Herman Willem Daendels
Marshal of Holland
Dutch Generals of the Napoleonic Wars
Campaign in North Holland,
Civilian Life, and
Kingdom of Holland 1799-1807
by Geert van Uythoven, The Netherlands
 |
The Campaign in North-Holland 1799
On 27 August the invasion took place: 12,000 British commanded by Abercromby landed in Holland on the isthmus between Calandsoog and Den Helder. Daendels decided to defend in front with a weak force, and to defend both flanks strongly to prevent a British advance in these directions. He then wanted to counterattack with both wings simultaneously when the time was right. During these attacks the beach and forward dunes had to be avoided because of the British warships. The centre would be formed by two Jäger battalions, their task was to engage the British and lure them inland. The commanders were urged to keep their battalions together and to retreat if the pressure became too great. To support their retreat an infantry battalion was placed on their left flank near Groote Keeten. The right wing, commanded by Major General van Guéricke, consisted of three infantry battalions, two squadrons heavy cavalry and four guns of foot artillery. His orders were to take a position south of the marine harbour Den Helder, to defend this place and to wait for the order to attack the British left flank. Guéricke was ignorant of Daendels' plans. His relationship with Daendels was not very good. The left wing, commanded by Colonel Crass, consisted of two battalions and two guns of the horse artillery. He would be reinforced with the troops of Major General van Zuylen van Nyevelt, who was marching from Alkmaar and Haarlem. Artillery Barrage Preceded by an intense artillery barrage from the warships at 5.00am, the first troops - Coote's Brigade, about 2,500 men - were landed. The gunfire forced the outposts from the Jäger battalions out of the forward dunes, and prevented them from interfering with the landing. The first six battalions ashore entered the dunes and, although unformed and mixed with each other, fiercely attacked the Jägers. The commanders of these Jäger battalions did not keep them together as ordered, but had part of them dispersed in skirmish order. In spite of this they managed to hold ground for some time, till they were attacked in the flank by Lieutenant General Pulteney at the head of four companies. The commander from one Jäger battalion was killed, and the Jägers were routed. The commander of the supporting battalion noticed the rout, and tried to counterattack the British, instead of providing the Jägers support in order to rally as was ordered. The battalion also had no chance against the superior British, and was also routed after the death of the commander. The survivors of the centre were thrown back to the south-east, into the Koegras marshes. The centre of Daendels' army ceased to be a real threat for the British. Meanwhile the British landing passed very successfully. After three hours 7,000 men and some sailors were put ashore. Abercromby arrived with part of his division, but limited his action by immobilising the Batavian troops near Huisduinen and Kleine Keeten. Pulteney left some troops facing Koegras to engage the Jägers, and advanced south. Major General van Guéricke had observed the rout of the Jägers. He could do nothing but watch the British building up their forces, and after some time his mere 2,100 men were facing about 5,000 British (Coote's and MacDonald's Brigades). Every half hour he dispatched a staff officer to Daendels, to ask permission to engage the British, but did not receive any answer. After hours waiting, he left his positions with part of his force on his own initiative and moved into the Koegras. Naturally he could not do much in this marshy terrain. British Advance The British now had consolidated their positions, and were already advancing in great force in the direction of Groote Keeten. Pulteney had been reinforced by the 1st Guards Brigade. It was to late now for Daendels' counterattack. Instead of attacking immediately after the first landings, he had postponed it to 1.00 or 2.00pm. At that moment it was already to late. The reason why Daendels postponed his counterattack is unknown. When he at last gave the order to attack, Major General Guéricke could not take part any more (with half of his force in the marshes), so the attack was made by the left wing alone. The first line was formed by two battalions under Colonel Crass, supported by the horse artillery. They were supported on their right flank by the survivors of the Jägers. Second and third lines were formed with the battalions of the 2nd Brigade (Nyevelt) as soon as they arrived. Crass attacked vigorous_ly, and succeeded in driving back the British some kilometres! The horse artillery, covered by a dragoon squadron, inflicted heavy loss on the British troops. The attacking battalions at first drove back the British, but were stopped by gunfire from the supporting ships, who were covering the open spaces between the dunes. They were also shot at in the