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In this piece, I hope that I have shown why Clausewitz (and perhaps others?) might be ruled out as a witness on this issue. However, perhaps we have a “new” witness – or at least, one whose “testimony” has long been forgotten or ignored. In Pflugk-Harttung’s extensive and interesting work on this issue, his close textual analysis of Gneisenau’s statements shows that, even though Gneisenau left no record of the Brye meeting, what records he did leave, and what he did not say therein, may be important “testimony”.
What is certain is that this issue will continue to arouse controversy, not least because of the numerous and contradictory accounts of the meeting by “witnesses” and later writers: I hope to return to this subject at a later date. 20
Footnotes (including references)
1 The present article follows my article “A Message about Siborne and Clausewitz” in FE70, which examined those two authors’ accounts of the issue of Ziethen’s messages of the 15th June 1815, and the work of the German archivist and historian Pflugk-Harttung on that issue. Its genesis was the claim by P. Hofschröer (after my earlier piece in FE67) that I had missed much of his material, and the suggestion that I should read the sections on Clausewitz and Siborne Sr. in his “1815” books. The “1815” books, in dealing with the Brye meeting, cite Clausewitz’s account, and I looked at Siborne Sr. and Pflugk-Harttung’s versions as well, but lack of space prevented coverage of the issue in FE70.
Clausewitz’s account is to be found in: “Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich. Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewitz, über Krieg und Kriegsführung.” Vol. VIII. Karl Philipp G. von Clausewitz. Dümmler, Berlin, 1835. (“Feldzug”).Siborne Sr.’s version is to be found in his great: “History of the Waterloo Campaign”. Captain W. Siborne. Third edition 1848. Reprinted by Greenhill
Books, London, 1990. (“History”). Pflugk-Harttung’s work on this issue can be found in a book and two articles:
- “Vorgeschichte der Schlacht bei Belle-Alliance – Wellington”. Julius von Pflugk-Harttung. Berlin, 1903. pp. 160-169 and pp.222-252. (“Vorgeschichte”);
- “Die Verhandlungen Wellingtons und Blüchers auf der Windmühle bei Brye (16. Juni 1815)”. Julius von Pflugk-Harttung. Historisches Jahrbuch, Band XXIII, Munich, 1902. pp. 80-97. (“Verhandlungen”);
- “Zu Blüchers Brief an den König von Preussen vom 17. Juni 1815”. Julius von Pflugk-Harttung. Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine, Berlin, 1904. pp. 219-221. (“Brief”).
2 The official Prussian report of the campaign says that: “It was on the 15th of this month, that Napoleon, after having collected, on the 14th, five corps of his army, and the several corps of the guard, between Maubeuge and Beaumont, commenced hostilities. The points of concentration of the four Prussian corps, were Fleurus, Namur, Ciney, and Hannut; the situation of which made it possible to unite the army in one of these points, in 24 hours. On the 15th, Napoleon advanced by Thuin, upon the two banks of the Sambre, against Charleroi. General Ziethen had collected the first corps near Fleurus, and had, on that day, a very warm action with the enemy, who, after having taken Charleroi, directed his march upon Fleurus. General Ziethen maintained himself in his position near that place.
Field-marshal Blücher intending to fight a great battle with the enemy as soon as possible, the three other corps of the Prussian army were consequently directed upon Sombref, a league and a half from Fleurus, where the 2nd and 3rd corps were to arrive on the 15th, and the 4th corps on the 16th. ” …from “The Blücher / Gneisenau Report of the Waterloo Campaign “…written by the order of field marshal Blücher [by] General Gneisenau”: available on-line at: www.napoleonic-literature. com/WE/PrussianAccount.html (“The Blücher /Gneisenau Report”).
3 Gneisenau wrote from Paris on 6th August 1815 to his friend Gibsone, consul in Danzig: “Had our reserve arrived towards evening [at Ligny on the 16th June], then we Prussians alone would have gained one of the most complete victories.” ...quoted “Vorgeschichte”, p. 233; translated from the German by GC.
4 “…The Army will concentrate tomorrow on the Sombreffe position where the Prince [Blücher] intends to accept battle….In two hours’ time headquarters are moving to Sombreffe to which place I desire that you inform us as soon as possible when and where the Duke of Wellington intends concentrating his forces and what he has decided to do…”. …quoted in “What Time”, p.99 (see footnote 5).
