Letters on: Norway; More on the Frankfurt batallion; More (TV) Sharpe; Napoleonic Publishing; Three Letters on Waterloo; Explanation on Anglo-Russian Invasion maps; a correct place name at Auerstadt; and a reply to Gibbs' letter about Hofschroer's review of Nosworthy's book.

Norway Calling...

Dear David Watkins,

What a pleasant surprise it was to receive my first issue of "First Empire". Please keep up with your good work. Here in Norway we don't have any military historical magazines, so your magazine will fill a gap for me. When my English improves I would like to write some articles in FE if you don't mind, perhaps an article about the Norwegian skisoldiers who were unique to Norway? (Ed. Feel free and don't worry about your English, we will try to put it right for you, and your written English is greatly superior to my spoken Norwegian!). One of these companies is reenacted here in Norway. I and some friends are working on plans too recreate another of these "skicompanies" from the period 1800-1810.

Other units recreated here in Norway from the Napoleonic era are two units of infantry, one unit of grenadiers, one unit of artillery and a coastal unit with a canonboat with 24 oars and a 24 pounds cannon in the rear. These also operate 3 optical telegraph stations, which they sends messages with.

If you, or anyone else would like to know more about Norway and our activity here, please write to me at the address below.

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More Frankfurters

Dear David,

The following may be of some assistance to the reader searching for information on the Frankfurt Battalion at Talavera.

Organisation: the battalion was organised entirely along French lines with four fusilier companies and one company each of grenadiers and voltigeurs. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel von Welsch, the battalion numbered 853 men in August 1808 when it was assembled in Frankfurt. After the exertions of several months in Spain, however, the battalion could only muster 13 officers and 373 men when it departed Madrid in January.

With the arrival of some 100 replacements under Major Vogt in May, its strength at Talavera was approximately 500. Von Welsch was wounded in the battle (the division lost about 1,000 out of 4,000) and replaced by Major Fritsch.

Uniform: this is a complex matter as the battalion marched off to Spain in white with red distinctions (the voltigeurs apparently in green), but changed to blue coats and "Spanish brown" trousers in March/April 1809 after the Battle of Medellin (left to clean up the battlefield, the Frankfurt troops made good use of Spanish overcoats for their loose trousers; they requisitioned the blue cloth for their new tunics). Somewhere between Mainz and the Pyrenees, the battalion also switched from bicornes to French-style shakos. For further uniform details, please refer to the sources listed below.

Some sources:

The most detailed source is G. Bernays, Schicksale des Grossherzogtums Frankfurt und seiner Truppen, Berlin, 1882; well supplemented by C. Sauzey, Le Regiment de Francfort (vol. I of Les Allemands sous les Aigles Françaises), Paris, 1987-88. Volume II of Sauzey's work (Baden) provides strength figures for all the "German Division" units at Talavera. Also very good is A. Umhey, 'Das Infanterie-Bataillon des Grossherzogtums Frankfurt 1808-1813', in Das Bote aus dem Wehrgeschichtlichen Museum, Heft 17, Jahrgang 9, 1985.

Not to forget several excellent articles from the Zeitschrift für Heereskunde with a wealth of arcane uniform details:

M. Bethke, 'Frankfurter Soldaten....ein verlorener Haufen', Nr. 284/285, XLIII, 1979.

P. Wacker, 'Grossherzoglich Frankfurtische, fürstlich Primatische Soldaten 1806-1813', Nr. 304, XLVI, 1982.

F. Herrmann, 'Eine Bildersammlung aus dem Kriege in Spanien 1808-1813', 1989-1991.

More Frankfurter Info:

More on the Frankfurters in issue 29
Frankfurt Politic in issue 30
Frankfurt Grenadiers 1806
Frankfurt Infantry 1807-1813

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Model Waterloo

Dear Mr Watkins,

This is an urgent plea for help! I would be very grateful if you, your colleagues or your readers can help me.

I am trying to model in small scale the buildings at Waterloo and I would like my effort to be as accurate as possible. Is there a source of detailed information about them (scale drawings, photographs, reconstructions from contemporary accounts, etc)? The accounts of the battle I have read simply don't supply this sort of detail!

Unfortunately, I am unable to visit the site itself but would quite naturally pay for any information.

Waterloo Discussed

Dear Sir,

Stephen Brennan evidently thinks his observations on Waterloo "extremely naive", but such basic questions do more to stimulate interest and initiate debate in our field than any number of letters on Hamilton-William's erroneous box-numbers!

