Defense of Danzig 1813

January to End February

by A. Ricciardiello, Poland

From the 4th Jan and on the 10th some Neapolitan units were recalled, 2 half provisional brigades were kept and orders were sent to Marchand's division and 2 battalions of Davout's at Thorn to garrison Danzig. On the 13th the troops of X corps passed into his command. Prior to this though, he asked MacDonald to keep them in the field as long as possible to give him time to collect supplies, especially forage. Eventually by the beginning of serious hostilities the strength and garrison composition can be seen in table I to which can be added about 6000 in the hospitals.

The actual defence started in the night of 12/13th January when General Bachelu, with the rearguard of X Corps had just crossed over to the left bank of the Vistula when he came under attack by an advance guard, which forced him to retire into Palschau. A surprise attack by a Polish battalion forced the Russians to retreat, leaving 50 dead, 40 wounded, 28 prisoners and 60 horses. A few other minor combats ensued over the next few days, all in favour of the French and more men came into Rapp's command.

Rapp had established a line of defence around himself but by the 18th he decided to call in his men into their respective bases due to a temperature of -18 Celsius. The hospitals were getting even fuller because of the weather. He left just a few outposts about a league around the city.

On the 20th, 4 companies of Neapolitans, who were returning from prisoner escort ran into some of the enemy but came through relatively unscathed. The significance here is not so much their action, but the fact that Rapp was contemplating some kind of rescuing sortie and was worried about them. He obviously by now had some idea of what hat was around him for he wrote of his surprise that they came back in good condition and so quickly through the blockade.

To try and loosen the strangle hold, the 29th January saw a column leave the city under the command of General Grandejean to beat off the Russians around the city. This with several others met with sonic success. However, the blockade was tightening.

The only supply line open was the sea, if anything could escape English patrols. By this time there was no real hope of reinforcements, nor of materials. Rapp, however, wrote that the hospitals, lodgings etc., in the city and outer forts were now all in order, but more importantly he writes of the high morale of the men. However, despite the sorties the blockade became increasingly more severe. From the 29th Jan. to 15th Feb. no news could be sent out except for a summary report of the situation for this period.

General Rapp, Governor of Danzig to the Prince of Neuchatel

Danzig 15th. Feb. 1813

The enemy has so increased in difficulty the impediment of crossing his lines, that I call no longer send reports overland to YS.H. I have therefore decided to send out a small vessel, to which I have given the order to sail up to Straslund if possible, and land Captain Cichosky of the 3rd Polish, who with much zeal has offered to discharge this important mission, to whom I now entrust.

After the 29th of the last month the day in which I sent my last report to YS.H, we have had various encounters with the enemy: in the first, ours, commanded by General Destrees who had a French battalion of the 30th Division, 2 Neapolitan battalions, I Westphalian, and 4 squadrons of cavalry ...

The description of the action is rather brief in the letter and is more informative elsewhere.

Having established that the Russians had been reinforced, D'Estrees was sent out with the above force, plus 3 guns. The aim was to reconnoitre and establish the strength and dispositions of the enemy, in the direction of Brentau.

On joining the column at Lang Fuhr, the French batt, the artillery, a sqdn. of cuirassiers and one of Polish lancers were left at the south entrance of the village, to constitute a reserve, and guard the heights to the east of Silberhammer. On a hill east of the road wen tthe Westphalians supporting the left of the Neapolitans, who were to advance towards Stries for the main operation.

The 1st battalion 7th Neapolitan line (650 men) and 50 flankers from the 6th Neapolitan line were to force the position at Stries, when the road passed through a narrow defile. From this they were to attack Brentau and occupy the heights nearby where specific officers were to go and fact find.

Having left a small flank detachment the 7th threw out the enemy cavalry from the defile and assaulted the village in front and flank and took the place after brief resistance. The flankers occupied it and positioned themselves in and around the village.

The Russian cavalry reformed about their infantry reserve placed beyond Brentau from where here they launched an attack on the flankers, but were successfully repulsed.

The main body continued to Brentau. The The taking of the Kabrunn redoubt: night 16/17th November 1813. Chambure leaves a deflant note to Prince Wurtemberg. officers made their notes and the unit started to retire.

