More Regulating Battalions!
Brigade Advance
by David Commerford and Howie Muir
 |
Those of you who read our article on
Regulating Battalions in First Empire
76 will recall our remarks on
what should have happened when the
Brigade’s units closed with the enemy.
At the time of writing we had no actually
quotable source from an eye witness for the
things that we felt had to happen for the units
within the Brigade to undertake their combat
role. Once the mechanism of Regulating Battalions
got them onto their objective.
As is often the case no sooner had we
posted the copy, than we turned up the following
material to illustrate what we had surmised,
in these quotes from Brigadier General
Richard Kane.
It is not possible to foresee what may
happen at this critical Juncture, nor to lay
down Rules how to proceed, but must leave it
to the Discretion of the commanding Officer to
act as Things may offer, or according to such
Orders as he may receive from the General.
As you will see, Kane predated the Napoleonic
period by some considerable time. In
fact he fought under the Duke of Marlborough
and we know from other sources that he com-manded
the 18th Foot at Battle of Malplaquet
in 1709.
So not only did he preach, he practiced.
This is important, as it is descriptive of
“Horse and Musket” warfare in its essentials.
The body of the quote transfers easily into the
later period. Furthermore it should be remembered
that the era in which Kane was active
represents all the difficulties of command experienced
by Napoleonic commanders, including
the magnitude of the task. In terms of
men on the field, Malplaquet itself was the
biggest black powder battle before Wagram a
hundred years later.
As we mentioned in the original article,
the concept of “regulating battalions” had existed
long before our era of study and continued
well after it, right up to the disappearance
of close order drill and manoeuvre from the
field of battle. It is therefore reasonable, and
indeed logical, to assume that Kane’s
“Conduct of the Regiment is then at the Discretion
of the commanding officer” applied
just as much in the smoke and confusion of the
early 19th Century as it did a hundred years
earlier. As such it provides a sort of practical
fudge-point at which the constituent battalions
are loosed from the confines of trying, or
having, to conform to the Line or Brigade, the
steering element of which would have been a
regulating battalion.
Of course in wargames terms we would
not wish to see the individual battalions let of
the leash at the first blast of musketry and
revert to the self-guidance mechanisms we
have avoided until that point. For this is where
the Brigade level of Situational Awareness
drops down to the individual Battalion commanders.
The limitations of smoke, confusion and
ability to react to little that is not straight
ahead, must then be accounted for, to avoid
the eternal “catch – as - catch – can” of unit
attempting to flank a unit, that is in turn flanking
etc. so beloved of wargamers.
Players seem eternally lost in their comprehension
of how hard it is to get a two or
three rank line of 500 –700 men to alter course
and conduct an ordered wheel in close proximity
to the enemy, while under fire. If the
enemy breaks and a battalion commander is
sufficiently confident of what’s happening
around him to push forward that’s one thing.
Having the confidence to, at that point, conduct
the wheel of 45 – 90 degrees so readily
undertaken by gamers, thereby turning the
battalions flank or even rear, to a supporting
line of battle, relies on considerably more
information being available than was generally
the case.
Regulating Your Battalions Tactical Processes and Simulation by David Commerford & Howie Muir, UK
|