During the 1680s two processes changed the nature of tactical warfare as it then existed and returned infantry to preeminence. The first was the gradual introduction of the flintlock musket into the infantry forces. This led eventually to the total eclipse of the matchlock, although many armies went through a period when both weapons were in use. The French, for example, did not completely replace the matchlock in its infantry until 1708.

The second process was the development of a weapon that could turn the musket into a short pike by mounting a knife-like contrivance, called a bayonet, on the end of the barrel. The first attempt, the plug bayonet, was less than an optimum solution, but, nevertheless, most armies eventually adopted it. The plug bayonet was a double-edged weapon, with a blade about one foot long, and a handle that fitted into the barrel of the musket. The good news was that now each infantryman could convert his musket into a short pike which allowed him to defend against cavalry.

The bad news was that it often took more time to plug the bayonet into the barrel of the musket or matchlock than the charging enemy (cavalry or infantry) would allow. Furthermore, once plugged into the barrel, it was difficult to remove. Hence, for all practical purposes the infantryman in the heat of action remained either pikeman or musketeer, but he could not be both using the plug bayonet. French infantrymen during this period do not seem to have warmed to the use of the plug bayonet. If ordered to charge the enemy they usually threw down their muskets and went at the foe sword in hand.

Finally, the problem was solved by the development of the socket bayonet. This weapon had a triangular blade about 16 inches long with a socket instead of a handle. The socket slid over the end of the musket barrel. A lug braised to the barrel slid through a slot in the socket. When the bayonet was then turned 45 degrees it was secured onto the gun.

The flintlock musket combined with socket bayonet was a major development in weaponry that increased the effectiveness, efficiency, and flexibility of infantry. The flintlock musket weighed slightly less than the matchlock, and was easier to use and to manufacture. The flintlock mechanism was more reliable and easier to operate than the matchlock, leading to fewer misfires. It took only 26 or so individual movements to load and fire a flintlock, compared to the 42-46 needed to get off a shot with a matchlock.

By 1703 most countries had adopted the paper cartridge. The cartridge encased both powder and ball, which further eased the task of loading. These efficiencies increased rate of fire significantly. Perhaps as important, the cartridge and flintlock mechanism made it safe to position musketeers shoulder to shoulder. This had not been possible previously, when the dangerous combination of matchlock firing mechanism and loose powder carried in pockets and on bandoleers rendered the musketeer a potential human bomb (complete with fuse) capable of igniting not only himself, but neighbors as well if a safe distance was not maintained between the men.

Due to slow rate of fire of matchlocks, and because safety required that each man standing in line be separated from those next to him by at least three feet, the destructive effect of the fire of the front (firing) rank was not great, making it necessary to form musketeers many ranks deep so that a fresh firing line could be moved to the front to fire while the rank that had fired marched to the rear to reload. By this maneuver called "the caracole" a steady volume of fire was maintained, theoretically, across the front of the column of musketeers.

It does not take much imagination to visualize how cumbersome and prone to confusion this method of delivering fire was to implement on the battlefield. The introduction of the flintlock musket rendered this tactic, along with several other complicated methods of delivering fire, obsolete. Now it was possible to form infantry more densely on the firing line, shoulder to shoulder, thus bringing more muskets to bear across the frontage of the battalion, and it was also possible to close up the ranks so that all three could fire at once in a volley, if desired. These advances in efficiency made possible by the adoption of the flintlock musket doubled, or even tripled the effectiveness of infantry firepower compared to what it had been during the matchlock era.

The new flintlock-bayonet equipped musket revolutionized infantry tactics and established the foot soldier as the dominating force on the battlefield. It made possible a single universal line infantryman capable of performing all the combat functions that had previously required two types of infantry (pikemen and musketeers).

Battalions composed of such men had much enhanced firepower and could deploy more quickly. They could assault with "cold steel" while retaining the ability to fire, and could defend against cavalry attack. Battalions composed of musket armed infantry gave commanders the means to develop dynamic new grand-tactics. However, the world moved more slowly in the 18th Century, and although the basic fire tactics that were used throughout the musket era were quickly developed, it would take almost one hundred years for armies to discover and reap the full tactical potential of the flintlock musket armed infantrymen.

By 1703 most of the infantry of every western European army had adopted the flintlock musket with socket bayonet as its standard infantry weapon. As a consequence, the way infantry formations deployed for battle changed as military men attempted to exploit the firepower and maneuverability of the new infantry now available to them. The result of their efforts was the "Linear System" of warfare. It can be argued that the linear system is the father of all subsequent western battle tactics. Gone were the large square or rectangular blocks of men representing the traditional battle formation of each infantry unit that formed the line of battle of an army during the matchlock and pike era, or even before that.

The new battalion deployed for combat in a long thin line only three or four ranks deep. Since this thin new formation created vulnerable flanks, it was necessary for the battalions in the line of battle to abut each other, providing mutual support. Thus arranged, the deployed battalions formed a solid wall of musketeers that might stretch for several miles across the countryside. Although grand-tactical battlefield deployment and maneuver would gradually change during the more than 160 year period when the single shot musket ruled the battlefield, the battalion or regiment arranged in a thin firing line remained the tactical staple from Blenheim (1704) through Waterloo (1815), to Gettysburg (1863) and beyond.

More From Breitenfeld to Waterloo The Origins of Napoleonic Infantry Tactics

Introduction
Infantry in the Early Musket Era
The Flintlock Musket Revolutionizes Warfare
The "Order of Battle" During the Classical Linear Period
Firepower vs. Shock
Further Reading