By the time the Battle of Waterloo began at 11.30 am on 18 June, Napoleon had squandered his best chances of a decisive victory. Nevertheless, Napoleon was confident of beating Wellington and his plan was simple. First, he would send the II Corps to Hougoumont to pin down Wellington's western wing in order to prevent it from undertaking any offensive moves. In its advanced position around Hougoumont, the II Corps would act as a pivot for the main attack.

Second, a Great Battery would bombard Wellington's eastern wing to soften up the opposition there.

Third, the main attack would break through Wellington's eastern wing. VI and I Corps would seize both La Haie Sainte and the complex of buildings around Papelotte and would punch through the enemy infantry in between these farms. Light cavalry would protect the flanks of this attack.

Fourth, the French would seize the village and farm of Mont St Jean. The sappers of I Corps would immediate barricade the village to prevent its recapture, for in French hands it would cut Wellington's line of retreat along the Brussels road. Wellington would therefore have to retreat away from the Prussians towards Ostend, falling back on his detachment of 17,000 men at Hal on the way. In later years, Wellington made contradictory statements about his intended line of retreat had he been beaten. But in fact, he would have had little choice. If Napoleon's main attack had broken through, Wellington would have had to retreat north-westwards and this certainly would have accorded with his claim of 1825: 'had I been forced from my position, I should have retreated to my right, towards the coast, the shipping, and my resources.' [6]

Fifth, Napoleon's Reserve Cavalry and Guard would support the assault. Presumably, in accordance with Napoleon's method of warfare and as first demonstrated at the Battle of Castiglione in 1796, these units would act as a masse de décision, a 'decisive mass', punching through the weak 'hinge' of Wellington's now beleaguered and 'L' shaped battleline at the crossroads. This would result in the rout of Wellington's army. Light cavalry would exploit and pursue. Hougoumont would remain to be pounded into submission after its isolation while elements of Wellington's shattered army would inevitably have to be cleared from the Forest of Soignes.

Vs. Continental Armies

This plan would have succeeded easily against most continental armies. Indeed, in reality it swiftly routed Major- General Count van Bijlandt's Dutch-Belgian brigade. Napoleon's main attack would have had a good chance of success only if Wellington had garrisoned his east wing entirely with less reliable troops instead of interspersing his foreign units with British ones.

It is clear with hindsight that the French high command adopted the wrong formation for its main attack. The French generals probably never guessed that they might come under a cavalry onslaught before they had overwhelmed the enemy infantry and then deployed. The massive, unwieldy columns which assaulted Wellington's ridge were used owing to the cramped battlefield and for ease of manoeuvre. But once cavalry had broken into a dense column, it could not be stopped. The crowded ranks could hardly use their muskets or bayonets and the luckless French infantrymen could either run or wait to be killed. The use of a large number of far smaller battalion columns would have increased problems of co-ordination but would have been more resistant to cavalry counter-attack.

Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the French main attack would have achieved a breakthrough in any formation, given the strength of Wellington's position and the tactical superiority and greater firepower of his British infantry. The one change in the tactics of this attack that might really have benefitted the French is a prolonged bombardment of La Haie Sainte by heavy artillery prior to the infantry assault. This might have led to the fall of the farm sufficiently early in the battle for the French to exploit it to its full potential.

At right, Napoleon's headquarters at L'Caillou, 1995. © David Watkins

At Napoleon's breakfast conference at his headquarters of Le Caillou that morning, some of his generals had urged him to manoeuvre rather than launch a frontal attack against the deadly firepower of the British infantry. The destruction of Napoleon's main attack, and the repulse of all the subsequent frontal assaults on Wellington's line suggests that such advice was justified. Wellington himself expected to be outflanked by the west: 'I should have turned the flank – the right flank. I should have kept the English Army occupied by a demonstration to attack, or perhaps by slight attacks, while I was in fact moving the main body by Hal on Brussels.' [7]

An outflanking move would have led to a battle fought on terms more favourable to the French than the frontal battle they in fact fought against a tough defensive position. But it would have meant different difficulties and success would not have been certain. Wellington had stationed a force of 17,000 men eight miles away at Hal and Tubise to guard his western flank, and a chain of battalions linked this force to the main army on the battlefield of Waterloo. Napoleon would have been unable to move his army from the battlefield without being noticed and any surprise onslaught around Wellington's western flank would have been impossible without undertaking a twenty-five mile march around Hal and Tubise.

