Friedland
14 June 1807
The Russian Disaster
by Patrick E. Wilson, UK
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The day after the Battle of Heilsberg, 11th June 1807, Benningsen's position became untenable when Marechal Louis Davoust advanced along the road to Landsberg and was thus able to turn Benningsen's flank. This move by Davoust also threatened Benningsen's communications with Konigsberg, it was here that Benningsen had his main supplies and where his Prussian allies were located. Consequently Benningsen immediately detached Kamenskoi's division to strengthen the forces that defended Konigsberg, under the Prussian General Wilhelm L'Estocq. Kamenskoi marched via Bartenstein and Lampasch and joined L'Estocq behind the Frisching River on the 13th June 1807. Benningsen himself remained in position at Heilsberg, until midnight and then set off for Bartenstein with his divisions, the last of which did not leave Heilsberg until 5.00am, Platov's Cossacks did not leave until 7.00am after they had destroyed three pontoon bridges there.
Benningsen's march was conducted in four columns on both sides of the River Alle and was covered by General Prince Peter Bagration with the rearguard of one infantry division and a substantial body of cavalry. The French followed with a division of Dragoons and two of light cavalry but seem to have eventually lost contact. On reaching Bartenstein, Benningsen rested his troops but a few hours before resuming his march and headed for Schippenbeil at midnight on the 12th June. He was becoming increasingly worried about being outflanked on his right as Davoust had continued his advance on Konigsberg by way of the Landsberg road. Benningsen's leading formations reached Schippenbeil as early as 4.00am on the 13th June and as the troops passed through the town they took up position behind it and between the River Alle and it's tributary the Guber.
The troops were weary after a week of almost continuous movement and fighting, the weather was bad and it had been raining quite heavily during the last few nights but there was to be no rest at Schippenbeil. Benningsen had just found out that the French had already reached Domnau, his communications with Kamenskoi, L'Estocq and Konigsberg were threatened. Benningsen again resumed his march, this time his destination was Friedland and then Allenburg and Wehlau, from whence he could cross the River Pregel and unite with Kamenskoi and L'Estocq in the direction of Konigsberg. It seems that Benningsen had no intention at that moment of fighting a decisive battle at Friedland, far from it, he merely wished to fall back to secure his supplies and contact with his Prussian allies.
On the 13th June the leading formations of Benningsen's Army under General Prince Gallitzin reached Friedland. They found it already occupied by elements of the French 9th Hussars, these Gallitzin quickly ejected and drove back upon their parent regiment, which in turn he forced back upon the approaching forces of Marechal Jean Lannes, who was then arriving from the direction of Domnau. Benningsen himself arrived at 8.00pm; learning of Lannes' proximity he ordered the construction of three pontoon bridges and dispatched the first infantry that arrived to support Gallitzin's cavalry. Gallitzin had already established a line of outposts from Heinrichsdorf to Sortlack in front of Friedland. It wasn't until 11.00pm that the main body of the Russian Army began to arrive. Learning from prisoners that he had only a reinforced infantry division to deal with, Benningsen reinforced Gallitzin with two infantry divisions and planned to fall upon this isolated division and destroy it at dawn on 14th whilst the rest of his army rested that day at Friedland. This however was not to be. It soon became apparent that the French were themselves being constantly reinforced throughout the early hours of 14th and Benningsen found himself compelled to reinforce his own forces on the left bank of the Alle too, though in retrospect he was to write:
"I freely admit that I should have done better not to undertake the affair of Friedland; I had the power, and should have been safer to maintain my resolution, not to undertake a serious battle, since it was not necessary for the safety of the march of my army."
And yet, Benningsen did have sufficient time to carry out his plan, he just did not take full advantage of the opportunity before him, the reason for this is probably the skill displayed by Marechal Lannes in containing him until help arrived.
Lannes Arrives
Lannes arrived on the scene at about 1.00am on 14th; he had Napoleon's orders to take Friedland bit found that he only had General Oudinot's Grenadier division immediately available. Courageously, given the disparity in numbers, he ordered Oudinot forward, Oudinot's Grenadiers easily seized Posthenen, a village central to the immediate area, but could not get any farther forward. If Oudinot had tried it would have been suicide; he did however push two battalions into the Sortlack wood to his right and later, another three battalions were sent to Heinrichsdorf, another key village on Oudinot's left. The rest of Oudinot's force, together with his artillery, were deployed in front of Posthenen and covered by a heavy screen of skirmishers. Still Oudinot's force was very stretched but fortunately Benningsen's forces seemed to be preoccupied with getting themselves correctly aligned and contented themselves with bombarding Oudinot and attempting to drive his troops from the Sortlack wood. Another vital factor in Oudinot's favour was the inequalities of the ground and the height of the corps growing in the nearby fields, this concealed from Russian observation the weakness of Oudinot's position and it was also a factor that Lannes took full advantage of.
Oudinot's troops still held the Sortlack wood, despite the efforts of Russian Jägers to dislodge them.
