1756

With the start of the Seven Years War, Seydlitz and his regiment were attached to the corps under Ferdinand of Brunswick, Frederick's brother-in-law. This body of troops was to cross the Saxon border and press on via Halle and Leipzig toward the stronghold of Pirna, to which the Saxons had retreated. With the Saxons bottled up in this position awaiting help from the Austrians, Seydlitz was sent to that part of the Prussian army under the command of Frederick marching to intercept Marshal Browne's army, bound for the relief of Pima.

October 1st, 1756

The Austrians are encountered on the field of Lobositz. Frederick thinks the distant bodies of Austrian horse that he can barely discern through the heavy morning fog represent only the rear guard of the Austrians. Little does he know that Browne's entire army lies before him in a good position well protected by streams, morasses, and the dominating Lobosch hill on the Austrian right flank. Summoning Seydlitz for his opinion, the King asks if he thinks his cuirassiers can overthrow the enemy horse. "Yes," replies Seydlitz, "but the cannon of Lowositz [sic] will soon bring me to my senses." (Ibid, page 31. )

Undaunted by Seydlitz's forebodings, Frederick brings up his cavalry and orders an initial charge with his dragoons in order to determine the strength of the enemy. The charge proves successful, driving back twenty-five squadrons of Austrian cavalry. But now the dragoons find themselves enfiladed on both flanks by artillery and small arms fire. Driven back in their own turn, they rally below the Homolkaberg, an important position held by the Prussians, and are quickly joined by the cuirassiers, including Seydlitz with his five squadrons. General Geseler, commanding the cavalry and who has boldly joined in the initial assault, cannot be found by Frederick's couriers. He is caught up in the chaos while trying to rally his men.

Frederick is disabused of his earlier conception of the number of Austrians before him. Contrary to his wishes, yet consistent with the standard cavalry instructions of the time, the charge is launched anew. This time, the Prussians drive the Austrians even further back, until the Prussians themselves are disordered by a stream they have to cross. Behind it are some unrouted Hungarian infantry who let loose a volley. The Prussian attack is again broken up, and Seydlitz, whose horse becomes stuck in the mud, is almost captured but for the quick thinking of other cavalrymen who pull him out. (Duffy, Frederick the Great. P 105-6)

Frederick orders his cavalry to retire behind the infantry, and it is the latter who, after some hard fighting, are able to claim the day for Prussia.

With the subsequent capitulation of the Saxons, the year's campaign was over.

1757

The opening of the campaign of 1757 saw Seydlitz posted with the advanced guard of the troops under the command of Prince Moritz of Anhalt-Dessau. Here, under the immediate command of General Zieten, he distinguished himself in numerous small cavalry engagements. He was unable to participate in the battle of Prague because his regiment was on the far side of the Moldau River that day. However this fact did not stop Seydlitz from trying to ford the river, and he was nearly drowned owing to the depth of the stream and the quicksand bottom before being fished out with a rope by some of his men.

With the Prussian victory at Prague, the Prussian army was split into two parts; one to oversee the siege of the city itself to which had fled most of the remnants of the defeated Austrians, and another, under the command of Frederick to act as an army of observation. This latter army that included Seydlitz's regiment marched forth to block an Austrian relieving army under the command of Marshal Daun.

June 18th, 1757

The opposing armies meet near the city of Kolin. Frederick's plan is to outflank Daun's army and attack its right wing with his own left. He intends to withhold his right from any close engagement so as to have sufficient reserves to feed into his left wing. Things do not go as planned. Daun observes Frederick's flanking march and moves his army accordingly. In addition, bodies of Croat irregulars supported by very light artillery pieces begin peppering the exposed right flanks of the various Prussian regiments as they march in column down the road known as the Kaiserstrasse toward the Austrian right.