Such a march, indeed any outflanking move to the west, would have been to place Wellington between Napoleon and Grouchy. Grouchy would then have been in peril between Wellington and Blücher and this would have been to contradict the whole principle of the central position, which lay at the heart of Napoleon's strategic plan for this campaign.

More realistically, Napoleon might have attempted to outflank Wellington to the east, but would have encountered rough terrain complete with hedges and sunken lanes around Papelotte. It would have brought him nearer to the Prussians, who could therefore have intervened in the battle earlier. On the other hand, Napoleon might also have learnt of their approach earlier and been near enough to the Lasne defile to check them there. Proper reconnaissance of his eastern flank early in the morning of 18 June would also have alerted Napoleon to the Prussian threat soon enough for him to block the Lasne defile. He might well have held the Prussians at bay here long enough to defeat Wellington.

Wellington would have noticed any French outflanking moves to the west or the east and could have adjusted his defences accordingly. If Napoleon was going to manoeuvre, it was too late to do so by the morning of 18 June. The troops had not rallied and reached the battlefield ready to deploy until 10.00 am. It was too muddy to expect the units to carry out complicated moves quickly enough to win a swift victory by manoeuvre.

Sir Hussey Vivian, who commanded a British light cavalry brigade at the battle, considered that the French 'should have attacked Hougoumont in a different manner than that in which they did attack it, not advancing against the garden and wood, but occupying in force the height above it and driving our troops out with their Artillery, and then turning our right altogether.' [8] Indeed, Hougoumont would never have fallen unless surrounded and, like La Haie Sainte, starved of ammunition. Thus for Napoleon, capturing Hougoumont was not the key to winning Waterloo; instead, winning Waterloo was the key to capturing Hougoumont. Even artillery bombardment and fire failed to dislodge the garrison, for the French could not isolate the garrison unless they had driven Wellington's army off the ridge crest to the north.

For Napoleon, once his main attack had failed, La Haie Sainte became the key to the battlefield. He should never have allowed another attack to be launched against Wellington until La Haie Sainte had fallen. This farm would have been a secure, advanced base just two hundred metres from the centre of Wellington's front line. It would have served as a launch-pad for assaults and as a rallying-point.

In reality, La Haie Sainte fell towards 6.30 pm and heralded an attritional attack along Wellington's line using infantry, cavalry and artillery in mutual support. This inflicted severe damage on Wellington. Had Napoleon used such tactics earlier, instead of allowing Marshal Michel Ney to waste his cavalry in unsupported charges, he might well have broken through. Napoleon would have had at least two extra hours in which these attritional tactics could have worn down Wellington's line ready for a powerful attack by his reserve cavalry followed closely by his Imperial Guard.

For, according to Wellington, Napoleon 'gained some of his battles by the use of his cuirassiers as a kind of accelerated infantry, with which, supported by masses of cannon, he was in the habit of seizing important parts in the centre or flanks of his enemy's position, and of occupying such points till his infantry could arrive to relieve them.' [9]

Thus, once the cavalry had gained the ridge crest, the Guard would have been able to advance without coming under fire to secure the ground the horsemen had occupied. Once the French had achieved a breakthrough, they could have exploited it by wheeling left and right and rolling up Wellington's punctured line along the ridge crest. Light cavalry could have moved to the fore in time to pursue broken formations.

The early capture and exploitation of La Haie Sainte offered the only realistic chance of a French victory. Even so, such a strategy necessitated a frontal attack and it is by no means certain that the French would have broken through. Two days before Waterloo, Napoleon had captured Ligny village from Blücher but had then been fought to a standstill. He had broken into the Prussian army's position but not through it. Similarly at Borodino in 1812, Napoleon had finally driven the Russians from their strongpoints, the Great Redoubt and the Flèches, but had failed to win either a breakthrough or a decisive victory. At Wagram in 1809, Napoleon had failed to smash through the Austrian line in spite of assaulting it with a massive column under Marshal Etienne Macdonald. The Austrian commander, Archduke Charles, was forced to order a general retreat and suffered heavy casualties but his army survived.

Similarly, at Waterloo, Wellington's infantry would have fallen back and occupied the farm of Mont St Jean, just six hundred and fifty metres north of the crossroads. This farm would have served as a tough strongpoint to anchor a new defence line and it would have proved as difficult as La Haie Sainte to capture. Even if the farm fell, the village of Mont St Jean five hundred metres further north would have seriously delayed, if not checked, the French advance.

