse, July 14, 1758, Bisset, II 418-19. The Prussians burned a village near Olmutz on May 20 in reprisal for the murder of two hussars (ibid 11 24).

[4] Three grenadier btns, two cuirassier regiments, and 900 hussars posted there after General Meier's detachment (see note 2) had been attacked on June 17 from Prerau.

[5] Loudon's corps lost 51 dead, 107 wounded and 399 missing, of whom about 200 were captured, along with 2 or 3 cannon.

[6] Grenadier battalions Rath and Carlowitz, the 2nd battalion of Jung Kreytzen, half of battalion Teuffel and 200 Puttkammer hussars.

[7] 2nd battalion of IR Mutzschefahl and the rest of battalion Teuffel.

[8] This now consisted of the convoy's former advance guard reinforced by grenadier btns Alt-Billerbeck and Schenckendorff. The advance guard escorted the Austrian prisoners taken on the 28th.

[9] On the right (north) facing Loudon: 2nd btn Tresckow, grenadier btn Bahr, 1st btn Mutzschefahl; center: btn Prinz Ferdinand, 1/2 btn Teuffel; left (south) facing Siskovics: btn Nostitz, btn Ruchel, and 1st btn Tresckow.

[10] The survivors consisted of grenadier btns Alt-Billerbeck and Schenkendorff, 77 officers and men of grenadier btn Carlowitz, 60 of Rath, plus 1st btn Jung Kreytzen and the remains of the 2nd battalion, along with KR Kyau, I sqd KR Schmettau and the two battalions sent by Frederick.

[11] Frederick and Keith had 66 btns, 114 sqds, 2 companies Jager, 2 companies miners, or nearly 40,000 effectives; while Daun had 94,000 effectives plus 12,420 under DeVille detached via Troppau to besiege Neisse.

Bibliography

R.B Asprey, Frederick the Great: The Magnificent Enigma , (NewYork, 1986)
A. Bisset (ed), Memoirs and Papers of Sir Andrew Mitchell, (2 vol umes, London, 1850)
C. Duffy, Frederick the Great: A Military Life (London, 1985)
C. Duffy, The Fortress In The Age Of Vauban and Frederick the Great, (London, 1985)
C. Duffy, The Army of Maria Theresa, (London, 1985)
C. von Jany, Geschichte der Preussischen Armee, (4 volumes, Osnabruck, 1967) Volume II.
Prussia, Grosser Generalstab, Der Siebenjahrigen Krieg, (13 volumes, Berlin, 1901-1913) Volume VII.
O. Schuster/F.A. Franke, Geschichte de Sachsichen Armee, (3 volumes, Leipzig, 1885), Volume II.
K. Staudinger, Geschichte des Bayerischen Heeres, (5 volumes, Munich, 1901-1909) Volume III.

The Ambush of the Olmutz Convoy At Domstadtl June 28-30, 1758

Introduction
The Olmutz Convoy
Rounds 1 and 2
Commentary, Footnotes, Bibliography
Orders of Battle: Prussian and Austrian
Jumbo Campaign Map (very slow: 237K)
Large Convoy Map (slow: 76K)

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