Documentation on the battle of Hastenbeck, on the whole, is full of gaps. This is particularly apparent in two areas: the question concerning the artillery of either side, and the missing French order of battle.

Some authors simply copy from each other, shying away from original research or at least a critical examination of existing evidence. Meaning to avoid this pitfall, the following notes will try to answer a few questions unresolved so far.

Cumberland's Artillery

Every battalion of the Duke of Cumberland's so-called Army of Observation possessed two 3-pounders as regimental (or battalion) guns. That amounts to 94 regimental guns on the Hannoverian side. As to the number of heavy field artillery, a reliable indication of the number of its guns seems hard to come by. Discrepancies in this field are great. The pertinent volume of the work of the German General Staff of 1903 declares the army had 22 heavy guns, but talks of "some 28 guns" being present during the battle of Hastenbeck. The same work then proceeds to detail the number of guns in each battery, but the sum total emanating from this assessment is again different: namely 25 guns.

Carl Renouard, the author of a 3-volume history of the allied army, assumes 24 heavy guns, but the sum of his account in detail is 28. He takes it for granted that the Duke had fetched an additional ten 12-pounders from the nearby fortress of Hameln. But this would then make a sum of 34 or 38, respectively. Another disquieting element about Renouard is the fact that he derives this guess from a source that talks of "a few 24-pounders".

In fact the problem harks back to the primary sources. Cumberland, in his first-person account of the battle tells of three batteries that he had erected around Hastenbeck. He mentions taking a few 12-pounders from Hameln. Johann Wilhelm von Reden, a participant of the battle, remembers only two batteries in the vicinity of the village, but mentions another two batteries on the right wing.

A third source, the war diaries of a couple of Hessian artillery officers, talks not of 12-pounders, but 24-pounders being drawn from Hameln. This last version, at any rate, seems to merit the highest credibility, for Hameln, as a fortress, possessed mainly siege guns of a very large caliber.

Table 1: Distribution of Guns in Hanoverian Batteries
Bty No.	1A	1B	2	3	4
Position	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
Howitzers	-	-	-	4	2
24-pdrs.	2?	-	3?	-	-
12-pdrs.	-	-	2	8	2
6-pdrs.	4	2?	4	-	-
3-pdrs.	-	X	-	-	6

Position Notes: position (a) is the extreme right wing of the Hanoverian army; position (b) is the right wing; position (c) is north of Hastenbeck; position (d) is the great battery east of Hastenbeck; and position (e) is on the left wing northwest of Voremberg. Refer to the map shown on page 42.

Close examination of numerous sources and books seems to result in ascertaining five allied batteries, two on the right wing and three in a near circular arrangement behind Hastenbeck. The distribution of guns among these batteries is given in Table I above. Arguable numbers are indicated by a question mark, unknown numbers by the letter "X".

A conspicuous phenomenon in this first battle of the Seven Years War in western Germany is the temporary inclusion of battalion guns among heavy batteries when there was a lack of heavy guns.

The six Hanoverian howitzers comprised two 30-pounders and four 16- pounders. The denomination of the howitzers must not obscure their true caliber, for the so-called 30-pounder shell (in 18th century German called Bombe) in reality weighed 50 to 60 pounds and the so-called 16- pounder shell about 30 pounds.

All heavy guns without exception belonged to the army of the electorate of Hanover. The Hessian and Brunswick contingents possessed only battalion guns during the whole Seven Years War.

The gun emplacements had been dug out in great haste on the eve of the battle and were provided with inadequately low parapets.

The artillery was under the command of the Hanoverian Colonel Hermans. A third of the artillery personnel were newly recruited, thus having no experience. In the bustle of mobilization there had been no time to prepare cartridges. So the guns had to be charged with loose powder, the bulk of which was fetched from Hameln. The lack of cartridges enormously slowed down the firing process.

During the cannonade, several guns were knocked out. In the great battery (no. 3), a French cannonball hit a smouldering portfire, which was consequently hurled back towards the powder carts and caused a powder keg to explode.