Blücher also dashed off a quick letter to his wife at around noon on the 15th June: “At this moment I have received the report that Bonaparte has engaged my whole outposts. I break up at once and
take the field against the enemy. I will accept battle with pleasure.” …quoted p. 52, “The Eagle’s Last Triumph”. A. Uffindell. Greenhill Books, London 1994.
5 see the debate between P. Hofschröer and J. Hussey on this subject:
- “Did the Duke of Wellington Deceive His Prussian Allies in the Campaign of 1815?” P. Hofschröer. War in History. Vol. 5, no. 2. pp. 176-203. London, 1998.
- “At What Time on 15 June 1815 Did Wellington Learn of Napoleon’s Attack on the Prussians?” J. Hussey. War in History. Vol. 6, no. 1. pp. 88-116. London, 1999. (“What Time?”).
- “At What Time on 15 June 1815 Did Wellington Really Learn of Napoleon’s Attack on the Prussians?” P. Hofschröer. War in History. Vol. 6, no.4. pp.468- 478. London, November 1999.
- “Towards a Better Chronology for the Waterloo Campaign”: J. Hussey. War in History. Vol. 7, no. 4. pp. 463-480. London, November 2000.
6 The official Prussian report shows how the assumptions had changed when it became clear that Bülow’s IV Corps was late in joining the rest of the Prussian
army: “The Prussian army was posted on the heights between Brie and Sombref, and beyond the last place, and occupied with a large force the villages of St. Amand and Ligny, situated in its front.
Meantime only three corps of the army had joined; the fourth, which was stationed between Liege and Hannut, had been delayed in its march by several circumstances, and was not yet come up. Nevertheless, Field-marshal Blucher resolved to give battle, Lord Wellington having already put in motion to support him a strong division of his army, as well as his whole reserve stationed in the environs of Brussels, and the fourth corps of the Prussian army being also on the point of arriving.” …from “The Blücher / Gneisenau Report” (see footnote 2).
7 “Feldzug”, p. 67; translated from the German by GC. Clausewitz’s discussion of the meeting is contained in “Feldzug” pp. 67-68 and pp. 100-101.
8 Wagner’s version is as follows: “At 1 o'clock, shortly before the beginning of the battle, the Duke of Wellington came onto the height of the windmill at Bry, and had a discussion with Field Marshal Blücher, in which he gave him the assurance that his army was assembled at this moment, and that he would immediately set it in motion. For his part, the latter promised to accept battle, in a position which offered few advantages, and requested the English commander to direct his operations towards the left wing of the enemy. The decision to give battle in the taken position actually only now became fixed.” …from “Plane der Schlachten und Treffen…”, Obstltnt. Wagner, vol. IV, Berlin 1825, p. 29; quoted and discussed in “Vorgeschichte”, pp. 242-243;
translated from the German by GC. Wagner’s 1815 volume was part of a Prussian General Staff history of the Wars of Liberation. Pflugk-Harttung’s verdict on Wagner on this issue appears in “Vorgeschichte”, p. 243.
9 “The Blücher / Gneisenau Report” claims that the French army numbered 130,000 men, when in fact, of the total French army of around 124,000 men, only 64,000 fought at Ligny. This may have reflected the Prussian assumption before the battle, that they faced the entire French army: but after the battle it would indicate poor judgement of numbers.
The assertion that it was at Brye that Wellington first ordered the reserve from the forest of Soignies to Quatre Bras from Brye is questionable: the reserve began arriving at Quatre Bras by around 3 p.m., and must have been begun to move on someone’s orders before then.
Clausewitz’s account gives no details of the various options for providing support to the Prussians, which were available, and were discussed at the meeting according to other accounts. Broadly there were two options:
- Wellington could drive southwards from Quatre Bras against the French troops there, then turn to his left to take the French army facing the Prussians in the flank and / or rear.
- Wellington could send all of his troops to Ligny to act as a reserve to the Prussians (exactly what they should do there need not detain us here). The greater the French numbers at Quatre Bras, the greater the numbers Wellington needed merely to hold them; the more likely a full scale battle would develop at Quatre Bras; the less likely a successful offensive operation from Quatre Bras; and the fewer troops available to be sent to act as a reserve to the Prussians at Ligny (and the more dangerous any attempt to make a detachment).
But according to certain accounts, the first option was ruled out for reasons of the time that it would take, the poor state of the roads along which Wellington’s troops would have to march, etc. This was surely choice material for Clausewitz, especially if his audience was army officers in training.
10 Pflugk-Harttung’s comment is in “Vorgeschichte”, p. 244; translated from the German by GC. That the Prussian III Corps, to which Clausewitz was chief-of-staff, only completed its deployment on the far left of the Prussian position after midday, while the windmill at Brye, where the discussions were held, was on the Prussian right, may also be relevant.
Hofschröer unfortunately translates Clausewitz’s “sollen seine Worte gewesen sein”, not as “are supposed to have been his words”, but simply as “were”: a translation which might suggest that Clausewitz is reporting what he heard in person; see pp. 236-237 of “1815: The Waterloo Campaign”: (I) “Wellington, his German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras”. P. Hofschröer. Greenhill Books.
London, 1998. (“Allies”).
11 “History”, p.64.
12 Siborne Sr.’s source material included the works by Wagner and Damitz - see footnotes [8] and [14]. His account of the meeting largely accords with that of Damitz. Damitz is important as the supposed source of the “testimony” of Grolman, but also showed signs of influence by Wagner: I may examine this more closely at a later date.
13 Gneisenau was chief-of-staff, and Grolman the acting (for Müffling) QMG, to the Prussian Army; Müffling was Prussian liaison officer at Wellington’s HQ, and Hardinge was Wellington’s liaison officer in the Prussian HQ; Dörnberg was commander of Wellington’s Anglo-Allied 3rd Cavalry Brigade and Wellington’s intelligence chief at Mons. Blücher did not enjoy such discussions, and anyway spoke no French, the language in which they were conducted. (“Vorgeschichte”, p. 161). According to one source, he left the others to handle the talks, saying “Na macht’s nur ab” - “Well, just agree the thing!” (“Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neithardt von Gneisenau”, Delbrück / Pertz, vol. IV. Berlin, 1880. p. 656; “Gneisenau”).
14 Strictly speaking, Grolman did not write an account, or indeed leave any memoirs himself, but his papers were used by Maj. von Damitz in writing his
“Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 in den Niederlanden und Frankreich”, published in Berlin, Posen and Bromberg, 1837-1838. Müffling wrote three accounts of this meeting, in:
- his early account: “Geschichte des Feldzugs im Jahre 1815”, Berlin 1816; published in English as “History of the Campaign of 1815…”, London 1816.
- an 1849 letter to Hofmann, used in the latter’s “Zur Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815”, Berlin 1851;
- his memoirs “Aus meinem Leben”, Berlin 1851, published in English as “Passages from My Life…”, London 1853.
Pflugk-Harttung thought that the accounts in Müffling’s 1816 work and 1849 letter were the most reliable. The account in the memoirs, like much of the rest of that book, showed signs that Müffling “improved” his personal role in events, and was influenced by the controversy about Wellington’s non-arrival at Ligny. This judgement is supported by Hofschröer, who says (“Allies”, p. 238) that the account in the memoirs “generally tends to be self-important, flavoured with the benefit of hindsight and circumspect when dealing with Müffling’s errors...” (although for unknown reasons he does not refer to the 1816 work or the 1849 letter in his discussion of this issue).
Dörnberg’s account was in an undated manuscript in the Berlin War Archives (Pflugk-Harttung gives the reference Berliner Kriegsarchives II. VI. E. 58). An extract is published in “Vorgeschichte”, pp. 291-293. Pflugk-Harttung rated this account highly, because he saw it as completing Müffling’s accounts, and rejected suggestions that its value was reduced by its being written many years after the events. Dörnberg explicitly stated that no promises were made at Brye. Delbrück said that Dörnberg was right that no promises were made about how support would be given; but some support was promised, and this was so self-evident, it was not necessary to discuss the issue further at the meeting. (“Gneisenau”, p 656).
15 Pflugk-Harttung, as well as ruling out Clausewitz, also ruled out the presence of Nostitz, Blücher’s ADC, at the negotiations, (“Vorgeschichte”, p. 168, footnote): by Nostitz’s own account, only Wellington, Müffling, Gneisenau and Grolman took part in the discussions.
