by Robert Goetz, USA
Barclay had been watching the Wkra line since his retreat from Plock on the Vistula, and had held the positions of Kolozab and Sochocin for about two weeks. In the days leading up to 24 December, the Russian army had shifted its dispositions based on the new orders of Kamenskii, who had assumed command of the combined Russian forces on the 21st. As a result, Barclay’s command was reinforced with one or two battalions of 1st jäger under Colonel Ia kov Iakovlevich Davydovskii and, it seems, additional horse artillery. [3]
Barclay placed his own 3rd jäger regiment in position at Kolozab covering the route from Plonsk to Nowemiasto while Davydovskii’s force, along with 3 squadrons Isoum hussars and two guns, was positioned at Sochocin on the 22nd. At both points, the Russians occupied the bridgehead on the right bank with patrols and foraging parties stretching as far out as Plonsk. In the woods on the left bank between the two posts and in a position to support a French attack at either point stood the Tenguinsk musketeer regiment. A third force of unidentified composition was positioned at Wrona to the south of Kolozab to secure lateral communications on the right bank of the Wkra, although it’s not clear if this force was detached from Barclay’s command or Dorokhov’s forces from Borkowo.
While the Russians were shifting forces to their right, increased French activity north of the Vistula alerted Barclay to the impending French offensive. French reconnaissances in the vicinity of Plonsk on the 20th and 21st of December had encountered Russian foraging parties. As the French advanced towards Plonsk between the 21st and 23rd, the Russian patrols withdrew to the bridgeheads.
The position at Kolozab lacked any readily defensible terrain so Barclay had constructed a redoubt to cover the bridge in which he placed his 6 guns. The redoubt was supported by two battalions of 3rd jäger with two squadrons of Isoum hussars in reserve. Cossack patrols and perhaps also some infantry detachments occupied advance posts downstream. In all Barclay had no more than 1,100 infantry and 650 hussars and Cossacks plus the half battery of artillery.
On the 23rd, a French force, consisting of cavalry, infantry and artillery approached the Russian positions at Sochocin, Kolozab and Wrona, prompting Barclay to withdraw his forces to the left bank. At Kolozab, the opposing troops exchanged fire and the French actually prepared some rafts to threaten a crossing of the river. The Russians easily beat off the half-hearted attempts of the French who, having achieved their purpose of provoking the Russians into revealing their positions and strength, retired.
During the night of the 23rd, Barclay’s forces braced themselves for the likelihood of a renewed attack the next day, this time in force. The bridge, which apparently had been left intact in anticipation of the offensive planned by Kamenskii, was dismantled, although the pilings were left intact. The morning of 24 December dawned cold and overcast and after an anxious morning, patrols finally brought word of an approaching French column. The French column, comprised of the 1st division of Desjardin and Milhaud’s cavalry brigade, had concentrated at Plonsk at 4:00 AM and began its march on Kolozab around 8:00, approaching the Russian positions around 11:00 AM. Desjardin, observing the redoubt and the general lack of cover for any troops on the right bank, ordered Lapisse to take a detachment of 2 battalions of 16th légère
downstream to locate a ford by which to turn the Russian position.
The remainder of Lapisse’s brigade was ordered to engage the Russian forces on the opposite bank to occupy their attention while the turning maneuver was being executed. Lefranc’s brigade and Milhaud’s cavalry remained in reserve. While Lapisse’s column marched off to the southeast, Colonel Savary of 14th ligne, supported by 11
guns under the command of battalion commander Dubois, advanced on the bridge, supported on his right by the remaining battalion of 16th légère. Savary detached one battalion of 14th ligne to seek a crossing about one km to the north.
The details of Savary’s orders are not clear, but the intention appears to have been to engage the Russian forces rather than to storm the bridge outright.
[4]
Savary, however, apparently seeking glory and impatient of waiting for the turning maneuver to develop, decided to force the crossing. Around noon Savary assembled the grenadiers of his regiment with the battalion of 16th légère deployed on the riverbank to provide fire support and the 11-gun battery directing its fire on the redoubt to try to neutralize the Russian artillery fire. Tearing planks off houses on the approach to the river, the grenadiers stormed the bridge, laying the planks across the footings. Although they sustained serious casualties, the grenadiers made it to the other bank. Observing the French assault on the bridge, Barclay ordered one squadron of Isoum hussars under Lieutenant Gluskov to charge the French grenadiers who had reached the left bank. Gluskov charged the French with his hussars, inflicting considerable casualties among the disorganized party that had gained the left bank, Savary being among those killed. More French swarmed over the bridge, however, and a small party of French cavalry managed to swim to the left bank.
At about this point in the action, Barclay was alerted to the approach of Lapisse’s column on his left. Lapisse had found a ford about 1500 meters downstream just beyond the village of Pruszkowo. Crossing, Lapisse drove back the Cossack patrols and quickly marched to attack Barclay’s flank, making contact shortly before 1:00. Barclay realized that he was outflanked and that it was hopeless to try to stop Lapisse’s force and contain the French at the bridge with the small forces that he had, particularly in light of the overall strategic situation. In addition, orders to withdraw on Strzegoczin were issued by Kamenskii from Nasielsk around 12:30 and seem to have arrived at Kolozab between 1:00 and 1:30. Barclay deployed the other squadron of Isoum hussars that he had at his disposal against the head of Lapisse’s column,
which seems to have held them up momentarily, and ordered a retreat towards Nowemiasto.
Lapisse, faced with only a small body of horse, deployed his battalions and continued his advance. With Lapisse’s force on the left and 14th ligne passing over the makeshift bridge in force the retreating Russians were hard pressed. While the infantry and cavalry managed to withdraw in good order, 6 guns emplaced in the redoubt could not be withdrawn in time and were captured by the French who by this point outnumbered the Russians by 2 - 1 on the right bank. Barclay’s forces withdrew down the main road towards Nowemiasto. As the remainder of 14th ligne and 16th légère crossed at the bridge, Lapisse formed them up and set off in pursuit of the Russians towards Nowemiasto.
As the Russians began withdrawing from their positions (around 1:30), Captain Lesecq of the engineers had set to work rebuilding the bridge with his party of sappers. By 2:00 the bridge was passable and Milhaud’s cavalry, Lefranc’s brigade (44th and 105th ligne) and the artillery crossed to the right bank. Milhaud joined Lapisse’s forces in pursuit of Barclay, although the pursuit was limited to driving the Russians back and securing the bridgehead. The forces of Lapisse and Milhaud bivouacked a short distance from the river that night.
With the bridge at Kolozab secured and Barclay’s forces retiring on Nowemiasto, there remained only the Russian forces to the north. Colonel Ershov, commanding the Tenguinsk musketeer regiment, had received orders from Barclay to withdraw, but soon after lost contact with him due to Lapisse’s aggressive pursuit. As a result,
he withdrew Tenguinsk to the north through the woods, intending to join forces with Davydovskii at Sochocin and retire from there to Nowemiasto. Augereau directed Lefranc to the north in pursuit of the Tenguinsk regiment and to support the operations of Augereau’s 2nd division at Sochocin.
Action at Kolozab 24 December 1806
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