Chateauneuf 1814

Concerning the Experiences of
General de Division Comte Curial

by David Commerford

Chateauneuf was an action typical of numerous engagements fought by the make shift French Army of 1814. A battle fought in the poor winter conditions by an mixture of the remnants of established forces and ad hoc battle groups, committed to buy time for the main force under Napoleon himself to continue his war of manoeuvre against vastly superior Allied numbers. It also provides a helpful illustration of the types of decisions field commanders of the period were forced to make. Where you could, while acting under written orders and limited information, be right for the wrong reasons, wrong for the right reasons or any possible combination of the two!

In early March 1814 Curial found himself at the head of one of these temporary formations by virtue of his position as one of the senior commanders of the Guard. However, on this occasion he was not at the head of the rapidly thinning ranks of a fixed formation, rather a detachment from the senior elements of the Guard organisation, as once again during this Campaign, Napoleon was forced to turn to the "Grumblers" to act as his "fire brigade".

At the head of an Old Guard Brigade, taken from Friant's Division, Curial together with a small detachment of Guard Cavalry and a Battery of Guard Artillery a Cheval was ordered forward to Ferieres (see map for details) to cover possible Allied penetrations toward the main army in the South. In the prevailing conditions of late winter/early spring the roads everywhere were in an appalling state.

As Curial's force trudged westward toward Ferieres they may well have wondered what lay in store. Communications in such a rapid campaign had been difficult, to say the least, the weather and the roads were conspiring to make Napoleons task superhuman. His only advantage lay in the fact the Allies had the same problems, made worse by the disunity of their multi national command.

Arrival at Ferieres

In terms of what Curial knew on reaching Ferieres, he was decidedly short on accurate information. The only hard facts in his possession (now some hours old) were that Roussel's Dragoon Brigade were operating off to the South West, in the vicinity of Cressay and somewhere beyond the hills to the East, Ricard's infantry division, with whom he was instructed to maintain contact, were moving on Chateauneuf. In line with his orders Curial deployed the Brigade to march NorthWest following the line of the road toward Cressay with the squadron of Chasseurs a Cheval screening the advance and the Grenadiers a Cheval together with the Horse Artillery in support to the rear.

The force reached the cross-roads East of Cressay without incident. However, Curial was soon to observe a large movement of cavalry both to his front and off to his left. This at once posed a dilemma. Given the size of his force, the unclear nature of the cavalry in question and the relatively open terrain that lay between him and the Cressay – Chateauneuf road, the idea of moving further West, looked an increasingly dubious option.

Decision at the Cross-roads

As things stood, Curial was, to his knowledge, carrying out his orders, all be it by default. The cavalry units had made no move towards him and as such presented no immediate threat, either to his force, or the flank of the main body. However, given the weakness in numbers of his mounted element, it had to be questionable what level of resistance could be maintained, should the Allies decide to push forward.

Things were further complicated when heavy fire could then be heard from off in the direction of Chateauneuf.

Curial was now in a classic situation. There were three options:

  • To remain in place, fixing the cavalry he could see, in accordance with his orders but risking the command.
  • Retire on Ferieres and hope to draw the Allies after him.
  • Move on Chateauneuf and try and support Ricard on the assumption it was in fact he who was engaged.

On the basis that (1) offered no control over the timing of events and Allied actions and that (2) could lead to his force being overrun before Ferieres was reached, he decided to try and move toward Ricard.

This at least offered the possibility of drawing the Allied cavalry further North, via a move through less cavalry favourable country and it was in keeping with part of his orders. There might also be the chance that combined action with Ricard would force the Allies to fear for the security of their own flank, while undertaking any turn inside the Chateauneuf position.

The Move North

After deploying both cavalry squadrons, in line, to his front, in order to disguise size of his force. Curial turned the Brigade to the right and set off North, down the road to Chateauneuf Keeping the poor ground between himself and the opposing cavalry. Then turning past the high ground on his right, he came insight of the village itself

More Chateauneuf 1814


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