flank by British infantry who were occupying some dunes near the beach under cover of the naval fire. Batavian losses were heavy. The British were reinforced by their reserve brigade, but so were the Batavians by the arrival of three infantry battalions. However, without the simultaneous attack from the other wing a decision could never be reached. Daendels was also in the front-line all the time without any escort. Eye-witnesses recorded him 'standing in a rain of bullets'. It was very brave of him to stay in a dangerous position the whole afternoon, but also foolish. Command and control became very difficult, and his death would have had a bad effect on the Batavian morale. At about 3 or 4pm Daendels was forced to retreat and give up the captured terrain because of the heavy losses sustained. At this time the British had disembarked two field guns. With these guns, manhandled by sailors, the 1st Guards Brigade attacked Crass and his troops along the beach. Crass reformed his troops and received and repulsed the attack. After this he resumed his retreat to Groote Keeten. The fighting ended at about 6pm after which the Batavian troops retreated to Calandsoog. Major General van Guéricke had left his troops in the Koegras and went to Daendels in person to ask for orders. He found Daendels still 'alone in a rain of bullets'. Daendels, knowing it was impossible to defend Den Helder against an attack from land-side, ordered Van Guéricke to evacuate Den Helder and join him, after nailing the guns and throwing the powder in the water. Giving up Den Helder was sensible from the military point of view, but it was a heavy blow for Batavian morale. Most Batavians thought that the defences of Den Helder were strong enough to withstand an attack, and giving it up without a fight could well have been the last straw for the navy to surrender to the British fleet. This fact was used by Daendels' enemies to his disadvantage. Disaster The first day was a disaster for the Daendels: 1,400 of his troops were dead, wounded or missing, including 57 officers. The British had succeeded in consolidating their positions and had gained a strong bridgehead. They captured Den Helder at little cost. Daendels in the meantime was busy strengthening his defences in the Zijpe polder. His position was not very good, the left wing especially was very weak. The British could advance along the beach, protected by their fleet, and turn the Batavian positions. Daendels had under his command 7,650 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 18 guns to hold a front-line of sixteen kilometres. His ammunition supply was not sufficient, and there was no chance of quick support. Lastly, the British could support their attacks with gunfire from the fleet and landings behind the Batavian positions. The Batavian engineers were ordered to make an entrenchment near Petten, batteries and parapets were thrown up, however, thinking his position not strong enough, he ordered a retreat to a better position. The British in the meantime did nothing. Abercromby surprised by the strong resistance he encountered was very cautious. The few civilians that were living in this part of Holland did not show much enthusiasm on their arrival. The Batavian troops were much more disciplined, determined, clothed and armed as supposed. Brune ordered Daendels to leave his position in the Zijpe only if forced to do so, and in that case to execute a fighting retreat, defend Alkmaar, and if necessary to fall back to Haarlem. When he heard that Daendels already was retreating, he ordered him to defend Alkmaar to the last, and, only if forced, to fall back on Beverwijk. Daendels began his retreat on 30 August at 3am. After receiving Brune's orders half way along the march, and knowing that the French General Gouvion, with the first reinforcements (2 infantry battalions), had arrived at Haarlem, he decided to take position with his left wing at Alkmaar, and the right wing at Avenhorn. His HQ was at Schermerhorn. This new position was a very strong one, especially behind the very deep circular canal of the Schermeer polder. The two French battalions had to defend the terrain between Alkmaar and the North Sea. When Brune received the news of Daendels' retreat he is reported to have said: "He is mad. or he is a traitor!" ("Il est fou, ou il a traitre"). Brune was still expecting the landing in North-Holland to be a feint, and expected landings elsewhere. On the 30th Daendels wrote to the Batavian Agent of War Pijman: "Today I left the untenable position of Zijpe, but I shall stay here because at last the French are beginning to appear, and I have strict orders to stay; but I would state it as a crime to my country to stay here any longer". On this letter the story was based that Daendels had plans to leave North-Holland with his Division, to take in Amsterdam a huge amount of money from the Bank and then to retreat to Gorkum with the Batavian government and save the Batavian Republic! Probably the story was made up by Daendels' enemies, because there is no