The role played by the contingents of the lesser German states in the Campaign of 1815 is one that receives scant attention. This article will examine the role played by one particular corps, that commanded by the Prussian General Kleist von Nollendorf, hero of the battle of Kulm where, in August 1813, Vandamme's Corps was destroyed as a fighting force. After the First Abdication, Kleist was placed in command of the German forces on the Lower Rhine. His objectives were to enforce the Prussian territorial claims in that part of Germany and to observe any troop movements – particularly French – in that part of Europe. When the bitter wrangling over the shape of a Europe at peace at last for the first time in many years were interrupted by Bonaparte's escape from exile on Elba, Kleist found himself in command of the army that was most likely to have to intervene in France to put an end to the adventure. Although well qualified as a soldier for the task, Kleist did not have sufficient prestige to give sufficient force to Prussia's territorial claims and desire to be recognised again as one of the Great Powers. Thus, on 19 March 1815, Friedrich Wilhelm III, the King of Prussia, sent Kleist the following order: [1] 'As Napoleon Bonaparte's enterprise in France will probably make it necessary to take up arms against him again, I have, for such an event, again given the supreme command of my army to Feldmarschall Prinz Blücher, with Generallieutenant Graf Gneisenau as Quartermaster-General. … To you, however, I give the supreme command of all the Federal troops of the North German princes, namely of Hesse-Kassel, Saxony, Nassau, Mecklenburg, Anhalt and those of the lesser principalities on this territory, who have at this moment been requested to provide such troops to be placed under the supreme command of a Prussian general. … I have given you the command of this mixed corps in the belief that you, with your attributes, will be able to deal with the problems of such a mixed force.' Kleist's response to the Royal Order was: 'This command is a very unpleasant task, but one has see it through, nothing can be done about it'. With this order, Kleist was removed from command of the Prussian forces in the Netherlands, and, pending the arrival of Blücher, Gneisenau, junior to Kleist, was placed in temporary command of these Prussian forces. Müffling, Kleist's chief-of-staff was shortly found another post elsewhere, as liaison officer in Wellington's headquarters. Gneisenau, already unpopular in certain circles as, not coming from one of Prussia's established officer families, he was regarded as an upstart and outsider, was not made any more popular by this decision. Kleist's Thankless Task This decision left a bitter taste in Kleist's mouth, but being a professional soldier, he set about carrying out his orders. These were to transform a hotchpotch force of troops of mixed quality from various small German principalities into an army corps with military potential. With a nominal strength of 35,000 men, Kleist's corps was, on paper, stronger than a Prussian army corps. Reality was somewhat different, as it never exceeded 17,500 men. This was due to the constant bickering amongst the Allies about the allocation of the contingents, the general shortage of manpower in Germany and the wide dispersal of the constituent parts of this corps. In effect, Kleist had been demoted, but at least he had an independent command. However, he soon found himself needing to approach Blücher for supplies of musket cartridges and flints, both of which were in short supply, or even totally lacking, in certain contingents. This led him into a relationship of dependency on the Field Marshal. Soon, Blücher was giving Kleist orders. Around 20 April, Kleist left Aachen for Neuwied, a small town on the right bank of the middle Rhine. He chose this town for its central position, and for its proximity to Koblenz, a centre of Prussian administration. Neuwied was far enough away for him to have a degree of independence, yet close enough to be near the centre of affairs. The Anhalt-Thuringian Brigade, part of his command, was bivouacking in and around Neuwied, where its headquarters was stationed. South of this town were stationed the Hessians. Initially, Kleist wanted General von Engelhardt, commander of the Hessians, to move his headquarters from the town of Nassau to Neuwied. Later, he changed his mind as it became evident that he could use the Hessians to apply pressure on the Nassauers. Faced with a myriad of difficulties, Kleist would need to have a capable staff with which to execute his tasks. This, too, was denied him. Müffling was transferred to Blücher's command; even his personal aide, Oberstlieutenant von Watzdorff, was moved elsewhere. On 20 May, Kleist sent a letter outlining his difficulties to the Minister of War, writing: [2] 'To date, I have done the duties of the Quartermaster, the Assistant