Why did Cumberland not muster up all his energy to procure more guns and ammunition from Hameln? The reason must lie in the depth of his tormented personality. It should be remembered that he was throughout his life plagued by fits of asthma and kidney infections. 'Me wound that he received in the battle of Dettingen never closed up good, affecting his health for the rest of his life.

Hameln was a strongly fortified city of about 4,000 inhabitants at a minimal distance (3 miles) from the field of battle. It was equipped with a rampart, 8 large bastions, revelins, a wide ditch with glacis, and a bationed bridgehead on the left (i.e. western) side of the river Weser. When Hameln surrendered a few days after the battle, the French came into possession of 72 siege guns.

The French Artillery

In the beginning of the Seven Years War, all French infantry regiments were provided with one light gun only per battalion. As regards heavy guns, however, the army of Marshall d'Estrees was far superior to the Duke of Cumberland's Army of Observation, for d'Estrees possessed 68 heavy cannon and 8 howitzers.

Yet the size and caliber of these guns were not what one might suppose them to be. As late as Spring 1759, the French field artillery consisted of an overwhelming majority of long-barreled 4-pounders (58%) [Editor.- Elite Miniatures makes a fabulous 25mm rendition of this cannon, complete with scroll work and royal cypher on the barrel.] with only 29% of 8-pounders and 13% of 12-pounders. Thus we are bound to assume that at least 40 out of the 68 guns of d'Estrees were long 4- pounders. Still, the French artillery was twice as numerous as the Hanoverian one.

On the morning of July 26th, the French guns were deployed in six groups of about ten to twelve guns each in front of the center and right wing of the army. In the course of the battle, part of the guns moved gradually forward 1,200 yards up the level of Hastenbeck to fire at the enemy infantry north of the village and particularly at the great (Hanoverian) battery.

The capture of the left wing battery (number 4) as well as the great battery (number 3) was the decisive factor in the battle. Although the crown prince (Erbprinz ) of Brunswick, by a heroic act, regained the great battery for a short while, Cumberland -- according to his own account -- lost heart when he realized that the French would now be able to shower his troops with enfilading cannon fire from the dominating place of the great battery.

The French engineer captain Lambert does not grossly exaggerate when he remarks: "the Royal [Artillery] Corps has had the satisfaction of receiving compliments from the whole army on the good efficiency of our guns, which by their sole effort forced the enemy to relinquish the plain and the field of battle.

The French Order of Battle

The French order of battle for Hastenbeck, if it indeed ever existed, is not extant. The battle orders in print are by and large misleading, because they have no discernible bearing on the tactical reality. Therefore, we have to depend on a historical reconstruction based on the knowledge of the missions given to the commanders and their brigades.

D'Estrees' army seems to have consisted of 84 infantry battalions and 83 cavalry squadrons on the day of the battle. This strength included four imperial battalions from the Habsburg Netherlands (i.e. Belgium) and ten mercenary battalions from the Palatinate, a German ally of France. Assessing the battalion at 600 men and the squadron at 120 (which is perhaps too high an assumption in either case), we arrive at a total of approximately 60,000 men.

On the morning of the battle, the army deployed in two lines. The first line comprised three divisions and an enveloping task force. The term "division" is used in this context in the sense of a temporary grouping. The second line was composed of two cavalry divisions and the infantry reserve. Every division contained four to five brigades, each brigade as a rule comprising four battalions. Divisional and brigade structures were not permanent, but were liable to be altered whenever the commander-in-chief saw fit to decree differently.

Chevert's enveloping force was given the mission to move round the left flank and rear of the Hanoverians and encircle their position. Broglie's division was instructed to march towards the village of Hastenbeck. Contades was to storm the great battery (number 3).

Armentieres received the order to attack the left flank of the enemy's line through the woods. In performing this intricate task, he had to conquer the battery on the extreme left of the Hanoverian flank (number 4). After obtaining considerable reinforcements he finally commanded a force of 23 battalions, more than any other general at Hastenbeck. Why Armentieres' role in the battle is completely neglected by some historians (e.g. Savory) is unexplainable.

In the course of events, three brigades in succession were sent forward from the infantry reserve: Eu was detached to support Chevert, Champagne and Reding were to reinforce Armentieres.