At 8.00am Lannes' remaining division put in an appearance, these troops, General Verdier's division, were used to support Oudinot at Posthenen and his battalions in the Sortlack wood, where Russian numbers were beginning to have some effect. Lannes strength was now around 25,000 men and more were on the way, these reinforcements had not gone unobserved by Benningsen but it seems he was not perturbed by them and thought that it would be possible to defend his current position in front of Friedland until nightfall and then slip away in the darkness. The combat of the morning seemed to have died down everywhere except in the Sortlack wood, and according to Sir Robert Wilson, at Heinrichsdorf where Grouchy and Nansoulty still battled it out with Russian cavalry for that Village. Only the Russian artillery seemed to keep up a desultory cannonade of Lannes position.
Battlefield
The battlefield of Friedland could be described as a large amphitheatre and by 11.00am the French had undoubtedly secured the best seats for themselves by occupying the villages of Heinrichsdorf, Posthenen and the Sortlack wood. These features formed a semicircle on land that overlooked the town of Friedland, which occupied a space on the left bank of a curve in the River Alle. The land between the Villages of Heinrichsdorf and Posthenen, and Friedland itself, was open and at the time of the battle a sheet of tall crops ready for harvest. Another important feature was the Millstream, tributary of the Alle that cut Benningsen's forces in half, and had forced the Russians to have some wooden bridges built so that their forces could communicate. This stream flowed down to the centre of Friedland through a large pond to the north-west of the town and thus restricted still further Benningsen's space for deployment.
By 11.00am Benningsen had placed his army as follows: two divisions, the 1st and 2nd, together with the Advance Guard and some cavalry from the Millstream to the Sortlack wood under Generals Prince Bagration and Kologribow. The greater part of his army, the 3rd, 6th, 7th and 8th divisions under General Prince Gortschakoff and the cavalry under Generals Prince Gallitzin and F.P. Uvarov, were placed to the north of the Millstream and faced Grouchy's cavalry and Mortier's infantry. A further Russian infantry division remained on the right bank of the Alle though and a number of artillery batteries were situated on that bank as it was higher then the left and thus offered better fields of fire.
It was evident to Benningsen as the afternoon progressed that the French were being continuously reinforced and that his position at Friedland was becoming increasingly risky. However Benningsen still felt he could hold his position until nightfall and then he would withdraw. Indeed he had already issued his orders to that effect when a French salvo announced that they were renewing the battle, and Benningsen was forced to countermand his retrograde movement that had already begun.
It was 5.00pm and the new French attack was led by Marechal Michel Ney and his 6th Corps d'Armée, which issued from the Sortlack wood and aimed for Friedland itself. Ney had formed his two divisions into two large columns which attacked without bothering to deploy, General Marchand's right hand column stormed the village of Sortlack in fairly short order but was then brought to an abrupt halt by fire from Benningsen's batteries on the right bank of the Alle, which fired into Marchand's flank and inflicted severe casualties. Meanwhile Ney's other column, under General Bisson, made straight for Friedland but was intercepted by Bagration's cavalry as he tried to deploy in response to Russian artillery fire. The Russian cavalry attacked with such fury that they routed Bisson's column, which dragged part of Marchand's with it. Only three French regiments stood firm in this rout.
However, help was at hand, General LatourMaubourg's Dragoons intervened successfully against Bagration's cavalry, whilst General Dupont led his infantry division forward to support his former colleagues in the 6th Corps, (he had served in that corps in 1805). But the most effective intervention was to come from the artillery commander of Marechal Victor's 1st Corps d'Armée, General Alexandre Senarmont, who in the confusion of the fight advanced with two 15 gun batteries directly into the frontline. With audacity that astounded even Napoleon, Senarmont proceeded to deploy his guns at 600 paces and opened fire, then he repeated this at 300 paces, then again at 150 paces and finally at a mere 60 paces. The fire of Senarmont's batteries was horrific, they crushed Russian artillery brought against them, mowed down Russian cavalry that tried to charge them and finally ploughed deep furrows in the Russian infantry masses before them. Senarmont's guns inflicted perhaps 4,000 casualties on the Russians and forced Bagration's divisions to fall back into Friedland itself, where Ney pursued them with his successfully rallied 6th Corps d'Armée.
Russian Imperial Guards
Benningsen observing the disaster befalling his left wing tried to intervene to save the situation with the Russian Imperial Guards. Crossing the millstream by way of his pontoon bridges, he had the cavalry attack Senarmont and the infantry attack Dupont's infantry. Unfortunately Senarmont's skilled gunners quickly turned their flank guns on Benningsen's cavalry attack and stopped it with two salvos, whilst Dupont's men met the 'northern giants' of the Russian Imperial Guard with the bayonet and despite the obstinacy with which they fought pushed them back across the millstream. Crossing the millstream themselves, Dupont's men then fought their way down the Konigsberg road into Friedland itself. Senarmont meanwhile supported Dupont's attack with some well-aimed salvos into the Russian masses in and around Friedland.