“Eye-witnesses”, who saw the meeting taking place either from afar or from close up, must be distinguished from “ear-witnesses”, who were present at the discussions, and perhaps contributed to them, and heard first-hand what was said. (Reiche, as chief-of-staff to Ziethen’s I Corps, may have seen the meeting from nearby, since I Corps was deployed in the vicinity, but he devoted more lines to describing Wellington’s outfit and horse furniture than to details of the meeting, and his value as an “ear-witness” may also be questioned). Taking evidence from those who were not “ear-witnesses” runs the risk of
elevating hearsay - derived from the sayings and writings of others - to the status of fact, especially if their “recollections” were only committed to paper several years after events (although the accounts of true “ear-witnesses” are not immune from this shortcoming). Certainly it is odd that so many of the accounts do not appear to recall, or to think it worth recording, what was said at the meeting in any detail.
What happened at Brye was of major importance for the campaign, and as Reiche points out, here were two of the great generals of the era, meeting to discuss how they might act together to bring about the downfall of the greatest, who was but a short distance away: one would think that the details would be memorable. Of course, if some “eye-witnesses” may not actually have been “ear-witnesses” to the meeting, that does not rule out their usefulness altogether.
16 “Verhandlungen”, p. 94; translated from the German by GC. For Pflugk-Harttung’s full version of the meeting, see “Vorgeschichte”, pp. 160-166, or “Verhandlungen” pp. 91-94. Pflugk-Harttung considered that events at Quatre Bras – where Wellington arrived at around 3-3.15 p.m. to find himself facing up to 40,000 French troops, instead of the assumed weak opposition - would have invalidated any promise made at Brye, had one been made. The options for giving direct support to Blücher discussed at Brye were now ruled out: Wellington had to
save himself, and with only 7,000 troops to begin with at Quatre Bras, not a man could be spared to be sent to the aid of the Prussians at Ligny. Nevertheless, Wellington’s resistance at Quatre Bras rendered the greatest assistance possible under the circumstances to the Prussians at Ligny. It gave the Prussians the opportunity to win at Ligny, or if they should lose, the chance to make an orderly escape and still contribute to the outcome of the campaign. If the French troops thus tied down had been available to the main French army at Ligny, the Prussians would have been outnumbered and crushed (unless Wellington could have hurried to provide direct support under those circumstances) - with dire consequences for the campaign as a whole. Prussian judgements, that Quatre Bras was
a mere “side-show”, undervalued Wellington’s contribution on the 16th June, and were wrong, in Pflugk-Harttung’s view.
17 for Pflugk-Harttung’s views, see footnote 1.
18 Cited and discussed in “Vorgeschichte” pp. 226-233. Extracts from some of the letters are discussed, with a different interpretation, by: P. Hofschröer in
“Allies”, pp. 350-351; and on pp. 283-287 of the article “Zur Geschichte des Jahres 1815”, M. Lehmann. Historische Zeitschrift, XXXVIII, 1877.
19 For discussion of Prussian communication on the 15th June, see the articles referenced under footnote 5 and my article “A Message about Siborne and
Clausewitz” in FE70. The Prussians’ IV Corps under Bülow - perhaps largely due to Gneisenau’s fault - did not take part in the battle at Ligny, despite which the Prussians were able to field 85,000 men on the 16th June, and outnumbered the French by 4:3 - although “The Blücher / Gneisenau Report” exaggerates the French numbers, as stated in footnote 9.
20 In this article I have threaded together Clausewitz and Gneisenau because of their close relationship, and Pflugk-Harttung’s work on them: what others, including Wellington, did or did not write or say about the meeting at Brye is no less interesting…
Acknowledgements
Mr. Christopher Bassford, of the National War College, Washington DC, USA and co-editor of the Clausewitz Homepage at www.clausewitz.com, for the picture of Clausewitz.
Mr. Dave Watkins of First Empire for the picture of Gneisenau.
The Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München, the Staats- und Stadtbibliothek Augsburg, and Herr Thomas Hemmann (www.napoleonzeit.de) for help in locating materials.
Wellington and Blucher Meet 16 June 1815 Before the Battle of Ligny
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