Stephen's main query is why the Allies did not enjoy a superiority of numbers at significant times and areas, given that the mass of the French infantry had been squandered at Hougoumont and in D'Erlon's attack. His overall impression is that the allied forces nonetheless remained seemingly greatly outnumbered and under extreme pressure for the rest of the day.

I suggest that there are several principle reasons for this apparent conundrum; though these cannot be dealt with in detail in the space of a short letter like this.

1. Accounts of the battle inevitably focus on those units that were most closely engaged. This makes for engrossing reading, but not necessarily a balanced understanding of typical experiences. If Stephen looks at the orders of battle in Bowden: "Armies at Waterloo", he will see from the casualty lists that some large allied formations must have been lightly engaged for much of the day; for example Chasse's Division, Halkett's Hanoverians and Mitchell's British Brigade.
2. Though the French reserves of formed infantry were quickly depleted, preventing them from achieving a decisive breakthrough, they retained plenty of the right resources; cavalry, skirmishers and artillery to pin and steadily wear down the allied front.
3. Holding the initiative as they did, the French could "pick their spot" and achieve local superiority of numbers, at least initially. The attack of La Garde was an exception, its timing and direction betrayed by a defector.
4. The Mont St Jean Ridge is indisputably a strong position by the standards of the Low Countries, but anyone who has seen it will confirm that units on the gently declining allied side of the crest would have been only incompletely shielded from plunging French artillery fire.
5. The Cumberland Hussars may have provided the most spectacular mass desertion that day; but other allied cavalry may have been almost as unenthusiastic to the cause. Uxbridge himself was evidently left in the lurch by Trip's Belgian "heavies" who turned tail leaving him almost in the French ranks; though in fairness they may already have suffered 20% casualties.

To answer Stephen's last question,he will find in Bowden's "Armies at Waterloo" that most Allied cavalry regiments were of 3 squadrons, the exceptions being the KGL lights and the 4th and 6th Dutch-Belgian lights at 4 squadrons and the Life Guards and Blues at 2 each.

Moore on Waterloo roadworks....

Dear Dave,

May I answer in part a letter in Dispatches last. To answer it all would take the entire magazine, but there are plenty of books around to read on the subject, as I'm sure most readers will have already advised (Wellington at Waterloo by Jac Weller would be my recommendation).

The 'ravine' Mr Burley queries is the one that did exist (usually referred to as the 'sunken road') but was greatly enlarged in literature by Victor Hugo to explain the French cavalry disaster at Waterloo, and in the ensuing painting showing cuirassiers plunging down a sheer thirty foot drop. I did as some readers know, do a fair bit of exploring around Waterloo, and I'd like to offer the following as a help.

The ground to the 'front' (facing the French) of the road to the immediate Allied right of the crosroads was removed and used to build the Lion Mound. It is now 2 metres lower than at the time of the battle. The ground on the opposite side of the road one hundred metres west of the crossroads is today only slightlylower than at the time of the battle, and is said to be the original height on both sides at that point, and around the crossroads. It would have been an obstacle to cavalry, but not a complete block (ask a present-day "Gen Ponsonby", Alan Larson of the superb 12th LD group, for a better opinion).

A second so-called 'ravine' exists further west. I once went there to ascertain if it was the position the 'hundred or so' cuirassiers shot down by British infantry got stuck in. It lies behind and north-west of Cotton's museum. There is a Waterloo Study Group, and details can be obtained through me or from Mr J S White, Secretary of the Friends of the Waterloo Committee.

May I add a little personal experience as a re-enactor? During the 1985 reenactment of the battle, I was told by a friend in the Grande Armée afterwards that the French cavalry approached the redcoat squares with the assurance that the squares had neither a) loaded or b) fixed bayonets. Only when within close proximity did the horsemen see bayonets fixed, and some sheered off (they were also fired on at this point). The French cavalry didn't approach the square of the 95th Rifles I had command of, as they had been assured that the rifles would be loaded, but they could also see swords fixed. The cavalry had both the time and the space to permit evasive action of us, something Mr Hugo said they hadn't got at Waterloo, so plunged into the 'ravine' instead.

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More Waterloo

Dear Dave,

With reference to C. Burley's letter in issue 27 of First Empire magazine.

The 17,000 troops stationed at Hal were there for the purpose of stopping any French thrust in this area which might possibly cut the allied forces off from Brussels and the coast, crucial for their line of supply.

It seems that even when battle was joined and despite seeing the vast numbers of the Armée du Nord (which Napoleon had placed in view of the Allied line for full psychological effect), Wellington did not consider recalling those soldiers at Hal to reinforce Mont ST. Jean. Perhaps he simply could not believe that Napoleon, famous for his quick outflanking stratagies, would settle for such a simple (and costly) frontal assault, for he did not know of Napoleon's contempt for the average British soldier...

Had the battle been lost, perhaps by Reille's forces successfully capturing Hougoumont and rolling up the Allied flank, Wellington could have possibly continued his defense of Brussel itself using those untouched troops from Hal. Some people have blamed Marshal Soult for his apparent inactivity while Ney led the cavalry to destruction against the stubborn Allied squares. As Chief of Staff he was ill-suited and certainly was no Berthier, yet under the circumstances what could he do?

Reille and Lobau were in action at either end of the field and although d'Erlon's corps had recently been rallied, it would take time to reform these shattered battalions before anothe rassault could be made. This left only Kellerman's cavalry and the Guard units. As usual Napoleon kept his elite in reserve for the final breakthrough and they would advance only on their Emperor's command. Thus it was the Guard that "twiddled its thums" during this time (wasn't it always the case?!) since Napoleon to send Kellerman in to aid Milhaud's struggling cavalry. The result was simply tragis. His army was soon left without a suitable cavalry reserve which could have covered the survivors during their retreat once the battle had been well and truly lost.

I'd also like to add support to the arguments made by Peter Gibbs regarding some of Peter Hofschröer's "reviews", of which his one in issue 27 was a perfect case in point.

He seems to spend a great deal of time slating 'English authors' such as in the said review, that he did not really give very much valuable information about the book itself at all!

Judging by his comments about the Prussian Army, perhaps he feels that Napoleon could have been defeated by Blücher alone without the co-operation of Wellington when the real truth is, of course, that neither commander could have succeeded without the other Napoleon would not have simply crushed both in turn as he had originally intended.

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Napoleonic Publishing...

Dear Dave,

Thank you for publishing my letter in First Empire 26 on Napoleonic fiction. I would like to use the letters page to raise another issue, particularly with regard to the publishing of new Napoleonic books.

I might describe myself as an ardent, even fanatical collector of Napoleonic literature; spending hours scaning the catalogues of military booksellers. Publishing like most other aspects of our modern lives tends to have to have trends and fashions. The most recent fashion, and I am very grateful to all publishers concerned is the reprinting of these rare titles. However, what will become of the Napoleonic publishing world when the supply of quality reprints dries up?

Like many inhabitants of this island nation my command of a foreign language is somewhat limited and anyway "they all speak English over there." Which does make life very frustrating when looking through lists of French, German, Spanish and Italian volumes which seem to offer a plethora of memoirs, campaign studies, battle studies and uniform guides. Surely there must be an unlimited market for such sources of material which is translated into English? My collection of books does contain some colourful uniform guides in French and Spanish but it is those serious memoirs and academic works that I am after. Arms and Armour press have recently taken a step forward and led the way by producing a translation of the Georges Blond study of 'La Grande Armée'. Is anyone else willing to follow? Maybe this will provoke some response?

Reply: Translations Available
On New Books

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Vive La Sharpe!

Dear Dave,

It seems that about once a year I actually contribute something to this section, but being as enough has built up, I thought I'd give it another go. My first topic is actually this column. There seems to be a certain attitude that people having a go at each other is terribly bad form. Pooh! I really enjoyed the slanging match between the distinguished - and apparently some not so distinguished - writers over Waterloo books and morality in general. It mad excellent reading. Indeed, as long as it doesn't leave the Venerable Rag open to legal action, I would beg for more.

In fact, my second topic may unleash just such a can of worms. Hold on to your shakos. I'm going to say that rudest of words - Sharpe! There, I did it. Just what the hell is going on, and I mean with the attitude of the majority of the re-enactors, or so it would seem. Mention Sharpe, and they either look down their noses at you or laugh condescendingly. Okay, it's not the most accurate historical work out, but that doesn't seem to stop H-W.

The point being, it's entertainment; and we aren't exactly awash with Napoleonic sitcoms, are we? It seems that the NA has an unwritten desire to distance itself from Sharpe and that 're-enacting outcast', Richard Moore. I feel that a pause should go in here, because I have of course mentioned the other NA dirty word. Well, it may come as news akin to Bourmont defecting in 1815 to discover that I have been in conversation with the dreaded rifleman, but such is life. What I really want to know is why we don't have 5,000 members or more, like certain other associations I might mention.

Sure, Napoleonics is more expensive, but with the arrival of the 200 pounds Charlesville and intelligent use of campaign clothing - is there any taboo subject that he won't desecrate - you can get in the field for under 500 pounds. That's less than 20 trips to the pub.

Anyway, back to the point. Sharpe gets about 10 million viewers a time. 10 MILLION. And what have we done about it? Nothing that I know of, and I'm on the committee. We should have ourselves accredited whenever anything to do with the series comes out. That's my opinion. And not because I necessarily like it. I thought that the latest one about the Loup Brigade was complete rot, and the accompanying book appeared to be an afterthought, written more in the style of Sean Bean's TV Sharpe rather than the character in the previous books. But I still watched it. How many of you serious re-enactors secretly watched it? You ALL did. And you'll catch the repeats. Why? Because beggars can't be choosers. I have no idea who it was coined the phrase ' no publicity is bad publicity', but they were damned right. We are shooting ourselves in the foot over this. So come on, those of you who vilify Sharpe and Rifleman Moore. Argue with me.

In answer to John Salmon's article, 'Was Wellington a Defensive Commander,' I must say by and large, yes. I think he was a bit of a counter-puncher; but then again, with some of the troops he had to command, would you have dared to attack?

In reply to Phil Lawrence (Dispatches 27), I think he is referring to my Fighting Marshals piece on Old Baldy. Davout may well have been 'plain lucky' to win at Auerstadt. Regrettably, that just makes him greater still. Wasn't it the Fat One who said that the characteristic he most valued in his generals was luck? If any body knows of a better characteristic than 'lucky', I'd like to know it.

Finally, why is Allen E Curtis living in my name.

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Anglo - Russian Invasion Maps...

Dear David,

Reading Richard Stubbs comments on my maps of the series on the Invasion of Holland 1799 (First Empire #26), I realised I made a big mistake with these maps. But firstly, I have to apologise for the quality of the maps. I am no map-maker, and there is on the moment no one who could draw them for me. But the mistake that I made was to assume that everyone is familiar with the Dutch landscape. That's why, although the maps are clear enough for me, for many others they are difficult to understand. To remedy this, I will describe the landscape in the part of Holland the 1799 campaign took place, and assisted by this, clarify the maps.

The following types of terrain could (and still can) be found in this part of Holland in 1799:

1. Beaches ("strand")
2. Dunes ("duinen")
3. Marshes ("moeras")
4. Polders ("polders")
5. Villages ("dorpen")
6. Cities ("steden")

1: The beaches are sandy. No rocks or stones can by found on Dutch beaches. The wideness of these beaches differ, not only with the tide. On the part of the coast the British invasion took place, wideness of the beach was not more then a hundred metres. But especially on the part between Calandsoog and Petten, the beach was much wider, at places even more then one kilometre.

2: The Dutch dunes are best to compare with the Sahara desert: hills consisting of loose sand. In some places there is some vegetation (especially inland), consisting of beach-grass and thorny bushes. Hight of the dunes was normally 15-25 metres, but on places were the dune were more extended, for example west of Schoorl and Bergen, the hight of the dunes could be over one hundred metres. Because the wind usually comes from the west, the eastern slopes are normally steep, and the western slopes more flat.

Movement through the dunes was difficult and very slow, and for the artillery nearly impossible. Keeping the right direction was difficult, especially if the dunes were very extended. Also an advancing enemy had to take special care for his flanks, because the sight was limited and they could be attacked in the flank or rear very easily.

3: The only great marsh in this campaign was the Koegras, already described in part 1. Apart of this marsh some parts of the polders were also marshy, especially near the shores of the lakes.

4: The polders are typical of the landscape in most parts of the Netherlands. In earlier times, these were parts of the land that were covered by the sea at high tide, or even constantly. The first polders were made dry behind the dunes along the North Sea coast, and gradually extended to the east by making dry new parts. How did a polder arise? Firstly, a dike was thrown up, around the terrain that would be the polder. The ground from these dikes came from both sides of the dike. In this way on both sides of the dike a canal was created On these dikes windmills were erected.

These mills pumped the water out of the canal inside the polder, in to the canal at the outside. In this way the polder was made dry. Now the whole polder was provided with parallel ditches, to lower the water-level even more. Everywhere in the polders windmills were placed to pump the water out of the polders.

In this way very fertile clay-ground was ready to be used for agriculture. The crops that grew in these polders were mainly potatoes, corn (growing to about 2 metres high) and grass. In the vicinity of villages and cities there were more differing crops.