Due to the lie of the land the 7th could not see what the flankers could. The skirmishers advanced to warn them of cavalry building up to attack them. Unfortunately, they arrived in time to see them being assaulted in flank and front and then being caught up in the engagement too. The Grodno Hussars sabred most of the skirmishers.

Eventually the Neapolitans reached the Streis defile occupied the heights and had a provisional squadron of Chasseurs chase off the Russians to Lang Fuhr who had by now lost their appetite for further combat. This expedition had cost the Neapolitans 230 dead and wounded

The fight though was not yet over. Lang Fuhr was occupied and to help hold on to it 2 squads of 40 men each took a house in the centre by the main road. At about 5 in the evening the town was attacked and the 7th outnumbered, eventually were driven out leaving the two squads behind. During the night they were surrounded in their houses and attacked until reduced to half their numbers, without cartridges they were forced to surrender.

Rapp now goes on to mention other incidents that happened at the same time.

. . . The same day General Franceschi commander of the 34th Division who had his advance posts at Ohra and Stolzenberg ordered them to keep watch and report on the enemy movements. Colonel Housselot of the 29th at Ohra did this, but Col. Preeringen, commander at Stregemberg conducted himself somewhat differently.

Grouping two thirds of his men he led them towards Schidlitz and then on to Worneberg. From there towards Schonfeld attacking small Cossack posts between the two villages. The Cossacks regrouped and numbered about 350 men. Meanwhile Col. Preeringen marched towards Miggau and after reaching a height imprudently descended into a gully which separated it from another rise, parallel to Miggau, which he seemed to want to attack.

He started his ascent on the slope of the second rise that hid the movements of the enemy, who profited by the error committed by ours. They moved forward under cover and vigorously attacked the left and front of Preeringen's position. It seems that taken by surprise they did not have time to form square and were thus sabred, with many taken prisoner. Many officers were gravely wounded amongst them Colonel Preeringen.

The result of this wretched affair was the loss of 18 officers, 180 men of the 4th and 6th regts. of the Confederation (Princiers), 1 officer and 16 Polish lancers.

Col. Preeringen is culpable for having initiated all action without orders, and were it not for the fact that he was taken prisoner I would refer him to a council of war and punished according to military law.

Rapp outlines the overall plan for the mission (29th Jan) by Grandejean and his subordinates, (which included D'Estrees' task mentioned above), and was primarily to retake Lang Fuhr. He then goes on to describe the success of the operation and how the proportion of casualties was very favourable to the French, plus several citations.

He then continues;

Our soldiers have found a lot of money on the dead officers and Cossacks. A voltigeur, a grenadier and a Polish lancer respectively have 1000 Ducats, 150 Double Florins of gold, and 300 Napoleons. The Cossack prisoners are of the Don region with some Bashkirs among them. After this combat we have not seen the enemy, only distant patrols.

The enemy continuously tries to disquiet the population. It started with a proclamation and a letter to the president of the senate. I immediately published this document in the gazette accompanied with a note demonstrating to General Platow how his blusterings were inopportune. I also had inserted in the successive gazette, a notice ridiculing enemy operations.

At this point Rapp turns his attention to fortresses that fell quickly, elsewhere, pointed out in Russian notices, but immediately sees Prussian treachery at work, and then briefly speculates on enemy motives and moves which he dismisses but ponders on a Russian Prussian alliance;

I am certain that Prussians with Russian uniforms are before Danzig, I personally know two who are amongst them. The Russians are of the mind not to assault Danzig, but reserve the honour to the Prussians who will take it for themselves.

The advance posts are well organised, and our young soldiers apply themselves with ardour against The Russians. It is dislikable that the humid cold, which has followed the hard frost, puts the men into a torpor that only melts in the presence of the enemy.

The 33rd from Naples on the shores of the Baltic demonstrate much zeal, but from all of them emerges the 7th for their discipline, uniformity, and for the vigour of their soldiers.

