The Treaty of Amiens
Origins of the War
of the Third Coalition
Introduction
by John Cook, UK
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In the introductory chapter to his remarkable little book, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, Professor Timothy Blanning describes the origins of great wars in general. He concludes that all wars are fought for essentially two reasons, gain or security, or both.
At right: Better known for his defeat at Yorktown, Cornwallis was governor-general of India from 1786 to 1791 and appointed viceroy of Ireland from 1798 to 1801, where he crushed the rebellion led by Wolfe Tone. He resigned in 1801 because of the George III’s refusal to support Pitt’s proposals for Catholic emancipation. He was Britain’s chief representative at negotiations for the Peace of Amiens but was no match for Joseph Bonaparte and Tallyrand. He returned to India in 1805 as governor-general again but died the same year at Ghazipur.
He also dismisses the uniquely ideological nature often claimed for the French Revolutionary Wars, on the twofold grounds that all wars have an ideological element to one degree or another, and that whilst elements of the Revolutionary government did have an ideological mission from time to time, it was, on the whole, more interested in territorial gain.
He also argues that the threat from Revolutionary France perceived by the principal European powers was not its ideology per se, but its aggressive use of military power and the resulting threat to their security. Of course, my summary of something into which Professor Blanning goes in considerable detail is somewhat simplistic but, if it is true, the War of the Third Coalition, appears to be a typical example of a war fought for reasons of security.
The collapse of the Second Coalition was a gradual process and resulted, at least in part, from the various partners having disparate war aims, a problem that was also to blight the Third Coalition and was not really resolved until 1813. The Russians, disillusioned with their Austrian and British allies, effectively abandoned the alliance in October 1799 and two months later formally withdrew from it.
Then, on 16 December 1800, together with Sweden, Denmark and Prussia, Tsar Paul I revived the 1780 League of Armed Neutrality, the purpose of which, on the surface at least, was to protect the maritime rights of neutrals. In reality it was an attempt by the Tsar to form another bloc, of which Russia would replace Britain as the dominant partner.
Although the Austrians were defeated at Marengo in June 1800, the War of the Second Coalition was not effectively ended until Hohenlinden in December of that year, and on 8 February 1801, the Austrians and French concluded the Treaty of Lunneville. This treaty was essentially a confirmation of the Treaty of Campo Formio of 1797, which had ended the War of the First Coalition. It restored to Consular France most of what had been acquired by the Directory and left her the dominant power in Italy and Germany, and in possession of the Austrian Netherlands, a remote and geographically inconvenient Habsburg territory which Austria had willingly ceded in exchange for territory in Bavaria and Italy.
The Treaty of Lunneville, however, like Campo Formio before it, decided nothing. Honours in the war were about even but, though placated by some territorial
acquisitions, Austria emerged from it with the same, if not greater, insecurities than before. French influence had increased significantly in Italy and Germany, both
areas of vital national interest to the Habsburgs, and she had now also acquired territory which went a long way towards achieving her goal of contiguous ‘French’
lands from the Atlantic to the Adriatic. Also like Campo Formio, the Treaty of Lunneville saw Britain’s last continental ally conclude a separate peace with France.
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