evidence to support it. From now on Daendels' participation was restricted to that of Divisional commander, with Brune taking overall command of the combined Franco-Batavian army at the front. Also Daendels' troops were forbidden to enter Amsterdam! His power behind Batavian political scenes was minimal from now on. Daendels 1st Division formed the right wing of the Franco-Batavian army. The centre was formed by the Batavian 2nd Division under Dumonceau, while the left consisted of French troops under his old 'friend' Vandamme. Brune at last was sure that this was the real invasion and no feint, and French reinforcements arrived daily. Total strength of the Franco-Batavian army now was about 25,000 men. Brune had the assurance of General Kellerman at Brussels that he would receive more reinforcements from the garrisons in Flanders. Brune knew that he had to do something before the British received more reinforcements. So he planned an attack on the morning of the 10 September.reinforcements arrived daily. Total strength of the Franco-Batavian army now was about 25,000 men. Brune had the assurance of General Kellerman at Brussels that he would receive more reinforcements from the garrisons in Flanders. Brune knew that he had to do something before the British received more reinforcements. So he planned an attack on the morning of the 10 September. Three-Column Attack The Franco-Batavian attack would be made in three separate columns. The first column would be the right wing of the Franco-Batavian army, consisting of the Daendels' Division. His objective was the village Eenigenburg and the Westfrie_sche Dike behind it, and then to advance in the direction of St. Maarten. The left wing of their advance would be protected by the demolition of the bridges across the Groote Sloot, guarded by artillery. At 2am Daendels left his starting positions, and at 4am he had already expelled the British from their forward positions at Haringkarspel and Dirkshorn. Moving from there to his objective Eenigenburg, he found his way blocked by troops from the 2nd Division (second column). He reinforced them with a Jäger battalion and directed the remainder of his troops to St. Maarten. Daendels attacked this village with two battalions supported by horse artillery, and succeeded in capturing part of it. Then he received the news of the disorder of the 2nd Division, whose attack was repulsed at Eenigenburg. He left his own Division and went in person to the 2nd Division. After restoring order there he returned to his own troops, and was just renewing the attack when he received a message that the second attack by the second column had also been repulsed. The French could also make no impression on the strong British defences, and the fighting petered out. Daendels held his position until a strong British column advanced from Schagen to Dirkshorn and threatened his flank. At 2pm he retreated to his starting positions, his losses were 10 men killed, 71 wounded and 82 missing. The morale of the Batavian troops was low after this defeat, even during the battle panics occurred, as we already saw. During the evening of 10 September, a sergeant of a Jäger battalion positioned at the village of Broek yelled that the British cavalry was attacking. Panic ensued with men yelling that the were cut off and 5,000 men took flight. It was only at St. Pancras, the headquarters of Daendels, that Daendels could stop the rout, with order restored, the troops were brought back to their posi_tions. Again this event did little for Daendels' reputation. Brune attached a French General to both Daendels and Dumonceau, to watch over the actions of the Batavian troops. The Franco-Batavians retreated to defensive positions. Daendels was ordered to defend the approaches to the South, along the Langendijk. Therefore Daendels ordered the construction of a redoubt in front of the village Oud-Karspel. The redoubt held fourteen guns. On 13 September York had arrived in Holland and taken over command, from thereon strong reinforcements arrived. Total Anglo-Russian strength now was about 35,000, including 13,000 Russians. Franco-Batavian strength was about 23,000 men. York decided to attack the Franco-Batavian positions on 19 September, even though the Russians had not recovered fully from their sea journey, and their commanders did not have the time to become acquainted with the terrain. Attack at Daybreak The attack would start at daybreak (5am) and be made in four columns. The third column, commanded by Lieutenant General Pulteney, would consist of the 1st and 3rd Brigade, 2 squadrons of light dragoons and eight guns, totalling about 5,000 men. The 3rd Brigade would advance through Dirkshorn to Daendels' position at Oud-Karspel and attack this village frontal. The 1st Brigade would advance through Schagen and the Heer Hugowaard, and outflank Daendels' position at Oud-Karspel. If Oud-Karspel was captured, the 3rd Brigade would have to advance in the direction of Schoorldam to support the second column, while the 1st Brigade would advance south.
