by Ian Barstow
Perhaps of all Napoleon's marshals, Davout is the most fascinating yet enigmatic. Practically the least popular, not only amongst his colleagues but also his subordinates, he was arguably the most capable independent commander available to Napoleon, making it all the more baffling as to why this capacity was never fully utilised. Davout was born on May 10th, 1770 at Yonne. Unlike many of his peers in the marshalate, Davout was born into nobility, with a strong military inheritance. The proper family name was originally d'Avot, changing no doubt at some point during the revolution. He was guided into the soldierly vocation and at fifteen entered the Royal Military School in Paris, having already benefited at the hands of teachers at its equivalent in Auxerre. The year was 1785. He graduated in 1788, commissioned into the Royal Champagne Cavalry Regiment. It is here that his strong republican sentiments became clear for the first time. Davout had a keen political sense, and he believed passionately in the new principles which were imbibing France. These views would set him on a collision course with the then authorities, culminating in his arrest on August 18th, 1790 for leading an unauthorised delegation to the capital without orders. He spent six weeks in Arras prison and was proscribed to resign. On his release, Davout returned to his home having successfully invalidated his resignation. Sadly the year he spent in semi-exile was an unhappy, and his choice in women proved as inappropriate as his politics. He married Marie-Nicolle Adelaide, who turned out to be a complete slattern. Things soon improved however, and in 1791 Davout was elected by the Volunteers of the Yonne to command their third battalion. Following training, they were posted in 1792 to the Army of the North. He quickly became known for fire and aggression, both militarily and politically, fighting at Neerwinden on March 18th, 1793. He sprang to public notice within a month, attempting to arrest the defecting Dumouriez who had gone over to the allies. In July he was promoted to General de Brigade, posted to the Vendee. Circumstances turned again in August, when it was decreed that all aristocrats were to be evicted from the army and required to reside outside a set distance from Paris. It was a sad irony, as Davout was a staunch supporter of the very people who had ordered his removal, yet he sadly complied. Home again, he went through further indignity as his mother was arrested, but after Davout tampered with potentially incrirninating evidence she was released. He was then able to wait out the worst excesses of the revolution, being re-appointed to brigade command on September 21st, 1794. Using what influence he could muster, Davout arranged a cavalry posting in the Army of the Moselle. It may surprise many readers who envisage Davout as dull and sombre to discover that he soon built up a reputation as a dashing horseman, although admittedly he was only dealing with the Austrians. Following this, Davout met and became friends with Desaix. He was taken prisoner by the Austrians following their siege of Mannheim, although he was quickly paroled by Wurmser. Once more he returned home, taking the opportunity of an enforced parole to improve his military studies. He was eventually exchanged in October 1796, and posted to the Rhine. There he served under Moreau and Desaix, performing well until the Armistice of Loeben. There was a small amount of confusion over Davout's apparent ommission from a letter of congratulations and he then incurred the wrath of Augereau when that gentleman took command. It appears that the blatant Davout was shooting his mouth off at a local inn. He was subsequently posted from his unit as a disciplinary measure. This was short-lived. Desaix, hearing of his friend's misfortune, and in the favour of Bonaparte, arranged for Davout to join the Army of England in January 1798. Then in March he met the Short One himself. It would seem that the future emperor was impressed by Desaix's recommendations, as Davout found himself posted to the Egyptian expedition. Like all the others, Davout's experiences amongst the Pyramids was not wholly pleasant. He spent most of his time hiding inside squares, his cavalry vastly outnumbered and ill-equiped. He contracted dysentery in Cairo, and his subsequent ruthless seizure of any horseflesh available earned him few admirers, save his understanding commander. He then rejoined Desaix's expedition into Upper Egypt in pursuit of Murad Bey. He then served with distinction at Aboukir, being mentioned in despatches by Menou. Shortly after, the chosen few were selected to escape back to civilisation, Davout was not amongst them. He soon clashed with the new commander, Kleber, opposing him over the Convention of El Arish. Given permission to leave on March 3rd 1800, Davout finally returned home in May. Accompanying Desaix, he returned to Paris. Sadly, it would be their final parting. The gifted general, and undoubtedly Davout's closest friend, was killed at Marengo. Davout then spent another short interim at home before being made up to General de Division on July 3rd 1800. A month later he was leading the Army of Italy's light cavalry. He clashed viciously with Brune in December, denouncing that unworthy (see my previous article if you don't believe me) to Bonaparte. As a result the two future marshals became