Wellington's units would now be suffering severely from French artillery fire as they no longer enjoyed the protection of their ridge. But the French would have needed time and effort to advance the guns of their Great Battery across the muddy fields and the double hedgerow of the Ohain road. The paved Brussels road itself would have been obstructed by bodies and other debris and would have been under fire. To move all the French batteries along the road would have taken too long and would have resulted in acute congestion.

Wellington may well have been able to withdraw his army intact as far north as the Forest of Soignes, covered by Sir Hussey Vivian and Sir John Vandeleur's light cavalry from the far eastern flank. [10] Once there, he would have been relatively safe: 'I knew every yard of the plain beyond the forest, and the road through it. The forest on each side of the chaussée was open enough for infantry, cavalry, and even for artillery, and very defensible.' [11]

If Wellington had been able to hold his army together, he would have survived until night put an end to the fighting. Napoleon could not have unleashed a powerful pursuit of the Duke as the Prussians menaced the French flank. 'Had I retreated in that direction,' asked the Duke, 'could they have followed me? The Prussians were on their flank, and would have been on their rear.' [12]

Therefore, Napoleon would probably not have won a decisive victory. He might have switched his main effort to the Prussian IV Corps and driven it back, cut off its contact with Wellington, and severely damaged it as it recrossed the Lasne defile under fire. But the arrival of overwhelming Prussian reinforce-ments in the course of the night would have enabled Wellington and Blücher to unite their numerically superior forces in battle against the French. Even if Marshal Grouchy had arrived at Waterloo, the allies would still have outnumbered the French. This would have presented Napoleon with a stark choice on 19 June: defeat or retreat.

Some commentators believe that Napoleon might have won had he sent in the Guard at 6.30 pm after the fall of La Haie Sainte, as Marshal Ney requested. This is likely to have won a temporary foothold on the ridge crest but not a decisive victory. Certainly, the Guard would have hurled back Wellington's decimated Anglo-Hanoverian 3rd Division but, as Jac Weller pointed out, 'a temporary penetration by the French of Wellington's line did not win Talavera, Busaco or Fuentes de Onoro. Besides, Napoleon could not send the Guard forward against Wellington with Plancenoit still in Prussian hands.' [13]

At best, Napoleon could have imposed a stalemate, thus postponing his defeat from 18 June until the morrow. A stalemate would have required Wellington's army to be disorganised and incapable of attacking. This required the disintegration of sufficient numbers of its units. In reality, the Duke of Cumberland's Hussars, a Hanoverian regiment, fled to Brussels, accompanied by large numbers of fugitives from other units. The key question is whether sufficient numbers of other formations would have done the same had the French Guard established itself on the ridge crest.

Fatal confusion could also have overcome Wellington's army if he had become a casualty. While the Duke was not as conspicuously dressed as Admiral Horatio Nelson had been at Trafalgar, he had nearly been captured by French cavalry at Quatre Bras. He would have been active in rallying units and leading up reinforcements and could easily have fallen victim to the intense crossfire. This would have had a devastating effect on the morale of his troops. Lord Uxbridge would have taken over as commander-in-chief, though the Prince of Orange would have been likely to interfere. On the eve of the battle, Uxbridge had been nervous about the possibility of becoming the acting commander-in-chief and had asked the Duke what his plans were. But on 17 June Uxbridge had also shown that he was a skilled cavalry leader and was good at conducting the rearguard of a retreat.

By the time Napoleon actually sent in his Middle Guard, towards 7.30 pm, Wellington had shored up his shaken front line. The Guard was now too late to break through. Its attack was too weak and too ill co-ordinated to win a success even had it struck Wellington's weakest sector, at the crossroads.

Ought Napoleon to have retreated instead of sending in the Middle Guard, as many commentators suggest? This option was not open to Napoleon, since a reverse would severely damage his political power in turbulent Paris. Moreover, he needed a victory to restore his reputation as a great commander. Thus he could not cut his losses and retire; he had no choice but to stake everything in a desperate bid for success.

Footnotes

[6] H. Maxwell, Life of Wellington (1900), v.2, p.48
[7] J. Weller, Wellington at Waterloo (1967), p.199
[8] H. Siborne ed., The Waterloo Letters (1983), p.152
[9] H. Maxwell, Wellington, pp.138-9
[10] H. Siborne ed., Letters , p.196
[11] H. Maxwell, Wellington, p.48
[12] Ibid.
[13] J. Weller, Wellington at Waterloo , p.199

Waterloo Continued:

Introduction
15 June to 17 June
18 June
Aftermath