Movement through the polders was very difficult. Especially in bad weather the clay would hamper all movement, and the situation would deteriorate rapidly if the same part was used by many men. After some time the trampling of all these feet would create a complete marsh, that would suck the shoes of the feet of the soldiers. The fact that the polders were intersected by many ditches would hamper movement even more. But normally these ditches would be fordable at most places.

This could not be said from the canals on both sides of the dikes. These were 5-20 metres wide, and not fordable. Movement of cavalry, and especially artillery, was restricted to the roads. Nearly all roads were on the top of the dikes, and if an army wanted to advance, the only way was these roads. Because there was a canal on both sides of the dike it was impossible to deploy if contact with the enemy was made. Further, the defender could make an attack or advance even more difficult by making cuts in the dikes, destroying the windmills and inundate the polders. Even if the water level in the polders would be only inches high, crossing the polders would become impossible because the clay would became soggy, and the ditches invisible and unfordable.

5: The villages in these part of the Netherlands were in the polders not older then a few hundred years at the most, because it wasn't earlier that the polders were made dry. The villages consisted of ribbon-development: Houses along a road and some small and short side-roads. These houses were mainly made of bricks and wood. The gardens had normally no walls, but a hedge, fence or ditch as a boundary.

The villages behind the dunes, were on higher ground and much older. There were more roads, and more and bigger gardens and orchards. Examples of such villages are the Egmond villages, Bergen and Schoorl.

6: The cities in North-Holland were in decline at this time. The cities Medemblik, Hoorn, Alkmaar, Purmerend, Edam, Monnikendam, Haarlem and Amsterdam were more or less fortified, but these fortifications were neglected and in a bad state. Because of this it was impossible, but also tactical not very useful for the Franco-Batavians to try to hold Alkmaar. The cities -or big villages- Den Helder and Beverwijk had only minor or no fortifications at all.

Remarks on the maps:

All existing roads are represented on the maps. Normally the roads in the polders (nearly all the flat landscape) are on dikes, with canals on both sides. The canals and ditches that are represented on the maps are unfordable. All the flat terrains are intersected by ditches and smaller canals. These are nearly all fordable at all places. The seadikes, the dikes along the North Sea coast and the Zuiderzee coast, are much higher and wider then the other dikes. For wargaming purposes, one could for movement purposes treat the polders as marsh. On table this would cause the wargamers to make all major movements by the roads, just as it was the case in 1799.

I hope that with the above it will be possible for Richard and other wargamers to reconstruct the terrain, and again would like to apologise for the trouble that I caused them.

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A Correct Place Name

Dear Dave,

Thanks for printing my last letter about Auerstadt. I'm afraid I made a "typo" in that the village is called HASSENHAUSEN and not Hausen. My tin hat is already donned and I'm disconnecting from the internet for the next few months in anticipation of the many abusive corrections.

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The Gibbs Letter

Dear Sirs,

With reference to Peter Gibbs' most interesting critique of my review of Nosworthy's latest, perhaps the following comments may be of interest to your readers.

Peter complains about my criticisms of what he calls "Anglo" authors. The term I used was actually "Anglo-Saxon". That is not quite the same.

He correctly states that "Prussia played a very small part in the Wars against Napoleon", but then suggests I claim otherwise. May I suggest he read the review again where I criticise Nosworthy for not refering to sufficient source material to deal properly with the "Russians, Austrians and Prussians". The Prussians are correctly placed in third position behind the Russians and Austrians. Peter's complaint is thus unfounded.

I would disgree with Peter's comment that: "I also find that most 'Anglo' (he means 'Anglo-Saxon') writers come to the same conclusions for Prussia's defeat in 1806 as Peter'. Who does he mean? Petre does not, Jeffreys does not, etc. Who does? The only author that comes to mind is Maude. His book as been out of print for about 90 years, so I doubt if many of your readers are aware of it. Perhaps Peter would like to explain his comment in a little more detail, giving examples?

I would happily take up Peter's challenge to "write a series of articles for 'First Empire' on Prussian and German tactics". However, I have done so already. May I refer Peter to my books in the Osprey Men-at-Arms and Campaign series, to my articles in 'The Courier' and 'Empires, Eagles & Lions' written over the last twenty years. Perhaps the editor of 'First Empire' would like to obtain permission to reprint these for the benefit of Mr Gibbs?

Finally, I did note that Nosworthy mentioned Hofschroer in his bibliography. However, he appears to disagree with my views and the information given. Unfortunately, he does not say why.

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