These salvos also aided Ney as he now stormed Friedland at the heed of his rallied Corps; the 59th ligne regiment had the honour of being the first into the town, though it took a fierce street fight to secure the town. By 8.00pm Ney and Dupont had secured possession of the now burning town and Bagration's decimated divisions had retreated via the bridges above the town to the right bank. These bridges were then torched on Bagration's orders as he himself withdrew from the fight, sadly this resulted in unnecessary casualties
Meanwhile on the Russian right, General Prince Gortschakoff had become increasingly concerned at the volumes of fire and the thick smoke arising from the housing and bridges in the Friedland area. Observing that Dupont threatened Gortschakoff's left flank, Benningsen had the two Divisions nearest Friedland of Gortschakoff's commend attack Friedland in an effort to regain the bridges there, (he did not know that Bagration had had them burned).
This attack was carried out with the bayonet and pushed both Dupont and Ney back into the town itself, some of Benningsen's troops made it to the burning bridges and finding it impossible to cross, fell back to a village to their rear called Kloschenen. Here a hitherto unknown ford was found that give Benningsen a chance to save Gortschakoff's command, which was now being hard pressed by the French left wing under Lannes, Mortier and Grouchy. Positioning elements of Gortschakoff's commend on the nearest high ground over looking Friedland to protect the newly found ford; Benningsen commenced an immediate retreat. Using Uvarov's and Prince Gallitzin's cavalry to stall the French advance, Benningsen got the artillery away first, not that this was easy as the ford was deep and the artillery teams had to swim part of the way and then haul their guns up the right bank of the Alle. Next Benningsen got his infantry across, though the French artillery tore wide furrows through their ranks as they fell bank on the ford.
Many of Benningsen's infantry then drowned as they waded through the Alle breast high but it seems that this was preferred to surrender. Part of Gortschakoff's cavalry crossed with the infantry although the greater part seems to have retreated down the left bank of the Alle to Allenburg. This was only possible because the French cavalry under Grouchy were so exhausted, though perhaps one more charge might have been possible. Nevertheless it is reckoned that upwards of 5,000 Russians retreated this way and eventually rejoined Benningsen on 15th June 1807.
Benningsen's army was now shattered, he had lost perhaps 12,500 men and 80 guns and had been routed. The French had lost about 8,000 men and 2 eagles captured but had achieved the decisive victory that had eluded them for six months. The Russian successes of Pultusk and Heilsberg, and of course Eylau, were to be swept away with the French victory of Friedland. Benningsen's reputation was to suffer too, unfairly in my opinion, and as a result Russia was defeated in the 180607 campaign in Poland. For shortly after Friedland the Tsar Alexander I signed the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon, the terms were not too bad and Russia even gained a small piece of territory at the expense of Austria but her friend and ally Prussia was decimated. Prussia was broken up and reduced to a shadow of her former self, her territory helping to create the Kingdom of Westphalia and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.
At Friedland the Russian Army had shown it's usual bravery and had demonstrated it's steadfastness in the most dire of circumstances, the ordinary soldier and regimental officer was not to blame for the defeat. The defeat belonged to Benningsen; he had been lured into a trap by the defensive skill of Marechal Lannes, arguably one of Napoleon's finest commanders. The temptation of an easy victory proved too much for Benningsen, as he later admitted, he should have resisted and continued his march and only fought again when the advantages were in his favour as he had done at Heilsberg. By undertaking the Battle of Friedland he threw away the good work he previously done at Pultusk, Eylau and Heilsberg, and what is more almost destroyed the Tsar's best field army. For this he should be criticised but then we all make mistakes, unfortunately Benningsen was on a rather large scale and greatly affected his later career. He could have become as famous as the Prussian General von Blucher but sadly his fellow officers Barclay De Tolly, Bagration and most of all Kutusov, have eclipsed him because he did not hold the command in 1812 that he deserved.
For this the Battle of Friedland is undoubtedly to blame, as Napoleon himself once remarked: "From the sublime to the ridiculous is but a single step", that step for Benningsen was Friedland.
Becke, A.F., Friedland (Magenta Publications, 1991 reprint).
More Friedland
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On the 14th June 1807 General Levin August Benningsen (at right), an Hanovarian commanding Russia's best field army, suffered perhaps the greatest defeat to befall Russia in the entire Napoleonic wars. How Benningsen managed to achieve this feat when only four days before he had inflicted a severe defeat upon the forces of Napoleon Bonaparte at Heilsberg, is the subject of this essay. As Napoleon himself once remarked: "From the sublime to the ridiculous is but a single step."
Fortunately at around 3.00am General Grouchy (at right) arrived with his Dragoon division and took position on Oudinot's left. Here the Russians had decided to seize Heinrichsdorf and turn Oudinot's flank. Grouchy's arrival thwarted this manoeuvre but only just and it was only after Grouchy himself received support from General Nansoulty and his Cuirassiers that Grouchy was able to successfully beat off Russian cavalry attacks. About the same as this combat at Heinrichsdorf was taking place Marechal Edouard Mortier arrived with his leading division, General Dupes' 6,000 infantry, this allowed Lannes to concentrate Oudinot's men in front of Posthenen whilst Dupes took up a position between that village and Heinrichsdorf. Benningsen's numerical superiority was slowly disappearing and Lannes only had to hold on. The Russian manoeuvre against Heinrichsdorf had been repulsed and