During the 1806 action, due to poor communications and command decisions, the Prussians and their somewhat reluctant Saxon allies placed themselves in a hopeless starting position for the battle.

The Prussian army moved off from their original starting positions, attempting to confront the French advancing across the Teutoburgerwald. Having found himself on the right flank of the Main Army, Crown Prince Louis of Prussia had initially crossed over to the right bank of the River Saale to support the withdrawal of Generalmajor von Tauentzien's Left Flank Corps.

He received correspondence from the Prussian Army Second in Command the Duke of Brunswick, (King Frederick-William being the nominal Commander in Chief). The correspondence indicated the entire Prussian army was to cross over to the right bank of the Saale, to meet and fight Napoleon's main forces. The correspondence suggested that it would not be advisable for The Crown Prince to cross until the concentration was complete, but that it would be one of his tasks to guard the flank in such a manoeuvre.

The Prince realised he needed to watch and defend the defile leading from the Teutoburgerwald, the road from Gräfenthal, and the river crossing at Saalfeld. Heavily outnumbered, and defending a river crossing with the river and lightly defended town to their backs, the Prussians failed to recognise the desperate situation they were in, and make good their escape, when the opportunity arose. Marshal Lannes, commanding the French V Corps, on the eve of battle, received news of Prussian formations ahead of his force. His request for assistance from the VIIth Corps of Marshal Augereau, met with little response. He decided to push through the defile with his leading division (Suchet's 1st Division).

To the High Ground

Dispatching light troops to occupy the high ground to his right Lannes found his leading units under fire from the Prussian forces around Saalfeld. Seeing that the Prussians meant to stand and fight, the Marshal echeloned his forces as they emerged from the defile to his left. Units were sent by the tracks in the woods on the slope to find a way around the enemy's right wing and rear. The pressure against both flanks built up during the morning. The Crown Prince Louis had committed all his reserves to bolster his lines.

However his left wing was crumbling and the enemy were on the point of capturing the river bridge. Prince Louis leading his cavalry in person charged at the enemy cavalry. In a brief fight he was killed and the battle became a rout.

As my battle was to be set in 1813, I felt it should be the Prussians representing the allies that are advancing. The Prussians are therefore in place of Marshall Lannes' Corps. Marshall Augereau's forces being represented off board by the Swedes, with the same reluctance to get involved in any conflict.

The defending forces part was taken by the Württemberg forces. Together with the Hessen-Darmstadt forces, I tried to recreate the action.

A personal overview of the 1813 Campaign

In mid August of 1813, the Allied forces were poised for their renewed offensive campaign against the French Empire armies situated in central Germany. The Alliance had formulated, (after a great deal of discussion and debate) the 'Trachenberg Plan'. The plan reflected the differing interests of the disparate nations involved in the Alliance. The only nation totally committed to the fighting was Prussia, needing a decisive victory. Such a success would keep up the morale of its population, sustain the coherence of the current Alliance. Prussia needed all their lands clear of their enemies. Failure to do so would leave them open to retribution by the occupying Empire forces. Exhausted in terms of resources and materiel, the Prussians were reliant on aid and resources from Britain and the other Allies.

The Swedes, under the former French Marshall Bernadotte, a man with an eye for the main chance, were looking to reinforce their land holdings in Northern Europe.

The Russians having liberated their country, were now becoming ever more reluctant to continue fighting and would possibly settle for peace.

The Austrians were unhappy with the alliance, perhaps remembering Prussia's discreditable conduct during their own campaign of 1805. They distrusted both the Prussians and the Russians, feeling that they should be the dominating power in the Central European area, matters should be therefore dictated by their command. An attitude that was to generate conflicts with the Prussians in a later generation.

The campaign had opened with Marshal Oudinot's Army of Berlin attempting to march against Berlin, as a diversionary tactic whilst the main Coalition forces moved against the Army of Silesia.

Oudinot's force consisting of IV, VII, XII Corps and III Cavalry Corps, a total of over 70,000 men and 216 guns, was supported on its left flank by Girard's 15,000 strong force and Davout's 35,000 strong XIII Corps, bringing the total to nearly 120,000 men. However many were poorly trained, and either in scratch units, or not in a position to take part in the forthcoming drive against Berlin. From the outset, the Army of Berlin was unable to meet the Allied forces on equal terms. The empire intelligence reports, suffering due to a lack of trained light cavalry, had not identified correctly the forces available to the Swedish Crown Prince. Although Napoleon had assumed that the former Marshal would be reluctant to commit his Swedish troops, little account had been taken of the attitude of the Prussian forces in the Army of the North.

The Crown Prince of Sweden could call upon around 98,000 men active in the field. The army consisted of many foreign troops including Russians and Swedes, but also a large element of Brandenburgers, who were therefore defending their homeland. Supplies were still a problem for this army, the country had been effectively stripped of resources and provisions by the French. Many of the units had been recently re-equipped during the armistice, and were in need of training.

Initial Moves

The initial moves by the French had resulted in the defeat at Grossbeeren on 23rd August. The Army of Berlin therefore retired back onto the Elbe, followed by elements of the Coalition army. The campaign continued and was subject to the fortunes of war. Both sides having opportunities for decisive actions, but poor command decisions and communication problems meant neither side achieved the ultimate victory. Although the Allied victory at Leipzig was a strategic victory, as it lead to the withdrawal of the French forces behind the Rhine; it did not achieve the ultimate destruction of Napoleon or annihilate his armies as a fighting force. It could have been said to be the beginning of the end, however.

On Napoleon's side the command system centred upon him as supreme commander showed its faults. The French Marshals, not properly trained for full independent commands; were mainly found wanting when operating against large bodies independently of their ruler. Tactically, Napoleon's lack of trained cavalry was to blunt his forces' ability to carry out vital reconnaissance patrols against the enemy, and prevent him following up any victory as effectively as in earlier campaigns.

More Battle of Coswig

Part 1: Historical Overview
Part 2: The Wargame
Part 3: The Battle