Quartermaster, and the Quartermaster-General; I myself rode to Trier to organise matters and have spent two entire days on horseback viewing the area. — [Major von] Legad [an officer of the Prussian General Staff and Kleist's ADC] is a very useful man, but not a staff officer, or at least, not at a higher level. He is, however, indispensable for lists and correspondence. — [Oberstlieutenant von] Perbrandt [also an officer of the Prussian General Staff] has been placed second in command, and he has been very useful on several occasions in the general staff; in Courland he served me very well. — Kapitain Staedterl of the Saxons is the only one of any use, but then only for secondary matters; even then, with his bad eyes, he cannot stay outside for long (at least, at first). — I have already written about [Oberst von] Thile, but did not receive a satisfactory answer; I have asked for him, if I could not get his brother [there were two Thiles, one in the War Ministry, the other was a staff officer], with which neither Müffling nor [Oberst von] Aster [chief-of-staff of the II Army Corps] could help; he is a good man, and thanks to his conciliatory character, would be ideal to be sent to mixed company. — If there is anything you could do to help me here, I would be most indebted to you. — It would do much to make me happier. — According to an order-in-cabinet, a certain Lieut. Wulffen has been allocated to me, but I cannot use him for important reconnaissance rides, or for other important matters. Furthermore, the Hessian General Engelhardt, a man of the best intentions, is over 60 years old. Should I fall ill, or be wounded, which is quite possible, then the affair would, without this man, have to be abandoned; I thus bring this to your attention. — See to it that an open minded, reasonable man is sent here soon. — Make sure he is not one of these modern geniuses with such forceful ways of expressing himself, that he would not fit in with this colourful mixture'. This sorry situation was exacerbated when Kleist fell ill with jaundice. Only then did Blücher send him Oberstlieutenant von Witzleben as chief-of-staff, and Kapitain Heiden as an ADC. Kleist suspected their loyalties lay with the Field Marshal, so he saw that they did not get much involved in his affairs. When his illness got worse, Kleist send his personal aide, Kapitain Graf von Schweidnitz of the 7th Hussars, to the king, requesting that he be relieved of his duties. Witzleben then took over the command provisionally. As the Hessian Engelhardt was actually the next senior officer, the Prussian Witzleben acted in Kleist's name. Major von Legat, a Prussian, provided support to the bed-ridden Kleist, drafting much of his correspondence. The Saxon Captain von Staedterl It is interesting to note that Kleist's headquarters was guarded by a detachment of Saxons consisting of one officer and 24 foot soldiers of the Saxon Guard, and 25 Saxon hussars. Despite the Saxon rebellion early that May, Kleist continued to have a high regard for these men. Moreover, in view of the heavy-handed fashion with which Blücher handled that situation, Kleist could still be sure of the personal loyalty of these men. The headquarters of the Anhalt-Thuringian Brigade was in a similar situation with regard to staff officers as Kleist. Its commander Oberst von Eglofstein had to write all his own correspondence. Later, he appointed Major von Sonnenberg, from Anhalt-Bernburg, as his chief-of-staff, replacing him in due course with Kapitain von Mauderode. The Hessians had a proper staff organisation right from the beginning. The Missing Contingents A worse problem facing Kleist was the continually uncertainty of which contingents at what strength he would get when. His corps was at half its supposed strength, and Kleist could not begin to organise it until these matters were clarified. Besides, he was suffering from a lack of money. Being a Prussian general, but with a non-Prussian corps, he considered it unwise to use Prussian funds to pay bills when it was not certain that the contingents would repay this money. Those states that did provide their contingent with funds did just that; they were not prepared to pay any money into corps headquarters. The gradual assembly of this corps with various contingents of varying sizes coming from different directions caused Kleist a number of problems. These included making sure their routes did not cross, and that they did not march through areas where heavy requisitioning had already taken place. Billets had to be found for these men, they often lacked equipment and needed further training. Kleist saw to matters personally, having the Weimar battalion parade before him, then visiting the Hessian troops on the Lahn and at Langenschwalbach. From here, he went on to Wiesbaden and Mainz, inspecting the Nassauers in the former place, and visiting the Austrian Archduke Charles in the latter. He then returned to