The Westphalians and Bavarians are not inferior to the Poles in courage and loyalty, despite attempts fi-om the enemy, to seduce them away. I have not had to deplore the loss of one man. I consider this division as my reserve, and am saving them as such.

It has been three weeks since Tschittchov's corps should have left for Elbing to join with Wittgenstein and Platow to come to Danzig. It would have seemed that the three generals would act in concert for an attack in force against us, from the side of the flooding, fi,om Motlau. But the Emperor Alexander had not even given orders when officers of the general staff had left Elbing, when counter orders reached the admiral [Tschittchov ] to return to Landsberg in the old Prussia.

It would appear that for such an undertaking, in Nehrung and in Werder, 2000 ladders and 6000 lits de plumes would have been requisitioned.

I learned of this when Platow wrote to the magistrates of Danzig also saying that 500 workers and certain other groups would rise against us at the moment of attack But Platow has deceived himself in his calculations, because the people of Danzig can be reduced to the utmost starvation, but not one would go against the soldiers of the Emperor.

I have let the enemy know how particularly little they can do by way of intrigues. Y.S.H. can thus rest perfectly tranquil regarding the inhabitants of Danzig, though I can not hide my distress in seeing these who have been without bread for one month.

The requisitions, of the previous year were considerable and followed through with such rigour that now the inhabitants live from day to day. The shopkeepers and the Poles dare not transport grain, and that they already took still has not been paid for. [Danzig was mostly German in population at this time, though a very large Polish contingent remained, that carried on the tradition of handling grain from the hinterland for export since the times when Poland was one of the greatest European powers.]

I have been written to by Platow and Prince Repnin on several occasions, and had representatives sent to me. I had them wait for an hour in the snow with a temperature of 18 degrees, then I did not receive them but let them know that I will only communicate by cannonade.

The Cossack prisoners say that that many of them have returned home, especially those with money. Some regiments are reduced to a hundred men.

I can not tell Y.S.H. exactly how many Russians surround us; for a long time there was but Cossacks. After some time infantry and artillery joined them, that increases daily.

Despite particular details which are necessary in records I keep, I will inform you of the more substantial points.

The privation that could be felt the most is in salted meat, having been a neglected supply. From the moment that those few beasts that remain on four legs will be consumed, there will not remain 33 days supply.

Forage is lacking; a natural consequence of the system of requisition by Commissioner Clapier. A system that has advantages and inconveniences, but should not have been applied here. The consensus of the Prussian government was that instead of requisitions, that they constantly, opposed, they would have made regular contributions.

The scarcity of forage is sorely felt and a lack straw for bedding is all the more so as there many horses.

The condition of the hospitals is even more sad. The rest of the details in the directory, I include will convince Y.S.H. I have more than 9000 men non-active and can not carry arms because they are ill in hospitals, infirmaries and barracks. To this it is necessary, to add those convalescing, but not in active service.

Mortality rates fluctuate between 50 and 60 a day, yesterday 69 died. More than two thirds are French, from the 30th Division in which there are numerous men in a weak condition, and in which the paternal care of General Heudelet does not manage to tear them away from death.

I have increased the number of hospitals to avoid the risk of contagion, of which is already being felt. I have had bought those medicines that were lacking and wine for the sick and I will try to preserve for the Emperor as many of these that can render the greatest service, but I fear I will see many dead.

Y.H. will see how our provisions are insufficient. I request the supply of salted meat from Pomerania or an Austrian city, or Denmark Further, we need salt, rice andmedicine. Y.H. knows now our needs and how grave our situation could be. I respond in the name of the troops that the Emperor has put it, my command, that there will not be a sacrifice that is not capable of being supported, privations that can be suffered and paid for by their exertions and work etc.

Commander X Corps Rapp

After the actions of above there was period of calm. The Russians contented themselves with a passive blockade of the city Although the Russians did no damage to the troops of the garrison the weather and the conditions did. In February over 4,000 men died.

Morale ebbed in the cold and inactivity The constant funerals only reminded the troop of the possible results of their sufferings. They were hoping that the end of February would see the beginning of better weather and this was to be. The thaw started and with it came the worst floods in 40 years, adding different problem! and work for the already fatigued garrison.

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