The East Indies, 1811
by Geert van Uythoven, The Netherlands
Now Janssens’ life would become directly influenced by Napoleon, when he was chosen, taking the place of Vice-Admiral Verhuell who refused, to bring the message of King Louis’ abdication of the throne of the Kingdom of Holland to Paris on 3 July 1810. General Jan Willem Janssens talking with native sovereigns. After his arrival on 22 July, Napoleon made him a member of the Council of the Affairs of Holland. After the incorporation of the Kingdom of Holland into the French Empire Janssens became général de division in active French service on 11 November 1810. He was appointed by Napoleon Governor-General of all French possessions east of the Ile de France (in fact the former Dutch East Indies), instead of Daendels, by Imperial decree of 16 November, and distinguished by being appointed grand officier de la Légion d’honneur, effective the day he would accept the appointment, which was on the 19th. On the 21st, the day of his departure, he was made a Commander in the same Order, again changed in Knight on the 25th. He left for the East Indies from Maindin in France on 29 December, sailing with the frigate “La Méduse”. Arriving in Batavia on Java, the main island of the East Indies, on 15 May 1811, the next day Janssens took over from Daendels. Janssens negative reports about the situation he found when he took over in my opinion do not justice to everything Daendels had done during the previous years. Although Daendels had his mistakes, he had achieved much, and especially had made an tremendous effort for the defence of the colony entrusted to him, as far as it was possible with the scarce means he had. British Invasion of Java This all was ready for use to Janssens, who would not have to wait very long. On 30 July a British invasion fleet arrived north of Java. The British war fleet consisted of 43 smaller and bigger warships, commanded by Vice-Admiral Stopford. He protected a transport fleet of 57 ships, which transported an army of 11,000 men and 500 horses, commanded by Lieutenant-General Samuel Auchmuty, and accompanied by the Governor-General of the British East Indies, Lord Minto. The army consisted for the greater part of veteran troops, and were divided in four brigades, of which one formed the advance guard and one the reserve. Lieutenant-General Janssens forces inherited from Daendels consisted of 11 infantry battalions, 2 jäger battalions, 4 cavalry squadrons, a foot artillery battalion, and 3 horse artillery companies. On paper these formed a total of 17,774 men, of which only about 12% were European, supported by an additional 2,500 native auxiliaries. However, in reality strength was much less, and many strategic positions had to be garrisoned. In addition, their quality was doubtful. The field army counted about 8,000 men, of which most were natives, with none or minor experience. many of them were forced to enter the Dutch army and hated all Europeans, and would try to run as soon as they had a chance. There was a huge shortage of officers, and therefore many NCO’s, mostly incapable for the task, had been promoted to fill the vacancies. Furthermore, by orders of Napoleon, the army was commanded by général de brigade Jean-Marie Jumel, a mediocre commander, who spoke no word Dutch or Malay. After careful reconnaissance of the coast Lieutenant-General Auchmuty decided to land his troops near the village Tjilintjing, about three hours east of Batavia. The careful preparations for the landing, with intensive support from the navy, appeared to be unnecessary because the landing of the advance guard on 4 August 1811 was unopposed. In accordance with the defence plans of Daendels the ‘French’ army [7] was concentrated between Weltevreden and Meester Cornelis, where at the latter place an entrenched camp was constructed. Janssens had his headquarters at Jacatra while Batavia was only defended by an insignificant detachment. The British advance guard moved along the road to Meester Cornelis to protect the landing of the remaining infantry. During the 5th the cavalry and artillery was disembarked.
When Auchmuty received a report that an enemy column was advancing from Meester Cornelis - although later it became clear that this column was nothing more then a reconnaissance patrol- his advance guard was ordered to move about ten kilometres south to the Kapel van Suyranah. During the march, several dead were caused by sunstroke. This made Auchmuty change his decision; instead of advancing inland he decided to advance on Batavia along the coast, hoping that the advance of his troops to the Kapel van Suyranah would let Janssens believe -as
occurred- that the British would go that way. Therefore, during the evening of the 6th, the British advance guard was relieved by the reserve brigade, and advanced along the road to Tjanjong Priok. Several bridges were destroyed by Daendels, but during the months that followed his relieve most of these were replaced by bamboo made passages by the natives. Because of this the British advance was unexpectedly swift, and
during the same evening their advanced patrols reached the place were the road crossed the Anjol River.
