The winter campaign of November-December 1745 brought the Second Silesian War to an unexpectedly early conclusion. Having soundly trounced his enemies at Hohenfriedberg and Soor, Frederick of Prussia was fairly confident that they would not risk a third engagement that year.
Sachsisches Militar (Linieninfanterie) aus der Zeit des zweiten Schlesischen Krieges. Von links nach rechts: Musketier, Tambour, Unteroffizier Offizier, Grenadier.
He retired to Berlin to await diplomatic developments, only to be rudely disturbed by the news that his opponants were on the move yet again. The operations that followed showed Frederick's strategic skills to their best, though the actual engagements were won by his subordinates. The two Prussian victories of Kat.holisch - (or Gross - ) Hennersdorf (November 23) and Kesselsdorf (December 15) finally persuaded the Austrians and Saxons to make peace at Dresden on Christmas Day.
Saxon Involvement
As the winter campaign saw Frederick primarilly pitted against the Saxons, it's worth pausing to consider how this electorate came to be embroiled in the Austro-Prussian dispute over Silesia. Like his fellow elector Charles Albert of Bavaria, Friedrich Augustus III of Saxony, king of Poland since 1733, had hoped to profit from the death of Emperor Charles VI in 1740. In particular, he hoped to acquire Silesia and so at last join Poland geographically to Saxony. As Prussia had already seized this province, Augustus' aim was essentially thwarted by 1741. Thereafter he was forced to look for a substitute to his original ambition.
Hopes of a few pickings in Bohemia were dashed by the failure of joint military involvement with the Franco-Bavarian forces (1741-42). This prompted a major rethink. The diplomatic and military events of 1743 seemed to indicate that Austria's star was rising and that the time might be ripe for a judicious change of allies. This was finalized in the Treaty of Dresden (December 20, 1743) by which Saxony promised to provide 6,000 troops for Austria in the hope of making territorial gains at Prussia's expense. Given the proximity of his territory to that of Prussia, an open break with his former allies would be risky. Accordingly, the treaty allowed for Saxon neutrality while the troops were termed "auxiliaries". These political considerations were to exert a major influence on the course of the 1745 campaign and greatly hamper allied operations. [1]
For the time being, however, events seemed to indicate that the elector had made the right choice. The Prussian invasion of Bohemia in 1744 proved a disaster and strengthened Augustus' resolve sufficiently for him to despatch his auxiliaries to the front that October. He now sought to upgrade his status to full belligerent in the hope that Austria would grant him part of northern (Lower) Silesia once it was recaptured. This led Augustus to join Britain and the Dutch Republic in a closer alliance with Austria, concluded at Warsaw on January 8, 1745. Though he still feared a Prussian attack, he agreed to increase his auxiliary corps to 30,000 men with the assistance of £150,000 from Britain. He also promised to declare war on Prussia, but hoped that Russia would join the alliance before he had to do this.
He was quickly disappointed. The Russian intervention failed to materialize. Austria refused to promise him anything of Silesia. The combined attempt to recapture that province was soundly defeated at Hohenfriedberg in June. Seeing his plans unravelling, Augustus quickly reduced his auxiliaries to the original 6,000 and concentrated every available man to forestall what appeared to be an imminent Prussian invasion. Finally, the remaining auxiliaries were defeated along with the Austrians at Soor. By October things looked bleak. A large army under Prince Leopold von Anhalt-Dessau (the Old Dessauer) was massing at Halle, poised to invade Saxony via Liepzig, while a second army under Frederick held Silesia.
The Prussian dispersal to winter quarters in mid-October gave the elector a reprieve. He now decided to take decisive action to salvage what he could from an unpromising situation. In return for a promise of the Saalkreis (the area around Halle) , he agreed to cooperate in an ambitious Austrian project to invade Prussia. This envisaged a three-prong strike to defeat the Old Dessauer's army and cut it off from the main force in Silesia. This had originally been proposed on September 8, 1745, but had been aborted by the defeat at Soor. The scheme was now modified by Count Rutowski, the Saxon commander, with the intention of executing a surprise attack.
[2]
Rutowski aimed to exploit the wide gap between the two Prussian armies and defeat them in detail. The main Saxon army (about 28,000) was currently camped close to Leipzig so that it could assemble quickly. It was to be joined by 10,000 Austrians under the command of General Grunne, already on their way from the Netherlands. Grunne was marching through Bavaria as if he was merely returning to Austria, but had secret orders to change direction once he reached the frontier and join Rutowski via western Saxony. [3]
Together they were to surprise the Old Dessauer in his scattered cantonments and push him back to Magdeburg. There he was to be contained by 5-6,000 men, while Rutowski and the main force headed for Berlin. This was intended to draw the other Prussian army out of Silesia. The Austrian army (28,000 men) under Prince Charles of Lorraine, togeather with the 6,000 Saxon auxiliaries under Lt. General Polenz, would then advance down the Bober River valley from Bohemia to the Lausitz (Lusatia, or eastern Saxony). From here they could attack the rear of the Prussians as they left Silesia while Rutowski assaulted their front. A further 3,000 Saxon light troops (i.e. Polish horse) were in western Poland poised to join in the fray. Both Rutowski and Charles were to start their advances on November 20, 1745. (See Map 1).
