Britannia Rules: The Classic Age of Naval History 1793-1815
by C. Northcote Parkinson
Published by Alan Sutton 1994 (In association with the Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth)
178 pages, 7 maps, 36 illustrations
ISBN 0-86299-468-3
This work by C. Northcote Parkinson was first published in 1977, and has been made available again by Alan Sutton and the Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth. It is a highly detailed account of the classic age of British naval history, and as the introduction states; 'one that can be both a provocative and beguiling primer for new students, and a challenge with new perspectives for the better read'. This book is an excellent introduction to British naval history of the Napoleonic era.
The work is divided into two sections. The first covers the Wars of the French Revolution 1793-1801, while the other section discusses the Wars of the Emperor Napoleon 1803-1816. One underlying theme to the book is the development of naval thinking during the period. In the early years commanders such as Rodney and Hotham were content to take a few prizes and put the enemy ships to flight. This attitude changed with such men as Howe, Jervis and Nelson whose aim was at least the destruction, and preferably the annihilation of any enemy fleet. This change in naval thinking is described and analysed in a very lucid and detailed manner, alongside an analysis of the characters involved; their abilities (or lack of!); and their relationship with the service and with each other. Britain began the Revolutionary Wars with a distinct advantage over the French, whose navy had suffered during the Revolution. Many French naval officers had been promoted from the lower deck and so their navy was weak in direction and leadership.
Britannia Rules looks at the organisation of the Admiralty and the Royal Navy at the outbreak of war. What I found particularly interesting however, was the relationship of the British Admirals to each other, and how this affected the Royal Navy as a fighting force.
In 1793 there was a rivalry between the Channel Fleet and that in the Mediterranean; a rivalry that was essentially between the Admirals commanding. Hood, commanding in the latter theatre, was also a member of the Navy Board, and discipline in this fleet suffered during his tenure. When Sir John Jervis took over command in the Mediterranean he restored discipline and laid the groundwork for the superiority of British naval power that has been attributed to Nelson. Northcote
Parkinson argues that Nelson did not innovate. He put into practice the ideas and concepts formulated by Jervis. Regarding the Battle of Trafalgar, this volume argues that the claims for Nelson's battle plan have been overstated; ' ...simple it may have been but new it was not'. The book may redistribute some of the laurels attributed to men such as Nelson, but this only serves to strengthen the reputation of the Royal Navy as a whole, and show how the many brave and talented officers of the time worked together to develop their ideas and tactics.
The mutinies at Spithead and the Nore are examined in great detail. It is interesting that the mutiny did not spread to the fleet in the Mediterranean, nor to frigates and sloops at sea. This event caught the French by surprise and they were too slow to take advantage of it. The role of the Royal Navy in the French invasion plans is described and discussed, from the invasion of Ireland to the proposed onslaught on the English coast in 1798-99 and again in 1803-05.
As would be expected, the Trafalgar campaign features in some detail, and here the author argues that Villeneuve knew what Nelson's tactics would be as they were a copy of Admiral Duncan's tactics at the Battle of Camperdown.
In most histories of the Napoleonic Wars, Trafalgar is seen as the climax of British naval activity. This is a fallacy, as the Royal Navy was kept busy throughout the period of conflict, in particular during the Peninsular War, when the Service was instrumental in keeping Wellington's army supplied, and in tying down French forces along the coast by mounting many hit and run raids.
After Trafalgar an arrogance set in amongst many Royal Navy officers, who assumed that they would always be superior to the French. A British victory at sea was thus always assured. Mr. Northcote Parkinson argues that in some respects the standard of training in the navy declined, with many officers placing more emphasis on rapidity of fire than upon accuracy of aim, and even more stress on sail-drill than gunnery. This attitude was to have serious consequences during the Anglo-American War of 1812, when a number of ship-to-ship actions resulted in defeats for the Royal Navy. British gunnery was improved as a result of this conflict.
The story of the Royal Navy of the period ends with the Battle of Algiers in 1816, which was fought to eradicate slavery from the Barbary States. This action owed its success to the lessons learnt during the preceding wars with France, and involved officers and seamen who had learnt their trade in the preceding years.
Britannia Rules is, for its size, a comprehensive account of the Royal Navy during this period. As the author states at the end; there has been '...no naval equivalent of a Napier or a Fortescue....We know al too little about the period which we regard as our greatest....Is it not time that the epic were fully told?'
This book provides a good introduction to such an epic history. Recommended.
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