sombre enemies. Following the Peace of Luneville in 1801 Davout returned to France as inspector general of cavalry and was appointed commander of the grenadiers of the Consular Guard. He was in some favour, as a second marriage to Aimee Leclerc gave him a distant relationship to Bonaparte. Encouraged by Josephine, the marriage ironically was a very satisfactory affair. It is during this period tbat Davout laid the foundations of what would become the most effficient corps in Napoleon's Grande Armee. In 1803 he gathered together at Bruges Oudinot, Friant, and Durutte. With them he plunged wholeheartedly into his corps. No detail was too minor. He was efficiency incarnate, forcing a savage training pace which he a&ered to himself. Then, on May 19th 1804 he was listed thirteenth on the roll of marshals, aged only 34. He was thus the youngest appointee. Amongst his enemies he numbered Augereau, Bernadotte, and Brune, and many others were left uncomfortable at his extreme professionalism and intolerance of the inept. As ever he wasn't backwards about coming forwards. Marshal Davout was officially given command of his beloved III Corps on September 23rd 1805. It was already the best in tbe army. They were so efficient in the 1805 campaigns that on more than one occasion they outran their supplies. Luckily Davout was also a master of living off the land, and he ensured that his men did not starve, no matter who else might. He was masterful during this time, marching in legendary style to be on the decisive field of Austerlitz. His performance at Auerstadt a year later when he single-handedly beat the Prussians was even better, and his arrival on the field of Eylau saved the day in 1807. During these campaigns it is hard to find anything to criticise Davout for, yet he surpassed himself on the Danube in 1809. Serving at Abensberg-Eckmuhl and then the cauldron of Wagram, he was subsequently created Prince of Eckmuhl to ride alongside the title conferred upon him after Auerstadt. Nevertheless, the Emperor was actually critical of Davout's performance on the second day of Wagram, alleging tardiness in his assault upon Markgrafneusiedl, yet it was he and not the Archduke Charles who emerged victorious from the fray. Napoleon had also discovered something else about Davout during the glory years. He was also a top-notch administrator. During the beginnings of the Spanish Ulcer, it was Davout who was left in Germany to keep things running smoothly. In retrospect, it might have been interesting if Wellington had ever come up against him. The Iron Duke against the Iron Marshal? He made his headquarters in Hamburg, where his strict nature did not endear him to the locals, nor to the former governor Bourienne, whom he denounced for smuggling with the British. In 1811, Napoleon, concerned at deteriorating relations with Russia, advised Davout to prepare an advanced guard along the Vistula (hurrah!) comprising of 180,000 men. Some advanced guard. When the Grande Armee finally arrived this force was redesignated I Corps and pruned to a 'more manageable' 72,000! As ever, Davout's troops were imrnaeulately prepared and equipped. If Ney had been dead he would have been rolling in his grave. Unfortunately, Davout had something of a blow out with Berthier and that malicious gentleman took no time in telling tales to his sovereign. For the first time Davout's position was being undermined by someone with real clout. Davout was soon thrown off balance. After Jerome threw a wobbly on July 14th, Davout took over the pursuit of Bagration, but the damage had already been done, and the Russian escaped, despite taking a beating at Mohilev. He was back with his corps at Smolensk, but Gudin's untimely death on August l9th further upset him. He then clashed with Murat who had been mishandling the cavalry screen badly. Davout told him as much and anybody else who might be in earshot, and they had to be held apart. That he had fallen so far from favour was not only sad, but disastrous for France. It was Davout who suggested turning Kutusov's southern flank at Borodino. Perhaps if the emperor had not had his mind poisoned by the likes of Berthier he would have listened. It is another of history's imponderables. The emperor is quoted as follows: "You are always for turning the enemy. It is too dangerous a manoeuvre." That alone suggests that Napoleon was already over the hill. The following day Davout remained in the saddle despite being wounded in thigh and belly. He quickly recovered in Moscow, and shortly after the retreat began was appointed commander of the rearguard. Regrettably, Davout too was showing signs of strain, and he was well below par, being cut off on November 3rd and having to be bailed out by Eugene. He was then replaced by Ney's III Corps. By Smolensk, I Corps was under 10,000 men but after Krasnoe Davout was accused of abandoning Ney. He was rapidly made the scapegoat despite Ney's reappearance. At the Berezina Davout commanded only 4,000 troops. After Napoleon decided to head for Paris and foolishly conferred command on the weak-minded Murat, who promptly had another skirmish with Davout before deserting his post, leaving Prince Eugene in command. The 1813 campaign proved to be a non-starter for Davout, and Napoleon undoubtedly suffered accordingly. Occupying Hamburg, he was relieved of I Corps and ordered to create XIII Corps from scratch. The autumn