Like some huge baroque timepiece, this intricate plan relied on all its componants moving like clockwork. Any miscalculation and the allies were likely to be caught scattered and divided. The first to throw a spanner (i.e. "wrench") in the works was the Saxon chief minister, Count Bruhl. While entertaining two Swedish diplomats to a lively and alcoholic dinner, Bruhi inadvertently let slip the details. One of the envoys, Rudenskjold, was a personal friend of Frederick and he hastened to Berlin where he reported the design on
November 11.
Neither the Old Dessauer nor Minister Podevils were prepared to believe this intelligence, but Frederick wisely took precautions. He had respected the falsehood of Saxon neutrality up till then for political reasons, but now deemed it more expedient to go over to a full offensive. To forestall a Saxon attack, the Old Dessauer was instructed to concentrate his men at Halle again. Major General Hacke was left to hold Berlin with 5,000 men while the garrisons of other fortresses were strengthened by recalling the New Garrison Regiments. With the Saxons thus blocked, Frederick intended to smash the Austrians with the main Prussian army from Silesia.
The commander of this force, Erbprinz Leopold von AnhaltDessau (the Young Dessauer) , had already sensed something was afoot when he detected the Austrians leaving their cantonments in central Bohemia and heading north towards the frontier. Accordingly, he began to collect his troops around Striegau in the center of Silesia, ready to move further north or west as the Austrian advance dictated.
Frederick arrived in northern Silesia on November 17, having left Berlin two days before. He immediately took command and made arrangements to further concentrate for a decisive attack. Lt. General Bonin and 3,000 men
[4] were pushed out to Bunzlau and Lowenberg on the Bober river which ran parallel to the Lausitz-Silesian frontier along the river Queis a little to the west. This screened the Prussian concentration and maintained Prince Charles' illusion that it was he who was making the surprise attack. By November 21 Frederick had 35,000 troops
[5] close to the Bober, while Lt. General Nassau collected the remaining Prussians at Frankenstein to cover Breslau and the magazine at Schweidnitz. An additional detachment was left in Cosel to guard the south of the province. All was ready, but Frederick wanted to wait until he was sure that the Saxons had admitted the Austrians to their territory and so became full belligerents rather than auxiliaries.
Despite Frederick's precautions, it became obvious that the Prussians were up to something. Bruhl became alarmed at the renewed concentration of the Old Dessauer's army, while Grunne seemed to be taking an inordinately long time to join Rutowski. So as not to infringe on the technical Saxon neutrality, Grunne was marching through the Franconian and Thuringian states along the electorate's western frontier.
By November 9 he was at Hof in northern Bayreuth, and reached Gera in an enclave of Reuss eight days later. This was still nearly 60km from Leipzig, while the Prussians at Halle were less than 40km away. On top of this disagreeable news, a message arrived from St. Petersburg stating that the Russians wanted a Prussian breach of Saxon neutrality as an excuse for intervention. In the meantime, the Saxons were to limit their involvement to their auxiliary corps. Togeather, this put an end to Rutowslci's planned preemptive strike against Halle. Operations would now have to be restricted to the Bohemian-Silesian theater. Rutowski was forced to change the invasion plans yet again.
The main Saxon army was now to divide. Half was to remain entrenched at Leipzig to fend off any strike from Halle and wait for Grunne. The rest under Rutowski would march eastwords to join Prince Charles. That worthy was to continue his march along Saxony's eastern frontier to strike at Frankfurt/Oder and so cut Frederick off from Berlin. This had to be changed a third time when it was discovered on November 25 that the Old Dessauer's force had grown to 25,000, or twice the strength of Saxon forces at Leipzig. [6]
Fearing imminent attack, Rutowski was recalled to Leipzig. In fact, this final change of plan now mattered little as two days previously Prince Charles' advance had been rolled back at Hennersdorf in the Lausitz.
Battle of Hennersdorf
Rutowski's Plans
MAP 1: Saxon theater of operations in the winter of 1745. Prince Leopold's Prussians would move from Halle towards Dresden to confront the Saxons, while Frederick's army moved from Silesia towards Gorlitz to confront the Austians.
The Winter Campaign of 1745, Saxon Involvement, and Rutowski's Plans
Operations In The Lausitz and The Prussian Advance
Surprise at Hennersdorf
Orders of Battle
Hennersdorf Jumbo Map (slow: 122K)
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© Copyright 1993 by James Mitchell
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