A Desperate Business:
Wellington, the British Army
and the Waterloo Campaign
Book Review
by Peter Hofschröer
 |
by Ian Fletcher
Waterloo books seem to be perennial and since the battle itself, hundreds have been published on the subject. Two centuries after the battle, one finds oneself asking the question: What is new or different about this Waterloo book and why should I buy it? The answer to the first question is not a lot and the fairest comment on the second question is to suggest strongly that a prospective purchaser look at it very carefully before making a decision. There are chapters on Wellington’s army, the “communications breakdown”, the outbreak of hostilities, Quatre Bras and its aftermath, and of course the various phases of the Battle of Waterloo. A concluding chapter deals with the advance on Paris. There are the usual maps, illustrations, orders of battle and bibliography. The layout is pleasant, there are some eye-catching colour illustrations, but in my copy at least - maybe I was unlucky - a lot of the illustrations were out of focus. One could describe the text as consisting largely of two elements. The first is a repetition of the author’s favourite Waterloo myths; the second is the gratuitous use of long quotations from well-known accounts, a number of which are in print today. The first is, I suppose, to be expected. There is hardly a British Waterloo historian that has approached this subject with an open mind and carried out the basic function of a good historian - to run down and establish the facts. Two that did so are the berated William Siborne and good old Chesney. They both wrote a century and a half ago, but the bad habits picked up since do not seem to want to go away, even in the 21 st century. Who said dinosaurs are extinct? The second is a pity and shame as there is a considerable body of primary source material from British participants in the battle that has yet to be used. This material is readily available in various archives and libraries in Britain and, thanks to modern communications technology, is very easy to access. The Wellington Papers, for instance, are available online. There are files of unused manuscript material in the National Army Museum, the PRO, the British Library, the National Library of Scotland, etc. A number of these institutions will photocopy and post the material, so one does not even need to go there to obtain it. Living close to London, Mr Fletcher has little excuse for not having done even just a little original research. A golden opportunity to bring new material to light to the general reader has been missed. Instead, the reader is presented with large chunks of material from Mercer and the Waterloo Letters. One notes that scanners have dropped in price. Had he done some proper research, then Mr Fletcher’s chapter on the supposed “Communications Breakdown” would never have been written. This chapter is pure bunk and myth taken to an extreme. Mr Fletcher, for instance, actually gives credence to the Grant legend, even referring to the discredited Hamilton-Williams for support. I would suggest Mr Fletcher read the Autumn 1998 issue of the “Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research” (JSAHR), which contains a thoroughly researched article refuting the charges against Dörnberg in detail. Further very basic errors of fact abound in this chapter. For instance, Mr Fletcher tells us that: “The information received by Wellington up to the evening of 14 June gave no real indication of the likely route of the French attack.” I would refer him to the letter sent by Hardinge from Blücher’s headquarters in Namur on 14 June, as printed in volume ten of the “Supplementary Dispatches”, which shows what Wellington actually did know. If mere oversight and inadequate research were not enough, Mr Fletcher ventures into the realms of fantasy. He tells us that: “To this very day German historians claim messages were despatched to Wellington much earlier than he admitted…” The only reference Mr Fletcher gives for this is Delbrück’s “Gneisenau”, first published in 1882, which he has clearly not read as no such claim is made in this work. Neither does Mr Fletcher list any German works in his bibliography, so all one can reasonably conclude is that Mr Fletcher simply does not know what he is talking about. Furthermore, while German historians certainly did accuse Wellington of misleading Blücher, these historians lived in the 19 th century and, not surprisingly, are not alive today. Mr Fletcher then treats us to his coup de grace: He agrees with Jac Weller’s view that Wellington was an honest politician. Those of us who have reached adulthood would beg to differ. I would suggest Mr Fletcher read the article on Siborne and Wellington in the Winter 2001 issue of the JSAHR. This, I am afraid, shows his honest hero telling a rather large porky. More myths abound throughout the book, in between the quotes from Mercer and the Waterloo Letters. Apparently, Wellington ordered his troops to Quatre Bras on the evening of 15 June. Wrong. Read his orders as given in volume twelve of the published Despatches! The De Lancey Disposition showing much of Wellington’s army marching to Quatre Bras at 7 a.m. on 16 June was apparently genuine. Wrong. Wellington did not order any troops there until much later, so how can it be? Read some of those published memoirs next to the scanner! The Frasnes Letter was apparently based on incorrect information and was not a deliberate attempt to mislead Blücher. If so, please explain why Wellington got the position of the Reserve incorrect, when he had ridden past it minutes before writing the letter, etc., etc., etc. Instead of all this drivel, Mr Fletcher could have written an account pointing out how astute Wellington was in dealing with the situation after Napoleon had humbugged him, how he kept his cool when lesser men would have gone to pieces, how he managed to keep a fragile coalition together in adverse circumstances and how he ultimately triumphed: By being an shrewd but dishonest politician, as well as a great military tactician. He could have backed it up with quotes from all that unpublished archive material. That would have been a contribution to Waterloo literature. In short, this book is an opportunity wasted. There is nothing really new in it. It is not so much a work of history as a work of mythology. Mark Adkin’s “Waterloo Companion” is vastly superior in terms of research, content and presentation and represents much better value for money. Ian Fletcher’s work is, indeed, a “Desperate Business”. A publisher with the reputation of Spellmount should have thought twice before publishing it. Under Review Book Reviews
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