Arriving there, they observed that the bridge across the river was burned and French outposts present on the other side. To take this obstacle in the evening of the 7th a number of navy sloops rowed upstream and created a passage, across which between 22.00 and 24.00 hours the infantry of the advance guard crossed the river. On the 8th, at break of day, they arrived in front of the suburbs of Batavia led by General Auchmuty, who demanded the immediate surrender of the city. The mayor of the city Hillebrink himself made his appearance with Auchmuty, declaring himself willing to co-operate and asking to spare the city and its inhabitants, in addition telling him that only a few cavalry were left. Nevertheless, the situation of the British advance guard was not very bright. Most of the houses were abandoned by their occupants, and
there was no drinking water available because the water-works were destroyed. In addition, there was a real chance for a French attack from the direction of Weltevreden. However, when the first British companies entered the city proper the French cavalrymen retreated, and the British
were not disturbed while they extinguished the fires of the magazines, which were set on fire by order of Janssens. In Batavia many guns and provisions were captured. During the evening most of the British advance guard entered the city and took up positions for its defence. It was an
uneasy night for them, because the had to stay under arms during the night, and had to repulse an attack from a strong French column.
Surrender Refused
Already on the 8th Lord Minto had send an envoy to Janssens - who had moved his headquarters from Jacatra to Meester Cornelis - to demand the surrender of the colony. Janssens bluntly refused. As a result, Auchmuty was ordered to continue his offensive. On the 9th, the British outposts were moved forward to Rijswijk. The next day, the bridge across the Anjol River was finished, enabling the cavalry and artillery to cross, and the main force and the reserve to enter Batavia also. During the following night the British advance guard moved to Weltevreden.
South of this village part of Janssens’ army, commanded by général de brigade Jumel, occupied good defensive positions, strengthened by
abatis, with the right flank protected by the Slokkan canal.
The left wing was however left undefended by Jumel, who had burned the bridge across the Tjiliwong but had not occupied the terrain. The British advanced in the centre under heavy musketry and gunfire, but could make not much progress because of the broken terrain and the obstacles. But then they managed to turn the left flank, and took an artillery battery consisting of four guns, despite the fierce resistance of the
gunners who died on the spot defending their guns. Brigadier von Rantzau had pointed out the vulnerable position of the artillery, without any infantry cover, but this was ignored by Jumel.
With their flank turned the French army was in disorder. It is said that at this moment Jumel yelled “lari! lari!”, intending to order a counterattack. These Malay words however have the meaning of “Get out of here!” True or not, the complete French army took flight, leaving behind an enormous amount of provisions and 280 (!) guns. A squadron of dragoons, who made many prisoners and badly wounded the
able French chief of staff, Colonel Alberti, hotly pursued the French.
The French were pursued all the way to the entrenched camp at Meester Cornelis. The British took 6,000 prisoners, loosing only 520 killed and wounded, and the victory enabled them to leave the unhealthy and marshy region around Batavia, and to advance to the more healthy highland. They had now reached the entrenched camp at Meester Cornelis, but it was clear to Auchmuty that he needed heavy guns to bombard the French positions before he could attack with a real chance of success.
Therefore, Auchmuty gave up his positions at Tjilintjing and ordered the fleet to move to Batavia were his siege train was disembarked. The Governor-General Lord Minto in the meanwhile again dispatched an envoy to Janssens, again demanding the surrender of the Dutch East Indies.
Again, Janssens refused. In addition, Lord Minto proclaimed to all the Dutch present on Java that the British had come to end French rule, and that he would take the island under the protection of the British Crown.
Janssens used the time the British left him to strengthen his defences. The surrounding terrain was inundated and additional batteries were thrown up. He tried also to hamper British activities as much as possible by firing at them whenever a suitable target was presented. During the night from 20 to 21 August, the British broke ground, and threw up their batteries north of the entrenched camp. During the morning of the 22nd, the batteries were finished and sailors started hauling up the guns to arm them, when their labour was disturbed by a sortie from the French.
The sortie was however badly prepared, with troops getting lost following difficult tracks in the wrong direction, and completely failed. During the next days, a heavy cannonade was maintained on both sides. The British guns were outnumbered, but this was made good by their better-trained gunners. The bombardment of the French positions lasted until the 25th. On this day the redoubts no. 1 and 2 north of the entrenched camp were so badly damaged that General Auchmuty decided to order a general attack on the camp, starting during the night. While making his plan of attack he was greatly assisted by information he received from a deserted sergeant. This sergeant marked out a road leading through covered terrain, right up to another redoubt, no. 3. This redoubt was situated on the right bank of the Slokkan canal and defended an intact bridge across it.
