Reuss The rulers of Reuss objected immediately to their contingent coming under Prussian command. Their troops had previously been under Austrian command, and were expected to join the garrison of Mainz. Hardenberg did his utmost to gain this contingent for Kleist. However, it marched off to the Middle Rhine, first joining the garrison of Frankfurt, [14] then later that of Mainz. Nassau In spring 1815, Nassauers formed a brigade under General von Goedecke who was later superseded by Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar. They formed part of the I Corps under the Prince of Orange. A further contingent of Nassauers was raised for use in the Mainz garrison. [15] All that remained available was the 1st Nassau Infantry Regiment, which Prussia immediately claimed. Duke Frederick and his court were opposed to Prussia's wishes, and wanted this regiment to join its compatriots under Wellington in the Netherlands. Kleist visited the Austrian Archduke Charles, commandant of the fortress of Mainz, in an attempt to resolve this matter in Prussia's favour. He reported to his king on 21 April that this regiment was likely to march to the Netherlands shortly.[16] On 21 May, at a strength of 2,987 officers and men under Generalmajor von Kruse, it did so. It reached Cologne by 27 May, Maastricht by 1 June, and finally took up its cantonments in the Brussels area on 7 June.formed part of the I Corps under the Prince of Orange. A further contingent of Nassauers was raised for use in the Mainz garrison. All that remained available was the 1st Nassau Infantry Regiment, which Prussia immediately claimed. Duke Frederick and his court were opposed to Prussia's wishes, and wanted this regiment to join its compatriots under Wellington in the Netherlands. Kleist visited the Austrian Archduke Charles, commandant of the fortress of Mainz, in an attempt to resolve this matter in Prussia's favour. He reported to his king on 21 April that this regiment was likely to march to the Netherlands shortly. On 21 May, at a strength of 2,987 officers and men under Generalmajor von Kruse, it did so. It reached Cologne by 27 May, Maastricht by 1 June, and finally took up its cantonments in the Brussels area on 7 June. Saxony The strength of Kleist's force was also affected by the Saxon issue. Originally, it had been intended to for the III German Army Corps to be formed from the Saxons and the German Legion, (formerly the Russo-German Legion). When the latter were absorbed into the Prussian army, the question of the future of the former became open again. The dispute over the fate of this contingent is covered in my forthcoming book. Mecklenburg-Strelitz This state had furnished the Prussian army with an excellent hussar regiment in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. Kleist, particularly lacking cavalry, hoped this regiment would join him. Indeed, the Congress decided that this state would provide one-third of its contribution in the form of cavalry. Prussia came to an agreement with Mecklenburg on this issue on 25 May. [17] Events however overtook it before it was implemented, in that the war ended before these troops had been fully mobilised. Oldenburg Nominally 1,760 men strong, the Oldenburg Infantry Regiment numbered less than 1,500 when it joined Kleist. The Congress of Vienna had originally wished this contingent to be allocated to Wellington's forces, but its Duke, a relative of the Czar, instead marched to the Rhine. This small gain in manpower for the Prussians was not enough to counterbalance the losses elsewhere. The Anhalt-Thuringian Brigade & the Hessians Thus, Kleist was left with less than half the troops expected. Moreover, these contingents wore various uniforms, carried different equipment and had inconsistent levels of training and motivation. Not only a logistical nightmare, they were simply not a coherent fighting force, and not suited for use on the field of battle. The first detachments of the Hessian and Anhalt-Thuringian contingents arrived at the Rhine from 17 April. The Anhalt-Thuringian Brigade took up quarters in Neuwied on the Rhine. The first Hessian force camped at Langenschwalbach and St. Goarshausen. The second detachment of Hessians followed shortly afterwards and was stationed on the lower reaches of the river Lahn. The individual contingents of the Anhalt-Thuringians were amalgamated into battalions, then formed into provisional regiments and later organised into a brigade that drilled according to French regulations. The Hessians were likewise organised into a brigade that was referred to occasionally as a 'division' and even as an 'army corps'. Kleist's corps amounted to a mere 8,737 men. On crossing the Rhine in May, this number had grown to around 13,000. The Hessians, after having crossed the Rhine under Kleist's supervision at Koblenz and Lahnstein, they marched down the Moselle valley, the Lahnsteiners on the right bank, the remainder on the left. The Anhalt-Thuringians crossed at Neuwied, marching towards Wittlich, which they reached on 16 May. Next, the corps took up its cantonments. With its headquarters in Trier, the Hessians were stationed with their right flank between the Saar and Moselle before Soest and Bibelhausen, the centre and left in front of Wiltingen, Ober-Emmel, Pellingen, Gutweiler and on the left bank of the Ruwer river. Three squadrons of hussars and two companies of Jäger deployed as outposts from Relingen and Saarburg to the heights of Kirf. They were in contact with the Bavarians. The Jäger were based at Munzingen, Sinz and Freudenberg from whence they patrolled the border with France. The four hussar squadrons camped in Grevenmacher, guarding the line of communication with Luxembourg, and observing the border towards Remich. The Anhalt-Thuringian Brigade was stationed along the left bank of the Moselle right of the Kyll and over the Sauer towards Vianden, Diekirch, Felz and Echternach. Here, Egloffstein based his headquarters. The Hessian dragoons attached to his brigade deployed one squadron at Diekirch to patrol the line of communication with Luxembourg and Arlon. The fortress of Luxembourg was thus at the centre of this deployment. The Hessians had by far the most dangerous positions which no doubt reflected the relative quality of the contingent. Further troops joined them over the following weeks. On 20 May, those of Waldeck, Schaumburg-Lippe and Lippe-Detmold arrived. They were formed into the 3rd provisional regiment under Oberst Graf Waldeck. They were stationed behind the Anhalt-Thuringian Brigade, forming a second line. On 29 May, this regiment was sent to the fortress of Luxembourg to replace Prussian troops that had just been called away. Two companies of Bernburg Landwehr arrived on 25 May. On 1 and 3 June, the Oldenburg Regiment arrived, being allocated cantonments in Bitburg and Neuerburg. On 8 June, three companies of Detmold Landwehr reached their designated positions, later being sent to Luxembourg. On 11 June, the remainder of the Hessians, Laßberg's Grenadier Battalion and the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment Kurfürst, joined their contingent. The 2nd Weimar Battalion was expected on 23 June. An army corps is, by definition, a force of mixed arms capable of independent action. Lacking artillery and cavalry in sufficient numbers, this corps, with 13,000 infantry, but with less than 1,000 cavalry and only eight guns, was not. It was not suitable for use as a battlefield formation. Without greater financial resources, little could be done to compensate for these shortages. The quality of the troops was also very mixed. In a report to his king dated 30 April, Kleist describes the Weimar Battalion as the best. [18] He continues by complaining that the Bernburg Jäger were not really riflemen, but actually musket-armed light infantry. He did not think much of the Gotha Battalion, although it was the largest. Added to this great variation in quality was an equally great variation in the size of the contingents. The policy of mixing the line and militia formations from one state together diluted the quality of the troops even further. The troops were in the main young and inexperienced, even lacking practise in the use of their firearms which was not helped by a chronic shortage of ammunition. These units contained very few veterans, with even the officers and sergeants being of a poor quality. Items of uniform were in short supply, the footwear was worn out, two-thirds of the muskets were French, one-third British, supply trains insufficient and field hospitals lacking. [19] Kleist certainly had his work cut out to turn this shambles into a fighting force. Despite his illness, he succeeded in accomplishing this most difficult task before resigning due to his ill-health on 18 June, two days after his corps had received the order to march for the front. The war ended before his troops ever came into action. Kleist was not only a casualty of internal Prussian politics, but also a victim of international political intrigues. Despite the enormous obstacles placed in his way by several parties involved in this episode, this most capable and professional commander did his utmost to carry out the task to hand. He largely succeeded in turning a mixed batch of poor recruits into an organised force. Kleist was clearly one of the most capable senior commanders of his generation, whose presence with the Army of the Lower Rhine during the difficult days of June 1815, would no doubt have significantly benefited the allied cause. However, internal Prussian politics prevented this talent being used to its greatest effect. Bibliography Klüber, D. Johann Ludwig, 'Uebersicht der diplomatischen Verhandlungen des wiener Congresses überhaupt und insonderheit über wichtige Angelegenheiten des teutschen Bundes', (Frankfurt an Main, 1816). Pflugk-Harttung, Julius von, 'Das Preußische Heer und die Norddeutschen Bundestruppen unter General von Kleist', (Gotha, 1911). Pflugk-Harttung, Julius von, 'Über die Ausrütung der Norddeutschen Heere 1815', Beiheft zum 'Militär-Wochenblatt' 8. Heft, (Berlin 1911). Starklof, R. 'Das Leben des Herzogs Bernhard von Sachsen-Weimar', 2. Band, (Gotha 1866). Footnotes [1] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundestruppen, p 69. [2] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundestruppen, p 80. [3] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundestruppen, p 92, letter from Blücher to Kleist dated 10 May 1815. [4] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundestruppen, p 88. [5] Pflugk-Harttung, pp 91 f, letter from Kleist to Friedrich Wilhelm III dated 10 May 1815. [6] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundestruppen, p 89. [7] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundestruppen, pp 92 f. [8] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundestruppen, p 96. [9] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundestruppen, p 98. [10] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundestruppen, p 98. [11] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundestruppen, pp 100 f. [12] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundestruppen, p 100. [13] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundeskorps, p 111. [14] Starklof, vol I, pp 169-171. [15] Klüber, vol IV, p 419. [16] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundeskorps, p 114. [17] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundeskorps, p 119. [18] Pflugk-Harttung, Bundeskorps, p 126. [19] Pflugk-Harttung, Ausrüstung, pp 380 f. History and Assembly of Kleist's Corp Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #37 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1997 by First Empire. 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