Colonel Crass, present at this position, commanded therefore not only some Jägers and the artillery, but also two whole infantry battalions. In co-operation with the French Adjutant General Durutte (added by Brune to Daendels' staff) Crass placed the infantry behind the parapets, and let the British advance to within thirty paces. At this distance the British were received by a shower of musketry and canister, and retreated with heavy losses. The British found cover behind the ring-dike around Bleekmeer and in a corn-field. After restoring order, Pulteney ordered forward his artillery, and an artillery-duel followed, in which the British came of worst. In spite of the losses sustained, the Batavian artillery kept up the fight and managed to disable two British guns and to set the caissons on fire. Pulteney now ordered a second and third attack, but both were beaten off with heavy losses for the attackers. It was clear now for Pulteney and Don that they had to wait for the advance of Coote, who could attack the Batavian position on their right wing and in the back. Pulteney did not stay idle: Reinforced by two battalions, he ordered Don to take the 1st Bat/3rd Guards and 4 companies of the 40th Rgt Foot and to try to outflank the Batavian position on their left through the heavily ditched terrain. Colonel Spencer was ordered to maintain fire on the Batavian positions with some line infantry and companies of light infantry, and to attack the Batavians if a good opportunity presented itself. It was now 10am. Daendels at that moment was very busy, receiving news of Dumonceau's wounding, and a request from Major General Bonhomme for reinforcements. He ordered Major General van Zuylen van Nyevelt to take with him two battalions, the dragoon regiment and the horse artillery to reinforce Bonhomme. This reinforcement arrived too late to have any effect. Meanwhile the 1st British Brigade advanced by Niedorper-verlaat to the Heer Hugowaard, and threatened the right flank of Daendels, here Coote couldn't advance any further: All the bridges across the circular canal were removed, and on the other side of the canal Daendels had posted some infantry supported by artillery. Daendels, receiving news about the British advance in the direction of Hoorn (the British left column) ordered a battalion to occupy Schermerhorn, and another battalion to Purmerend and Monnikendam to secure his back. After taking these precautions he moved to the redoubt in front of Oud-Karspel. Arriving there he found that the British artillery totally silenced, and only some sporadic musketry made clear that there were still some British troops in front of the redoubt. On his left flank there was no sign of the outflanking British troops (Don had ordered his troops to lie down in the corn). At that moment he received another request from Bonhomme: his troops were attacking the British, and to aid these attacks he requested Daendels to support them by advancing also. Sally Disaster After receiving the same request from Durutte and Colonel Crass, a company of grenadiers were ordered to undertake a sally and to capture two disabled guns left behind by the British. This sally proved to be disastrous: when the grenadiers reached the open terrain in front of the redoubt, Don ordered his troops to attack the grenadiers in flank, while at the same time Colonel Spencer attacked the grenadiers in front. The grenadiers, attacked so unexpectedly, took flight back into the redoubt. In doing this they masked the fire of the artillery. At the same time a caisson exploded inside the redoubt, killing many artillerymen. Using the arisen disorder, the British troops entered the redoubt with the grenadiers. The Batavians now had no chance left to stop them and Daendels ordered the retreat, leaving behind his artillery. The Batavians did not get the chance to recover, closely pursued as they were by the British. The Batavian troops that placed at the side of the Langendijk behind the circular canal to watch Coote were made prisoner. In total the British made in this attack 42 officers and 1,314 NCO's and soldiers prisoner, and captured all the guns in the redoubt. Only at the end of the Langendijk, at Broek, was the British advance stopped by four grenadier companies. These troops were in such a position that Pulteney did not think himself strong enough to attack without reinforcements. So Pulteney tried to get Coote with his brigade across the