Through a misunderstanding, the intended flanking attack soon deteriorates into a frontal assault. Despite the initial successes of the left wing cavalry under General Zieten, the timely arrival of Austrian reinforcements jeopardizes the Prussian plan. Then Austrian General Nadasdy is able to take advantage of a brief lull in the fighting to rally his cavalry and return to the fray, pushing Zieten's horse before him.

Seydlitz is ordered to support the faltering Prussian line and, if need be, to form a rear guard. Upon the death of Major General von Krosigk, Seydlitz is in effective command of a brigade of heavy cavalry consisting of ten squadrons of the Prince von Preussen's regiment (2'u Cuirassier Regiment), the Rochov Cuirassiers (Cuirassier Regiment #8), and five squadrons from the regiment of Normann (Dragoon Regiment #1). An attack by the Prussian cavalry under General Pennavaire falters in the face of determined Austrian opposition. Seizing an opportunity, Seydlitz launches a counterattack that succeeds briefly in stemming the tide of the Austrian onslaught. In rapid succession, the Austrian Wurttemberg Dragoons, the Saxon Carabineers, and the Hungarian infantry regiment of Haller are overthrown or ridden down.

Then Seydlitz manages to push back the "German" infantry regiments of Baden and Deutschmeister. However, numbers begin to tell, as does the fatigue of the Prussian horses. The Austrian regiment of Botta refuses to yield an inch of real estate to the Prussians. Faced by superior numbers of Austrians and with their horses blown, the Prussian cavalry are obliged to yield the battlefield to the enemy. As the Prussians withdraw from the field, the cavalry, under the capable leadership of Seydlitz and General Zieten, forms a rear guard.

Two days later, Seydlitz was promoted to the rank of major general and awarded the pour le merite for valor. When congratulated by General Zieten on his promotion he immodestly replied, "It was high time, Excellency, if they want to get anything more out of me; I am already thirty-six." (Quoted in Greenly, The Cavalry of Frederick the Great, page 39)

As a result of Kolin, Frederick was obliged to abandon his siege of Prague and move his army to safer climes where it could be reorganized. Fritz was in a tight spot. Facing a victorious Austrian army in Bohemia, he got word that the Russians were on the move in East Prussia, the Swedes were threatening Pomerania, and that the Reicheexekutionsarmee was moving through Thuringia to liberate Saxony, With grim determination, he decided to dispose of each of these threats in order and picked the Reichexekutionsarmee as his first target.

This latter force, under the Prince de Soubise of France and the Imperial Prince von Sachsen-Hildburghausen who had titular command, was a motley assortment of French, Imperial, and Austrian troops. The commanders were under the rather contradictory orders to try to recapture Saxony yet avoiding any major battle in which they might come out second best. Also, although Hildburghausen was the overall commander, he treated Soubise as more of an equal than a subordinate resulting in the two forming a sort of de facto committee that had to be in agreement before anything substantial was determined upon.

As Frederick's army moved westwards, a sort of dance was played out between the two armies. As Frederick advanced, the allies retired. As Frederick retired, the allies advanced. It was during this military minuet that Seydlitz was to perform one of his greatest martial stunts.

September 15th, 1757

Seydlitz has entered the town of Gotha after having driven back a few enemy outposts. Frederick himself then enters the town at the head of the Meinecke dragoons, where he is met by the populace with many signs of enthusiasm. The Prussians depart on the following day, only to learn that Soubise and Hildburghausen have arrived on the 19`h at the head of a reconnoitering force of 6,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, plus a few field pieces. Seydlitz is nearby with a force of some 1,500 to 2,000 troopers with which he proceeds to bluff the allies. Dismounting some of his hussars to act as infantry, he places his cavalry in three extended lines and advances on Gotha. He also sends a "deserter" into town to inform the allies that the King of Prussia himself is on the march.

