Reader's Reviews
1815: The Waterloo Campaign
reviewed by Neil Carey
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1815: The Waterloo Campaign "Publish and be Damning"Author Peter Hofschröer This is certainly one of the more important and controversial works in this well-exposed field since William Siborne went to print in 1844. It is not a comprehensive treatment of the campaign - to that extent the sub-title is the better description. Hofschroer's account ceases on the night of 16th June as the Prussian army centres its retreat on Wavre. And if you want "balanced", accessible coverage which includes the perspective from the French side, read Uffindell's "The Eagle's Last Triumph". But balance is not Hofschroer's objective: his mission is to apply a painstaking corrective to the traditional Anglocentric interpretation of the events of 14th to 16th June, and in this he succeeds admirably. The book begins with two useful chapters putting the campaign into the context of the political maneouvrings at the congress of Vienna and the frantic "divvying up" of North German soldiery between Prussia and Britain/Hanover that followed Napoleon's return from Elba. Hofschroer makes clear that Prussia and Britain, the latter represented by Wellington, were constant opponents in both these contests. It could hardly be otherwise; Prussia, traumatised and partly radicalised by events since 1806, was the most expansionist force in post-Napoleonic Europe. Britain had recent memory of Prussian designs on Hanover and a long standing policy to restore the status quo ante bellum. The reader should not assume from this political background that Wellington wished to see the Prussians receive a near-fatal drubbing at the Emperor's hands - which could be taken as the author's implication. Hofschroer continues with a comprehensive analysis of the deployment of the allied forces in Belgium, their intelligence of Napoleon's intentions, and the French advance to contact with the Prussian outposts south and west of Charleroi. Indeed the reader gets half way through the text before the first shot is fired. The author sheds new light on the logistical difficulties of the Prussian forces and the reluctance of King Willem of the Netherlands to billet them on his Francophile Walloon subjects. The effect of this was to confine the Prussian front in Belgium, extend the strategic responsibilities of Wellington, and effectively set the pattern for the coming campaign. At the Tirlemont conference of May 3rd 1815 the two allies agreed to support each other in the event of a French offensive, but Hofschroer acknowledges that there is no comprehensive account of what was decided there. He asks why the Duke remained stubbornly convinced that Napoleon would attack the pot-pourri allied army first and not the Prussians. A clue may lie in his own excellent research. On page 136 the reader finds that the Duke's most valuable intelligence sources were in General Bertrand's Cabinet in Paris. On page 148 we are told that the Prussians received information on 6th June, ultimately from Bertrand, alleging that Napoleon planned a false attack on Charleroi, then moving on Mons and Tournai to the west - deliberate misinformation. If Wellington was exposed to such deception, it seems less surprising that he did not immediately rush to concentrate his army at Quatre Bras. Had the Charleroi "push" been a decoy, his forces would have been strung out moving west to east in Napoleon's supposed path. French deception measures during the "Hundred Days" would be a useful field for further research.the pot-pourri allied army first and not the Prussians. A clue may lie in his own excellent research. On page 136 the reader finds that the Duke's most valuable intelligence sources were in General Bertrand's Cabinet in Paris. On page 148 we are told that the Prussians received information on 6th June, ultimately from Bertrand, alleging that Napoleon planned a false attack on Charleroi, then moving on Mons and Tournai to the west - deliberate misinformation. If Wellington was exposed to such deception, it seems less surprising that he did not immediately rush to concentrate his army at Quatre Bras. Had the Charleroi "push" been a decoy, his forces would have been strung out moving west to east in Napoleon's supposed path. French deception measures during the "Hundred Days" would be a useful field for further research. The most interesting and contentious feature of Hofschroer's treatment of the events of the 15th and 16th June is his analysis of Wellington's communications with the Prussians. He establishes that on the balance of probabilities, the Duke must have been warned by Zieten of the French advance by 9am or 10am on the15th, and not 