Main Column
The main column, consisting of the brigade forming the advance guard, and one brigade of the main army, would advance along this road, take redoubt no. 3, and attack the entrenched camp: the advance guard would attack south in the direction of redoubt no. 4; the other brigade west in
the direction of redoubt no. 2. To keep the French in the centre busy, another column would make a feint attack from the north, to let the French believe that the main attack would come from this direction. A third small column would take redoubt no. 1. Finally, a fourth column would make a flank movement, by advancing west of the Tjiliwong River as far as Campong Malaya, and then attack the French from this direction. The attack of the first three columns would take place at 3 o’clock in the morning of the 26th, while the flanking column would leave around midnight.
The British attack came not as a surprise for Lieutenant-General Janssens; he was informed about the upcoming attack by a Scottish deserter.
Therefore, he had given orders to prevent a surprise attack. In addition, général de brigade Jumel was ordered to take care that at 3 o’clock in the morning, all troops would be in position. Around this time Janssens himself appeared at the northern defences, asking Jumel if his orders of
the previous day were carried out. It became soon clear that they were not! Janssens harsh words to Jumel were drowned in the noise of muskets fired and the shouts of the advancing British. Led by the deserted sergeant the British advance guard arrived before redoubt no. 3 unnoticed. The outposts were run over, and the gunners managed to fire only one shot before the British were amongst them, who captured the redoubt and the bridge behind it.
Alarmed by the shots the French ran to their positions in great confusion, but before they had time too react the British advance guard also captured redoubt no. 4 at bayonet point. The British brigade following the advance guard directed its attack on redoubt no. 2. But by now the French were in position, and while they were climbing the walls they were met by a withering fire. In spite of this they managed to enter the redoubt, fighting hand-to-hand with the defenders. At this moment the following event occurred.
The Dutch Major of the artillery F.X. Muller and Captain Osman were determined not to give up the redoubt entrusted to them without the utmost resistance. So when it was clear the redoubt could not be held they threw a fuse in the powder magazine. With an enormous explosion the whole redoubt blew up, with friend and foe alike. The British were stunned and confused, and their advance halted for a while. Now the time was there for the French to counterattack, but their troops were not ready for this, unprepared as they were for the attack.
The right moment passed and the British resumed their advance, capturing also redoubt no. 1. The British advanced along the whole line, driving before them the defenders. When they reached the park, général de brigade Jumel order all available cavalry to counterattack, in a last effort to stop the British advance and to give the French time to rally. However, at the same time he ordered the infantry to open fire. As a result, the attacking cavalry was caught between two fires and repulsed by the British, receiving heavy losses. Now all hope for Janssens was gone. During the battle he tried several times, with danger to his own life, to restore order, but now he had no other choice then to order the retreat.
But at this moment the British column that had outflanked the French positions appeared at Kampong Malaya, and only a single file was open for the French to retreat. The retreating French infantry was forced off the road by the remaining horse artillery who moved at the gallop, followed by troops of wild buffalo’s, draught-animals of the train. The refugees were driven back by the British infantry, right in front of the
now attacking dragoons. These rode on much bigger horses then the natives were used to, and these threw away their arms and surrendered en masse.
The British made six thousand prisoners, including two hundred officers. Their pursuit ended at Tjanjong-Oost, about ten kilometres south of Meester Cornelis. They took the greatest care for the wounded of both sides. A number of ‘gentlemen’, on their way from Batavia in their carriages to sight-see the battlefield, were ordered to hand over their carriages to transport the wounded, much to their chagrin!
Surrender Refused Again
Lieutenant-General Janssens was one of the last to leave the battlefield. Nearly captured, and after a difficult journey, he reached Buitenzorg were he met part of his staff and the few remains of his army. Also there was an envoy from Lord Minto, to demand for the third time his capitulation. Janssens’ answer was ‘that the British had captured no more then a tenth of the island Java, and that he would not capitulate before he had not one soldier left to resist!
War has its luck, and until now it was not at the side of the French. But this will change and will decide the final outcome.’ Janssens
ordered Colonel Motman to rally the troops and to send them to Samarang under the orders of reliable officers. In addition, he summoned all native sovereigns to fulfil the obligations they were bound to by treaty, and to send their contingents of auxiliaries also to Samarang. Discipline however was bad among his native soldiers; most of them had enough and deserted in droves, murdering the officers trying to stop them. But instead of leaving for home they followed the retreating French column, killing stragglers and firing their muskets at them - if they still had
them. The time come for them to take revenge. Finally, the retreating army was down to about forty European infantry, a hundred dragoons and the remaining officers. On the 29th about five hundred native deserters attacked them, but these were repulsed by especially the officers, which had armed themselves with muskets.
