Beguiled though he may be by such theses, the game designer is yet left to wonder how to account for the very heavy casualties, as a percent of total forces engaged - to say nothing of those battalions in the thickest of the fight - characteristic of major battles of the Seven Years War. Perhaps reported losses were exaggerated; or perhaps the principal man-killers were the artillery and the cavalry, hospital statistics on the causes of wounds notwithstanding. But I think it more likely that what I label the "Ineffective Fire" theory is simply not applicable to this war.
Which of the remaining theories - Targeted Fire or Area Fire - should be employed? One might say that because the inaccuracy of smoothbore weapons combined with the blinding effect of black powder smoke made the targeting of individual enemies impossible, the area fire theory must apply by default.
But wait: at the short ranges typical for infantry firefights, bullets do not so much "rain" upon a position as strike it horizontally. If the position in question consists of a solid wall of multiple layers' [ranks] thickness, then the chance of scoring successive hits thereon does not diminish as hits accumulate, as long as at least one such layer remains across the front. It pays then to pack into the line as many ranks as can fire, if what incoming bullets be stopped are stopped by the frontmost rank alone. The mathematics of the situation revert to those of targeted fire, even though we have not "individual-aimed firing or sniping," but "volley firing at a position!"
Yet, if this model be correct, then how do we account for the anxiety to keep the second line-of-battle far enough back of the first to place it beyond enemy musket range? Why would the deployment of a non-firing fourth rank [to immediately replace losses to the fore] not be considered an unalloyed advantage? Why take any more trouble to shelter a column from fire than a line? No, it cannot be. The infantry "wall" is not solid, but permeable to bullets. The area fire theory applies, although the "area" in question is not upon the earth's surface, but perpendicular thereto, and has depth extending unto the firer's musket range.
Bibliography
1) "Mathematics in Warfare" by Frederick William Manchester as reprinted in Volume 4 of The World of Mathematics edited by John R. Newman, Simon & Schuster, 1956
2) "Firepower, the Fair Fight, the Fuzzy Wuzzy Fallacy" by William J. M. Gilbert, The Avalon Hill General, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Nov.-Dec. 1969)
3) The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-1763 by Brent Nosworthy, Hippocrene Books, 1992
4) Battle Studies by Colonel Ardant du Picq, Stackpole Books, 1958, Translated by J. N. Greely & R. C. Cotton
5) The Army of Frederick the Great, 2nd Edition, by Christopher Duffy, Emperor's Press, 1996
6) Instrument of War: Vol. 1 of the Austrian Army in the Seven Years War by Christopher Duffy, Emperor's Press, 2000
7) "Frederick the Great: The Campaigns of the Soldier King 1740-1763" by Frank Davis, Strategy & Tactics, no. 49 (Mar.-Apr. 1975)
Infantry Fire and Wargame Design
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© Copyright 2002 by James J. Mitchell
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