circular canal. While the crossing was taking place Pulteney received the message of the defeat of the right and second column, and the order to retreat to the Zijpe-positions. So late in the afternoon Pulteney retreated with his troops. Until that moment the Franco-Batavian position was precarious. Although on the left wing of the battle the Franco-Batavians were victorious, the centre was pierced by the British, who had occupied the Langendijk all the way to Broek. Because of this danger, and because Brune was angered by Daendels' defeat, Daendels was ordered to recapture his lost positions. Daendels opened his attack at the same time Pulteney started his retreat. So the retreating British were hotly pursued by the grenadiers, losing about a hundred men and four officers as prisoners. The Batavians recovered all their lost artillery, captured a field-hospital and the two disabled British guns from in front of the redoubt, the British having no time or horses to take the guns with them. York decided to attack the Franco-Batavian positions for a second time on 29 September, but due to bad weather the attack was delayed until 2 October. Again the attack would be made in four columns, but this time three columns would attack the French on the Franco-Batavian left flank. The fourth column was commanded by Lieutenant General Pulteney. His orders were to cover the left flank of the Anglo-Russian army, to threaten Daendels' Division and to prevent in this way Daendels reinforcing the left wing of the Franco-Batavian army. Pulteney was free to use his troops in any other way, if he thought the situation made it necessary. Experience This plan of attack made it clear that York had learned from his earlier mistakes. This time 23,000 men attacked on a small front, with both flanks effectively covered (by the North Sea and the Kanaal van Alkmaar). Pulteney made three attacks on the position at Oud-karspel. The British did not make any impression against Daendels, who had entrenched his troops in a very strong position. Pulteney kept the Batavians under fire, but this did not prevent Daendels from sending part of his troops to reinforce the Franco-Batavian left wing. The fighting on the left flank went less well for the Franco-Batavians. The retreat of the left wing under Vandamme and the advance of Abercromby along the beach made the rest of the Franco-Batavian position untenable. So Brune was forced to retreat with his whole army. His headquarters was moved from Alkmaar to Beverwijk. The 2nd Batavian Division (Dumonceau) joined with the French troops, and occupied the terrain between Uitgeest and Wijk-aan-Zee, with Castricum in the centre of their position. Daendels retreated to Purmerend and inundated the terrain to his front, creating an unapproachable position. To occupy this position 4,000 men were sufficient. The remainder of the Franco-Batavian army, about 20,000 men, had to defend the left wing in co-operation with the French. On 6 October another battle was fought, but Daendels' position was not attacked. The Anglo-Russians were beaten, and retreated to the Zijpe position. Daendels received on 8 October the order to take Hoorn. The execution of this order was difficult, because of the demolition of bridges and roads, and the flooding of the area. Only on the 9th, after a long hard night, a column from Monnikendam and another one from Purmerend succeeded in reaching Hoorn by the afternoon. On the 10th, Daendels received the order to take Winkel at the Zuiderzee, which was occupied by a strong British force. Advancing to Opmeer, the advance guard consisting of a Jäger battalion was attacked by a squadron of the 18th Light Dragoons, supported by infantry. The dragoons were driven off with musketry by the Batavian Jägers, which had taken up positions on both sides of the road. The British retreated to Aartswoude, only to be attacked again by the Batavians, and had to fall back on the retrenchments constructed on the sea-dike behind the village. At 3pm Daendels arrived in front of this position with the rest of his Division. The bad roads were the cause of his delayed arrival. Despite the lateness of the hour and the weariness of the troops, Daendels choose to make an immediate attack on the British positions. The attack would be made in three columns. One column would make a frontal attack the entrenchment's on the sea-dike, while the other columns would try to cross the canal. The latter