3pm as Wellington later maintained. In this context, his failure until 6pm or 7pm to issue orders to the allied army to at least gather in its cantonments looks much more questionable. This was commented on by Siborne a century and a half ago, but Hofschroer highlights that this and other apparently incriminating letters are strangely missing from the British archives. Even after this late start, the Duke's determination to cover an attack from the south-west led him to issue orders that would have left Quatre Bras completely undefended on the morning of 16th June; orders from which he was rescued by the intelligent disobedience of the Dutch Chief of Staff Constant De Rebecque. It was not until the early hours of the 16th that Wellington heard at the Duchess of Richmond's ball that the French had got as far as Quatre Bras, and that the offensive at Charleroi could hardly be a feint. The most controversial of Hofschroer's allegations is that at this point, Wellington embarked on a campaign of deliberate deception of the Prussians, exploiting the non-English-speaking Liaison Officer Muffling as an unwitting agent. Unaware that because of poor staff work, Blucher would have to fight at Ligny without Bulow's Corps, the Duke allegedly exaggerated his speed of concentration at Quatre Bras to ensure that the Prussians stood their ground in front of him. His basis for these allegations include the misleading "DeLancey Disposition", which made most of Wellington's forces appear closer to Quatre Bras than they actually were. Hofschroer evidently believes this document to be an 1840s forgery, concocted to justify the Duke's 1842 "Memorandum" and by extension, over-optimistic promises of support such as that implied in the misleading "Frasnes Letter" of 16th June to Blucher, not re-discovered until much later in the Prussian War Archives. This is not an entirely "new" contribution from Hofschroer. Though some earlier authors have attributed Wellington's inaccuracy to having been misled by his staff, particularly the unfortunate DeLancey; others, notably Gneisenau's biographer Delbruck asserted as long ago as 1882 that Wellington cynically "used" Blucher to cover his concentration. Hofschroer contends that Wellington must have known where his forces really were because he had ridden past his Reserve Corps that morning and had issued orders to other formations only hours before. The next controversy concerns what was said by the Duke when he met Blucher at Ligny at 1pm on the 16th. Did he promise support on the field of Ligny? Hofschroer's evidence is split, though the accounts of most of the Prussians, (Grolman, Nostitz, Reiche, Clausewitz) and the Bavarian Thurn und Taxis, imply that the promise was unequivocal. Dornberg and Muffling each state that he agreed to send direct help only if not attacked. Wellington and Hardinge are silent on this point, (though the former's Waterloo dispatch concedes that he was unable to support Blucher "as he had wished, as he was attacked himself"). Hofschroer is inclined to believe the former group, discounting the latter group as biased or unreliable. But it is a debate long past being "settled". In any case, is the dispute missing the point? If Wellington could not come to Ligny with 20,000 men it was because he was already tieing down 21,000 French under Ney and (fortuitously) distracting a further 20,000 under D'Erlon. Hofschroer is right to describe "Ligny-Quatre Bras" as a single battle; Wellington no less supported his allies because the support was not visible to them.not visible to them. The book concludes with an account of Ligny and Quatre Bras drawing entirely on the testimony of German regimental and brigade-level officers. This is perhaps the least satisfying part of this meticulous, informative work. These one-sided accounts create an impression that the Prussians faced heavy odds at Ligny. But the essential truth of that battle is that 38,000 French Infantry and 5,000 Cavalry expended or tied down three complete Prussian Corps 83,000 strong in defensive positions, enabling the Imperial Guard and supporting units to achieve the breakthrough at dusk. To summarise, this is an important book for the Waterloo enthusiast. Hofschroer has done a great service in mining the rich seam of German texts for the English reader. But newcomers to the subject should read one of the "general" introductions first; and all readers should maintain an open mind on Wellington's "guilt" or "innocence". More Reviews
1815 The Waterloo Campaign (reviewed by Neil Carey) Piquet: Wargame Rules 1815 The Waterloo Campaign (reviewed by Phil Lawrence) (FE#40) Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #41 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |