by John Cook and Dave Hollins
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Continental campaign histories like Krieg are supposed to be too detailed, but where do you expect to get the detail on tactics, battles and influences on strategy from? Krieg 1809 uses sources from both sides, relying particularly on Saski: La campagne de 1809 for the French material, alongside Germanic works, although the latter are better documented, largely because the sources are better. Although the suggestion aired two years ago that 'extracts' from non-English books can be used doesn't work, for the simple reason that, like statistics, they can be taken out of context to demonstrate whatever conclusion has already been reached, here are a few extracts just to give you an idea of what is out there: Many times, you will have read that both sides' commands made some strange decisions - reviewing the information flow into and objectives of both headquarters in the detail given shows that there was a clear rationale, even if mistaken and/or based on bad intelligence, to both sides' decisions - hindsight is a wonderful thing, but try putting yourself in the respective commanders' shoes, especially when trying to work out what the French were up to as Davout's 3rd Corps marched back and forth along the same route. The battle for intelligence was vital in the difficult broken terrain of Bavaria: "individual (Austrian) mounted units reconnoitered as far as 30km ahead of the lines held by the main forces. Thanks to their actions, a whole series of accurate reports about the enemy were obtained; however, most of them including the most important ones about Davout's arrival in Regensburg only came to the attention of the Archduke during the morning of the 18th ... ... the reconnaissance patrol under Rittmeister Friedrich Freiherr von Schneben, (2 Zugs of 4th Vincent Chevauleger) from IV Korps moving through Neufahrn towards Regensburg brought news, which largely confirmed the reports from GM Vecsey. Schneben had been ordered to post his detachment behind the Kleine Laaber near Pfaffenberg and to send out patrols as far as Regensburg, until he could establish some clear intelligence about the enemy. In the night of 17th/18th, having ridden up to Alt Egloffsheim with some Chevauleger and established that a 20-30 strong enemy mounted picket stood at Köfering, the Rittmeister reported that in an encampment near Burgweinting, which was "three hours march in extent", there were only French but no Bavarians; the local people gave varying estimates of enemy strength between 5,000 and 15,000.(5) This information reached IV Korps' Advance-Guard commander, GM Stutterheim, in Martinshaun during the same night, travelling on to the Korps Command in Essenbach to arrive at 5.30 a.m. on the 18th. FML Philipp Freiherr von Vukassovich, commander of III Korps' Advance-Guard had sent Rittmeister Wenzel Freiherr von Moser with a Zug of 3rd Erzherzog Ferdinand Hussars out from Türkenfeld towards Kelheim. Patrols from this officer's command rode through Reissling, both up to Ober-Saal, where they confirmed there was a French infantry picket, and to the banks of the Danube opposite Kelheim, about which Moser reported that the town was occupied by the French and that the bridge had been ripped down." "From the detachment sent forward to Eggenfelden, a reconnaissance patrol comprising a disguised Korporal from the 3rd Erzherzog Karl Uhlans with two 'reliable' troopers went on to the Landau-Dingolfing area... VI Korps' Advance-guard moved south of the Inn to Tüssling, from where Oberstleutnant Bretschneider of 7th Lichtenstein Hussars advanced with a detachment right as far as Mühldorf and started the repair of the partially destroyed bridge there. North of the Inn, an all-arms detachment was sent forward to Winhöring." Over on the Franco-Allied side, intelligence was also coming from other sources on 18th April: "Austrian deserters had again provided the Marshal (Lefebvre) with some substantive information: their army was marching from Pfeffenhausen towards Siegenburg; the headquarters had been designated for Pfeffenhausen on the 18th, where five infantry and four cavalry regiments forming an advance-guard had already arrived on the 17th. The Mayor of Siegenburg wrote that the Austrians had given notice of requisitioning supplies for 90,000 men in that area. These reports, which Lefebvre sent on from Neumarkt at 6 p.m. to the Emperor, would run counter to Napoleon's previous assumption, that the Austrian Generalissimus was marching from Landshut towards Regensburg and was offering an open flank into which the French could strike. The picture of the overall situation began to get confused. Of Davout's 3rd Corps, Lefebvre saw and heard nothing; no sound of action of any form pointed to a battle. Certainly, a mounted patrol led by an officer of the 5th Hussars had arrived in Abensberg under orders from Davout to demand the repair of the bridge at Abensberg, but beyond that, the officer had no idea of the Marshal's plan. Small Bavarian cavalry detachments were supposed to be searching out the heads of Davout's columns throughout the day, but it seems that they didn't venture that far and soon gave up attempting to establish communications, as there weren't in fact any between Regensburg and the troops on the Abens on the 18th. A written message from Lefebvre to Davout, indicating his willingness to support 3rd Corps and reporting on the tasks allotted to the Bavarian Corps was entrusted to a local peasant for transmission, but during the early hours of the 19th, he fell into the hands of an Austrian cavalry patrol." Most of you will have read that the Austrians marched slowly, but had you ever considered that many factors determined the rate of advance: "the Austrian army in 1809 was wilfully led astray by Bavarian guides, so that several times, they required 24 hours to complete a march, for which 4-6 hours should have sufficed. In Old Bavaria, one must be particularly suspicious; the people there are enemies of Austria and will endeavour, whenever they can, to lead the army down the wrong path; even the coachmen are untrustworthy and under orders from the government." What about conditions on campaign?: "The troops established bivouacs in continuous rain across washed out cultivated fields; wood, straw and provisions were, as far as they were readily available, willingly provided by the local population. Three Zugs of Pioneers (3) were left in Schärding to construct the fortifications planned for there." "the Korps suffered major shortages because the cumbersome supply trains could not move fast enough to keep up with them. Also bivouacking in the rain and on swampy fields brought about widespread illness; typhoid ravaged the troops and the victims filled the hospitals. Thus, for example, the sick list for III Korps already comprised 6.5% of its initial strength by 12th April and it remained at this level throughout. Sending the sick back followed the establishment of the main hospitals on 11th April at Schärding and Ranshofen near Braunau. The Army Command closed down a temporary hospital erected by III Korps at St. Martin, but didn't send the personnel back to the Korps. They were deployed in the main hospitals, where they were most definitely required." What is most confusing is that books with large numbers of OBs and detailed accounts of all types of battles are supposed to be in demand. Logistics and time suggest that wargamers would like a good selection of clashes of various sizes, indicating the movements of the units, while those interested in the specific account want the kind of detail that goes beyond the more general campaign history and provide the examples of how Napoleonic warfare was actually fought. Krieg contains numerous actions from the large set pieces like Eckmühl and Teugen down to small outpost actions, involving about a battalion and a half squadron per side. In addition there is the data necessary to reconstruct OBs and supporting maps. A mid-range example would be part of the battle of Arnhofen: "At this time, superior numbers of enemy troops were already in the process of deploying in front of Abensberg. On receiving news of the presence of Austrian troops in the woods around Bruckhof, Marshal Lefebvre had despatched the 1st Kronprinz Chevauxlegers and Regnier's light battery(39) from the Advance-Guard of the 1st Bavarian division, currently marching towards Abensberg, at the rush to Arnhofen, where these units arrived just in time to halt the Austrians. The Marshal had then ridden to Abensberg, had led the 6th Herzog Wilhelm Infantry Regiment (40) then posted there through the town at the double and tasked them with advancing towards the woodland (the Seeholz) to the south of Arnhofen. Crown Prince Ludwig received the order to follow on through Abensberg with his 1st Division. In the meantime near Arnhofen, with his 4th Levenehr Dragoon squadrons, Oberst Anton Graf Hardegg had mounted an attack across the terraced and rising farmland fields towards Regnier's battery and the Bavarian Chevauxlegers. The battery repelled the attack at close range with canister, but the Chevauxlegers, which had fired a carbine volley at 50 paces at the Austrian Dragoons, were driven off. So, the battery hurriedly limbered up and was just about to evacuate their position, when two fresh Bavarian squadrons - half of 1st Minuzzi Dragoon Regiment - sent forward by the Crown Prince, arrived on the battlefield, fell on the flank of the 4th Levenehr Dragoons and, together with the rallied Chevauxlegers, forced the Austrian horsemen to fall back. Regnier's battery opened up again from a more advanced position. Nevertheless, the already greatly exhausted Austrian Cavalry Artillery battery, reinforced by two guns brought up from Bruckhof, still managed to cling on in their disadvantageous position in the valley. However, later they had to be withdrawn into the woods, followed later in the action by Hardegg's Dragoons, against whom the enemy hadn't mounted any further attacks. The two battalions of IR1 