Lieutenant-General Janssens refused to see général de brigade Jumel, whom he held responsible for the disaster. Jumel accompanied the retreating column for a few days but no-one followed his orders anymore. Therefore he decided to leave by carriage and to go to Cheribon, to prepare the fortress there for defence. Cheribon was strategically very important, as it controlled communications between the eastern and western part of Java. However, General Auchmuty knew this also, and had dispatched an infantry battalion embarked on some frigates to
capture the place. Arriving in front of the city, it was occupied without resistance after Lieutenant van der Werf, who was in command at the fortress, had taken a commission in the British army! So when Jumel arrived he was immediately taken prisoner.
Another part of the British army was send to Karang Sambong, to prevent a retreat of the defeated French army to the west. They managed to cut of a column retreating in that direction. Outnumbered and without artillery and nowhere else to go the troops surrendered. As a result, all
French resistance west of Cheribon ceased. However, Auchmuty was in the dark about the plans and location of Janssens. He thought that Janssens was at Soerabaya, more specific at the fortress ‘Lodewijk’, to defend this region.
Therefore on 5 September he embarked part of his army, to land at Sadajo, near this fortress. However, when he had reached Cheribon, he
learned from a captured letter that Janssens was at Samarang, not at Soerabaya. Accordingly, Auchmuty changed his plans and decided to land
there, to repulse Janssens to Soerakarta and then to undertake the occupation of eastern Java. Arriving before Samarang on the 9th, again an envoy was send to Janssens, who again refused to surrender.
When Lieutenant-General Janssens arrived at Samarang, he really found that a number of native sovereigns had fulfilled their obligations and had send their contingents of auxiliaries. However the contingent of the Sultan of Madoera almost immediately had to return, because the British fleet threatened the island. Their remained about 6,000 men, consisting of the contingents of the Emperor of Soerakarta, the Sultan of Djoejokarta and the Prince Prang Wedono.
Quality of these auxiliaries was bad; their armament consisted mainly of pikes and sticks, morale and discipline were bad. With the garrison
battalions of Samarang and Soerabaya added, Janssens had about 8,000 men at his disposal. It was clear to him that he would stand no chance in defending Samarang, which was without defences and could be bombarded by the British fleet. Therefore he took up a strong position at Oengaran, waiting for the arrival of Auchmuty. His position was on a series of heights with steep slopes, both wings resting on impassable terrain.
Turning the position was only possible by a very long detour, through very heavy terrain. When General Auchmuty, in the morning of the 12th, noticed that Janssens had evacuated Samarang and removed the guns of the coastal defences, he immediately started landing his troops, which lasted until the morning of the 13th. He met however a serious setback, because Vice-Admiral Stopford had sailed further east with the
fleet and most of the transports, in order to capture the ‘Lodewijk’ fortress and Soerabaya, which had safe roads for his fleet during the upcoming monsoon.
Therefore, General Auchmuty was left with 1,200 men and six field guns only. Nevertheless he decided to attack immediately, while the enemy was still demoralised and his weakness unknown to them. Taking in regard the position taken up by Janssens and thrusting the quality of his soldiers he decided on a frontal attack, led by Colonel Gibbs. This decision proved to be right. Janssens’ troops were completely taken
by surprise and the undisciplined auxiliary troops, already weakened by mass desertions, took flight, killing the European officers who tried to stop them. Victory was complete. With only slight losses the British had taken an enormously strong position. This proved to be decisive, Janssens army was completely defeated.
Accompanied only by a few officers Janssens retreated to the Salitaga fortress. During the night he despatched a request to General Auchmuty for a cease-fire, in order to open negotiations with Lord Minto in Batavia. Auchmuty refused, not wanting to lose any more time, and declared that negotiations had to take place with him. On 18 September at Toentang Janssens capitulated, the remains of the French army lying down their arms before Auchmuty. According to Wüppermann this was not very difficult; only one musket was left! All French forces on Java became prisoner of war.
On 18 October 1811 Janssens sailed from Batavia to England as a prisoner of war. During his imprisonment, on 22 February 1812 Janssens received the Grand cross of the Order of the Reunion.
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