All the troops marched to their respective destinations in tightly packed formations, not in the linear fashion generally associated with l8th Century warfare. On the march to the areas of attack, the battalions presumably marched in column of platoon, i.e. in a width of two companies, so that the whole battalion ideally had a width of about 32 men abreast, 18 ranks deep. The four battalion brigade would then have a width of 64 men abreast, 36 ranks deep.

Table 2 constitutes an attempt to ascertain the composition of the divisions from a careful evaluation based on a variety of sources. Where the identity of battalions is not known with any degree of certainty, either a question mark is added or numbers only are given.

It should be kept in mind that in case of imminent combat the grenadier companies were removed from their infantry battalions. They were formed into temporary grenadier units, so that the number of tactical battalions on the battlefield was always greater than the number of organisational (i.e. formal establishment) battalions. As a rule, this is hard to verify from the sources as commanders did not think it necessary to put this measure down in writing when they drafted their reports.

Admittedly an impenetrable uncertainty reigns as to the question of how many and which battalions remained back at the place of the baggage and at headquarters at Latferde, Borry, Bessinghausen and villages left of the river Weser. What appears in Table 2 in this respect is a kind of informed guesswork.

There may be quite a number of errors in this table. The attempt at drawing up the list has been undertaken in the hope of offering a new starting point for further research and of challenging other students of military history to discover more accurate details.

TABLE 2
Division and Commander	Brigades	Regiments (Battalions)
Broglie, Lt.Gen. Victor Frangois duc de, b. 1718	1) one brigade of Grenadiers	Grenadiers Royaux de Solar (2 btns) another grenadier battalion (1 btn)
	2) Poitou	Poitou (2 btns) Aquitaine (2 btns)
	3) Royal Suedois	Royal Suedois (2 btns) Royal Baviere (2 btns)
	4) one brigade of Palatinate troops	? (4 btns)
	5) Deux-Ponts	Deux-Ponts (4 btns)
Contades, Lt.Gen. Louis Georges Erasme marquis de, b. 1704	1) Orleans	Orleans (2 btns) Conty (2 btns)
	2) Vaubecourt	Vaubecourt (2 btns) Conde (2 btns)
	3) Lyonnais	Lyonnais (2 btns) La Rocheaimon (2 btns)
	4) Mailly	Mailly (2 btns)
Armentieres, Lt.Gen. Louis de Brienne marquis d', b. 1711	1) Belsunce	Belsunce (4 btns)
	2) La Couronne	La Couronne (2 btns) Cambresis (1 btn) Perigord (1 btn)
	3) Alsace	Alsace (3 btns)
	4) one brigade of imperial troops	Vierzet (2 btns) Horion (2 btns)
Chevert, Maj.Gen. Frangois (de), b. 1695	1) Picardie	Picardie (4 btns)
	2) Navarre	Navarre (4 btns)
	3) La Marine	La Marine (4 btns)
	Also 12 grenadier companies (i.e. equalling about one btn.) and several Companies of light troops from the Volontaires de Flandre and the Volontaires de Hainaut
Left-wing cavalry division	about 35 squadrons

Books and Sources Consulted

Archival material from the French Army Archives at Vincennes.
Beytrage zur neuen Staats-und Krieges-Geschichte. Danzig 1758.
Du Bois, Camps topographiques de la camagne de 1757.1760.
Feldzuge der alliirten Armee in den Jahren 1757 bis 1762 nach dem Tagebuche von Reden. Ed. Osten, Wilhelm August von der. Vol 1. 1805.
Fischer, Wolfgang, Geschichte der Artillerie in Hessen, 1982.
Hatenbeck und Rossbach, (Die Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen. Pt. 3: Der Siebenjahrige Krieg. Vol. 5, 1903.
Nosworthy, Brent. The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-1763.
Pajol, comte de. Les guerres sous Louis XV, vol. 7, 1891. -
Savory, Reginald. His Britanic Majesty's Army in Germany, 1966.
Westphalen, F.O.W.H. von (ed.) Geschichte der Feldzuge des Herzogs Ferdinand. 1859-1872. Volume 2.
Whitworth, Rex. William Augustus Duke of Cumberland, 1992

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