Archduke John had reached Graz on May 24th with his main body, which was now down to 8600 men, having had to detach forces to Croatia. He was counting on Jellacic's force to rebuild his army to a more respectable strength with which he intended to carry out one of the following options: "I shall either return to the Hungarian Insurrection via Fuerstenfeld and attempt to advance from there, or put a few marches behind us and break out towards Austria, either via Aspang to Neustadt, or across the Semmering, or perhaps even via Mariazell to St.Polten."

Jellacic's disaster and the movements of the French, who reached Bruck and Frohnleiten on May 27th, removed most of these options and ensured that Eugene would be able to link up with his step-father's forces near Vienna. John left Graz on May 29th and marched via Gleisdorf and the Raab valley to Kormend, where he linked up with Gyulay's troops, giving him a force of 19000 men in early June. 720 men and 22 guns had been left behind in Graz under the command of Major Franz von Hackher.

In early June, Napoleon ordered Eugene to march his troops from their new base at Wiener Neustadt to prevent John's mixture of regulars and Insurrection troops from joining up with the main Austrian army on the Marchfeld, leading to the Battle of Raab (June 14th) in which John suffered a severe defeat.

The landwehr battalions that Jellacic had left behind in the Enns valley were under the command of Lt. Colonel Count Plunquet. On May 25th a double threat developed to these troops from the Bavarians to the west and the Wurttemburgers to the north-east. Plunquet called his units together and, on the 26th, tried to march towards St. Michael and what they thought was safety. They were met on the same day by a French officer bearing news of the disaster. Totally demoralised, Plunquet began negotiations for a surrender and, on the same day, 2000 landwehr surrendered to a company of grenadiers and 40 dragoons. The rest had simply gone home!

Jellacic

The question just has to be asked as to how Jellacic managed to get so badly beaten as his defeat, it can be argued, was a direct cause of the final Austrian defeat at Wagram, where the Archduke John's presence with a sizable force might have made a difference to the final outcome.

Firstly, Jellacic's judgment of the situation early on the morning of May 25th was somewhat faulty. In spite of the information from locals and from the landwehr he persisted in believing that only weak enemy forces were operating in the Mur valley. His poor reconnaissance compounded this problem as, despite having 75% of a cavalry squadron with him, he failed to send them ahead in the direction of St. Michael and the Mur valley while he was marching down the Liesing.

The confusion over orders described earlier in this article also added to the problem as, if the Austrians had marched on time, they might have been able to clear the St. Michael bridge before the French arrived in sufficient strength to prevent them. Once he was on the battlefield Jellacic's performance didn't improve. He failed to realise the danger of his position, fighting with his back to an unfordable stream crossed by only one bridge, and may have done better by abandoning his baggage and taking up a position in the narrows east of St. Michael, where a small rearguard could have held up the French advance for long enough to enable the main body to escape.

Jellacic, however, was fixated by getting his baggage away and thus chose to fight on the plateau west of St. Michael, precisely where Eugene could employ his superior forces to the best possible effect.

Other factors, over which Jellacic had little or no control, also contributed to the disaster. His men had made several debilitating marches in the previous month, especially in the few days leading up to the battle, and were exhausted. The French had also been marching hard and had fought several actions en route, but there was one major difference; whereas the Austrians were retreating, the French were advancing into enemy territory and were on a winning streak, having defeated Archduke John and chased him out of Italy and won several small encounters with local forces en route, especially over Gyulay at Tarvis on May 18th, which will be covered in a future article if the so-kind editor agrees.

To finish, a couple of comments on poor Jellacic would seem to be in order. Firstly from Archduke John's memoirs, written in 1853-1854: "On the 25th of May Captain de Lort arrived in Graz with news from FML Jellacic on the state of his corps (over 9000 reliable troops). I was unhappy to see him there, since as a representative of the General Staff, it was his duty to remain with his general - all the more so since I was well acquainted with Jellacic's indecision and slowness. A brave soldier in the face of the enemy, but not suited to act independently, as he had already shown, first at Feldkirch in 1799 and latterly in 1805. He needed a brave officer with him to guide him and to overcome his wilfulness."

Secondly , again from John, this time in a letter to Archduke Charles dated June 2nd 1809: "...he should only be used in the line. A brave soldier, but limited in his skills."

From these comments (which, interestingly, could also have been written about John himself) it seems incredible that he was ever chosen for an independent role in the first place!

More St. Michael - Leoben

St. Michael - Leoben: Introduction and Battle
St. Michael - Leoben: The Consequences of the Defeat
St. Michael - Leoben: Order of Battle and Bibliography
St. Michael - Leoben: 3 Large Battle Maps (very slow: 329K)
St. Michael - Leoben: 3 Jumbo Battle Maps (extremely slow: 637K)