Neuwied to cast an eye over the Thuringian Brigade. He had intended to inspect the remaining Hessian troops in Limburg on the Lahn on 6 and 7 May, but orders arrived from Blücher to march off, so he cancelled his plans. During his visits, he sent reports to the king. On 27 April, he informed Friedrich Wilhelm that he had found the Weimar Battalion in a good state. On 30 April, that the Thuringian Brigade was not yet complete. On 10 May, he was expecting the arrival of the Oldenburg, Waldeck, Detmold and Schaumburg contingents. Kleist was aware of the psychological problems facing these men, some of whom had fought with the French in the Peninsula and other theatres. He endeavoured to win over their hearts and minds, talking to each officer and sergeant he met, and speaking to the men. He saw to it that much of the equipment they lacked was obtained, and he implemented training programmes. Kleist was beginning to turn a colourful mixture into a homogenous body when, on 5 May, he received Blücher's order to march to the border. His troops were not yet ready for action, and it would be difficult to continue their training once they were deployed on the frontier, so Kleist was not pleased with the situation. Problems caused by the Saxon rebellion and reported French movements towards the frontier were the cause of Blücher's instruction to Kleist to move his troops to the front before they were really ready for this. There are certainly indications of a lack of preparations for this. [3] For instance, he had yet to set up a military postal system, although a military post commissar was on his way from Berlin. [4] The route of the march would run through an area sparse of supplies, and no provisions for establishing magazines had been made. [5] Furthermore, the Bavarians who would cover the left flank of this march were being less than co-operative. [6] Obviously, Kleist felt that he was marching into the blue with a partially trained force. Crossing the Rhine on 11 May, Kleist accompanied his troops as far as Wittlich before riding off to Trier, where he arrived on 13 May. His Hessians were the first to cross the Rhine, doing so at Ehrenbreitstein and Lahnstein. The remaining contingents crossed the next day at Neuwied. The corps arrived at Trier on 18 and 19 May. The dangers of a lack of a bridge across the Rhine became apparent during this manoeuvre. The Hessians alone, consisting of two infantry regiments, two of cavalry, two batteries and two supply columns, needed a whole day to cross the river by ferry at Ehren-breitstein, near Koblenz. Were a retrograde movement ever necessary, the corps could find itself trapped against the Rhine. On 14 May, a letter from Blücher dated 10 May reached Kleist. This message informed Kleist that Napoleon was concentrating between Maubeuge and Condé, and that Wellington was convinced he was about to go over to the offensive. Blücher reported to Kleist that he was moving his army to counter any such invasion, and ordered him to deploy his corps around Trier and Luxembourg, keeping in contact with the Bavarians. Kleist marked the letter with the note: 'In current circumstances and with the number of troops, this is very difficult to achieve'. [7] Kleist simply had too few troops to cover the area specified, and those he had were largely too poor a quality to be able to offer any resistance to the French. If that was not enough, Trier was under Bavarian occupation as, at the Congress of Vienna, the land on the right bank of the Moselle had been promised to Bavaria. Relationships between the Prussian officers and the Bavarians were not friendly, so access to local resources was restricted. Much of the Prussian garrison of the fortress of Luxembourg left to join the field army in mid-May, leaving Kleist to replace it with his second-rate troops, which stretched his already weak force even further. To make matters worse, Louis XVIII sent a representative, Général d'Arblay, to Trier supposedly to recruit any French deserters, but actually to observe events there. This area had been under French administration in recent years, and in which there were still strong sympathies for the French there. As certain of his recruits and officers might still have had leanings towards France, this could only make matters even more difficult for Kleist. Contingents Arrive On 12 June, contingents of the Anhalt-Thuringian Brigade arrived. [8] This was small comfort to Kleist, who was having problems with his erstwhile allies. The Prince Elector of Hesse-Kassel was proving particularly difficult. He was obliged to provide 12,000 men, but insisted this figure was to include non-combatants. The third batch of his men arrived later than scheduled; he only sent two batteries of artillery, and, initially supply trains. Only gradually did he give way and meet his obligations. Kleist's corps simply lacked so much of what it needed in the way of basic military essentials. Not only were the troops themselves poorly prepared for war, they lacked ammunition, flints for their muskets, food and forage, ironware, supply trains and field hospital equipment. Kleist managed to alleviate most of these problems, but he did not overcome his shortage of waggons. The main objective of this corps was to protect the border. On the northern part of this sector, it was covered by the Anhalt-Thuringian Brigade, who linked up with Blücher's Prussians; on the southern part, by the Hessians, who linked up with the Bavarians. Trier was in the centre of their positions. The outposts covered the French border from Arlon to Merzig. An intelligence network was established along the frontier. Behind that, cannon were posted to fire alarm shots should the French attack the outposts. Assembly points to the rear were designated. On 25 May, the Waldeck Battalion arrived and was added to the contingents of Lippe-Detmold and Lippe-Schaumburg, forming a regiment of 1,200 men. Kleist noted: [9] 'The men of this regiment are strong and good looking, and seem to be to be of the best will. Their clothing and armament require some attention, which will, as far as possible, be given'. At the front, all remained quiet. On 22 May, Kleist passed on information from a conversation between Hessian hussars and the French outposts in which the latter stated that they did not want to be at war. On 28 May, he reported to Blücher: [10] 'The Prince of Hesse-Homburg has informed me that according to reports coming in, the enemy will stage a general movement operating against Arlon between the 26th and 30th of the month'. Kleist was requesting help because he did: '… not expect any support from the Bavarians, whose infantry are in Kaiserslauten, and whose cavalry have only posted a weak cordon. The III [Prussian] Army Corps which was on my right flank, has moved to join the army, so I have lost all contact to my right'. Fortunately, nothing came of the feared French movement. These difficulties continued to undermine Kleist's health; his jaundice grew worse. Nevertheless, he did not stop carrying out his duties. On 10 June, three companies of Lippe-Detmold Landwehr arrived. These poorly trained troops were sent on to join their compatriots in Luxembourg. Kleist had the two companies of Bernburg Landwehr leave Luxembourg to join their line troops. [11] Wherever possible, Kleist preferred contingents from the same states to be together. On 11 June, a despatch from Blücher dated 9 June arrived. This ordered Kleist to be prepared to bring rations with him to supply his corps when marching to the Meuse as: [12] 'With the infertility and exhaustion of the countryside, it is not possible to obtain supplies in this region'. Blücher was making preparations for Kleist to join him in the Netherlands in the event of a French invasion which he clearly anticipated. Kleist concentrated his forces, which marched off on 17 June. Kleist was approaching Luxembourg on 18 June when his health finally gave way. Ironically, he relinquished his command on the day that the Allies gained their major victory in this campaign, but not after having accomplished a very difficult task, that is to turn his rag-bag corps into a fighting force. It was not only on a practical level that it proved difficult to put together a North German Army Corps; there were also difficulties on the political level. The main problem was the rivalry between Britain and Prussia over the future of Northern Germany, which was reflected in the fate of their military forces. The details of which can be found in part one of my forthcoming work, "1815 – The Waterloo Campaign". Allocation An order-in-cabinet of 19 March allocated the following contingents to Kleist: Hesse-Kassel, Saxony, Nassau, Mecklenburg, Anhalt, the Saxon Duchies, Lippe-Detmold, Schaumburg-Lippe, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sonder-hausen, Waldeck and the two principalities of Reuss.[13] The issue of Saxony was to be looked at more closely once it had been decided which parts were to be annexed by Prussia, and which were to remain under the crown of Saxony, as the troops from the latter were to join the Federal Army. Had Kleist received all of these troops, then he would have commanded a full army corps. However, his corps never reached full strength. The reasons for this were firstly that only part of the expected number of troops was supplied, and then only slowly and at irregular intervals, secondly the continual shortage of artillery and cavalry, and finally because certain contingents were taken away from the corps, notably those of Reuss and Nassau, while others, such as six battalions from Mecklenburg-Schwerin, did not arrive in time. The Contingents, Bibliography, and Footnotes Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #37 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1997 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com