This news, confirming as it does the impressions that the allies already have that the King's army is nearer than it actually is, causes great commotion and consternation, so that by the time the leading elements of Prussian cavalry make their attack, they find but minimal resistance. Soubise has barely enough time to leave the castle and get out of town. He doesn't even take the time to mount his horse, but flees on foot. Over sixty of the allies are taken prisoner as well as much baggage. The Prussians are literally able to dine on the meal that had been prepared for the allies. Seydlitz has gained a minor, but humiliating, victory over the French through pure bluff and finesse.

Frederick was so impressed by this exploit that in his later writings he said:

"Any other officer would have contented himself by withdrawing his troops from so difficult a position without much loss; but General Seydlitz would not be satisfied without gaining an advantage at the same time. His example proves that genius and courage in a leader are of more value than the number of his troops. In such a case an ordinary general would have been discouraged by the decided superiority of the enemy; would have retreated on their advance, and lost half his force in defending his rear guard, which the overwhelming number of the enemy's cavalry would immediately have attacked. The able disposition of one dragoon regiment, so distended as to deceive the foe from a distance, gave General Seydlitz an opportunity of winning everlasting renown." (Quoted in Lawley, page 47.)

The two armies finally met in battle at Rossbach on a fateful day in November of 1757. The French and Imperial troops, now numbering over 41,000 men, having been lately reinforced by a corps sent by the Due de Richelieu, had assembled near the town of MUcheln. Frederick was determined to bring them to battle. He marched on November 3'a through Braunsdorf and Rossbach so as to gain an appreciation of their dispositions. He found the allies arranged such that he initially believed that they could be defeated and made his plans accordingly.

That evening, however, the allies changed their positions, so that when the Prussians marched on the following morning, Frederick found them so well established in their new posts that he decided not to attack. Instead he retreated back through the village of Shortau behind which he bivouacked on high ground covered by marshes, with his right wing resting on the town of Bedra and his left wing on Rossbach itself The allies, upon viewing this retrograde motion, fired a feu de joie and celebrated as if a great victory had been attained. That evening, Hildburghausen and Soubise were in rare agreement that the Prussian position could be turned and its retreat cut off, thus forcing Frederick either to surrender at discretion or fight under very disadvantageous circumstances. The plan was to march around Frederick's left, leaving a blocking force under Generals Loudon and Saint-Germain to watch the Prussian front.

November 5th, 1757

The allies begin their march at eight o'clock in the morning. Their force, formed in three columns, first heads southward. French General Saint-Germain and Austrian General Loudon screen the allied move with their light troops. Nevertheless the march of the allies goes slowly. It is marked by disorder due to the lack of a unified march drill among the various allied contingents. Frederick has just settled down to dinner in the castle of Rossbach when he receives news that the allies are moving out from Seydlitz, who has been reconnoitering their positions.

At around two o'clock in the afternoon, the allies suddenly make a ninety-degree turn to their left. Informed that his flank is now threatened, Frederick puts little stock in this warning until the importunings of a captain of guides, Friedrich Wilhelm Gaudi, induce him to wander up to the garret of the building and see for himself Immediately he orders the soldiers to strike their tents, form up, and move by the left in order to counter this maneuver. In the meantime, Seydlitz is placed in command of all the cavalry, performing, in effect, all the functions of a lieutenant general. To the remonstrances of those who claim seniority, he merely states, "Gentlemen, I obey the king, and you will obey me." (Quoted in Duffy, Frederick the Great, page 141. )

Scouts from the army of Soubise and Hildburghausen report the sudden movement of the Prussian troops. Mistaking this sudden change of position as a retreat, the allied generals hasten their troops and order their cavalry forward to cut the Prussians off. Disorder ensues among the marching columns that now number five instead of three owing to the advance of these additional troops between the pre-existing columns. The allied cavalry in their eagerness for glory ride considerably ahead of the leading infantry, leaving a dangerous gap in the column of march.

Seydlitz has under his command five squadrons of the Szekely Hussars (Hussar Regiment #1) and the following cuirassier regiments: numbers 3, 7, 8, 10, and 13, as well as dragoon regiments number 3 and 4. By 3:15, the guns of Colonel Moller that have been maneuvered onto the Janus Hill, an elevation that enfilades the rout of the allied advance, begin to fire. Upon hearing the sound of the guns, Seydlitz forms his troopers in line and continues their advance until they are just east of the ridge of the Janus Hill. Here he wheels them into an attacking formation and waits for the optimal moment to charge. Seydlitz orders the charge at 3:30, just as the leading enemy cavalry elements have approached to within 1,000 paces of the crest of the hill. It is reported that his signal for the advance is by either throwing or raising his clay tobacco pipe into the air. (One source claims that the signal for the first line to attack was Seydlitz lighting his pipe. The signal for the attack of the second line was Seydlitz throwing his pipe away and drawing his sword. The signal for the third attack from Tagewerben was his alleged throwing of his hat into the air. See Grbasic and Vuksic, The History of Cavalry, pages 109-112. ) In the event, the meaning is clear enough for his eager horsemen.

The allies initially hold their own against his first line of fifteen squadrons, having been able to throw the cuirassier regiments of Bretlach and Trautmannsdorf into line along with the Szecheny Hussars and three imperial regiments that have moved forward in support. A battery of French artillery that has had time to unlimber and deploy also supports them. To counter this, Seydlitz throws in his second line of eighteen squadrons (his hussars cover his left flank and also charge). (Lawley, page 52.)

These form a double flanking attack that encompasses not only the Austrian and Imperial horse but also twenty-four squadrons of French cavalry that are just now arriving. The allied cavalry quickly are thrown into a confused mass and borne back to the sunken road that runs from Reichardtswerben to Tagewerben. Here the withdrawal turns into a rout.

Seydlitz now demonstrates his true genius for command. Realizing that the overthrow of the allied cavalry is only a defeat for the mounted portion of the allies, he now regroups his squadrons to take on the infantry rather than pursue the defeated horse. Rallying his squadrons just north of Reichardtswerben, he brings them to the hollow of Tagewerben where he prepares a new onslaught against the southern flank of the infantry. As the Prussian infantry engage the allies in a firefight from the north and east, Seydlitz unleashes his troopers against a few still retreating French cavalry squadrons before him and blows through them and into the infantry behind. Caught between a rock and a hard place, the allied army loses cohesion. The rout is now general, their beaten army only saved from destruction by a rear guard action of the forces under SaintGermain and Loudon. A contemporary describes the ensuing debacle:

"Everybody sank into a mob, and it was impossible to restore or stay the flight, whatever the efforts of the entire corps of generals and officers. The Prussian infantry followed on the heels of ours, and fired without checking its advance or having a man drop out of rank or file. The artillery shot us up without respite." (Quoted in Duffy, Frederick the Great, page 143.)

In a battle that lasted hardly more than two hours, the allies lost over 10,000 men, mostly as prisoners. The Prussian losses amounted to less that 550. Numbered among the wounded was Seydlitz, who had sustained an arm wound. Because of his syphilitic condition, this wound was slow to heal and kept him out of the fighting for the rest of the year. Thus, he was not a participant in Frederick's last major battle of 1757, the battle of Leuthen. Nevertheless Seydlitz found solace in being awarded the Order of the Black Eagle on November 20th, a promotion to the rank of lieutenant general, and the loving ministrations of a lady at Leipzig, who certainly lifted his morale, if not his health.

In fact, Seydlitz's health was quite bad. Although his arm had healed, it appears that a localized infection of some sort rendered him incapable of sitting a horse for some time. He may possibly have had a bout with hemorrhoids, if we read between the lines of his modest biographer, who writes, "...a local affection, connected with relaxed vessels and a weakened nervous system, prevented his riding for a lengthened period. (Lawley, page 59.)

Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr von Seydlitz (February 3, 1721 - November 3, 1773)

Introduction
1756 and 1757
1758 and 1759
1760, 1761, and 1762
Post War

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