attacks would be very difficult, because the British had demolished all the bridges across the canal. The main attack also would be difficult, because the British having taken position in their entrenchments, were closely supported by their artillery and had made some cuttings into the dike to their front. Not without trouble, the Batavian horse artillery had managed to deploy a howitzer on the top of the sea-dike and opened fire, while the infantry attacked the British who were defending the cuttings, and then the entrenchments. After throwing some grenades into the entrenchments, the British were routed, and the Batavians took possession of the defences. After the construction of some bridges across the cuttings, the Batavian infantry advanced, outflanking the British behind the canal, causing them to retreat. Now more bridges were thrown across the canal, and the remainder of Daendels' Division crossed. Threatened by superior numbers, the British troops evacuated Winkel, which was then occupied by Daendels at 8pm. On the 11th, Daendels advanced to Lutje Winkel, and met Dumonceau's Division. Also on the 11th, Daendels ordered General Major van Zuylen van Nyevelt to garrison Enkhuizen and Medemblik. The British marine was still too busy to empty the stores in these cities, and the arrival of the Batavian troops prevented further plundering of the civilian houses and the setting fire of the magazines. Daendels himself was still busy advancing his positions and to strengthen them sufficiently to counter any Anglo-Russian attack. On 13 October Brune informed Daendels that he was engaged in secret negotiations. No Government officials participated in these negotiations, and the completion of the treaty is very obscure, being the sole achievement of Brune. The result was that the Anglo-Russians evacuated their troops. The campaign was over. Civilian life, 1800-1805Daendels was now frustrated and disappointed, his influence and power were diminished. He saw clearly that the Batavian Republic had become a French satellite. The behaviour of Brune, especially in closing the treaty, made that all too clear. Brune was succeeded by General Augereau, and relations with him also were very bad. In October 1800 Daendels asked for long term leave, on grounds of family circumstances and ill health. The Batavian government was glad to get rid of him in such an easy way, and granted his leave immediately. Daendels moved to Gelderland and kept himself busy farming. In 1802 he asked for his dismissal, and received it (honourably) on 23 December. He kept himself far from politics, and was making progress in agricultural changes. Probably these years were for Daendels his happiest, but the Napoleonic age was no time for men like Daendels to become old quietly. Kingdom of Holland, 1806-1807In 1806 the Batavian Republic ceased to exist, and the Kingdom of Holland was created. Again, this state would be a satellite of the French Empire, to be ruled by Napoleon's brother, King Louis Napoleon. Daendels' expectations were high: the political combination of a republic with a kingdom could give the much needed unity in politics. Daendels was quick in offering Louis his services. King Louis, needing all the support he could get, was not slow in recognising the benefits of this, and Daendels was on 16 July 1806 appointed to Privy Council Extraordinary. On 16 September Daendels became again a Lieutenant General, and received command of the 3rd Division to protect the Kingdom, while King Louis took part in the 1806 campaign with the remainder of the Dutch troops. After the battle of Jena, Louis ordered Daendels to advance and occupy East-Friesland. Daendels fulfilled this task well, and King Louis appointed him Governor of Westphalia, This was not to the liking of Napoleon, who appointed augmented with some cavalry. A sharp rear guard action followed at Batrun. On 26 November IX Corps reached the main road at Bobr, pursued by Wittgenstein. The Corps was just in time to cover the retreat of the remnants of the 'Grand Armée' across the Beresina. Victor had established his Corps on the east bank of the Beresina, on both sides of Studianka. Heavy fighting followed. The 26th Division fought well. After their withdrawal there remained only 900 Badeners and 60 Berg men under arms. In three days fighting IX Corps was reduced from 11,000 to 2,000 men. I have no information on Daendels' activities during this battle.General Loison