Kaiser had in the meantime arrived on the western edge of the Seeholz, from where they opened fire at the advancing Schützen from the Bavarian 6th Infantry. A cannon from the Cavalry Artillery battery was moved up here later and poured effective fire into the Bavarians being led forward by GM Graf Beckers, who were repelled and forced to withdraw towards Abensberg. Marshal Lefebvre immediately ordered another attack. To the left of the 1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment, which remained in reserve, the 2nd Battalion now tried twice in vain, to drive the Austrians out of their positions. Only when Lefebvre reinforced the depleted Schützen with volunteers and they renewed the attack supported by infantry columns, could the Bavarians, who up until then had not generally suffered significant losses, were able to get into the woods. At this critical moment for the defenders, the infantry ordered forward from Bruckhof arrived in the woodland, halted the Bavarian 6th Infantry Regiment, who were not expecting any sudden Austrian counter-attack, and drove them out of the woods. However, the Bavarian 1st Division had already deployed in two lines in front of the Abbach road to the north-east of Abensberg and the 2nd Kronprinz Infantry Regiment were ordered forward to support the 6th. With two battalions alongside each other and Schützen out in front, the 2nd advanced to attack to the right of the 6th in such a way that the salient of woodland, in which the bulk of the Austrian troops were massed, was outflanked from the south-west. After lengthy fighting, the Austrians began to withdraw under instructions from the brigade commander, as large enemy units could now be seen advancing along the so-called Ochsenstrasse running from Abensberg to Bachl." No-one has to be reminded of the origins of the phrase: 'To lie like a Bulletin', but as the 19th century British historian, Chesney, pointed out, once we get east of Belgium, the English speaking world accepts French accounts at face value. Are they truthful? One last quote from Krieg: Baden Graf (Count) Hochberg, a Colonel attached to Massena's staff wrote: "Hardly was the battle (at Pfaffenhoffen on 19th April) over than I was despatched by the Marshal ... to the headquarters at Ingolstadt ... to convey the news to the Emperor of the outbreak of hostilities. ... (Massena) asked me, what I intended to report. I responded that it would cover what I had witnessed: the capture of about 50 enemy troops and the loss of only a few of our men. He answered me rather agitatedly, that I must not say this to the Emperor, as I would be taking a report with me, in which the Austrian losses were stated to be 400 prisoners and many dead, with which I had to concur". As the Austrian staff continue, rather tongue in cheek, "This may have been the case quite often, so it can come as no surprise that Napoleon frequently held quite incorrect beliefs about the extent of successes achieved." Largely comprising letters passing between the senior commanders at the time, Saski forms the basis of most existing accounts of the campaign. So, the current view of this campaign and many aspects of Napoleonic warfare is based on poor or at best one-sided sources - doesn't wargaming suffer as a result by recreating a world that never really existed? Do we really understand what happened 200 years ago? A few days after the translation was rejected, I was chatting to an FE reader looking for material on Alt-Egloffsheim, the cavalry clash which followed the main battle at Eckmuhl. A lengthy chat followed the comment that he had read Arnold - anything else wasn't accessible. Quite clearly, he was labouring under many myths associated with French accounts - not least that the Austrians were regularly breaking their forces up. What happened on the individual battlefields arose from the orders and objectives of the respective commanders etc., but there is still no account in English following the Austrian command through in tandem with the French. Obviously, 1809 enthusiasts will write to FE urging publication of Krieg, but as those consulted by the publishers might say, such a book has to appeal to a broad cross-section of the 'average readers', so would the 'average readers' let your views be known on why you would or wouldn't buy such a 320pp book on Eckmuhl or some similar Continental campaign. Following Aspern & Wagram, Osprey will be covering Eckmuhl next year - is that enough for you? Presumably, there is a tendency to buy books on the basis that they cover a specific campaign - is Eckmuhl obscure? If book sales are not doing as well as publishers might wish, might not one factor be the endless rehashes on the same old subjects? What do those who advise the publishers suggest is produced - 'The Napoleonic Wars - New Perspectives'?
Letter to Editor (FE#39) Regarding Publishing Krieg More ADC Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #37 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1997 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |
