Napier's "Waterloo Letter"
A good deal of what is popularly accepted as historical 'fact' by the many people interested in the events of the Waterloo Campaign often shows itself, on closer examination, to be little other than popular fiction, legends and tall tales written by 'authorities' basing their 'thoroughly researched' work on 'reliable sources'.
Much of the 'Waterloo Mythology' owes its origins to the political needs of the nineteenth century. Writers of fiction such as Hugo and Thackeray caught the public imagination as much as Cornwell has today. Napoleon, eager to maintain his image, encouraged history to be rewritten. Certain participants pushed blame on to others by denying their own errors. 'My country right or wrong' historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century did much to embellish the legends with yarns of their own that they then presented as 'documented fact'. Generally, these writings have ignored the basic rule of proper historical writing, namely that 'historical evidence, like judicial evidence, is founded on the testimony of credible witnesses.' [1] This, the first of an occasional series of articles, compares a source used frequently since it was first published in 1891, with the documented facts.
The Letter
Napier's "Waterloo Letter", written on 28 November 1842, takes pride of place in the younger Siborne's selection of letters published in 1891. These letters came from the 'Waterloo Correspondence', that is the collection of letters and documents elicited from various participants in and authorities on the Waterloo Campaign that Siborne senior used as source material for his 'History' of the events. Thanks to his monumental work on the Peninsula War, Napier was acknowledged as an authority. This is most probably why Siborne junior included this letter in his selection.
However, Siborne senior did not use the information in this letter as a source for his 'History'. Being a contemporary of Napier, Siborne senior is likely to have had his reasons for not placing reliability on this source. The modern reader lacks the inside knowledge that Siborne senior had. However, there are several indications of the possible unreliability of this source which should set the alarm bells ringing in the head of even a layman, let alone an historian. These include the note in the heading of this letter that Napier was 'not at Waterloo'. He was thus not an eyewitness to the events he describes, so what he says has to be treated with a little care. In the first paragraph, we see the story he gives '… is from the Duke's mouth.'
In other words, it is hearsay. Finally, in the penultimate paragraph, we learn that Napier is '…in a state of great debility from sickness …' It is surprising that a letter which is clearly not from a participant in the events and that contains hearsay remarks from a sick man is accepted by so many historians without question.
Witnesses
Let us now go back to the basis of proper historical writing, the testimony of credible witnesses. Before even examining the content of this letter in detail, there are already doubts as to the reliability of this witness that warrant further research into his background. Fortunately, there are details of Napier's background in Bruce's 'Life of General Sir William Napier', published in 1864. The relevant passage reads:
'During the whole of the autumn and winter of 1842, General Napier was a constant invalid, and this expression in his case signifies great bodily torture. The writer during the winter of 1842-3 had helped to nurse him through one of his painful attacks. It appeared to be inflammatory rheumatism or gout of the worst description, aggravated by neuralgia. Any sudden noise would at such times produce a terrible prolonged cry from the sufferer, not only of bodily pain, but of nervous agony, much worse, quite involuntary and irrepressible. He had no more power to prevent it than he would have had to prevent a bell from sounding when struck by the hammer. Between the worst paroxysms, and when comparatively easy, his mind worked with amazing activity. To convey any idea of the extraordinary force, beauty, and justness of his language on these occasions, is beyond the power of the pen which attempts feebly to describe him. Sometimes he would relate the beautiful visions which under the influence of the narcotic presented themselves to his imaginative brain; and the writer has heard him reciting in a low voice a sort of epic for an hour at a time, while the narcotic was commencing to operate, and while a storm of wind and rain dashed against the windows, which he said at such times excited him pleasurably.' [2]
The medical evidence from an expert witness make it clear the content of this letter may well be unreliable as it was possibly one of Napier's 'beautiful visions'. Before accepting any of points in Napier's letter, it would be wise for any historian to cross-reference them against other material. As the information on his medical condition has been in print for over a century and available in libraries, it is surprising to find that even in the most current works on the subject, unquestioning reliance is still placed on what is a potentially most unreliable witness. [3]
So far, the medical reasons for the possible unreliability of this witness have been examined. Next, to be examined is if Napier had personal reasons for causing difficulties for any of the people involved. As is well known, Napier wrote a major work on the Peninsula War. This work mentioned names, places and dates. As such, it would be most unlikely if any comments made by Napier were not bring him into dispute with some of the parties mentioned. Indeed, Bruce mentions one such episode:
'To his other labours was added in the course of this year that of supporting the accuracy of various statements in the 'History of the Peninsula War;' amongst other of one which had been published in 1831, relating to the capture of a howitzer at the combat of Sabugal. Napier in his History assigned the honour of the exploit to the 43rd Regiment; Colonel Gurwood, after fourteen years' silence on the point, claimed it for the 52nd; and he printed a pamphlet for private circulation, in which, besides the matter of the howitzer, General Napier's credibility was assailed in respect to his relation of the assault of the lesser breach at Ciudad Rodrigo.' [4]
Disputes
Harsh words exchanged in any of these disputes may then have an effect on in any future dealings with these people. So not only are there medical reasons for being sceptical about the reliability of Napier's letter, there is also a personal dispute in the background which may be clouding the objectivity of his comments. Besides, the Colonel Gurwood referred to above was none other than the editor of Wellington's 'Despatches', clearly a man with friends in the highest places. Insult Gurwood and you insult the Duke himself. This dispute between Napier and Gurwood ran on in public over several years. Also, from their days in the Peninsula together, Wellington and Napier had had a history of differences. Napier had a motive for embarrassing the Duke in public; he was a man with scores to settle. Any interpretation of Napier's 'Waterloo Letter' should take that into account.
Content of the Letter
So let us now examine the content of this letter that is as follows:
'I should not like to give my information to anybody but you, but your fairness about your Model makes me feel that I do not throw away what I am going to tell you, and it is from the Duke's mouth.
'He found the Prince of Orange at the Duchess of Richmond's Ball on the evening of the 15th. He was surprised to see him because he had placed him at Binche, an important outpost, for the purpose of observing and giving notice of the movements of the Enemy. He went up to him and asked if there was any news? 'No! nothing but that the French have crossed the Sambre and had a brush with the Prussians. Have you heard of it?
'This was news. So he told him quietly that he had better go back to his post, and then by degrees he got the principle Officers away from the ball and sent them to their troops. This was done, I think he said, about 11 o'clock.
'He then went to his quarters and found Müffling there, coming from Blucher with the news; he ought to have arrived long before, but said the Duke to me, 'I cannot tell the world that Blucher picked the fattest man in his army to ride with an express to me, and that he took thirty hours to go thirty miles.
'I am in a state of great debility from sickness and pain, being carried about and held up to write this, or I would give more details, but the substance you have.
'There is, however, a very curious story about the Espionage, which I believe no man knows but myself now. My authority (Grant, the Chief of the Espionage) is dead. General Dornberg was the real cause of the Duke's being surprised in his cantonments.' [5]
Four Episodes
There are four episodes related here. Episode one is the time, place and manner in which Wellington first heard of the commencement of hostilities. Episode two is when and how this news was communicated to the rest of the army. Episode three is when and how the Prussians communicated this directly to Wellington. Finally, episode four is the story of Grant's intelligence and Dörnberg's role in communicating it to Wellington's headquarters in Brussels. Each of these episodes will be examined in turn.
Episode One
Firstly, to the question of the time on 15 June 1815 that Wellington first heard of the commencement of hostilities. The Duke himself is on record as having made three different statements on this issue. At 10 p.m. on 15 June, he wrote to the Duke of Feltre indicating he had received the news by 9 a.m. that day. [6] Four days later, he reported to Bathurst, the Secretary of War in London that he had first heard of these events that evening. [7] In his 'Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo', written in answer to Clausewitz's criticisms of his handling of the campaign, he was most insistent that he first heard of these events from the Prince of Orange at 3 p.m. [8]
Which, if any of these different accounts from Wellington, is correct? As the Duke himself is clearly an unreliable witness, one needs to look elsewhere to establish the facts. It is known from the French authorities when their offensive commenced. [9] Logically, Zieten, commander of the Prussian I Corps at Charleroi, would immediately inform his superiors of any French movement. He is on record of having sent messages both to Wellington and Blücher around 5 a.m. on 15 June. [10] The message to Blücher is on record as having arrived in Namur at 8.30 a.m. [11] The message to Brussels, which is a little nearer to Charleroi, would have arrived before 9 a.m., which is consistent with the Duke's letter of that evening to the Duke of Feltre. [12] The Duke of Richmond's ball started late in the evening of 15 June. The first occasion that Wellington heard about the commencement of the French offensive was thus not at the ball, and not from the Prince of Orange. Zieten's letter was addressed to Wellington's headquarters, so one assumes it would have been delivered there, and the name of the despatch rider, 'Kolonnenjäger' Merinsky is also on record. Napier's version of events is thus far from the truth.
Episode Two
Now to episode two, when and how the news was communicated to the rest of the army. The rumour seems to have spread throughout Brussels during the day. Certainly, an officer of Picton's division out walking mentions hearing of it about 5 p.m. [13] Wellington is on record as having issued orders for the concentration of his forces between 6 and 7 p.m., and after orders at 10 p.m. [14] These events are documented by several eyewitnesses. [15] Thus Napier's account of the Duke sending his officers back to their posts one by one by 11 p.m. after just having heard the news cannot be correct.
Episode Three
Episode three, namely exactly how the Prussians delivered the news, has been covered by the examination of episodes one and two. However, this tale told by Napier is so far fetched that it warrants further comment. Anybody with a minimum of knowledge of military history must be aware that a major-general does not usually double up as a despatch rider, carrying urgent messages over long distances through storm and fire. Despatch riders tend to be young officers mounted on fast steeds. That is surely common sense.
Besides, as hostilities commenced at 4 a.m. on 15 June, and if Müffling really did arrive with the news at 11 p.m., then he would have taken nineteen hours to deliver the message. If he had needed thirty hours as Napier claims, then Müffling would have had to have left with the news of the outbreak of hostilities eleven hours before it happened. It is thus incredible that this, of all of Napier's 'beautiful visions', has been most readily accepted by so many without further comment.
Napier's story does however contain elements of the truth. It is a matter of record that Lt. Sir Henry Webster of 9th Light Dragoons brought the news of the French breakthrough to Quatre Bras to the ball, arriving about 11.35 p.m. [16] He had covered the distance from the Dutch headquarters to Brussels at a high speed on an English thoroughbred. Could it be that a delirious Napier is confusing the thinnest man on the fastest horse coming from the Dutch headquarters with the fattest man on the slowest horse coming from the Prussian headquarters? This particular point may well illustrate Napier's mental health at the time he wrote this letter.
Episode Four
Finally, to episode four. Was Dörnberg the real cause of Wellington 'being surprised in his cantonments'? This accusation has made the rounds through many historical works. One example of this can be found in Becke's History, regarded as one of the great classics on the campaign, where this historian states:
'General Dörnberg's presumptuous folly kept the Duke in the dark for much longer then there was the least necessity.' [17]
Examination of Wellington's 'Supplementary Despatches', [18] published some fifty years before Becke's work, will give an impression of how frequently and in how much detail Dörnberg at the Mons listening post provided Wellington with information. From this examination of published, documented fact, it is clear that Becke's accusation is without foundation. To the day and message in question, the documented facts are as follows:
1) The French offensive commenced around 4 a.m. [19] Delays
There were two main delays in the forwarding of this news via this route to Brussels. Firstly, due to atmospheric conditions, the sounds of battle at Thuin did not reach the Prussians outposts to the west. Arnauld thus had to spend part of his time spreading the alarm. He thus arrived at van Merlen's headquarters after some delay.
Secondly, it was Berkeley, and not Dörnberg, that took it on himself to await further news before sending this information off to Brussels. However, as the Duke of Wellington had heard of the French concentration on the frontier several days previously, had already heard on the evening on 14 June from Hardinge that the Prussians considered the outbreak of hostilities imminent and they were taking appropriate measures, had heard from Zieten that morning that hostilities had commenced and had received several other reports of this throughout the day, [26] then it is inconceivable that Dörnberg was in the slightest responsible for any delays in the Duke's actions. Episode four thus does not stand up to an objective examination of documented evidence.
One More Piece of Evidence
Having established that this letter is complete nonsense, and that Napier had a medical condition which could have been the cause of him writing such a letter as well as personal reasons for wanting to embarrass Wellington, there is now one more piece of historical evidence to consider. Napier wrote this letter on 28 November 1842. On 24 September 1842, Wellington published his 'Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo'. [27]
This 'Memorandum' was written as a reply to Clausewitz's critique of the Duke's handling of aspects of the campaign. It contains statements that are not only at variance with established historical record, but also with other statements made by the Duke. Wellington had a tendency to tell tall stories about the campaign. Napier was well known for his caustic humour and sarcastic comments. Could it be the case that Napier was, with tongue in cheek, telling taller stories than Wellington simply to highlight the implausibility of the Duke's own yarns?
Anyway, Napier's 'Waterloo Letter' thus does not contain a single word of sustainable historical fact. No historian should use it except perhaps as part of an examination of how historical myths come about. What makes it all the more surprising that Napier's 'beautiful visions' are repeated today as fact by certain historical writers is that this letter was examined by competent historians such as De Bas and Pflugk-Harttung more or less a century ago and were dismissed as being nonsense. [28]
Common sense causes one to doubt the veracity of parts of this letter. An examination of Napier's background gives reason to question the reliability of his information. An analysis of documented records shows the letter to be nonsense and historical investigations at the turn of the century demonstrated this clearly. Just why is this nonsense being presented as 'historical fact' by 'authorities' even today?
[1] Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, Credibility of Early Roman History, quoted in Chesney, Waterloo Lectures Related Articles
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2) Zieten reported this to Brussels and Namur around 4.45 a.m. [20]
3) Steinmetz, one of Zieten's brigade commanders, sent Major von Arnauld with this news to van Merlen's headquarters in St. Symphorien, arriving there about 8 a.m. [21]
4) Van Merlen forwarded this information to Dörnberg at Mons where it arrived at 9.30 a.m. [22]
5) Dörnberg then passed the report on to Braine-le-Comte where it arrived at noon. [23]
6) Here, Berkeley held on to it until 2 p.m. before forwarding it to Brussels, [24] where it arrived just before 6 p.m.
[25]
Footnotes
(London 1907) p. 2.
[2] p.198 f.
[3] See, for instance, Uffindell, The Eagle's Last Triumph, (London 1995), p 80. This contrasts with De Bas, Prins Frederik der Nederlanden en Zijn Tijd, (Schiedam 1904) Vol. III, Part 2, p. 549 and Pflugk-Harttung, Vorgeschichte der Schlacht bei Belle-Alliance, (Berlin 1903) p. 53, who almost a century ago, rightly disputed the reliability of this testimony.
[4] Life of General Sir William Napier, (London 1864), Vol. II, p 207.
[5] Siborne, Waterloo Letters, (London 1891), p.2.
[6] Gurwood, The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, (London 1838), Vol. XII, p. 473.
[7] Gurwood, op. cit., p. 478.
[8] Wellington, Supplementary Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, Vol. X, p. 524.
[9] Charras, Histoire de la Campagne de 1815, Vol. I, p. 126.
[10] Militärisches, Heft I, Januar 1896 (Leipzig 1896), p. 252.
[11] De Bas & T'Scerclaes de Wommersom, La Campagne de 1815, Vol. I, p 375.
[12] It is interesting to note that Siborne, in the First Edition of his History, published in 1844 followed the line given by the Duke in his 'Memorandum', i.e. 3 p.m. However, after examining further evidence received, he changed this to 9 a.m. in his Third Edition. The correspondence on this subject carried out with the Prussian General Staff together with Siborne's analysis of the subject can be found in the British Museum Add Ms 34,708 ff. 265-282.
[13] United Service Journal, 1841, Part II, p. 172 f.
[14] Gurwood, op. cit., p. 472 ff.
[15] Müffling, op. cit., p 229.
[16] United Service Journal, op. cit., p. 173.
[17] Becke, Capt. A. F. Napoleon and Waterloo, (London 1914),Vol. I, p.123.
[18] Wellington, op. cit. Vol. X contains eleven messages from Dörnberg to Brussels form 9 to 15 June alone. Again, it would seem that Becke chose to ignore documented fact when writing his work.
[19] Charras, op. cit.
[20] 'Militärisches', op. cit.
[21] British Museum, Add. Ms. 34,709, ff. 265-287.
[22] Wellington, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 481.
[23] Journal of Constant Rebeque.
[24] Wellington, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 480.
[25] Müffling, op. cit., p 229.
[26] See Jackson, Notes and Reminiscences of a Staff Officer, (London 1903), p.12; Scovell Papers (Public Records Office, London) WO/37/12.
[27] Wellington, op. cit., p. 513 ff.
[28] De Bas, op. cit.; Pflugk-Harttung, op. cit.
Waterloo: How Napoleon Might Have Won
Was Wellington a Defensive Commander?
How Wellington Got His Name
Waterloo: New Perspectives and the Siborne Manuscripts
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