instead. Already the different ideas of Napoleon and Louis became clear. Instead, Daendels was appointed Governor of Ost-Friesland. Daendels had no plans to stay at his residency in Embden, while his French colleagues were conquering whole countries. Occupation So on his own account he occupied the Hanze-cities, the manor Jever, Mecklenburg and Oldenburg. In doing this he went to far, and Louis ordered him to retreat again. However, Daendels made it clear to King Louis the advantages of occupying these territories: the British could be expelled, and the cities could bring Louis much wealth. This was to the liking of Louis, and a few weeks later Daendels received orders to occupy these territories again. Daendels again encountered Louis' inconsistency, in November he was relieved of his post, and had to take over command of the 4th Military Division. However, as he neared his new post, another order came, Daendels had to go to the city of Utrecht, to compose a field army, even then King Louis had other plans.... Long Talks In January 1807 King Louis had long talks with Daendels. The subject under discussion was the Dutch East Indies. Napoleon had told his brother when he became King of Holland: "If you lose your colonies, then I can do nothing for Holland". The chance of losing the most important colony - the East Indies - was great: after Trafalgar the British were masters of the seas; the last three Governor-generals were not up to the huge task at hand, so the defensive measures installed were virtually non-existent. Rumours were that the last Governor-general Wiese had plans to declare the East Indies neutral, to save his own fortune! The result was that on 28 January Daendels was appointed Governor-general of the Dutch East Indies. In return Daendels received a huge salary, and would receive on arrival on Java, the main island of the Dutch East Indies, the rank and title of Marshal of Holland! [2] There remained only one problem: how to arrive in the East Indies? The British were already aware of the appointment of a new Governor-general, and had of course great interest in capturing him. To deceive the British, it was planned for Daendels and his staff to depart in February from Hellevoetsluis with a frigate, from there, the group moved in civilian cloths over land to Lisbon, where a Portuguese ship would bring them to Java. At the same time, Vice-Admiral Buyskes would leave Texel with a naval squadron, also trying to reach the East Indies. If Daendels failed to survive the journey, or failed to arrive because of any other reason, Buyskes would become Governor-general. In Spain Daendels received information that the British already watched the ship that was intended to take him from Lisbon to Java. Therefore he moved to Cadiz, and from there he crossed the sea to Tangier. Again problems arose: not far from Tangier he was attacked by Arabian robbers, and lost al his money and belongings. One way or another he managed to reach the Canaries, and after a stay of nearly three months managed to buy an American brig on the account of the Dutch government. On 15 September the brig set sail, and on New Years Day 1808 Daendels arrived in the East Indies. On 14 January Daendels took over from Wiese. More Daendels
The Batavian Republic 1795-1798 Campaign in North Holland, Civilian Life, and Kingdom of Holland 1799-1807 East Indies to the End 1808-1818 Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #39 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |
During 1799, it became clear that the British and Russians had planned an invasion of the Batavian Republic. Daendels had to defend the province of Holland with his 1st Division (10,500), while Dumonceau with the 2nd Division defended the provinces Groningen and Friesland. The province of Zeeland was defended by French troops, which also made up the reserve. Overall command had General Brune.
As planned, the 3rd Brigade (Major General Don) advanced through Dirkshorn to Oud-Karspel accompanied by Pulteney, while the 1st Brigade (Major General Coote) advanced through Schagen by Niedorper-verlaat to the Heer Hugowaard. His advance had to take place by way of a dike, the Langendijk, so narrow that only 8 men could move abreast. In front of Oud-Karspel they approached the redoubt, constructed by Daendels. Pulteney ordered an immediate attack that was made with much vigour. In the redoubt it was just about time for the change of the guards.