offensive saw Davout ordered to support Oudinot's advance against Berlin, but despite local successes with his corps of Marie-Louises, Davout watched Oudinot's main thrust blunted at Gross Beeren. Davout had little option but to retire on Hamburg and prepare its defences. He carried out the defence magnificently, if brutally, running through into 1814. He beat off several full assaults, and gruffly refused to believe Bennigsen when he reported Napoleon's abdication: "The emperor, of whose downfall I am unaware, is not in the habit of communicating with his general through the enemy." Splendid stuff. He finally surrendered to Gerard on May 11th, who had arrived as a representative of the new Bourbon government. Returning to Paris, Davout was royally told to go to Savigny-sur-Orge and await orders, where he duly stayed until March 1815. On March 20th 1815 he greeted the Emperor at the Tuileries in company with Lefebvre. The only two marshals to do so. Reluctantly he found himself Minister of War. The reasoning behind this has been argued a thousand times. Napoleon needed a good administrator in Paris. I disagree. What he needed most was a crushing victory. Unlike most of his peers, Davout had lost nothing, and his command of either wing during the campaign might well have seen an extension of the Napoleonic period. Nevertheless, he went at his new job with the usual icy efficiency which was his trademark. After Waterloo, Davout encouraged continued resistance, proving again that he was the best fighting marshal of the lot. Napoleon's own vacillation unnerved him., and the following day he changed his stance. He then prepared to defend Paris, of which he was still governor. He comfortably repulsed punitive Prussian probes against his defences. His continued aggression was solely aimed at getting the French a better deal with the allies. He knew that they were defeated. His aims were not wholly understood by his subordinates, who were sometimes critical of his diplomatic manoeuvrings. He resigned his ministry taking command of the Army of the Loire, but he was ordered to surrender on July 14th by the new minister, St Cyr. He ruefully agreed believing that his men would not be abused, yet on July 24th, 19 officers were put ontrial for treason, and another 38 listed for arrest. Davout was infuriated, having received guarantees to the reverse. He resigned, offering himself in place of four convicted colleagues. In December he appeared for the defence in Ney's trial and on December 27th he was exiled to Louviers and stripped of all his titles. MacDonald helped intervene on his behalf, but it was the autumn of 1817 before Louis XVIII reinstated Davout on the army list with full pay backdated a full year. Subsequently his title of marshal was also returned. In turn, Davout gave his allegiance to the Bourbons, sure now that Napoleon would never return. Nevertheless, it was with the old Bonapartist that he spent much of his time. By the turn of the decade, Davout's health was deteriorating, not helped by the untimely death of his eldest daughter in 1821. On June 1st, 1823, he died of consumption. He was 53 years old. What can be said about Davout. He had few friends, and those that he had, like Desaix and Bessieres died on the field. He was a strong, self-disciplined man, who believed that virtue in a man was of prime importance. This was bound to be unpopular with a large number of the scoundrels on the marshalate. He made enemies remarkably easily, either by his quick and open tongue, his stern actions, or just by getting what he undoubtedly deserved. Marmont, for instance, never forgave the fact that Davout received his baton first. Others amongst his enemies numbered Bernadotte and of course Murat and Berthier. His obvious ability was begrudged by many, and of course those less capable were frankly informed as much. He was never much for society, where his viciously receding hairline and rimmed spectacles made him appear the eldest marshal, not the youngest. He was at home in the saddle with his men. If one is required to be critical of Davout, then perhaps the ease with which he denounced his colleagues can be mentioned. He was endowed with integrity and expected the same of others; when they failed he was merciless. He was also completely ruthless, although in a soldier I find that a rather warming characteristic. It goes with trust in Davout's case. Indeed, it made him completdy reliable. Conversely, Davout's second marriage was a happy one and his wife showed supreme loyalty to him after his fall from grace in 1815, campaigning vigorously on his behalf, with some success. Davout's greatest love was probably his men. His fastidious dedication to efficiency always made his formation the best in the army. Unless authorised, he would not tolerate pillaging and such was his authority that such rules were obeyed. As said before, Davout was probably the greatest fighting marshal of them all, and certainly the one with the longest shelf life. Agreed, his performance in the retreat from Moscow was poor by his standards, yet one would always prefer ability going forward, I think. It is a shame that he never fought the British, nor served in the Peninsula, for it is unlikely that we should have had such an easy ride if he did. Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire 26 This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. |